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Preface 
I have seen several analogies describing the feelings that one can have after the thesis is 
completed. These analogies include reaching the peak of a mountain or completing a 
difficult journey. They have in common that the author sees the final goal as a justification 
for the endurance experienced in the process of producing a thesis. I do not feel it in the 
same way. 
 
I have learned a lot from observing people and asking them about their behaviours, 
thoughts and motivations. I feel fortunate that I had the chance to do so, as not all jobs 
would allow me to get involved with the behaviours of others. I believe that I have an 
inquisitive mind (one may enquire with my parents about the graveyards of electric 
appliances, that I needed to ‘understand’). The research was thus, in part, driven by my 
personal curiosity. And I believe that this is one of the best motivations one can have for 
study leading to a dissertation. 
 
Although one can argue that writing a dissertation thesis is a solitary activity, it is not. It 
involves constant interaction with the many people involved to make sure that there is 
sufficient progress. Therefore, I am indebted to the many people who played an important 
role in the creation of the book that you have in front of you. 
 
First and foremost, I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisors, Jeltje van der 
Meer-Kooistra and Bob Scapens. I am not sure if they realised that they were the ideal 
supervising couple for me. They gave me plenty of room to pursue my own ideas. 
However, they also confronted me regularly with inconsistencies in my argumentation. 
They also taught me to value a precise way of expressing myself, as well as to value 
variety in points-of-view. As such they stimulated my strong points, while constantly 
pointing out areas of improvement.  
 
I also want to thank the members of the manuscript committee: John Burns, Arndt Sorge 
and Ed Vosselman. I believe that these three gentlemen were more than qualified to 
evaluate my work, and I am grateful that they found the time to do so. 
 
I also received much guidance of a different nature. I would like to extend my gratitude to 
Ad Geerts, Arnold de Jong and Ditmer Lootsma of Rabobank Groningen and Bert 
Mertens of Rabobank Nederland for helping me find my way in the Rabobank 
organisation. Ad Geerts and Arnold de Jong played a special role in this study. They 
always allowed me to question the choices they made and the ways they foresaw the 
changes at the Groningen bank. To me, the way they generously opened up their 
organisation and their minds for this study represents the best the cooperative has to offer. 
I am also grateful to all other people at the Groningen bank to allow me to be part of their 
professional world for so long. 
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I also want to thank the management team of the West-Drenthe bank. Joop Zuidema, 
Marnix Eggens, Rinke Bok, Elly Hendriks en Mindert Veenstra and all other members of 
the MT+ group were very kind to let me be an observer of most of their activities 
surrounding ROM. I am very grateful for their openness and kindness, as well as for the 
very nice lunches in the Börke.  
 
A special thanks is definitely in order for Lieuwe Krol. I am still very impressed by the 
openness with which he discussed the various choices he made, and the way he dealt with 
the various responses from the various client organisations he advised. I fondly think back 
to our discussions. I was fortunate to be able to work with Lieuwe. 
 
Rob Blom and the team of consultants also need to be mentioned here. Especially in the 
early stages of the study, they gracefully agreed to provide guidance in the types of banks 
that I could approach for interviews.  
 
Of course the study would not be possible without the support of the additional twelve 
member banks, where I conducted a number of interviews. I thank them for that, but I also 
thank them for the warm reception that I experienced every time. The discussions were 
enriching, and they allowed me to understand human behaviours better; I am grateful that 
I had the opportunity to pick the brains of so many people at those twelve member banks.   
 
The thoroughness that I have sought in my research would never have materialised if it 
were not for the efforts of Jessica Bakker and Betsy van Rooij. Thanks to their efforts 
transcribing many interview tapes, I was able to analyse this material in a systematic way. 
This would not have been possible without their help.  
 
I am glad to have my ‘Paranimfen’ Astrid Boogers-van Griethuysen and Marian 
Oosterhuis at my side when defending this thesis. I believe they are very knowledgeable 
in their fields, but more importantly, I have come to know them as warm, kind and 
committed people.  
 
Additionally, there are also some people in my family that deserve to be acknowledged. 
Of course, my parents Heleen and Pieter, who gave me the sense that I have many 
different options in each phase of life, thus encouraging me to do whatever that makes me 
happy. Also my sister, Saskia, needs to be mentioned as she occasionally reminds me to 
see the things I do in perspective to the many other options that are open to me.   
 
And finally, there is one person to whom I am greatly indebted. Saskia Op het Veld has 
been there every step of the way. She supported me in numerous practical ways, ranging 
from returning phone calls to member banks, to transcribing interview tapes. But however 
helpful these activities were at the time, they are dwarfed by her kindness in dealing with 
my late night arrivals at home; my mood swings, when things were not progressing as I 
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hoped; and the extended nights and weekends of solitude she went through while I was 
polishing my work. I believe that Saskia had a profound effect on my thesis and my 
wellbeing during the preparation of the thesis. I feel grateful and proud to share my 
defence with her.     
 
Reflecting on the above list, who can then still argue that writing a dissertation thesis is a 
solitary activity? It is truly a team effort, much of which was invaluable to the result you 
have in front of you. In essence, this thesis is a record of an extended period of sense 
making on my part. The long list of people I am indebted to serves as an illustration that 
sense making was definitely not solitary for me. I came across the following statement: 
‘don’t talk unless you can improve on the silence’. I believe that this thesis can improve 
on the silence for the accounting community, but the hardest part is yet to come. For, 
breaking the silence is one thing; getting people to listen is a different matter altogether.  
 
Now it is time to close this chapter. At times, the production of this book was very 
frustrating, especially nearing the end, but if I were to describe the period of producing the 
dissertation in one sentence, it would be that it provided lots of fun, plain and simple. And 
in the end, I know that fun does not produce happiness in itself, but it is an essential part. 
For now, I am happy to present my results and I hope that, in time, they will prove to have 
improved on the silence. 
 
Martijn van der Steen 
Groningen, November 2005.  
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When addressing changes in the management accounting system, one can be lured into 
thinking that management accounting practices are prone to change in similar ways. This 
would assume that changes in the structural features of the accounting system would be 
followed by changed organisational practices that fit the structural features once again. 
However, this link between systems and organisational practices is not this unambiguous. 
Rather, management accounting practices and the formal accounting systems affect each 
other in rather unexpected ways. Therefore, one needs to focus explicitly on the 
conditions under which changes in the accounting system emerge, and how they become 
embedded in day-to-day practice. The study at hand will provide a perspective on changes 
in management accounting procedures and practices that accommodates the unexpected 
ways in which management accounting practices can undergo change. This perspective is 
rooted in ongoing efforts that are inspired by various forms of institutional theory. The 
management accounting literature has recognised that the relation between structural 
organisational arrangements and day-to-day practices is an important domain for 
providing explanations of the emergence of management accounting change. An 
increasing number of explorations of the introduction of new management accounting 
instruments and techniques have explicitly focused on both formal structure and informal 
practice. This work will draw on the resulting insights, and will attempt to contribute in 
various ways that will be briefly addressed in paragraph 1.2 below. The next section will 
first introduce the view of management accounting as a social practice, which is being 
used throughout this thesis. From this view, institutional theories are considered 
appropriate theoretical frameworks for studying such social practices and changes therein. 
The final paragraph of this chapter will provide an outline of the thesis and a description 
of its chapters.  
 
1.1 Management accounting: a social practice in organisations 
Management accounting has changed very swiftly over the last decades and it is still 
changing (Ezzamel et al., 1997, p. 461; Vaivio, 1999; Dugdale & Jones, 1998; Bjørnenak 
& Olsson, 1999, p. 336; Burns et al., 1999; Scapens & Jazayeri, 1998). Miller and 
O’Leary argue that accounting expertise has gone through major changes in response to 
the changing demands of contemporary organisations. They argue that ‘whilst it is too 
early to assess fully the extent and implications of such changes, it is none-the-less 
evident that accounting expertise, at least in the American setting, no longer holds 
untrammelled sway’ (1993, p. 203). This has also been recognised by the accounting 
research community, as the research agenda has broadened considerably since the 




‘Old accounting is proclaimed dead, but simultaneously accounting is proclaimed alive 
and well, albeit in a ‘new form’ (Ezzamel et al., 1997, pp. 460-461, emphasis in original). 
Certainly, the belief in the ideal of managing complex organisations by the numbers, 
which contributed to the popularity of management accounting, is declining (Miller and 
O’Leary, 1993). Yet, the standing view is that the purpose of accounting is to ‘facilitate 
rational decision making by faithfully representing the task technology or economic 
reality of the organisation’ (Covaleski et al., 1993, p. 65). While this purpose may indeed 
be the goal for a system of accountability, it diverts attention from the fact that 
management accounting is in essence a ubiquitous human practice (Arrington and Francis, 
1993a; 1993b). It touches the lives of many, and it provokes reactions on the part of the 
people subjected to its standards. The emphasis on accounting as a rational description of 
economic reality could lead us to neglect the essential role that accounting plays in our 
human existence. This interconnection between accounting practice and the wider context 
of organisations is well recognised. ‘Organizations, and accounting practices within them, 
are intrinsically dynamic and social entities. Organizations are reciprocally linked to a 
multiplicity of interests’ (Miller, 1994, p. 6). Writers such as Arrington & Francis (1993a; 
1993b), Macintosh & Scapens (1990), Covaleski et al. (1993), Carruthers (1995) and 
Boland (1993) have indeed recognised that accounting cannot merely be seen as a 
technical activity that operates outside of social structures, but that it is an essential part of 
those structures. It influences and is influenced by the social context in which it operates 
and the operators within that context. This recognition has had a major influence on recent 
management accounting research. 
 
Mainstream management accounting research has remained relatively insulated from 
these post-modern intellectual developments (Shearer & Arrington, 1993). Especially the 
research tradition of the US has continued to focus on an accounting view that has been 
rooted in the neo-classical theory of the firm. It has viewed management accounting as 
being determined by an (internal) trade-off of demand and supply of accounting 
information. Through this trade-off, an equilibrium state of management accounting 
content would arise that provides optimal information. The theoretical basics of this 
stream of research rely strongly on assumptions of market equilibrium and economic 
rationality (Scapens, 1994, p. 302). It is these assumptions that are increasingly being 
challenged, as it is questionable to suppose that economic agents have a full grasp of all 
available alternatives when they make utility maximising choices (Vanberg, 1993). In 
fact, it is argued that people do not maximise every moment, ‘they rather satisfice, 
because they have not the wits to maximise’ (see Scapens, 1994, p. 309). Furthermore, it 
would seem likely that economic phenomena are caused by a dynamic process which 
Scapens described as evolutionary (but not necessarily in the Darwinian sense of 
evolution as optimisation). The study of accounting change envisaged in this thesis does 
not regard accounting solely as part of firm behaviour, as mainstream economics 




This thesis uses the proposition that the normative description of management accounting 
rooted in the neo-classical theory of the firm does not match the accounting practices that 
are observed in practice (Johnson & Kaplan, 1987; Scapens, 1994). Therefore, the thesis 
regards accounting practices to be resultants of social processes within the organisation. In 
order to do so, there is a clear need for alternative modes of research that accommodate 
this view. A number of studies have been done, drawing on a variety of social theorists, 
and ‘…this literature has problematized the history of accounting, revealing its interested 
nature, challenging claims to an inherent accounting rationality and neutrality, providing 
alternative insights into the functions of accounting and offering new explanations of the 
forces giving motion to processes of accounting change’ (Humphrey & Scapens, 1996, p. 
87). Examples come from sociology (Macintosh & Scapens, 1990), accounting as cultural 
practice (Arrington & Francis, 1993b) and accounting views that are related to broad 
social movements such as the feminist movement (Shearer & Arrington, 1993).  
  
1.2 Management accounting change 
One strand of these alternative modes of research is known as institutional theory. 
Institutional theory is not one theory, but a wide range of different views of organised 
human behaviour. These have in common that they assume that human action is in some 
way constrained by social structures that are the product of past social interactions. 
Institutional theories challenge the idea of the economically rational actor, who can freely 
select the optimal action alternative, without considering the restrictions posed by the 
social environment of which the actor is a part. Institutional theories regard the actor’s 
action choices for a large part contingent on the norms, values and habits embedded in his 
social setting. This focus on the constraining dimension of the social context has led to 
criticism that institutional theories under-emphasise human agency (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1991; Seo & Creed, 2002). Therefore, what is needed is an approach that reconciles the 
constraining properties of social context, with the continuing ability of individuals to 
decide on their own actions and to have a real stake in their fate. For, if there were not an 
ability of individuals to go beyond the institutions that constrain them, change of these 
institutions would be impossible. Although individuals are constrained by institutions, 
they are able to escape these constraints. Therefore, this thesis will present a framework 
that is compatible with institutional theory, but which gives explicit attention to individual 
behaviour under the constraints posed by the institutional arrangements belonging to their 
social setting. The framework will help to address how institutional change is possible, 
using a micro perspective; the level of the individual person in the organisation.  
 
The research focuses on the introduction of a new accounting practice: Results Oriented 
Management (ROM) at the Rabobank, one of the major banks in the Netherlands. The 
ROM program was an attempt to introduce a new method of strategic planning and 
control. Moreover, most banks belonging to the Rabobank Group used the ROM program 
to introduce a cultural and behavioural change. The management of these banks felt that 
1. Introduction 
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their employees needed to have a more result and risk orientation in their day-today work. 
As such, ROM was not only intended as a change in structural features of the bank, but 
also as a change in behaviours. In all, this thesis addresses a basic research question: using 
an institutional and cognitive perspective, how can we explain the process of structural 
and behavioural change, resulting from the introduction of Results Oriented Management? 
 
This thesis will explore this process of accounting change using an institutional/cognitive 
perspective. Basically, it will use insights from earlier institutional explanations of the 
process of accounting change, but it will do so from a behavioural perspective. The thesis 
will present a framework that illuminates how institutions present themselves to 
individual actors. In light of question posed above, this focus on individual experiences of 
accounting changes is not surprising. For, although institutional theories have elaborated 
on how individuals are constrained by institutions, they have not discussed how people 
can escape them. A more detailed individual oriented perspective is needed. A micro 
perspective on the process of institutionalisation addresses concerns relating to the lack of 
attention to human agency in institutional theory. This thesis strives to contribute to 
institutional theory in a number of ways: firstly, as noted above, it provides a possible 
reconciliation of human agency and institutional determinism. The thesis proposes that 
under some circumstances people are able to act wilfully, and defy institutional influence, 
while in other circumstances, they are heavily influenced by those same institutional 
arrangements. It attempts to uncover the process leading to institutional change. Secondly, 
through its use of insights from cognitive psychology, it provides a conceptualisation of 
how institutions present themselves to individuals. Thirdly, it allows for the idea that only 
specific elements of practices can become institutionalised, and that it is virtually 
impossible to predict which elements that will be. Fourthly, the thesis forges ties between 
elements in institutional theory and cognitive science, as it observes that these can be 
complementary. They both deal with representations of the world and perceived 
regularities, although on a different level. In all, the thesis uses the research question to 
obtain knowledge about the intricate relations between institutions and individual 
behaviours.  
 
1.3 Thesis outline 
The next chapter will present an overview of a number of influential institutional theories. 
As this study seeks to address institutional change, it needs to introduce some of the basic 
features and concepts found in the different institutional theories. Chapter 3 then presents 
the theoretical framework that will be used in the study reported in this thesis. The chapter 
explores the theoretical insights that have a bearing on how individual organizational 
participants address institutional change. The chapter results in a micro model of 
institutional change. Chapter 4 introduces the setting in which the study is conducted. The 
cooperative Rabobank is one of the largest banks in the Netherlands, and strives for a high 
market share in the worldwide food and agricultural businesses. For reasons disclosed 
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later, the Rabobank has been selected to track a complex change project that can be 
regarded as a management accounting change. Chapter 4 will also discuss some of the 
banks features. Chapter 5 discusses the study’s methodological underpinnings. The 
chapter will propose a two stage structure for the empirical study: a first order analysis of 
the cases, which is a discussion of how the events under study present themselves to the 
participants in the bank, and a second order study, which consists of active analysis of 
these events by the researcher. Chapter 6 will present the first order analysis. This chapter 
discusses in a chronological order how the change program presented itself to the 
participants. Chapters 7 to 10 present the second order analysis. These chapters focus on 
four phases of institutionalization, which were derived theoretically in chapter 3. Chapter 
7 will focus on the emergence of a need for change, while chapter 8 will discuss how 
institutionally constrained individuals make action decisions. Chapter 9 builds an 
argument on the routinisation of these newly devised actions and finally, chapter 10 
discusses the conditions under which institutionalisation is likely to take place. The 
insights obtained are used to propose a revised framework of institutional change that is 
presented in chapter 11. The framework includes insights that result from the case study at 
the Rabobank. The thesis concludes with an evaluation and conclusion in chapter 12. As 
noted above, the next chapter will introduce the three most relevant streams of 
institutional theory in current management accounting research. 
  6
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2 Institutional theory 
2.1 Introduction 
The introduction to this thesis argued that the stage is set for a research approach that 
explicitly recognises the social rooting of management accounting practice. As such, a 
wide variety of theoretical efforts come into play, as many writers have recently explored 
the role of accounting in its social environment. This thesis draws on institutional theories 
as explanatory devices for management accounting changes at the Rabobank, as these 
allow for a view of accounting as socially embedded practice. 
 
Although institutions cannot be uniquely defined, for this purpose the definition could be: 
‘a way of thought or action of some prevalence and permanence, which is embedded in 
the habits of a group or the customs of a people’ (see Scapens, 1994). However, choosing 
a definition remains rather arbitrary, as different meanings reflect many different 
approaches to institutional theory (Mäki, 1993, p. 3; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, p. 1). 
New Institutional Economics (NIE) differentiates itself most from other approaches as it 
retains a notion of bounded rationality and it assumes (limited) economic optimisation 
‘through economising on transaction costs’ (Scapens, 1994, p. 308). Moreover, some 
applications of NIE assume a degree of opportunism that affects the behaviour of the 
actor. Whereas New Institutional Economics uses the concept of institutions in relation to 
transaction costs, Old Institutional Economics (OIE) emphasises the enabling and 
constraining qualities of institutions. It assumes considerable uncertainty in the range of 
alternatives available to agents and in the possibility that agents can evaluate these 
alternatives in time. In this sense, OIE challenges the assumption of rationality found in 
neo-classical economics. New Institutional Sociology (NIS) also deals with institutions, 
but it treats them largely as a given. Moreover, the processes of institutionalisation over 
time are not well developed by NIS. Instead, its focus is primarily on how and why firms 
conform to institutionalised beliefs in society. While institutions are an integral part of 
organisational life in the view proposed by OIE, the view held by NIS treats institutions as 
largely exogenous to the firm.  
 
This range of views on institutionalism is bound to give rise to questions regarding the 
differences between them. What are the properties of the different views? How do they 
differ? How can they best be applied? And how do they relate to each other? And most 
importantly to this thesis: how do these strands of institutional theory help us to 
understand processes of management accounting change? In order to assess the usefulness 
of the different strands of institutional theory for a study on management accounting 
change, one needs to confront their properties and assumptions. The next section will 
describe some of the properties of the three strands of institutional theory addressed here: 
New Institutional Economics, New Institutional Sociology and Old Institutional 
Economics. The purpose to this thesis is to clarify the properties and assumptions of the 
2. Institutional theory 
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various institutional theories so that the most appropriate theories can be selected for the 
research question that was posed in chapter 1.  
 
2.2 New Institutional Economics 
New Institutional Economics (NIE) is known from many different strands of theory. 
Agency theory, Game theory, Transaction Cost Theory and Public Choice processes of 
e.g. rent seeking are all parts of the strand of New Institutional Economic theory. This 
section discusses Transaction Cost Economics (TCE). The early pioneers of the 
transaction cost reasoning (originating in the work of Coase, 1937) were especially 
interested in the boundaries of the firm, an issue that was later reformulated into the make-
or-buy decisions (Williamson & Ouchi, 1981, p. 348). Transaction cost economics (TCE) 
exists in many variants, but the variant promoted by Oliver Williamson has received the 
most widespread application (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996, p. 16). It is regarded as a response 
to the stringent assumptions made by neo-classical economics (Van der Meer-Kooistra & 
Vosselman, 2000, p. 54). TCE makes use of transactions and their associated costs as the 
primary unit of analysis (Williamson, 1998, p. 36). TCE is essentially a theory of co-
ordination of transactions between and within business organisations. It assumes that 
organisations incur costs of transactions, such as costs of contracts, supervision costs, 
costs associated with opportunistic behaviour, and costs associated with specific assets (in 
particular those that are not easily used for different transactions). TCE argues that firms 
will select the governance structure that minimises the costs of effecting a transaction. 
Markets, firms, common law and regulations all provide alternative forms of governance 
(Palay, 1985, p. 156). Williamson (1973) proposed that depending on a number of general 
dimensions of transactions, different modes of contracting exist (through the market or 
through the hierarchy or through an intermediate form referred to as “obligational market 
contracting”). 
 
Transaction costs are costs that are usually ignored in standard economic theory, but play 
an important role in TCE. But, similar to neo-classical theories, NIE appeals to the idea of 
optimisation. As Hira & Hira state: ‘rather than seeking to replace neoclassical economics, 
the new institutionalists wish only to modify the rational choice, utility-based neoclassical 
model by relaxing some of its assumptions. The new institutionalism focuses on the 
central assumption of zero transactions costs in neoclassical economic models as the main 
gap to be filled’ (2000, p. 269). Williamson notes that ‘many would-be theories of 
economic organization are primarily retrospective, in that they offer an ex post 
explanation of what has transpired’, but that ‘sooner or later, candidate theories of 
economic organization must go beyond ex post rationalization and offer predictions’ 
(1998, p. 35, emphasis in original). His ultimate goal is to predict beforehand which 
structure decision makers will choose, given the dimensions of the transactions. One of 
the most attractive features of New Institutional Economics is its ability to generalise 
2. Institutional theory 
 9 
human qualities. It ‘is attractive in the sense that rational choice perspectives seem to 
allow for a “universalization” of individuals’ political actions, just as a market-based 
model allows for the aggregation of individuals’ economic behaviour’ (Hira & Hira, 2000, 
p. 268).  
 
Below, I will describe five features embedded in TCE reasoning that are critical to the 
functioning of the theory. They are thus partly responsible for the focus of the theoretical 
ideas. Moreover, the section below will address a potential problem with TCE that 
reduces the usefulness of TCE reasoning for this thesis.  
 
2.2.1 Critical features in TCE 
This section is divided in four sub-sections. The first sub-section will briefly discuss the 
three dimensions of transacting conditions, distinguished by TCE. Then the next two sub-
sections explain the two behavioural assumptions of opportunism and bounded rationality; 
both of which create the need for elaborate contracting. And finally, the fourth sub-section 
addresses a problem with TCE: its ‘invisible hand’ approach (Langlois, 1989), meaning 
that it perceives the drive for efficiency as an inherent feature of institutions, without 
providing an explanation for the emergence of these institutions. This lack of attention for 
the emergence of institutions will constitute the argument why TCE is not the most 
appropriate theory for this thesis.  
 
Dimensions of transacting conditions 
Williamson identifies three critical dimensions that describe transactions, and thus 
influence the choice for a particular governance structure: the frequency with which 
transactions recur, the uncertainty (disturbances) to which the transactions are subject, and 
the condition of asset specificity (Williamson, 1998, p. 36). The frequency of transacting 
is the number of times that a transaction takes place within a given amount of time. 
Uncertainty results from the inability to predict events in the environment. And finally, 
asset specificity relates to the specificity of organisational assets involved in specific 
transactions; e.g., specific investments or particular technologies. Asset specificity 
describes that assets are part of specific contractual relationships, from which they cannot 
be released or they can only be released at a cost. Asset specificity is especially important, 
as it formulates a condition of mutual dependency. It takes a variety of forms, among 
which are site specificity–e.g. stations located closely together to facilitate transacting; 
physical asset specificity–e.g. specialised production equipment; human asset specificity 
that arises from learning; and dedicated assets that are purchased for specific customers 
(Williamson, 1985, pp. 95-96). Williamson (1985, 1997, 1998) argues that the 
combination of these three dimensions (frequency, uncertainty and asset specificity) 
determine for a very large part the optimal governance structure; i.e. transactions can be 
effectuated through the market, or through the internal organisation, or through an 
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intermediate form. TCE uses two behavioural assumptions that allow TCE theorists to 
make inferences on the selection of a governance structure: opportunism and bounded 
rationality. These will be discussed next.  
 
Opportunism 
Opportunism refers to a more sophisticated form of self-interest seeking, namely self-
interest seeking with guile. ‘Opportunism suggests calculating behaviour more 
sophisticated than the usual assumption of simple self-interest. Opportunism refers to 
“making false or empty, that is, self-disbelieved threats or promises,” cutting corners for 
undisclosed personal advantage, covering up tracks, and the like’ (Williamson & Ouchi, 
1981, p. 351). The assumption of opportunism dictates more sophisticated calculating 
behaviour of the actor than assumed in neo-classical theories. TCE argues that the 
presence of opportunism in itself is not a problem per se; it is the combination of 
opportunistic behaviour and bounded rationality (see next sub-section) that creates the 
need for elaborate contracts. The basic idea of transaction cost theories boils down to the 
following: A situation where individuals have the propensity to behave opportunistically 
on the one hand, and the individual property of bounded rationality on the other. In this 
situation, the task is to organise transactions that will economise on bounded rationality 
‘while simultaneous safeguarding those transactions against the hazards of opportunism’ 
(Williamson & Ouchi, 1981, p. 351). As Williamson assumes that agents are looking for 
personal gain (opportunism), contracts need to be drawn up to attempt to minimise this 
opportunism. The costs associated with these contracts are an example of transaction 
costs. In Williamson’s (1985) view, contracts enforce legal rights ex post. However, 
organisations can also employ other means, such as specific investments to demonstrate 
“credible commitments”. These “credible commitments” signal to the other party that the 
organisation intends to honour the agreements as it has a clearly visible interest in its 
outcomes. For example, an investment in a specific asset places the organisation in a 
position in which it has an interest in honouring the contracts. As such, it provides 
information on the probability that it would engage in acts of opportunism. Williamson 
discusses this notion of “credible commitments” particularly in relation to intermediate 
structures, which are located between discrete market contracting on the one extreme and 
hierarchical organisation on the other (1985, p. 163). 
 
It is important to note that given the overall aim of economising on transaction costs, the 
assumptions of opportunism and bounded rationality are essential to the functioning of the 
model. Therefore, the next section will explore the notion of bounded rationality 
somewhat further.  
 
Bounded rationality 
Bounded rationality is an assumption that attributes qualities such as the propensity to 
optimise on a (limited) number of different alternatives. It assumes more moderate 
qualities than the neo-classical agent, who is assumed to maximise based on a superhuman 
ability to assess all available alternatives. Bounded rationality allows for an imperfect 
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ability to assess all alternatives. Therefore, individuals do not maximise, but only optimise 
with the information at their disposal. Indeed, Williamson states that bounded rationality 
‘is behavior that is intendedly rational but only limitedly so’ (1997, p. 22; 1998, p. 30). 
This means that all complex contracts are unavoidably incomplete.  
 
The notion of boundedly rational behaviour is not particularly problematic when the 
original objectives of TCE are considered. TCE was developed as a positive theory to 
explain the boundaries of the firm. Specifically, this positive theory set out to explore why 
firms exist and continue to exist in competitive markets. However, more recently, it has 
been extended to explain behaviour within firms (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996, p. 16). This 
constitutes of a problem as the prediction and explanation of organisational behaviour is 
relatively different from that of individual behaviour. When studying firm behaviour as a 
whole, only basic assumptions of individual rationality may suffice, as one does not seek 
explanations of individual behaviour. In other words, the explanandum is on a different 
level to that of individual behaviour. ‘Economics does not seek to explain individual 
behaviour per se, an undertaking that would no doubt require a picture of the agent that is 
quite complex and hence ‘realistic’ in any number of senses. Rather, economic theory 
most often uses assumptions about individual behaviour as an intermediate element in the 
explanation of various economic phenomena (changes in price and quantity, for example)’ 
(Langlois & Csontos, 1993, p. 115). Therefore, a highly abstract agent may be very well 
suited for the description of the behaviour of the firm, as any quality of this agent that 
does not purport directly to perceived firm behaviour is ignored (Curwen, 1976, p. XV). 
But the notion of bounded rationality can prevent TCE to predict behaviour within 
organisations, as that would require a more elaborate depiction of individuals. As Argyris 
(1973, p. 254) observed, it is not likely that a single, isolated individual can ever reach any 
high degree of rationality, simply because the environment is too complex. 
 
Bounded rationality causes imperfect ex-ante contracting, thereby introducing the need to 
adjust contracting as more information becomes available. However, the choice of the 
optimal governance structure is assumed to be a choice that is made under conditions of 
perfect rationality. ‘Whereas transaction cost theorists have successfully incorporated 
bounded rationality into their analyses of the comparative efficiency of alternative 
designs, there has been much less attention paid to the implications of bounded rationality 
at the design-selection level’ (Roberts & Greenwood, 1997, p. 351). As such, TCE is not 
entirely consistent in its views on human behaviour: it accepts imperfect ex-ante 
contracting, because of the notion of bounded rationality, but it also assumes that the 
agent is able to select the most appropriate governance structure for a given configuration 
of uncertainty, asset specificity and frequency of transacting.  
 
A number of arguments used by TCE have attracted some criticism over the years. One 
category of this criticism relates to the source of the drive for efficiency. Rutherford 
(1989) and Langlois (1989) both question the ‘invisible hand’ approach that NIE assumes. 
They both argue that the assumption of an invisible process of selection, leaving 
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institutions that are most efficient, can lead to a limited applicability of the ideas of NIE. 
Langlois puts is like this: ‘The maximisation metaphor is an extremely appealing and 
powerful “positive heuristic” for a theoretical structure. It is easy to use, and it provides an 
explanation in terms of a widely applicable set of fundamental ideas. But only in a very 
restricted set of situations is it in fact a substitute for looking at the actual process by 
which institutions come into use and are maintained over time’ (1989, p. 294; cf. similar 
comments made by Rutherford, 1989, p. 313). The next section will discuss two separate 
processes that can account for the drive for efficiency assumed by TCE. It also indicates 
why this drive for efficiency limits the application of TCE for this thesis.  
 
‘Homo transaction cost economicus’ vs evolution: the source of the ‘invisible hand’ 
New Institutional Economics rests on either of the two following principles: the 
assumption of man as ‘homo transaction cost economicus’ or the evolution principle. The 
first principle implies that man is naturally concerned with efficiency. He would then be 
'homo transaction cost economicus' (Buckley & Chapman, 1997, p. 132). This view 
implies that individuals can and will perceive all transaction cost minimising 
arrangements beforehand. The evolution principle (the second principle) argues that the 
market will favour the most efficient organisational form and that it will eventually drive 
out those that are less efficient.  
 
The assumption of ‘homo transaction cost economicus’ is unlikely to hold as the mere 
ability of men to assess all alternatives beforehand has been doubted, even by TCE itself. 
As Dow observes: ‘Intentionality arguments collide with the transaction cost school’s 
emphasis on bounded rationality. If agents cannot cope with contracts featuring complex 
contingencies….it is doubtful that they can select in advance an efficient decision making 
procedure to use in adapting to future contingencies’ (1987, p. 27). Moreover, individuals 
prefer the energy saving properties of acting rationally, and engage in this type of 
behaviour routinely. This has also been remarked by Ritzer (1993, p. 35), who notes: 
‘people rarely search for the best means to an end on their own. Rather, the previously 
discovered best possible means to innumerable ends have been institutionalized in a 
variety of social settings.’ Lastly, Schumpeter asserts that individuals act based on 
routines and habits, that are consistent with wider beliefs of what is to be considered 
“rational”. When knowledge and habit ‘become as firmly rooted as a railway embankment 
in the earth,’ individuals do not undertake much calculating action. Accordingly, ‘there is 
very little of conscious rationality, still less of hedonism and I [individual] egoism 
(Schumpeter, 1934,1961)’ (Raines & Jung, 1992, p. 113). Ultimately Schumpeter suggests 
that if individuals act rationally (consistent with their established ideals) it is because they 
have learned from experience how things are done and prefer the energy-saving feature of 
fixed habits of thinking. It is for these reasons that ‘homo transaction cost economicus’ 
may not be a viable assumption upon which to base the workings of TCE.  
 
The evolution principle causing the drive for efficiency does not necessarily relate to the 
most efficient form that can be identified, but it can be limited to structural arrangements 
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that have actually been applied (Vosselman, 2000). As Vromen (1995, p. 60) observes: 
‘Following Simon (1983), …. only a weak form of selectionism is tenable. A strong form 
of selectionism would hold that the most efficient form possible will of necessity be 
established. Weak-form selectionism entails ‘survival of the fitter’, not ‘survival of the 
fittest’’. Evolutionary selectionism rests critically on the motive of survival. Buckley & 
Chapman note that ‘the only analytically robust definitions of “successful adaptation” and 
“betterment” are coterminous with survival itself’ (1997, p. 129). TCE is thus about the 
adaptation of governance structures in response to pressures for survival of the 
organisation. It is logical that competitive pressures play an important role in the 
functioning of TCE. As we assume that TCE works through a weak-form evolutionary 
process (Vromen, 1995) and as this implies a satisficing decision maker, it is competition 
that drives the need for an optimal governance structure. The level of competitive pressure 
determines the level of efficiency that would be perceived as minimal for the organisation. 
Sub-optimal intra-organisational arrangements may persist over long periods, as 
competitive pressures operate on whole organisations with varying intensity (Roberts & 
Greenwood, 1997, p. 352).  
 
Agents at different positions in the organisation can perceive competitive pressures 
differently, and thus different views would be taken of the need for efficiency enhancing 
measures; i.e. different satisficing levels of efficiency can exist among different people 
depending on their position within the organisation and their outlook on the environment. 
The line of argument proposed by Roberts & Greenwood (1997) is that the institutional 
environment enables and constrains decision makers in their efforts to be as rational as 
possible. This is in line with the evolution principle. If one wants to explain decisions 
using TCE, one needs to go beyond frequency of transacting, asset specificity and 
uncertainty, to clarify how the institutional environment influences the pressures faced by 
decision makers. Williamson (1997, 1998) acknowledges the importance of the 
institutional environment in which the organisation operates. However, his view of the 
institutional environment is limited. He explicitly argues that the institutional environment 
consists of ‘the formal rules of the game’, especially property (polity, judiciary and 
bureaucracy) (Williamson, 1998, p. 26). Langlois (1989) argues that this limited view on 
institutions reduces the applicability of TCE outside those institutions that are typified by 
a drive for efficiency maximisation. He notes: ‘we have good reason to think that many 
processes leading to institution do not select for efficiency (that is they maximise 
something other than wealth or the negative of the sum of production and transaction 
costs)…It seems much more reasonable to look beyond the maximisation metaphor to a 
consideration of the actual processes involved. That an institution economises on 
transaction costs is an important part of the story; but it is not the whole story’ (Langlois, 
1989, p. 294). 
 
In conclusion, one can argue that in the absence of a ‘homo transaction cost economicus’, 
TCE assumes an institutional environment that emphasises the achieving of efficiency as 
primary motive for action. This is especially the case in market relations; but TCE 
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provides little evidence that relations within organisations and between people are 
governed by the same principles. For many applications of TCE this poses no problem, as 
it does not seek to describe or explain relations at such a low level. But to this thesis, it 
does pose a problem, because here we must take into account the wider institutional 
environment so as to provide a richer image of management accounting change at the 
level of social groups and the individual.  
 
Therefore, I will shift the focus to a set of theoretical principles that allows me to assess 
the effects of a wider range of externally induced preferences in the organisational setting. 
Transaction Cost Economics emphasises the legally sanctioned role of institutions, but 
institutions have a broader effect on organisations and its participants. An institution may 
not only constrain the action choices of agents, it can also ‘ ‘enable’ the bounded-rational 
agents to economize on the information processing needed for decision making’ (Aoki, 
2000, p. 18). Institutions do not only constrain options, they establish the very criteria by 
which people discover their preferences (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, p. 11). NIE describes 
processes of structural co-ordination with the purpose to affect transactions as efficiently 
as possible (minimising costs of transaction). As such, the following features make the 
TCE variant of NIE theory unsuitable for the purpose of this thesis: the provision of an 
explanation for the process of management accounting change at the Rabobank; 
1. TCE assumes that a drive for efficiency comes either from a natural propensity of 
people to act as efficiently as possible or from economic (institutional) pressures. 
These assumptions cannot be used for this work, as it needs to explore which 
institutional influences exist at the cooperative Rabobank. It cannot merely 
assume that efficiency is driving the changes that are observed. 
2. The unit of analysis of TCE is the transaction, and individual behaviours are 
simplified to accommodate the analysis of transactions. The current study is 
interested in the interactions between people before and during a process of 
management accounting change. For this purpose, the simplified individual will 
not do. 
3. TCE is no process theory. By this, I mean that TCE does not describe the 
processes by which organisations change. Rather, it identifies an optimal 
governance structure for a given configuration of asset specificity, frequency of 
transactions and uncertainty. It does not address how the organisation arrives at 
the desired governance structure. This ‘how’ question is essential to this work, 
therefore, it cannot rely on TCE. 
 
Furthermore, the economic rationality assumed by TCE may not hold when interactions 
within specific social groups are studied, since rationality is an institutional phenomenon, 
not a universal property of human action. As DiMaggio & Powell note: ‘the very notion of 
rational choice reflects modern secular rituals and myths that constitute and constrain 
legitimate action’ (1991, p. 10). These rituals constitute rules of acceptable means to 
desirable ends: ‘modern societies are filled with institutional rules which function as 
myths depicting various formal structures as rational means to the attainment of desirable 
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ends’ (Meyer & Rowan, 1991, p. 46). These last quotes belong to the domain of New 
Institutional Sociology, a theory that uses a different concept of institutions and their role 
in society. 
 
2.3 New Institutional Sociology 
Most social analysis has been built upon two distinct models of organisational actors: the 
rational actor model and the institutional model (Tolbert & Zucker, 1996, p. 176; Pfeffer, 
1981, p. 2) The rational actor model assumes the individual to be a rational decision 
maker, constantly engaged in the calculation of costs and benefits from alternatives. As 
such, the rational actor tries to make optimal decisions. The institutional model assumes 
an ‘over-socialised’ individual whose decisions are mainly influenced by prevailing social 
norms, and not by any reflection or resistance based on personal interest. This model 
resembles the decision model discussed by Pettigrew et al., who argue that actions can be 
seen as ‘politically and socially approved tokens of concern’ (1992, p.15). Tolbert & 
Zucker (1996) propose that these two general models of the individual (overly rational vs. 
‘over-socialised’) should not be seen as two opposing views, but rather as two ends of a 
continuum of decision-making processes and behaviours. They note that what is needed 
‘are theories of when rationality is likely to be more or less bounded’ (p. 176, emphasis in 
original). 
 
New Institutional Sociology (NIS) addresses the behaviour of organisations as motivated 
by forces in wider society. It argues that organisations will seek legitimacy by adhering to 
rules and norms that are valued by society and, more specifically, by certain institutions in 
society. The mechanism through which organisations adopt similar procedures is termed 
institutional isomorphism. Isomorphism is ‘a constraining process that forces one unit in a 
population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions’ 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 149). Early NIS theorists sought to explain how different 
organisations in many respects conformed to similar standards of behaviour and how they 
employed similar structures. Moreover, they sought to explain the stability in these 
standards of behaviour and organisational structures.   
 
2.3.1 Institutional isomorphism 
Hannan & Freeman (1977) note that early views of isomorphism (such as those discussed 
by Hawley, 1968) argue that distinguishable differences in environmental features tend to 
lead to different optimal organisational structures and practices. As a result, one can find 
similar organisational configurations in similar environments. The earlier ideas on 
isomorphism regarded the environment as static and homogeneous. But Hannan & 
Freeman suggested significant extensions to these views, which provided more clarity on 
the processes of competition that drive organisations to adopt ‘optimal’ organisational 
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configurations. Furthermore, they propose refinements that suggest that organisations face 
competing demands from various and changing environments. Nevertheless, Hannan & 
Freeman (1977) continued to assume a system of rationality, which encompasses 
measures of economic fitness and market competition (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, pp. 
149-150). They were primarily interested in competitive isomorphism, which is mostly 
concerned with organisational adaptation as a result of competitive pressures. DiMaggio 
& Powell (1983, 1991) were primarily interested in institutional isomorphism. 
Institutional isomorphism is the domain of NIS theory. Institutional isomorphism 
emphasises that organisations do not only compete for resources, but also for political 
influence and institutional legitimacy. It points to the influence of political power and 
ceremonies that are aimed at increasing legitimacy of the organisation (cf. Meyer & 
Rowan, 1991).  
 
Meyer & Rowan (1991) argue that, as large rationalised organisations expand their 
dominance over other domains of social life, organisational structures have come to 
reflect these rationalised and institutionalised rules of society. Berger and Luckmann have 
asserted that society imposes an objectified reality upon individuals, based on these 
institutionalised rules. ‘All institutions appear in the same way, as given, unalterable and 
self-evident’ (1979, p. 77). They appear as undeniable facts, although institutions are 
human made. Individuals are confronted with an objective structure of facts presented to 
them on a day-to-day basis (cf. Weber, 1976, pp. 54-55). The rules of society are 
presented to the individual as unchangeable objective facts and the application of these 
rules is a routine matter, according to the established norms of rationality. ‘The rational 
thought process spreads and becomes ingrained in the decision making process. If this 
accurately describes economic action, rational behavior is a learned response rather than 
innate, organic behavior’ (Raines & Jung, 1992). Weber argued that ‘market behavior is 
influenced by rational purposeful pursuit of interests. The partner to a transaction is 
expected to behave according to rational legality and, quite particularly, to respect the 
formal inviolability of a promise once given’ (1968, p. 636). Especially in Western 
society, where it gets increasingly difficult to pinpoint the boundaries of the market sphere 
(‘Rational administration pushes out nonbureaucratic forms, schools assume the structure 
of the workplace, hospital and university administrations come to resemble the 
management of for-profit firms, and the modernization of the world economy proceeds 
unabated’ (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, p. 78)), it is this manner of providing reasons for 
actions that has gained moral superiority similar to the way that ‘economic markets place 
a premium on rationality and coordination’ (Meyer & Rowan, 1991, p. 42). 
  
Rationalised institutions create myths of formal structure, which shape organizations 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1991, p. 51). Scott uses the example of schools to argue that ‘much of 
the orderliness of and coherence present in American schools is based upon institutionally 
defined beliefs rather than on organisational structures’ (1987, p. 506). A further example 
is the introduction of the case-mix accounting system in American hospitals. Covaleski et 
al. argue that the DRG framework and case-mix accounting are ‘practices whose principal 
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purpose is at once to express and demonstrate a conformity with institutionalized rules 
and expectations’ (1993, p. 76). Another example could be the rise of corporate training 
programs (Scott & Meyer, 1991) and even the act of management is an example. It 
provides rationalisation for the activities of the organisation to inside, as well as outside 
constituents, thereby increasing the illusion of control over events. ‘A preference or bias 
in favour of interpretations of power and personal efficacy will colour the explanations of 
action developed and held within organizations’ (Pfeffer, 1981, p. 4). The manager 
himself acts as a symbol for rationalised organisational activities and its outcomes. 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 16; see: Söderlund & Vilgon, 1993).  
 
DiMaggio & Powell (1983) distinguish three mechanisms of institutional isomorphic 
change: Coercive isomorphism, Mimetic isomorphism, and Normative isomorphism. 
These three mechanisms cause organisations to become increasingly alike. Therefore, one 
can argue that NIS is more a theory that explains similarities amongst organisational 
structures than change in organisations (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996). The 3 mechanisms 
of institutional isomorphism will be discussed next. 
 
Coercive Isomorphism 
Coercive isomorphism relates to the formal and informal pressures that result from 
coercive authority. This coercive authority comes from the organisation’s dependency on 
other organisations and the cultural expectations in the society in which the organisation 
functions (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Organisations may alter some of their structural 
features quite directly as a result of changing legislation (think of stricter anti-pollution 
laws, employee health and safety codes and consumer laws), but they can also change 
more organically in response to changing societal preferences. DiMaggio & Powell (1983) 
and Meyer & Rowan (1991) argue that these organisational re-configurations can be in 
large part ceremonial, but that does not mean that they are inconsequential. Rather, they 
convey the message to the various stakeholders in the organisation that the organisation is 
responsive to the preferences of the society in which it operates. This adherence to 




A second process leading to institutional isomorphism is called Mimetic Isomorphism. 
DiMaggio & Powell (1983) argue that uncertainty is a powerful incentive for imitation. In 
particular, ambiguous goals, poorly understood technologies or symbolic uncertainty may 
cause organisations to model themselves on other organisations. The introduction of 
Japanese management techniques in US firms constitutes an example of changes caused 
by mimetic isomorphism. American firms (and so called knowledge entrepreneurs) 
observed the successes of Japanse manufacturing industries and introduced their 
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understanding of the techniques used by the Japanese firms. In addition, DiMaggio & 
Powell (1983) argue that one of the reasons that organisational structures tend to be 
homogenous is that there are not many different organisational models to imitate. 
Therefore, attempts to select an organisational structure to deal with ambiguity and 
uncertainty are often based on similar organisational templates. The change from a 
functional structure to a multidivisional structure is an example. 
 
Normative Isomorphism 
The third source of isomorphic organisational change is normative isomorphism. It stems 
from pressures from professionalisation. DiMaggio & Powell (1983) argue that two 
aspects of normative isomorphism are of particular interest: (1) the grounding of formal 
education and of legitimation on a cognitive base produced by university specialists; and 
(2) the growth and influence of professional networks that allow new practices to be 
diffused rapidly across organisations. Universities function as knowledge centres that 
influence the development of professional norms and values for organisations. As such, 
they promote normative standards that make professionals comparable; i.e. their 
behaviours can be measured against these normatively determined standards. Examples 
are professional associations for accountants, medics and lawyers. These professionals 
have strong ties with their professional bodies, which determine the criteria for ‘proper’ 
and professional behaviour (cf. Greenwood et al., 2002). These criteria are strongly 
influenced by universities and professional training centres. ‘To the extent managers and 
key staff are drawn from the same universities and filtered on a common set of attributes, 
they will tend to view problems in a similar fashion, see the same policies, procedures, 
and structures as normatively sanctioned and legitimated, and approach decisions in much 
the same way’ (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, p. 72). Normative Isomorphism related to 
professional managers focuses our attention on the norms and values embedded in the act 
of management. Managers operate in a set of roles, a web of relationships with internal 
and external groups and individuals. They are constrained by their own structure of 
reality, which is influenced by normative pressures and accepted ideas on ‘proper’ 
behaviour (e.g. see: Berger & Luckmann, 1979; Pettigrew et al., 1992; Javidan & 
Dastmalchian, 1993).  
 
2.3.2 Decoupling 
These three sources of isomorphic change (coercive authority, mimetic change to resolve 
uncertainty, and normative pressures) cause organisations to adopt comparable structures 
and practices. They compete not only for economic resources, but also for institutional 
legitimacy. Essentially, NIS has pointed to additional ways in which the organisation 
attempts to gain legitimacy, not only in economic terms (e.g., sales and profit), but also in 
social terms, to be seen as a contributor to society. However, the presence of institutional 
pressures does not mean that organisational structures are not also heavily influenced by 
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technical requirements posed by the products and markets in which they operate. 
Therefore, a tension may build between the technical requirements and the institutional 
requirements posed on the organisation. Javidan & Dastmalchian (1993) have noted that 
‘each of the set of stakeholders present different challenges in terms of desired behaviors, 
values, and attitudes’. DiMaggio & Powell (1983) and Meyer & Rowan (1991) proposed 
that organisations can decouple particular structural features of the organisation from its 
primary activities. Organisations can demonstrate compliance with norms and values in 
society by having structures and practices that are (partly) ceremonial, while the actual 
ways of working are not greatly affected. DiMaggio & Powell (1983) argue that this 
decoupling allows the organisation to adhere to various institutional demands, while 
organising its primary processes more efficiently than would be possible if it were to 
adhere to all institutional requirements. It must be noted that decoupling does not 
necessarily mean that the actual ways of working remain unaltered, while requirements 
from external institutions are kept at arm’s length. Siti-Nabiha & Scapens (2005) argue 
that decoupling can also create a (temporarily) stable organisation. This stability may then 
create the conditions to introduce change in the organisation. However, older views of 
decoupling focused on contradictory institutional pressures on the organisation that were 
alleviated by introducing structures and practices that were predominantly ceremonial in 
character.  
 
2.3.3 NIS and changes in the management accounting system 
Scott & Meyer (1991), Scott (1991) and Richardson (1987) argue that accounting can be 
employed to satisfy external constituents, while ‘shielding’ internal processes from too 
much intrusion by these external constituents. Accounting procedures, such as budgeting, 
serves this role when funding authorities are located outside the organisation (e.g. 
hospitals and public services, such as the police and fire department). Friedland & Alford 
(1991) argue that the accounting system introduces socially constructed categories of 
material action, such as “profit” or “debt”, and as such represents institutions that exist in 
wider society. In their view, accounting has come to constitute some of society’s 
preferences, and this has more consequences for the operations of the organisation, than 
the “accounting-for-legitimacy” view suggests. Friedland & Alford argue that “profit” and 
“debt” are ‘culturally and politically constructed categories whose definition changes 
historically with shifts in accounting policies and tax laws’ (1991, p. 245). Meyer & 
Rowan make a similar point when stating that ‘modern accounting creates ceremonial 
production functions and maps them onto economic production functions…. Monetary 
prices, in postindustrial society, reflect hosts of ceremonial influences, as do economic 
measures of efficiency, profitability, or net worth’ (1991, p. 51) In these views, changes in 
accounting systems stem from changes in wider societal preferences or institutions. For 
example, Skaerbaek (1992) argues that the introduction of a new accounting system at a 
theatre in Copenhagen was an attempt to introduce a form of accountability in the theatre. 
However, this challenged the artistic standards of the theatre, representing a potential 
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conflict between two sources of institutions. This example exposes both the strength and 
the weakness of NIS theorising. NIS sensitises the observer to the socially constructed 
nature of practices, such as accounting, and the role it plays in social interaction. 
However, it also points to the emphasis on stability in NIS theory. NIS points to the forces 
that lead to isomorphism, but it does not address the forces that cause institutions to 
change. 
 
NIS ‘is always in danger of forgetting that labelling a process or structure does not explain 
it’ (Zucker, 1991, p. 106). It describes the general processes that can be observed from the 
premise that institutional forces cause organisations to resemble each other. NIS provides 
various reasons for the emergence of stable organisational configurations (legitimisation, 
responses to uncertainty, professionalism); but it does not account for the unpredictable 
and fluid nature of organisational change. It derives all explanations for observations from 
arguments which place external institutions in the centre of the analysis. NIS depicts the 
need for structural change as an inescapable consequence of institutional change. In this 
view, the individual is assumed to be primarily motivated by a desire to conform to 
institutional pressures. This institutional determinism (the assumption that the individual 
is motivated by a desire to conform to institutional pressures) leaves NIS open to 
criticism. In particular, the assumption of organisational passivity and the failure to 
address strategic behaviours and conscious interventions have been criticised in the past 
(Covaleski & Dirsmith, 1988; Oliver, 1991).  
 
2.3.4 More recent developments in NIS  
In the previous section, I touched upon two areas that are underdeveloped in NIS, and that 
are problematic for studies of change: (1) NIS was originally a theory more concerned 
with explaining stability than change; and as a consequence (2) it does not explain how 
institutionally constrained actors can challenge and change those institutions. More 
recently, NIS theorists have made several attempts to extend NIS theory to cope with 
these problems. This section will explain these refinements.  
 
Oliver (1991) introduced a degree of wilfulness on the part of the institutionally 
constrained actors. She discusses the various strategies that an organisation can deploy in 
response to institutional pressures. She therefore questions the notion of institutional 
determinism, as she argues that people can make attempts to resist institutional pressures. 
She proposes that institutions do not cause a course of action to be selected, but rather 
they are variables in a selection process of alternative strategies, that constitute a varying 
degree of active resistance to institutional pressures. Baum & Oliver (1996) combined 
ecological and institutional explanations for organisational action to combine institutional 
arguments with resource dependency arguments. The advantage of this view is that it 
allows the combination of institutional pressures and also purposeful economic action, 
while earlier NIS theories largely ignored this type of action. Oliver (1992) sketched the 
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outlines of a theory that addresses the way in which institutionally constrained people are 
able to bring about institutional change. She focused on the determinants of institutional 
erosion, dissipation and rejection. Instead of NIS’s emphasis on cultural persistence, she 
studied the factors that affect deinstitutionalisation, and thus she created the outlines of a 
theory based on NIS, which can explain change as opposed to NIS’s earlier focus on 
stability.  
 
Greenwood & Hinings (1996) built further on the work of Oliver (1992). They proposed a 
framework of radical change, in which they bridge NIS and OIE. They model 
organisational change as a series of processes that are influenced by the institutional 
context. As such, they introduced a view that perceives organisational change as a 
complex process that is not only affected by institutional pressures, but also by the 
rationality of the market context in which firms operate. Similar to Baum & Oliver (1996), 
Greenwood & Hinings proposed that institutional pressures do not prevent actors from 
acting reflectively, but rather that change consists of a web of different processes that 
affect the outcomes of change. Siti-Nabiha & Scapens (2005) presented a theoretical 
framework that retains an OIE perspective, but also addresses issues that used to belong to 
the NIS domain such as decoupling. They did so by addressing the processes of change, 
focusing on both internal and external institutional influences. Roberts & Greenwood 
(1997) also used a processual view, but they proposed a combination of NIS and NIE. 
They used the foundations of NIE, consisting of the notion of comparative-efficiency in 
design selection as a starting point. This type of design selection means that an 
organisational design will be adopted based on the expected improvements it will bring to 
the efficiency of the organisation. Roberts & Greenwood (1997) adapted this view to 
include institutional pressures and constraints that influence this selection process. 
However, contrary to Greenwood & Hinings (1996), Roberts & Greenwood (1997) do not 
address the process of change, but rather the selection of change. 
 
The early NIS pioneers discussed institutions primarily in terms of stable organisational 
structures that reflect institutionalised beliefs about legitimate and rational processes and 
structures. As Oliver notes: ‘the emphasis in the institutional literature on legitimation 
processes, organisational conformity and enduring organisational change has tended to 
preclude inquiry into the factors that cause organisations to challenge, discard or abandon 
legitimated or institutionalised organisational practices’ (1992, p. 564). Since then, 
different authors have tried to expand NIS to include explanations of change. The authors 
discussed here have in common that they attempted to introduce a processual view of 
institutional change. Oliver (1992) and Greenwood & Hinings (1996) studied the 
processes of institutional change using a theoretical framework that is grounded in NIS 
reasoning, but that also includes insights from OIE. Roberts & Greenwood (1997) 
combine insights from NIS and NIE to provide a processual view of organisational design 
selection.  
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However, these efforts have not addressed the position of individuals in these processes or 
the effects of institutions on the actions of individuals. The frameworks discussed here 
remain quite impersonal, as they do not address the link between individual action and the 
wider institutional environment, nor do they clarify the role of the individual in 
institutional change. The later NIS inspired articles have provided some valuable insights 
in the process of institutional change, and the work of Greenwood & Hinings is 
particularly interesting as it studied the dynamics of institutional change by combining 
viewpoints from NIS and OIE. Whereas NIS emphasised persistence, OIE uses changes in 
social entities as a starting point. Therefore, the next section will discuss the principles of 
OIE in more detail. 
 
2.4 Old Institutional Economics 
This section addresses Old Institutional Economics (OIE). This ‘theory’ emerged early in 
the twentieth century, and is the oldest theory of the three discussed in this chapter. OIE 
grew out of dissatisfaction with existing economic theory. Its proponents, such as Veblen, 
Ayrens and Commons, were critical about the assumptions of mainstream economics. In 
particular, assumptions relating to the presumed rationality of economic actors and the 
concept of equilibrium conditions are challenged by OIE. OIE theorising revolves around 
common beliefs, norms and values that bind together action patterns. As such it provides 
additional explanations for human action, apart from those proposed by ‘traditional’ 
economics.  
 
OIE is not a clearly delineated theory. Rather, it is a collection of ideas that Hodgson 
(2000, p. 318) describes as following:  
(1) Although institutional economists are keen to give their theories practical 
relevance, institutionalism itself is not defined in terms of any policy 
proposals. 
(2) Institutionalism makes extensive use of ideas and data from other 
disciplines, such as psychology, sociology and anthropology in order to 
develop a richer analysis of institutions and human behaviour. 
(3) Institutions are the key elements of any economy, and thus a major task for 
economists is to study institutions and the processes of institutional 
conservation, innovation and change. 
(4) The economy is an open and evolving system, situated in a natural 
environment, effected by technological changes, and embedded in a broader 
set of social, cultural, political and power relationships. 
(5) The notion of individual agents as utility-maximising is regarded as 
inadequate or erroneous. Institutionalism does not take the individual as 
given. Individuals are affected by their institutional and cultural situations. 
Hence individuals do not simply (intentionally or unintentionally) create 
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institutions. Through “reconstitutive downward causation” (Hodgson, 2000) 
institutions affect individuals in fundamental ways.  
 
These general principles of economic action are clearly different from those belonging to 
‘traditional’ economic theory. With regards to human behaviour, OIE is situated between 
transaction economics, that is provides an undersocialised account of human behaviour 
and institutional sociology that provides an over-socialised account of behaviour 
(Granovetter, 1985; Roberts & Greenwood, 1997). OIE maintains that human action is 
constrained by institutions, but it also recognises that institutions enable people to come to 
meaningful action. For example, Sjöstrand (1993) regards institutions as infrastructures 
for human action. In OIE, institutions can be either formal or informal. Formal institutions 
are grounded in existing procedures, manuals and formal rules. Informal institutions do 
not have a formalised basis, but they have rule-like status due to the perceptions that these 
institutionalised practices ‘have always been done that way’.  
 
OIE emphasises that institutions appear unalterable and permanent. This is partly, because 
they tend to be self-reinforcing. As noted above, institutions constrain actions to those that 
fit the tacit assumptions that are part of the institution. Sjöstrand (1995, p. 19) argues that 
institutions are constituted by and reinforced through social (inter)actions. This will be 
explored further in chapter 10, but the point made here is that OIE recognises the self-
enforcing quality of institutions. Moreover, OIE argues that institutions are not 
independent of the individuals that inhabit the various social settings; rather, institutions 
exist through behaviours of these individuals. As such, there must be some distinguishable 
relation between institutions and individual action. In this, OIE differs from the other 
approaches discussed in this chapter. Both NIE and NIS assume that institutions exist 
independently from individual behaviour. OIE sees individual behaviour as an integral 
part of the institutions that govern much of social life: ‘institutions simplify action 
choices; they are not separate from, but are part of, the individual (inter)actions’ 
(Sjöstrand, 1995, p. 21). However, although OIE recognises the relation between 
institutions and individual behaviour, it does not pursue a detailed explanation of this 
relation or the processes leading to changes in institutionally induced behaviours. 
Moreover, with its emphasis on the self-reinforcing qualities of institutions, OIE is not 
particularly sensitive to questions related to the source of change. If people perceive each 
other’s actions and behaviours in terms of the institutions common to their social group, 
how can change ever occur? In fact, I distinguish two problems related to OIE, that are 
relevant for this thesis. These will be shortly discussed next.  
 
The first problem related to OIE, is that it does not provide insights into the drivers for 
institutional change. OIE assumes institutions to be present, but it does not clarify when 
people come to that conscious recognition that institutional arrangements are no longer 
adequate. In other words, it does not clarify when individuals come to the collective 
recognition that something needs to change (Seo & Creed, 2002). The second problem 
related to the usefulness of OIE to this thesis is that OIE as a set of theories does not 
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provide an explanation or detailed description of the relation between individual action 
and the presence of institutions. It provides an alternative to the assumption of the 
economically rational actor, and it outlines some of the influences on human (inter)action, 
other than an all-consuming desire to gain welfare or a mindless adherence to external 
institutional pressures. But it does not clarify how processes of institutional change 
proceed on a micro level. Although the focus of many OIE theorists has been on a macro-
level, being concerned with organisations and societies (e.g. see Nelson & Winter, 1982, 
for a study of institutional change on a macro level), little is known about the impact of 
institutions on individuals or about how individuals are able to alter institutions. 
 
However, in the last decade, a number of authors have used the principles of OIE to come 
to an explanation of institutional change. I will deal here with two of them as they are 
often referred to in this thesis. Barley & Tolbert (1997) argue that institutions are encoded 
in behavioural regularities or ‘scripts’ (‘Observable, recurrent activities and patterns of 
interaction characteristic of a particular setting’ (p. 98)) that are enacted in ‘the realm of 
action’. Actions can replicate or revise these behavioural regularities. Finally, these 
regularities can be externalised in the institutional realm, meaning that these behaviours 
are rendered independent from the particular circumstances of their conception. They have 
become ‘just the way things are’. Basically, Barley & Tolbert argue that institutional 
change can occur through alterations in behavioural regularities over time. These 
regularities thus constitute and are constituted by institutions. Basically, changes in scripts 
can cause changes in institutions. Barley & Tolbert (1997) conceptualised behavioural 
regularities by the notion of scripts, while Burns & Scapens (2000) have focused on rules 
(formal rules and procedures) and routines (actual behavioural patterns). Burns and 
Scapens have explicitly modelled how the interdependence between action and structure 
may lead to institutional change. This is depicted graphically in Figure 2-1. 
 














Key:  a = encoding
          b = enacting
          c = reproduction




Figure 2-1: A Framework of institutionalisation (taken from Burns & Scapens, 2000, p. 9) 
 
Burns & Scapens argue that institutions are encoded in rules and routines1 (arrow a). 
These rules and routines are enacted (arrow b) and reproduced (arrow c) through actions 
undertaken by the individual actors. Yet through this ongoing enacting and reproduction, 
changes to rules and routines emerge that, under specific conditions, can be 
institutionalised (arrow d). Once rules and routines have been institutionalised, ‘in the 
absence of ‘external’ changes, such as advances in technology, or a take-over crisis, there 
is unlikely to be a reopening of previously agreed arrangements and therefore routines 
may become somewhat resistant to change’ (Burns & Scapens, 2000, p. 10). These 
institutional arrangements comprise the taken-for-granted assumptions that a certain 
pattern of behaviour is the norm for the social group of which one is part. Burns & 
Scapens (2000) also note that rules can affect routines in the sense that new rules can lead 
to an adaptation of existing routines, but the opposite is also possible. Routines can be 
formalised to preserve current ways of working and to facilitate the entrance of new 
members into the group. Although institutionalised routines are resistant to change, they 
                                                
1 Note that Barley & Tolbert (1997) argued that institutions are encoded in scripts. 
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argue, change is possible. Yet, the framework does not specify how human agency takes 
its form. How do people organise themselves to come to coordinated action that has the 
potential to alter the institutional arrangements in their social setting? How does the 
interaction between rules and routines manifest itself to an employee in an organisation? 
How does the institutionalisation of rules and routines work? These are questions that 
relate to the role of human agency in institutional theory. Burns & Scapens (2000) offer a 
framework to assess the process of institutional change. But ‘the framework is offered as a 
starting point for researchers interested in studying management accounting change, and 
through such studies, the framework will be extended and refined’ (Burns & Scapens, 
2000, p. 3).  
 
So far, I have argued that OIE allows for a more comprehensive conceptualisation of the 
individual than NIE. OIE allows us to abandon the ‘traditional’ view of the individual. 
NIS emphasises legitimacy as the motivation for much human action, but this resulted in 
the criticism that NIS theory depends on an over-socialised individual (Granovetter, 
1985). Moreover, NIS theory is primarily concerned with organisations and societies as 
the unit of analysis; institutions are regarded as external to organisational participants. 
OIE may provide a solution to these problems; however, I also identified two difficulties 
associated with OIE theories that are not resolved by the OIE inspired literature: (1) OIE 
does not provide any insights into what causes people to recognise the inadequacy of 
institutions; or put differently: where institutional change comes from; and (2) OIE does 
not provide explanations of agency in the process of institutional change; the role of 
individual behaviours therein. 
 
2.4.1 The onset to change: what causes institutional change? 
The first problem associated with OIE is that it does not theorise about the onset to 
change. It does not provide clarity about how institutionally constrained individuals can 
change the institutions that shape their preferences, actions and conceptions of rationality. 
This issue was not adequately addressed by Barley & Tolbert (1997); as Seo & Creed 
note: ‘they still leave an important theoretical dilemma unresolved: when and how do 
actors actually decide to revise behavioural scripts when their actions and thoughts are 
constantly constrained by the existing institutional system? In explaining institutional 
change, Barley and Tolbert propose, first, that a critical number of actors must make a 
collective, conscious choice before they can make a multilateral departure from 
established patterns of social reproduction (scripts) and, second, that a bigger contextual 
change (e.g. technological and economic shock) may be necessary before actors can make 
such a collective choice’ (2002, p. 224). Seo & Creed go on to argue that Barley & 
Tolbert do not explain where this shock comes from, nor do they clarify how the process 
of collective recognition and choice proceeds. The same holds for the work of Burns & 
Scapens (2000), who distinguish between revolutionary change (change that radically 
challenges existing institutions and routine ways of working) and evolutionary change 
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(change that takes a rather long time, and which is shaped by a combination of random 
factors and organisational inertia, that can lead to resistance to the change). Revolutionary 
change is a significant disruption of established routines. Such change makes it necessary 
to establish new meanings through which to make sense of organisational activities; as 
such, it involves a conscious choice for change. Evolutionary change, on the other hand, 
does not necessarily involve choice. It is the process of change in routines that occur in 
response to wider institutional changes (Scapens, 1994, p. 312). But they do not discuss 
the process that leads up to the changes in themselves. Although these authors argue that 
change is path-dependent, they do not extend the consequences of this path dependency to 
the recognition of a need for change.   
 
Many studies of accounting change (Burns & Scapens, 2000; Euske & Riccaboni, 1999; 
Ezzamel et al., 1997) argue that the traditional functional rationalist approach does not 
sufficiently capture the complexities involved in the process of organisational change 
(Scapens, 1994). But then, this literature does not focus on the timeframe that precedes the 
implementation of change. The conception of a need for change remains rooted in a 
traditional rationalistic approach. Case studies on management accounting change 
motivate the need for the change by referring to external pressures or simply as a demand 
by senior management that is considered ‘given’ (e.g. Vaivo, 1999; Ezzamel et al., 1997). 
The paradox that arises is: although the OIE inspired literature on management accounting 
change rejects the notion of rational optimising individuals when looking at the 
implementation of change processes, it does not do so relating to the perceived need for 
the change. The need for management accounting change is presented as self-evident and 
independent from the organisational context. The reason for the disruption of existing 
routines remains largely unquestioned. 
 
Seo & Creed (2002, p. 225) argue that one of the primary causes of institutional change is 
what they call ‘institutional contradiction’; the ruptures and inconsistencies that emerge 
within established social arrangements. They argue that this institutional contradiction 
produces tension and potential conflict, which can shape consciousness and lead to actions 
to change the present order. Seo & Creed’s analysis and their use of institutional 
contradiction provides a useful framework for studying the conception of changes in the 
management accounting practices at the Rabobank. It sensitises theorists to the tensions 
that come to exist between and within institutions. However, Seo & Creed do not 
elaborate on how these ruptures and tensions materialise themselves to organisational 
participants, who are under their influence. Therefore, although this thesis takes the hints 
that are provided by Seo & Creed (2002), it needs to go beyond their pointers, and to 
discuss how institutional contradiction affects the people involved.  
 
2. Institutional theory 
 28
2.4.2 Explanations for the process of change and the individual’s role 
therein 
Attempts have been made in recent years to elaborate on the process of institutional 
change. Although these efforts do not necessarily qualify as OIE per se, they draw on its 
objections to the ‘traditional’ depiction of the individual and the use of other theories, 
such as sociology and psychology. Two of these efforts are particularly worth noting, as 
they attempt to describe the process of institutional change on the level of social groups. 
Barley & Tolbert (1997) and Burns & Scapens (2000) have both attempted to provide a 
partial solution to the first problem that was identified above (OIE’s inability to provide 
an account for the process of change on a micro level). They have adopted the argument 
that institutions constrain and enable action through behavioural regularities. These 
approaches will be discussed shortly here.  
 
Seo & Creed have recognised the lack of attention for the role of human agency in OIE 
and frameworks inspired by OIE. They argued that institutional change can arise from 
agency embedded in incompatible institutional arrangements. They refer to this 
phenomenon as praxis. Praxis involves: ‘(1) actors’ self-awareness or critical 
understanding of the existing social conditions in which their needs and interests are 
unmet; (2) actors’ mobilization, inspired by the new, collective understanding of their 
social conditions and themselves; and (3) actors’ multilateral or collective action to 
reconstruct the existing social arrangements and themselves’ (2002, p. 230). This notion 
of praxis provides a more detailed understanding of human agency, but it assumes that 
agents are primarily motivated to act if their needs and interests are unmet (see ad. (1) 
above), as well as it involves an active search for alternatives (Seo & creed, 2002, pp. 
230). As such, it hints at the assumption of economic optimisation that early OIE theory 
criticised. It represents a movement that Granovetter describes as a movement ‘from a 
position, earlier in the twentieth century, of drawing eclectically on several other 
disciplines, to a stance of building its arguments almost entirely out of neoclassical 
materials’ (1992, p. 3). Although the notion of praxis presents a possible explanation of 
the process of action that may lead to institutional change, it remains limited in that it does 
not address human aspirations, ambitions and desires on a micro scale. However, Seo & 
Creed’s discussion (2002) does direct attention to two problems associated with the OIE 
inspired management accounting change literature. OIE does not clarify how people come 
to that conscious point that they realise that action is in order and it does not explain how 
institutional change is presented to the institutionally constrained individual, e.g. through 
tensions in the actual use vs. intended use of accounting practices and systems.  
  
Old Institutional Economics is a stream of theoretical ideas that accommodates the study 
of management accounting changes rather well. It allows for an eclectic approach that 
serves as an understanding of the processes underpinning changes in accounting systems 
and procedures. The practices of management accounting can be seen as the rules and 
routines that constitute and are constituted by the institutions present in a social setting. 
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As such, institutional theory in general and OIE in particular are promising for the study 
on the process of institutional change. However, I identified two problem areas that need 
resolving in order to clarify how individual behaviour is affected by institutional changes 
and changes in the accounting system. Both problem areas are related to the way in which 
human agency is possible for institutionally constrained individuals. (1) How do 
institutionally constrained individuals recognise a need for management accounting 
change and decide to act upon this need; i.e., how does the decision for intervention 
materialise; and (2) how do these individuals give form to institutional change; i.e. how do 
individuals actually intervene in particular institutions which are constituted by 
accounting rules and routines? Seo & Creed (2002) have recognised these issues and they 
have provided hints on how to address them. Their attention to human agency in 
institutions and their analysis of the representation of the need for institutional change is 
especially useful for this thesis. As such, they have started to fill in the blanks left by OIE 
and the management accounting change literature inspired by OIE. This thesis will discuss 
the theoretical issues outlined above, drawing on insights from various disciplines, with 
the objective to contribute to the institutional perspectives on management accounting 
change, that have emerged in the management accounting literature.  
 
2.5 Discussion 
This chapter has provided an overview of institutional theory. More specifically, it 
discussed three streams of institutional theory: New Institutional Economics (NIE), New 
Institutional Sociology (NIS) and Old Institutional Economics (OIE). The purpose was to 
clarify the focal points of the various institutional theories. NIE was identified to be 
closely associated to ‘traditional’ economics, in that it adopts the image of a boundedly 
rational individual. Moreover, NIE, in its application of Transaction Cost Economics is 
especially concerned with the evolution of the governance structures of organisations. As 
such, the cost of transacting is the unit of analysis. Moreover, Transaction Cost 
Economics does not describe or explain processes of organisational adaptation. Rather, it 
identifies optimal future states of the organisation’s governance structure under specific 
conditions. These considerations make NIE an unlikely candidate to theorise about the 
process of institutional change. NIS does not employ a process view either. It regards 
individual behaviour as primarily governed by external institutions and driven by a desire 
to increase the legitimacy of oneself and the organisation in which one works. Although 
NIS may explain the emergence of practices such as Activity Based Costing and the 
Balanced Scorecard, by referring to the acceptance of these practices by the wider 
business community as legitimate and desirable, it does not describe how the process of 
implementation of new practices proceeds. NIS therefore focuses more on organisational 
responses to wider institutional pressures, and as such its view of the individual may be 
regarded as deterministic (in that human actions are primarily dictated by the presence of 
institutions). OIE is not a theory in itself, but a set of principles that allow for eclecticism. 
As a result, theories inspired by OIE can be sophisticated with regards to the qualities of 
2. Institutional theory 
 30
the individual. OIE has inspired a number of theorists to apply the notion of institutions, 
as discussed by OIE, to processes of organisational change. Barley & Tolbert (1997), 
Burns & Scapens (2000), Seo & Creed (2002) and Phillips et al. (2004) have attempted to 
model how the process of institutional change proceeds. However, this chapter has 
identified two areas that need elaborating: the recognition of a need for change and the 
way human agency materialises are topics that need to be clarified in order to discuss the 
changes in management accounting practices at the Rabobank.  
  
Some of the main features of the three streams of institutional theory are summarised in 
Table 2-1: 
 






Economics and the 




Transaction Organisation Social (sub) group 
Assumptions 
on individual 





Process view? No No Yes 
Changes 
addressed 








Efficiency External legitimacy Behavioural 
regularities 
Table 2-1: Features of three streams of institutional theory 
 
This thesis is about the processes of change that are instigated by a formal change 
program. The knowledge it needs to yield must include the ways in which social groups 
deal with programs of organisational change. The theoretical basis of the thesis will 
therefore contain theories that stem from OIE. More specifically, it will use the 
frameworks devised by Barley & Tolbert (1997) and Burns & Scapens (2000) as a starting 
point for exploring human agency in institutional theory.  
 
As argued above, these frameworks leave some blanks. These frameworks for addressing 
(management accounting) change within organisations do not address two important 
issues: (1) how do institutionally constrained individuals recognise a need for change and 
decide to act upon this need; i.e., how does the decision for intervention materialise; and 
(2) how do these individuals give form to institutional change; i.e. how do individuals 
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actually intervene in institutions? Therefore, I need a theoretical framework that explicitly 
addresses these issues. Furthermore, the theoretical framework must guide our 
investigation of accounting changes inside the Rabobank. In order to do so I need a 
framework that allows us to draw inferences about the linkages between the institutional 
environment and individual behaviour (such as habits and routines). This will be the topic 
of the next chapter. Chapter three will propose a theoretical framework that will be used to 
inform our inquiry of accounting change at the Rabobank.  
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3 Stability & Change: Making Sense of Experience 
when Scripts Break Down 
3.1 Introduction 
Organisations that strive for durable organisational change will have to address the issue 
of embedding this change in the daily tasks of different groups of employees. As chapter 2 
argued, the efforts of Burns and Scapens (2000) offer an insight into the embedding of 
management accounting in day-to-day practices. Yet, the transition from the analytical 
ideas of their proposed framework to day-to-day observations within an organisational 
setting is rather difficult to make. Although their ideas form a useful framework for 
thought, they need to be expanded further. Their ideas in their current form do not answer 
two important questions: (1) how do institutionally constrained individuals recognise a 
need for management accounting change and decide to act upon this need; i.e., how does 
the decision for intervention materialise; and (2) how do these individuals give form to 
institutional change; i.e. how do individuals actually intervene in particular institutions 
which are constituted by accounting rules and routines? These questions revolve around 
the role of individual behaviour in institutional change, a topic that the OIE inspired 
literature on management accounting change has largely ignored. Therefore, to be able to 
explore accounting changes at the Rabobank through an OIE perspective, we need to 
develop a framework that is in line with the ideas of Barley & Tolbert (1997) and Burns & 
Scapens (2000) on the one hand, but offers a more detailed perspective on how 
institutions change, and how this change affects the individual and his social group.  
 
This chapter will propose a theoretical framework, which addresses some of the blank 
spots in the applications of the ideas coined by OIE theorists. It will focus on the way in 
which human agency is possible in institutions. The framework envisaged here offers a 
micro perspective on the institutionalisation of practice and the processes that actors face 
when these institutionalised practices are challenged. It will provide an explanation for the 
process of interaction between individual action and collective social structures, such as 
institutions and it attempts to bridge the two. It also looks into the disruptions of routines 
and the anxiety that can result. It will explore the qualities of routines that make them 
supposedly resistant to change. The goal will be to explore the process of institutional 
change.  
 
The role of routines in processes of management accounting change have been explicated 
in the framework of Burns and Scapens (2000), in which they explain that action through 
the reproduction and adaptation of rules (the formalised working procedures) and routines 
(working procedures-in-use) influence institutional change. However, it is not clear how 
routines change in the first place. An issue that was subsequently addressed by Busco et 
al.(2000), who described the take-over of an Italian company by the American corporation 
3. Stability & change 
 34
General Electric. They observed that this take-over induced a ‘shock’ that could cancel 
out the ontological security that individuals strive for, and that could allow for an 
‘unfreezing’ of formal and informal agreed rules of behaviour. This is not disputed in this 
work, but following this line of argument would needlessly limit the reader to assuming 
that nothing short of a shock would be able to effectively implement management 
accounting change. It would not leave much room to explore change that occurs without 
explicit disruption of existing arrangements. In other words, it is left unclear why it is that 
some successful implementations are relatively harmonious, in the absence of crisis, while 
others stir up the organisation, as routines display their resistant nature towards change, 
necessitating the ‘unfreezing’ of routines through an introduction of a shock. To devise a 
framework that identifies the possible routes of institutional change on a micro-level, the 
chapter is structured as follows. The chapter is divided in two sections: one section 
dealing with stability in organisations and one dealing with change in organisations.  
 
Although one can argue that stability is a concept that has meaning only relative to 
change, the first section serves to explain the inherent stability of coordinated 
organisational action. The chapter starts from the premises that stability is not the absence 
of change, but the presence of regularities. This warrants an explicit theoretical treatise on 
organisational stability. The section explains how decision-making by rule following aids 
organisational stability. I will argue that organisational decision-making processes are 
inherently stable as they are mostly driven by relatively inarticulate processing 
mechanisms: the script. Then the following section will demonstrate that routines 
themselves are not specifically resistant to change, unless they are accompanied by scripts 
that are. I will take the position that routines are the behavioural expressions that may 
point to cognitive scripts and schemas. It is this that validates the strong emphasis on 
cognitive structures in this work. The section will demonstrate the effects of employing 
scripts, using the candid overview by Gioia of the events at Ford during the Pinto crisis. 
The text to that point rephrases the main questions. Instead of asking: how does 
institutional change proceed in organisations, it becomes: if cognitive structures cause 
individuals to display some degree of stability in their decision characteristics, under what 
conditions are people induced to reconsider these structures, and what affects their new 
form?  
 
The second section will address these questions. The section starts by categorising the 
concept of change into first order change and second order change, as proposed by 
Bartunek & Moch (1987) and Nielsen & Bartunek (1996). It will argue that it is especially 
important to explore how individuals select and invent new scripts. To do so, I have 
adapted a framework of Louis (1980), who noted that a breakdown of cognitive scripts 
culminates in a sense making effort. It is this sense making effort that is triggered by the 
inability of existing cognitive structures to deal with novel events. Sense making then 
leads to new scripts, better adept at dealing with similar classes of experiences as the one 
that triggered its conception. Sense making thus leads to new meanings being given to 
experience, on which repeated action (i.e. routines) can be based.  
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The chapter will propose a framework that explains how institutional change emerges 
within social groups, from the perspective of the individual as participant in these social 
groups. This framework will be used for the enquiry at the Rabobank.  
 
3.2  Stability in Organisations 
3.2.1 Decisions as rule following 
Several authors have recognised two possible categories of decision-making processes 
(March, 1994; Levitt & March, 1996). These two categories confront two possible views 
of decisions for choice: the economically rational1 decision and rule-following behaviour. 
As chapter 2 discussed, the first view on decisions assumes that the decision maker 
engages in intendedly rational calculation. Decisions are based on an evaluation of 
alternatives in terms of their consequences for preferences. Rational- or intended rational 
choice is an activity of defining preferences, assessing alternatives and their consequences 
and selecting that alternative that matches the consequences which are close to predefined 
preferences. For example, strategic decisions have been presupposed to be a rational-
comprehensive process (Wooldridge & Floyd, 1990) that can yield optimal solutions. 
Assumptions on the rational nature of decision-making processes have had their share of 
criticism. ‘The neglect of context and the role of powerful groups within it has produced a 
situation in which myths abound about rational problem solving processes and linear 
implementation’ (Pettigrew et al., 1992, p. 7).  
 
The second view replaces the logic of consequence by the logic of appropriateness, in 
which actions are matched to situations by means of rules that are appropriate for such 
situations. The guiding principle is then no longer the ability to select an alternative based 
on its perceived utility, but rather to select the proper alternative while following a certain 
decision rule appropriate for certain situations and for certain roles that one can play. 
March illustrates the distinction between the logic of appropriateness and the logic of 
consequentiality by the following table: 
 
                                                
1 The word ‘rational’ here may seem misleading. It may imply that rule following is not rational. This is not 
suggested here. Rule following may be the most rational thing to do for an individual who lacks sufficient 
information processing capabilities.  
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Anticipatory action (logic of 
consequentiality) 
Obligatory action (logic of 
appropriateness) 
1. What are my alternatives? 1. What kind of situation is this? 
2. What are my values? 2. Who am I? 
3. What are the consequences of my 
alternatives for my values? 
3. How appropriate are different actions 
for me in this situation? 
4. Choose the best alternative that has the 
best consequences. 
4. Do what is most appropriate. 
Table 3-1: Anticipatory action vs. Obligatory action 
 
Rule following in choice is supported by Zucker (1991, p. 85), who notes: ‘when acts 
have ready-made accounts (Garfinkel, 1967), they are institutionalised, that is they are 
both objective and exterior. (…) While these accounts are socially created, they function 
as objective rules because their social origin is ignored (Schutz, 1962). At the same time, 
ready-made accounts define the possible–institutionalisation makes clear what is rational 
in an objective sense’. Rules as noted by March are often institutionalised, but not 
necessarily so. For example, a ‘trendsetter’ type of person is labelled as such more by the 
absence of institutionalised rules of behaviour, rather than because of their presence. Rule 
following in choosing is considered important by a number of authors including 
DiMaggio & Powell (1991), Greenwood & Hinings (1996), March & Simon (1958), and 
March (1989a; 1989b). But different schools of thought take rules to be so obvious, that 
they are not explored in their own right, but rather as a context for behaviour. For 
example, DiMaggio & Powell (1991), as representatives of NIS theorists, have presented 
the theme of legitimation towards the outside world. Rule following then implies 
legitimised behaviour. 
 
Rule following in action choice is a complex starting point for analysis. It involves the 
definition of appropriate rules for varying situations. The next paragraph will address 
roles, which can be considered desired and expected behaviours by others and identity as 
an expression of how we see ourselves. The section will argue that roles and identity, 
combined with rules of proper behaviour, are intrinsically linked. Its purpose is to 
demonstrate the inherently stable nature of choice by rule following (cf. Leblebici & 
Salancik, 1982).  
 
3.2.2 Roles, Rules and Identity 
Identity involves the definition of one’s role within the organisation and ones sense of self 
(March, 1994). Identity is the linking pin between the individual actor and his roles and 
associated rules of behaviour. It is important to note that the formal rules of conduct are 
associated with roles and not with individuals. Individuals are only bound by rules of 
proper behaviour through the influence of roles on their identity. Weber has discussed the 
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notion of roles and their implications for behaviour, although he refers primarily to the 
occupation of an office, which in itself is compatible with a role in March’s terms. March 
(1989a, p. 23) argues that: ‘rules define relationships among roles in terms of what an 
incumbent of one role owes to incumbents of other roles. The terminology is one of duties 
and obligations rather than anticipatory, consequential decision making’. 
 
Identity and role are linked through motivated action. Identity is important in explaining 
motivated behaviour and the sense that this behaviour makes (Dutton et al., 1994). 
Zijderveld (1973) observes that motivated behaviour results from the fact that situations 
are defined in terms of action and possible results of these actions. He finds that 
purposeful and motivated action is therefore more an attitude than anything else. It is a 
special attitude in the sense that it involves the matching of the identity of the actor with 
the definition of the situation. Role is the manifestation of an actors presumed course of 
action and attitude that is expected by others in the group. Zijderveld uses an example to 
illustrate this definition of a role. He notes that when two randomly chosen groups of 
people pooled in soccer teams are asked to kick a ball, not much result can be expected. 
Behaviour remains unmotivated, because the actors cannot identify with the role of 
‘soccer player’. The roles remain empty shells, because of the inability of actors to see 
themselves or the team members as soccer players. Once one contrasts this with the play 
of two professional soccer teams, one would observe clear roles, definitions and 
motivations. Players are more motivated as they identify with the role of soccer player. 
‘Their roles are…filled, if it were, with identity: I belong in club A and I am a left-back’ 
(Zijderveld, 1973, p. 134). This example focuses on a condition for motivated action: a 
match between identity (as an expression on how one sees ones self and how others see 
ones self) and role (how others expect one to behave in a certain setting).  
 
Identity and ego-identity are subjective notions of who we are and how we are seen. Roles 
are notions of what we are supposed to do and be in certain social settings. We all have 
multiple roles and they are contingent upon the social setting we find ourselves in as well 
as the choices we have made about the roles we wish to fulfil. Motivated action is possible 
when actors are able to align identity and roles, to the extent that the role is internalised by 
the actor. Rules follow from roles. They are the procedures and decision rules that are 
associated with specific roles. As such, rules are the behavioural patters that follow from 
the occupation of roles. From this line of argument, it follows that the actual behaviours of 
actors are influenced not only by the role under which the decisions are taken, but also by 
the identity of the actor and the degree of alignment of role and identity. Moreover, the 
alignment of identity and role is an important condition in the propensity to act according 
to the rules common in the social circle in which we move. It can be depicted graphically 
as follows: 





(What should I do?)
Rules




Figure 3-1: Identity and roles in rule following 
 
From the perspective of rule driven decision-making, March (1994) noted that first an 
assessment is made on the type of situation. Based on the outcome, an individual usually 
knows which role to play. A range of possible action choices, i.e. the rules of proper 
behaviour, feeds the role patterns. However, limited purposeful action can occur, without 
the inclusion of identity. This was observed by March who incorporates the question ‘who 
am I?’ in decision-making based on rules, as well as Zijderveld (1973) who observes that 
motivated action needs an alignment of identity and role. The following paragraphs will 
argue that this view of decisions implies that decision patterns are inherently stable. 
 
Rule based decision-making can be learned. For example: ‘The management of the office 
follows general rules, which are more or less stable, more or less exhaustive, and which 
can be learned. Knowledge of these rules represents a special technical expertise, which 
the officials possess. It involves jurisprudence, administrative or business management’ 
(Weber, 1968, p. 958). From the perspective of rule-driven decision making, decisions 
display certain regularity. In a fixed setting, the actor learns the requirements of the group 
of which he is part and possibly of other participants. These requirements can be seen as 
the role of the actor. It is the role that an individual fulfils that sets the standard of 
‘rational’ behaviour in his/her circumstances. The better the role suits the identity of the 
actor, the more he is capable of motivated behaviour. Foote has eloquently explicated the 
regularities that are implied in behaviours: ‘The regularities in our behavior toward 
(someone else) are necessarily based upon our expectation of regularities in his behavior. 
The regularities in his behavior toward us are in turn based in the same way upon his 
sharing our conception of his identity and his expectation that we share his conception of 
our identity. Naturally there is many a slip (1972, p. 348)’ (quoted by Zijderveld, 1973).  
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The above shows that stability is at the core of rule-based decision-making. It is very 
much concerned with identity and the roles of others and ourselves. Motivated behaviour 
requires a match between role and identity. Furthermore, the reason for motivated action 
is dependent upon the interaction with the setting. Roles and identities are linked to others 
in the group or role-set, and the interaction between individuals is based on mutual 
understandings of identity. Consequently, decision patterns are stable, because of these 
mutual understandings and expectations of what the role incumbent is supposed to do. 
These understandings and expected consequences of various actions are embedded in a 
social feature that allows individuals to simplify and classify their environment: the 
cognitive script. This thesis will argue that the script serves as the individual counterpart 
of routines.  
 
Therefore, the next section will address routines and cognitive scripts, and the manner in 
which they tie in together. In the context of this study, it is necessary to address the 
cognitive script; as such scripts embody the regularity in much of our actions. In order to 
explore what is needed for change, one first needs to focus on the conditions of stability. 
Stability can often be observed by the presence of routines. The next part will address 
cognitive scripts and routines as the primary vehicles of stability in human (inter)action.  
 
3.2.3 Scripts and Routines 
3.2.3.1 Cognitive scripts 
Louis (1980) noted that relatively inarticulate cognitive scripts, which are coherent 
sequences of events expected by the individual, drive most behaviour. Taylor and Fiske 
(1978) asserted that most of our every day decisions are made ‘off the top of our heads’. 
The scripts underlying these decisions are reviewed only when the individual senses 
‘something out of the ordinary’. A cognitive script is a conceptual structure that allows 
individuals to approach familiar events in a relatively similar fashion. More specifically, 
Choo (1996) noted that ‘a cognitive script is a sequence of actions and events in an 
individual’s knowledge structure that enables that individual to understand a specific 
situation or context and guides his or her behavior in that situation or context’ (p. 339). 
Edwards (1994) notes that scripts are generalised event schemes, which are derived from 
concrete experience of events and thus represent ‘how the world works’ (p. 211). 
Cognitive scripts are a category of schemas, which entail scripts, and also plans, 
categories, implicit theories, prototypes and heuristics (Wofford, 1994, p. 181). Schemas 
are knowledge structures in memory that people use to understand their environment, 
handle problems, and form expectations on results. A script is then ‘a cognitive memory 
structure consisting of the objects, events, roles, conditions, sentiments, and outcomes that 
occur in a sequential pattern in familiar tasks and situations (Wofford, 1994, p. 181). 
Nooteboom (2000) visualises scripts as a set of events, or nodes, which produce outcomes 
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that are then introduced in the next node of the script or nodes outside the current script. A 
simplified version of the visualisation that he presents is provided in Figure 3-2: 
 







Figure 3-2: Visualisation of scripts (simplified version of figure taken from Nooteboom, 2000, p. 126) 
  
Nooteboom (2000) describes scripts as ‘one’s cognitive, categorical framework or 
absorptive capacity’ (p. 126). He argues that scripts can be seen as series of nodes, which 
correspond to sets of events or actions. These events or actions can be ‘substituted’ into 
the nodes, and thus become part of the script. Nooteboom further argues that nodes 
produce outcomes that can then be substituted in subsequent nodes. It is also possible that 
outcomes of a particular node are substituted into nodes of different scripts, or in no other 
script at all. Nooteboom’s view is relevant to this thesis as it emphasis that actions can be 
invoked ‘automatically’, if they result from the substitution of outcomes of earlier nodes.  
 
Shank & Abelson (1977) and Gioia & Poole (1984) regard scripts as cognitive 
representations of rule-guided, stereotypical sequences of events and actions. They point 
to the fact that a script contains knowledge on sets of events or behaviours (weak scripts 
according to Gioia & Poole, 1984) and their sequence (strong scripts; Gioia & Poole, 
1984, p. 449). Shank & Abelson (1977) treat scripts primarily as cognitive phenomena, 
contrary to Barley & Tolbert (1997), who propose that scripts are ‘observable, recurrent 
activities and patterns of interaction characteristic of a particular setting’ (p. 98). They 
focus more on the actions that are embodied in the scripts. Gioia & Poole (1984) provide a 
definition that focuses both on the mental storage of scripts (the cognitive component) and 
on the resulting behavioural regularities. They define a ‘script’ as ‘a schema held in 
memory that describes events or behaviours (or sequences of events or behaviours) 
appropriate for a particular context’ (p. 450). This definition fits the description of 
decision making as rule following from the last section. Moreover, Gioia & Poole discuss 
the notion of ‘scripts’ instead of ‘cognitive scripts’. In doing so, they emphasise the 
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sequence of events or behaviours, instead of their cognitive representations. Although 
these are practically difficult to separate, this thesis focuses theoretically on ‘scripts’, to 
underscore the idea that scripts can be more than cognitive structures. They can be part of 
habitual action in a very real manner, just as Barley & Tolbert (1997) propose. However, 
it cannot dismiss the associated cognitive phenomena, as these cause specific behavioural 
regularities to be displayed. Knowledge on how and when scripts are invoked, and when 
they are not, is needed to provide explanations of changes in repeated behaviours.  
 
The definition of scripts that is used in this thesis accommodates processes of cognitive 
adaptation that individuals can experience when confronted with novel situations. These 
cognitive processes include the processes that lead to ‘automatic’ script performance or 
conversely, cognitively controlled processing of situational information. This is in line 
with Gioa & Poole (1984), who write: ‘scripted organisational behaviour is often 
performed unconsciously…, although active cognition is involved during the process of 
script development and when encountering unconventional situations’ (p. 449). As such, 
the associated cognitive dimension is an important part of this thesis, although primarily 
related to the invoking or dismissing of scripts as well as the ‘invention’ of new scripts. 
Therefore, this chapter presents a slightly adapted definition of a script: ‘a regularly 
performed schema held in memory that describes events or behaviours (or sequences of 
events or behaviours) appropriate for a particular context’. This definition focuses not 
only on its cognitive representation, but also on the regular performance of the schema, 
producing potential behavioural regularities, that can result in the production of routines, 
as the next section will argue.  
 
3.2.3.2 Routines 
It appears that a number of authors employ the term routine in the same manner as others 
employ the term script. In this work, routines are collective, observable behavioural 
regularities, whereas scripts are the underlying individual cognitive regularities that may- 
or may not accompany routine behaviour. This section will explain why it is important to 
focus on scripts, while we are primarily interested in the workings of routines and their 
effect on the propensity to change1. It will illustrate the role of scripts in the propensity of 
individuals to consciously or unconsciously select behavioural responses from their 
repertoire in any type of situation. With regards to change processes and the presumed 
resistance to change that people display, scripts are the individual cognitive counterparts 
of routines. It thereby legitimises the strong emphasis on scripts. Finally, it will expand on 
how sub-optimality can arise in decision-making. It is this well-known quality that can be 
very well illustrated using the cognitive script approach. 
 
                                                
1 The reader may recall from chapter 2 that Burns & Scapens (2000) argue that routines are important for 
institutional change. 
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Similar to scripts, routines allow actors to make complex decisions, without resorting to 
extensive search behaviour for alternatives and preferences. Their value lies in the 
reduction of the ‘complexity of real-world decisions to manageable levels by limiting the 
scope of the “problemistic search” for solutions’ (Sharp, 1994). Nelson and Winter (1982) 
argue that routines reduce decision complexity by providing a narrow range of 
environmental signals (cues) that indicate possible causes for action (see also March & 
Simon, 1958). The price that one has to pay for increased simplicity is that actors do not 
oversee all possible alternatives, but only parts thereof. Stein (1997) notes that the 
cognitive processes of reduction and elaboration can lead to choice biases, as well as 
influencing the sensory inputs we give attention to and those we do not. Giddens (1984) 
sees routines as the very fabric of social structure. Structure exists because of the 
continuous production and reproduction of action. Yet, at the same time, routines enable 
the continuity of the personality of the agent. In different terms: routinisation enables 
structure as well as personality of those operating under the influence of structure.  
 
Sharp (1994) suggests that routines can be seen as Standard Operating Procedures (SOP’s) 
that facilitate decision making in the face of complexity and uncertainty. In this, he makes 
no distinction between formal routines and factual routines. Burns & Scapens (2000) and 
Cohen & Bacdayan (1994) do make this distinction. They perceive routines to be the 
informal counterpart of formal rules of behaviour. They separate Standard Operating 
Procedures from routines-in-use. From their perspective, rules are the formalised 
statement of procedures, whereas routines are the procedures actually in use (Burns & 
Scapens, 2000, p. 7). A somewhat different concept of routine behaviour is provided by 
Louis (1980). She observes that in normal every day action, individuals operate in ‘a kind 
of loosely preprogrammed, nonconscious way, guided by cognitive scripts’ (p. 239). She 
suggests that conscious thought does not play a major part in these activities. Porac et al. 
note that ‘many experienced employees perform their work with highly routinised 
behavioural patterns and thus may not engage in much causal reasoning simply because 
work has become “scripted”’ (1983, p. 286). These writers refer to scripts, but related 
notions have also been used, including schema (Weick, 1979) and habitualization (Berger 
& Luckmann, 1979). These concepts are more individually oriented than the concept of 
routines noted above.  
 
Most authors agree on the persistence of routines even in situations where they yield sub-
optimal or even adverse results. Because of the relative ease with which routines are 
available, they can be invoked in situations when this type of response may not be 
warranted (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Cohen & Bacdayan, 1994; Cohen, 1996; Sharp, 
1994). Cohen (1996) makes this point when referring to laboratory studies on the subject: 
‘In the laboratory, subjects can often be induced to form routines for tasks so that they 
will miss “obvious” opportunities for improved performance (i.e., they make the 
equivalent of three right turns when they could have made one left)’ (p. 192). But there 
exists some confusion with regards to the ability of routines to change. For example, 
Feldman (2000) argues that routines have a very real potential for change. She illustrates 
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by referring to an extensive case study at an organisation that manages student 
dormitories. She shows that working routines can and do change from one iteration to 
another. It is this position that does not fit common knowledge.  
 
This points us to a distinction that appears to be relevant: routines resulting from the 
collective performance of a script, vs. the conscious and collective repetition of action. 
Stinchcombe’s (1990) notion of routines illustrates the latter: ‘a skilled person becoming 
really expert and fast at doing some number of distinct tasks’. Stinchcombe recognises 
that the skill of skilled workers is only in part attributable to action routines. In part, the 
skill of skilled workers is also dependent on ‘the many principles of decision which tell 
workers when to use one routine, when to use another’ (1990, p. 33). Implicitly, 
Stinchcombe distinguishes between (action) routines and scripts on the same basis: the 
motor skills of acting and the cognitive skills of deciding1. March (1989a) on the other 
hand, observes that routines can be related to rules. Rules in themselves are not routines, 
as there are multiplicities of rules applicable to each situation. Rather, the process causing 
some rules to be evoked more than others point to routines can occur due to the 
performance of scripts. According to March, routines embody collective and individual 
identities, interests, values and worldviews. These are used on a regular basis to deal with 
potential problems.  
 
Feldman points to a feature that is explicated by distinguishing between scripts, and action 
routines or skills. That is that scripts do not necessarily accompany action routines. 
Feldman (2000) observes that yearly routine activities do change from one iteration to the 
next. The routines she discussed consisted of yearly activities of which the result was 
aimed to be the same over the years (i.e. yearly move-in in dormitories; the yearly hiring 
and training of student personnel). She explicated that each yearly routine was preceded 
by the extensive reflection on the result of last years’ iteration. Feldman (2000) observed 
that routines were especially susceptible to change when the intended outcome was not 
achieved, or the outcome was unintended and undesirable, or outcome produced new 
possibilities, or the outcomes fell short of ideals. In any case, extensive reflection occurred 
retrospectively on the outcome of each iteration. In other words, scripts did not lead 
‘automatically’ to the invoking of the yearly routines. Rather, routines were accompanied 
by retrospective sense making. Scripted decision-making may have been at the basis of 
the actions that were to follow, but they also instigated a yearly review of last years results 
and subsequent adaptation of routine behaviour. The selection of a course of action was 
not uniquely determined by following scripted knowledge.  
 
It follows that routines can be susceptible to change as long as they are accompanied by 
some degree of reflection, in terms of its applicability to circumstances and considerations 
of possible refinements. This is not possible when unconscious scripts invoke routines, to 
                                                
1 Although Stinchcombe implicitly recognises the distinction; he focuses primarily on routine tasks within an 
organisational setting, as does Feldman. 
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the extent that no consideration is given to different environmental conditions. Scripts can 
trigger the relative automatic selection of a course of action (or in Stinchcombe’s terms: 
the selection of one of many sets of skills to invoke), without extensive reflection. The 
presence of scripts can lead to the selection of sub-optimal action routines that may or 
may not be appropriate to the situation. Contrary to the case described by Feldman (2000), 
no extensive judgement is then being made on the usefulness of each action routine and 
possible methods of improvement.  
 
The focus on scripts serves to accommodate the possibility that action routines can 
change, but only if they are reflected upon. Therefore, one conclusion is that action 
routines may be so persistent, because they are accompanied by cognitive scripts that 
prevent them from being assessed in relation to the situation in which they are employed. 
Instead of saying that routines are resistant to change, it is more accurate to note that 
‘unconsciously’ invoked repeated actions are more resistant to change than consciously 
invoked repeated actions, such as those described by Feldman (2000). Put differently, 
scripted action (actions resulting from the performance of scripts) does not require actions 
to be brought to a reflective level. The mindless and repeated performance of these scripts 
thus results in repeated actions that are not consciously evaluated for their 
appropriateness. Even consciously invoked scripts (‘I am going to get some money from 
the Automatic Teller Machine’) can involve unconscious actions, as parts (or nodes, in 
Nooteboom’s, 2000 terms; see p. 40 of this chapter) of the script are invoked as outcome 
of earlier nodes. This results in the proposition that the performance of scripts can result in 
the ‘mindless’ execution of actions and routines. But, as Feldman (2000, 2003) argued, 
routines can also be susceptible to change, when they involve a degree of reflectiveness. 
This means that these routines are not fully governed by scripts, but by a level of 
conscious cognitive processing.   
 
Scripts as guiding and regular principles of behaviour open the door for the motivation of 
the occasional sub-optimality in decision-making noticed by Simon. Gioia & Poole (1984) 
note that ‘the recall of events for a similar or prototypic situation provides the decision 
maker with the script for understanding and predicting the outcome of the decision. 
Scripted decision making, therefore, is efficient decision making, but not necessarily good 
decision making. Scripts are heuristic knowledge structures that aid in reducing the 
cognitive complexity of decision making. However, the scripting of decision situations 
has an obvious drawback: it can induce a failure to be aware of the fine-grained 
differences that distinguish a current decision problem. … This is because the process of 
deciding is based on a protoscript, rather than a step-by-step accounting of the uniqueness 
of events relevant to the present situation’ (p. 454). The implied regularity of script based 
decision-making, leads to occasional sub-optimality. Moreover, Harris (1994) proposes 
that the schema-directed1 nature of the perceptual process ‘lessens the frequency with 
which schema inconsistent information is discovered and made conscious. The very 
                                                
1 Scripts are a category of schemas. 
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nature of schemas act to ensure that drastic challenges to their validity seldom arise.’ (p. 
311). This is because new knowledge is usually fitted into existing schemas. It implies 
that new knowledge is formulated in terms of old schemas, and therefore helps to sustain 
these schemas, and this reduces greatly the odds that this knowledge will challenge 
existing schemas.  
 













Figure 3-3: Relation between scripts and routines 
  
Figure 3-3 shows a continuum that ranges between conscious invoking of routines and the 
scripted invoking of routines. It is depicted as a continuum, as routines are never fully 
automatically invoked or fully conscious. Rather, invoking can be more scripted or more 
conscious. It is a matter of degree, not absolute. The figure shows that actions and events 
can be invoked as a consequence of the performance of scripts (which does not require a 
reflective level). This constitutes scripted invoking of actions. Alternatively, actions and 
events can also result from a high degree of purposeful and conscious consideration 
(conscious invoking). The conscious and deliberate choice for actions does not mean that 
all separate actions involve the same degree of reflectiveness. A course of action can be 
decided for quite deliberately, while parts of the actions themselves are performed rather 
mindlessly (e.g. the choice to obtain money from an Automatic Teller Machine can be a 
conscious one, yet the various steps: entering card, entering PIN code, selecting amount 
and receipt, can all be invoked rather mindlessly). The selection of a script itself may 
occur consciously, while the various elements that form the script (see the discussion on 
nodes on page 40) can invoke action on a more subconscious level. Gioia & Poole (1984, 
p. 454) note: ‘Organisation members know the appropriate patterns of behaviour for many 
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situations. They consciously choose to perform these patterns, although the patterns 
themselves might be well learned and predominantly unconscious’. This idea is reflected 
in Figure 3-3 by the dotted arrow pointing from “conscious invoking” to “script 
performance” 
 
This section has identified a number of properties of scripts and routines that are in part 
definitional by nature. Firstly, routines are the counterpart of formal procedures. They are 
collective repetitive actions that are not necessarily formalised. Secondly, scripts can 
invoke routine actions, or routines can result from repeated conscious cognitive 
processing of situational information. Only routine actions accompanied by scripts that 
prevent the assessment of appropriateness may qualify as ‘resistant to change’. Therefore, 
related to the effects of accounting change on individual actors, it may be more productive 
to address scripts than routines as we are foremost interested in the source of change and 
stability. The regularity implied in the presented view of decision-making may lead to 
sub-optimality as scripts can be applied to situations where they are not wholly suitable, 
but leave this sub-optimality unobserved. Furthermore, as new information is processed in 
terms of existing schemas, existing schemas are seldom challenged by new information 
itself.  
 
3.2.4 Scripts enabling and constraining sense making  
As noted in the previous section, schemas and scripts are alike in many respects. A script 
is a schema, but opposite is not necessarily true. A script is a category of schemas. 
Nevertheless, the two are often used to indicate the same phenomenon: a schematic 
knowledge structure held in memory that specifies behaviour or event sequences that are 
appropriate for specific situations. However, the element that differentiates the script from 
the schema is that the former is primarily concerned with the individual’s behavioural 
repertoire (Gioia & Poole, 1984, p. 450). Therefore, the attention of this work is aimed at 
the script. But since the script is a subcategory of schemata, properties of the latter will 
hold for the former.  
 
Gioia & Poole note that scripts serve as sense making devices. They help actors cope with 
familiar situations. They provide dual benefits: they facilitate understanding of a situation 
and they provide a guide for behaviour. However, there are differences of opinion 
regarding the precise role of sense making. Louis (1980) argues that a script is the result 
of sense making in that the script provides understanding of a situation, while Gioia & 
Poole (1984) argue that a script is a means of sense making, in that people make sense 
through the use of scripts.  
 
Gioia & Poole focus on the act of sense making under conditions of stability. In their 
view, scripts serve as sense making devices, in that they guide the interpretation of events. 
These events are perceived in terms of existing schemas. Therefore, they do not perceive 
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the act of sense making as a necessarily active and conscious process. Rather, it is the 
interpretation of the environment through the use of scripts. Louis, however, notes that, 
under conditions of instability, the process of sense making contributes to the creation of 
more encompassing scripts. This notion of sense making constitutes the conscious and 
active efforts of an actor to make sense of the world around him, when he comes to the 
realisation that currents scripts are insufficient to deal with new experiences. Louis 
therefore argues that people can devise new actions through the concept of sense making. 
These actions can ultimately become scripted, but not necessarily so. It is a view that is 
supported by authors such as Abelson (1976, 1981) and Schank and Abelson (1977). In 
these works scripts are depicted as essentially automatic in nature and sense making is the 
conscious processing of situational information. 
 
This thesis adopts the view of Louis (1980). It argues that sense making is a conscious 
activity to interpret experiences, when scripts are not available or incapable to deal these 
(often) new experiences. This will be explained further in section 3.3 below, the part of 
this chapter that covers change. The current part of this chapter discusses stability, which 
means that existing scripts guide many actions. Sense makings does not play a major role 
in these circumstances, as people are not triggered to consciously question the scripts that 
guide their behaviour.  
 
Scripts come in two basic sorts: weak scripts and strong scripts (Abelson, 1981). A weak 
script relates to other forms of cognitive structures such as person prototypes and serves 
mainly to form and to organise expectations concerning the behaviour of others. However, 
these do not specify the sequence of this behaviour. Strong scripts contain not only 
expectations of the occurrence of events, but also their progressive sequence. Strong 
scripts are mainly related to stereotypical and ritualistic events.  
 
By now, it is clear that the view I present here implies that individuals can select their 
actions from numerous possible responses. This process of action selection can range 
from relatively mindless selection through the performance of strong protoscripts, which 
hold knowledge on actions and the expected sequence of events that should follow, to the 
invention of new scripts to deal with un-encountered events. Goia & Poole (1984) observe 
that developing and invoking of scripts occurs to many different degrees. It depends on 
the typicality of a situation. They have depicted this insight in Figure 3-4: 
 
3. Stability & change 
 48
Typicality of the situation
Low High
















Figure 3-4: A continuum of script development (Gioia & Poole, 1984) 
 
According to Figure 3-4, a novel situation does not necessarily lead to script development 
by individuals. When the situation is unlikely to recur, the individual will deal with it 
without triggering script development. However, when a situation is infrequent, but is 
perceived likely to occur again, the individual may be triggered into script development. 
Then, the more typical the situation, the more scripts the individual has to his disposal to 
deal with it without resorting to extensive search behaviour and the more automatic the 
processing of scripts is likely to be; and therefore, the more automatic the selection of 
different sets of behaviours will be.  
 
The left side of the above continuum is about situations in which existing scripts are 
perceived as incomplete to resolve the issues at hand. These are situations that are at the 
core of change. For, the realisation that existing arrangements are incomplete is a first step 
to change. Schein (1985) referred to this stage as the unfreezing of existing arrangements. 
In these circumstances, sense making refers to the fabrication of new cognitive structures, 
to allow the actor to deal with a new experience. This will be the topic of later sections of 
this chapter, in which a conceptualisation will be offered of sense making of newly 
encountered experience. 
 
This work deals with two explicit events: the situation of stability, that is the situations 
depicted to the right of the continuum in Figure 3-4. It is the situation in which automatic 
script processing occurs. Automatic script processing is the property that can cause 
resistance to change. Whether these scripts are invoked, depends on the presence of cues 
for their performance. The next section will illustrate the inherent dysfunctional properties 
of scripted decision making, by referring to Gioia’s review of the events surrounding the 
infamous Ford Pinto crisis. Then a case will be made for the inherent stability of 
organisational life, by arguing that much action can be attributed to the automatic 
processing of scripted knowledge. And finally, a framework will be proposed of actions 
that are performed in a relatively ‘automatic’ fashion. This ‘automatic’ performance is due 
to the presence of cognitive structures such as scripts and schemas. 
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As noted above, first a case will be made for the workings of scripts. I will illustrate the 
workings of scripts by referring to the Pinto case, which Gioia was closely involved in. Its 
purpose is to illustrate how scripts can affect human decision-making. Especially 
interesting in the case is how individuals use management accounting information as cues 
that serve to invoke scripted knowledge.  
 
3.2.5 The dysfunctional properties of persisting scripts 
So far, I have argued that scripts can be held accountable for the consistent manner in 
which people deal with different events. They provide individuals with clues on how to 
behave in a manner that does not warrant extensive information processing. They guide 
behaviour according to present paths. To illustrate some of the consequences that this can 
have I will briefly review Gioia (1992), who analyses his own role in the Pinto fires crisis1 
that has haunted the Ford motor company for many years.  
 
In his remarkably candid review of the events leading to the ultimate abandoning of the 
Pinto model by Ford, Gioia used script analysis to explore his own role as Ford’s Field 
Recall Coordinator, a position in which he was responsible for recommending recall 
schemes for automobiles that were showing defects. The consequences of these defects 
could range from minor damage to the cars, to life threatening situations, as was the case 
with the Pinto model. In his analysis Gioia focuses more on what he did not think about 
and act upon, than what he decided and what he did do. The problem came first to his 
attention when a few reports of collision fires came in, but ‘was there a problem? Not as 
far as I was concerned. My cue for labelling a case as a problem either required high 
frequencies of occurrence or directly traceable causes. I had little time for speculative 
contemplation on potential problems that did not fit a pattern that suggested known 
courses of action leading to a possible recall. I do, however, remember being disquieted 
by a field report accompanied by graphic detailed photos of the remains of a burned-out 
Pinto in which several people had died. Although that report became part of my file, I did 
not flag it as any special case’ (pp. 381-382). 
 
At this stage, the field information did not fit the known properties of what constituted a 
‘problem’. Also, Gioia was not induced to evaluate his conception of ‘problem’; i.e. there 
was no ground to doubt the tacit assumptions forming the very fundamentals of his 
actions. As argued by Louis (1980), surprise in its broadest form is needed to engage in 
the act of sense making that is to start to contemplate on the appropriateness of scripts-in-
use. The trigger that served as this surprise was the sight of burned car at a Ford depot. 
                                                
1 The Ford Pinto was a compact car that was marketed in the 1970’s. It had major design flaws that caused it to 
incinerate following relatively minor low-speed collisions. Ford’s reluctance to recall all vehicles, even in the 
face of overwhelming (with hindsight, that is) evidence caused Ford to be the first corporation ever to be indicted 
for criminal behaviour, called reckless homicide. 
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‘The revulsion on seeing this incinerated hulk was immediate and profound. Soon 
afterwards, and despite the fact that the file was very sparse, I recommended the Pinto 
case for preliminary departmental review concerning possible recall. After the usual 
round of discussion about criteria and justification for recall, everyone voted against 
recommending recall - including me. It did not fit the pattern of recallable standards; the 
evidence was not overwhelming that the car was defective in some way, so the case was 
actually fairly straightforward’ (p. 382). Gioia argues that the requirements of the job-role 
supersedes emotions: ‘I would argue that for organisational members trained to control 
emotions to perform the job role, emotion is either not a part of the internalised script, or 
at best becomes a difficult-to-access part of any script for job performance’ (p. 386). With 
this, he illustrates that even emotional surprise does not guarantee the opening up of 
scripts for evaluation, because of the sometimes-rationalised business practices. It is this 
feature that was prominent in Weber’s work, where he proposed that the rationalisation of 
society and of the workplace, would put demands on how actions would be motivated.  
 
It was not until the National Highway Traffic Safety Association (NHTSA) issued a 
formal determination that the Pinto was defective, that the model was recalled. One could 
argue that the evidence provided by the NHTSA, a federal agency, had sufficient 
credibility or possibility of enforcement, that it either appealed to scripted knowledge of 
what to do, or that it succeeded in opening up existing scripts, making more conscious 
evaluation of the case possible. Gioia does not state which is true.  
 
During his period at Ford, Gioia (1992) did not recommend recall at all. Later on he 
wondered why he did not see the gravity of the problem (p. 383). He offers as an 
explanation in his central thesis: ‘My own schematised (scripted) knowledge influenced 
me to perceive recall issues in terms of the prevailing decision environment and to 
unconsciously overlook key features of the Pinto case, mainly because they did not fit an 
existing script. Although the outcomes of the case carry retrospectively obvious ethical 
overtones, the schemas driving my perceptions and actions precluded consideration of the 
issues in ethical terms because the scripts did not include ethical dimensions.’ (p. 385). 
 
Goia was socialised into the culture of Ford, and this had its impact on his decisions. 
Interestingly, he does not argue that he presented his decisions in certain terms to increase 
legitimacy or increase chances of acceptance as is argued sometimes by institutionalists 
(e.g. DiMaggio & Powell, 1991) but he fully internalised the criteria, thereby missing 
what were, retrospectively, obvious pointers to what was to become a disastrous affair for 
Pinto drivers, as well as for the Ford motor company. He notes that ‘organisational 
culture, in one very powerful sense, amounts to a collection of scripts writ large. Did I sell 
out? No. Were my cognitive structures altered by salient experience? Without question’ 
(p. 387). The retrospective nature of the analysis becomes clear in what I see as the core 
of his experience at Ford: ‘Before I went to Ford, I would have argued strongly that Ford 
had an ethical obligation to recall. After I left Ford I now argue and teach that Ford had 
an ethical obligation to recall. But, while I was there, I perceived no strong ethical 
3. Stability & change 
 51
overtones to the case whatsoever. It was a very straightforward decision, driven by 
dominant scripts for the time, place, and context’ (p. 388). Harris (1994) observes that 
while schemas, the larger structure of which scripts are part, can facilitate complex 
decision making, they can also blind the decision maker to features that threaten the 
validity of the scripts-in-use. Lorsch (1985) referred to this phenomenon as ‘strategic 
myopia’.  
 
This section raises the question concerning how change can occur at all in the face of 
persistent scripts. Before turning to this question in the next section, it is useful to 
distinguish between different types of change. Scapens (1994) differentiates between 
evolutionary change and revolutionary change. The former involves the gradual change 
from one state to another, without the questioning of shared concepts of meaning. The 
latter ‘involves a significant disruption of established routines as some major crisis 
disrupts the truce and makes it necessary to establish new meanings through which to 
make sense of organisational activity’ (Scapens, 1994, p. 312). This crisis has been 
depicted as a black box in a later paper by Busco et al. (2000) and could be seen as being 
‘given’. A different separation between categories of change has been provided by 
Bartunek & Moch (1987, p. 486). They offer a 3-way categorisation of organisational 
change. Their three categories are especially helpful to this work as they revolve around 
the effects on cognitive scripts.  
 
First order change is the tacit reinforcement of present understandings. The change is 
consistent with existing understandings and schemas. This does not mean that scripts 
cannot change under first order change; however, they change in line with present 
understandings. For example, a stronger emphasis on participative decision-making could 
induce scripted action that leads to more participative decision-making. Second order 
change does involve a change in shared schemas. This involves the conscious change of 
schemas in a specific direction. As a result, scripts can change as well. The primary 
difference with first order change is that the underlying beliefs that can be considered one 
of the sources of the emergence of scripts are challenged. This is not the case for first 
order change. For example: when a management accounting system have been seen as 
scorekeeping devices for many years, and the organisation is suddenly required to use its 
data as inputs for decisions, then the shared concept of the management accounting 
system is altered. Now the meaning and the attached range of actions are changed. 
Associated scripts are thus changed. Third order change relates to an awareness of the 
schemas that are in use. It is not simply about changes in schemas and scripts, but about 
an increased awareness of the existence of schemas and the realisation of the fact that the 
use of some scripts may be sub-optimal. Third order change is thus about a heightened 
awareness of the core concepts of scripts and schemas. Later sections will primarily focus 
on first- and second order change, as the changes at the Rabobank were primarily located 
on these levels. As Bartunek & Moch (1987, p. 487) argue: ‘Many OD interventions have 
been implicitly designed as first-order interventions – that is, they focus on solving 
problems so that established patterns can function more efficiently’. The Rabobank 
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wanted not only to introduce new practices, but also alter the established patterns of 
conduct (this will be explained in chapter 4). 
 
The next part will address organisational stability as collective expressions of stability in 
behaviour. As noted earlier, stability is essentially a theoretical concept for no 
organisation is ever in a perfectly stable state as it naturally moves through time. 
Nevertheless, it is an important concept as these explorations of stability allow better 
insights into change.  
 
3.2.6 Organisational stability 
So far, the individual has been at the core of the argument. But this would be incomplete 
as it ignores the fact that social structures can be external to the individual and objectified 
to the extent that they present themselves as ‘given’ to the individual. However, it presents 
a classic dilemma to the present effort: what is the relation between individual choice and 
action, and the effect on social structure. I do not presume to provide a complete answer, 
but I will provide a workable solution to the issue at hand: inherent stability in actions. So 
far, this has been limited to individual regularities, but now this will include 
organisational regularities by virtue of its cultural traits.  
 
3.2.6.1 Culture as sustaining regularities in interaction 
Culture has received considerable attention over a wide time span, but few authors have 
addressed culture’s manifestation in individual sense making efforts. The individual 
dynamics of organisational culture have been neglected to a certain extent. But as Louis 
(1985) asserts, organisational culture encompasses both individual and group level 
phenomena. Group level manifestations of organisational culture affect individual sense 
making, and individual sense making can be an expression of a culture. Therefore, 
organisational culture plays a dialectic role in individual behaviour as well as being the 
common basis for knowledge of entire groups. Van Maanen and Barley (1985) observed 
that ‘while a group is necessary to invent and sustain culture, culture can be carried only 
by individuals’ (p. 35).  
 
The relevance of culture to a study on the effects of routinised and schema-based action is 
best described by Harris (1994) who notes: ‘Organizational culture’s influence on 
individual sense making is revealed in the operation of a patterned system of organisation-
specific schemas’ (p. 309). Moreover, Abrahamson & Fombrun (1992) argue that culture 
is the unintended result of routine interaction between networks of actors. Harris (1994) 
argues that culture becomes a variable within individual sense making through the mental 
dialogue that decision makers have with other contextually relevant individuals or groups 
(real or imagined; past or present). Harris focuses more on schemas than on scripts, 
thereby emphasising the shared nature of schemas. However, as scripts are part of the 
3. Stability & change 
 53
broader category of schemas, the terms schemas and scripts are used interchangeably. 
Scripts refer to mental maps that enable individuals to orient themselves within their 
experiential terrain. Routines and the accompanying scripts sustain culture. Harris 
identified five types of in-organisation schemas that are relevant for individual sense 
making: 
 
Self schemas: “Self-in-organisation” schemas refer to theories and generalisations on 
aspects of self in the organisational context. It includes values, roles and behaviour. Mead 
(1934) noted that much of what we define as ‘self’ is a mirror image of what we observe 
in the reactions of others to us. Therefore, the self can only be understood in terms of the 
social environment. The self is private, but cannot be conceived without the help of 
others. The self guides action and helps to select appropriate scripts to deal with a given 
problem. For example: ‘an accountant who viewed herself as being honest would refer to 
this schema knowledge when deciding how to react to a client’s request to help “cook the 
books”’ (Harris, 1994, p. 312).  
 
Person schemas: Person schemas in organisations refer to expectations and impressions 
about the traits, goals, behaviours and preferences of others. These others are manifested 
in the form of individuals, groups, and work roles. Harris observes that these schemas are 
important as they shape the reality that one is trying to understand. Thus, person schemas 
not only help to categorise people (‘he is in management’), but they also summarise 
knowledge on the other’s likely behaviour, and beliefs and values. In fact, they can be 
seen as informed guesses about the criteria (schemas) used by others. For example, related 
to a scripted form of organisational roles, there can be a shared meaning for what 
‘management’ as a role-set is expected to do. Person schemas therefore categorise our 
social environment, and attribute expected behaviours to these categories. Harris notes 
that in an organisational setting, organisational leaders, peers and subordinates are 
influential categories on which we schematise. Busco et al. note that in the setting they 
researched, ‘a massive operational and managerial revolution emerged as a result of an 
internal decision of the Board and the CEO in particular’ (Busco et al., 2000, p. 34, 
emphasis in original). The importance of senior management’s involvement was also 
noted by Euske & Riccaboni (1999), who recognised the important role of the company 
CEO: ‘He delineated the context and defined the changes during his term as Chief 
Executive Officer’ (Euske & Riccaboni, 1999, p. 478). Moreover, a new CEO brought a 
‘redefinition of interdependencies’ (Euske & Riccaboni, 1999, p. 478. This is confirmed 
by Fligstein’s observations that change appeared to occur when ‘key actors…articulated a 
new view of the firm’s strategy’ (Fligstein, 1991, p. 334) thus causing ‘some form of 
shock’.  
 
Greenwood & Hinings (1996, p. 1045) note that an ‘appointment of a CEO with a new 
functional background reflected a redistribution of power dependencies’. These role 
groups shape individual experience as they function as role senders; that is, by their 
actions they send messages about the priorities and values of these groups. This makes it 
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easier for an individual to learn the appropriate responses. However, it remains unclear 
what causes individuals to give prevalence to a certain group in specific situations. In a 
study of the computerisation of the workplace (Prasad & Prasad, 2000), participants 
primarily referred to their self image and to person schemas of peers, rather than referring 
to management to select their course of action. Since organisational members have 
multiple schemas at their disposal, it is not just a matter of defining the schemas, but also 
a matter of selecting between them. This is the problem of equivocality vs. uncertainty 
noted by Weick (1995). The same holds for the other types of culturally relevant schemas 
that are discussed below. 
 
Organisation schemas: These schemas are a subset of person schemas. They consist of 
knowledge and impressions regarding organisational groupings as entities. For example, 
references to ‘headquarters’ consist of a number of traits that are associated with a 
generalised idea of what headquarters is and does. More importantly, the organisation 
schema is somewhat detached from individual members. They do not refer to specific 
individuals, but only to generalised types of persons that are associated with the 
department.  
 
Object/concept schemas: Object/concept schemas are about knowledge of stimuli that are 
not inherently social. Harris gives as examples big offices with corner windows and the 
meaning of concepts such as “quality” and “participation”. These schemas are culturally 
bound as they guide the interpretation of physical and verbal cultural artefacts. In this 
interpretation, it is the meaning of objects and concepts that is central. 
 
Event schemas: lastly, event schemas contain knowledge on social context, situations, 
encounters, and events. They describe expected event sequences and possible appropriate 
behaviours in those situations. In this, they serve as guides to interpretations of 
behavioural artefacts such as ceremonies and rituals. Therefore, apart from guiding the 
behaviour in these events, event schemas also help to interpret the meaning of these 
ceremonies and rituals. 
 
The different types of schemas discussed here are expressions of what is ordinarily 
referred to as culture. However, there is one more requirement: there has to be a certain 
degree of similarity between the schemas employed by organisational participants. Harris 
(1994) observes that these schemas tend to be more or less alike, as organisational 
members are exposed to the same shared experience and are exposed to the same cues. 
Furthermore, as organisational realities are socially constructed (Berger & Luckmann, 
1979), members of a group tend to compare others’ reactions, in order to form an image of 
the reality in which they find themselves. It is widely accepted that communication plays 
an important role in this respect (Mead, 1934). Moreover, Salancik & Pfeffer (1978) note 
that the social environment ‘provides a direct construction of meaning through guides to 
socially accepted beliefs, attitudes, and needs, and acceptable reasons for action.’ (p. 227). 
They observe that the social environment focuses attention on specific information, which 
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makes the information more salient and thus provides expectations concerning proper 
behaviour and the consequences thereof. A last reason for the similarity of schemas held 
by various actors is that in the provision of cues to others, one cannot escape revealing a 
part of oneself. The process of receiving cues thus includes the other party’s preferences 
and contains information on the proper manner to behave. Proper behaviour is thus 
communicated. In short, culturally bound schemas are schemas belonging to the five 
stated categories, which have similar characteristics across a social setting.  
 
The above argument makes a strong case for the importance of sub-cultures. For, the 
transmission of schemas, which as a result will increase their similarity, occurs more 
rapidly and is more influential in intimate and small social groups that have regular social 
contact. Therefore, the importance of sub-culture on behaviour may supersede that of the 
often-celebrated organisational culture.  
 
3.2.6.2 Structuration of organisations 
Ranson, Hinings & Greenwood (1980) argue that structuration of organisational forms 
occurs by virtue of production and recreation of its organisational members. They argue 
that structuration ‘is the process of generating and recreating meanings, one in which 
organisational members wish to secure their “provinces of meaning” (Schutz, 1967) 
within the very structure and working of the organisation’ (pp. 4-5). The orderly 
production of roles and rules that constitute stability in this context comes from agreement 
on shared interpretative schemes. They note: ‘the deep structure of schema which are 
taken for granted by members enables them to recognise, interpret, and negotiate even 
strange and unanticipated situations, and thus continuously to create and re-enact the 
sense and meaning of structural forms during the course of interaction. Prescribed roles, 
rules and authority relations are drawn upon retrospectively to locate and validate the 
emergent action within the wider context of meaning.’ (p. 5). Ranson et al. argue in this, 
that action is emergent from tacit knowledge on how the organisation operates and that 
roles and rules are called upon retrospectively to place these actions in a wider frame. 
Barley & Tolbert (1997) and Burns & Scapens (2000) propose a similar dialectic relation 
between action and structure. Action reproduces structure, while structure constrains as 
well as guides proper courses of action. This temporary stable configuration comes 
primarily out of the taken-for granted interpretive frameworks. These remain inarticulate 
in the routine of action; i.e. routines are expressions of these taken for granted 
arrangements (Barley & Tolbert, 1997); but routines do not reveal the full array of 
assumptions underlying them. This observation brings us to the point made by Burns and 
Scapens (2000), who explicitly addressed the relationship between routine behaviour and 
their institutionalisation. 
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3.2.7 Institutionalisation of routines 
Burns & Scapens (2000) defined an institution as: ‘the shared, taken for granted 
assumptions which identify categories of human actors and their appropriate activities and 
relationships’. Put in different words is the description of Boons & Strannegård (2000): 
‘Institutions are to be understood as action patterns that have become taken for granted 
within an organizational field. Repeated actions turn into institutions that, in turn, exert 
influence on organizations’ (p. 9). Jepperson (1991) provides us with a different 
definition, that points to the role of routines in institutions. Jepperson notes: ‘institutions 
are those social patterns that, when chronologically reproduced, owe their survival to 
relatively self-activating social processes….That is, institutions are not reproduced by 
“action,” in this strict sense of collective intervention in a social convention. Rather, 
routine reproductive procedures support and sustain the pattern, furthering its 
reproduction – unless collective action blocks, or environmental shock disrupts, the 
reproductive process’ (p. 145). Burns and Scapens see institutions as underlying human 
behaviour, while Boons & Strannegård depict institutions more as human behaviour itself. 
However, all authors agree that shared assumptions partly drive human behaviour. But 
‘there is hardly any research linking the micro processes of sensemaking to the macro 
processes of isomorphism’ (Boons & Strannegård, 2000, p. 13). How individual sense 
making relates to institutional pressures, including isomorphism, remains unclear.  
 
Burns & Scapens (2000) note that the process of encoding institutional principles into 
routines draws on taken-for-granted assumptions that are currently embodied in meanings, 
values and power. From this it follows that we are forced to talk about change, as stability 
is unobservable to the individual by its taken-for-grantedness. Stability is only determined 
by retrospective sense making, on events and experiences that have already elapsed. 
Moreover, cues for change are found in events that take unexpected experience out of the 
experience stream. Therefore, the encoding of institutional principles into routines is 
almost exclusively associated with change, be it revolutionary or otherwise. This leads to 
the question: on what level does encoding occur? Is it the individual who routinises 
actions through the interpretation of institutional principles or does it involve a common 
effort by all participants that yields a common result?  
 
In the mere act of interacting, the individual participates in the creation and adaptation of 
the intersubjective sphere in which local interpretations are being made. ‘Individuals take 
action (externalisation), and when individuals interpret these actions as heaving meaning 
beyond the idiosyncratic action, objectivation takes place’ (Boons & Strannegård, 2000, p. 
9). The act of interpretation is the sense making of the action’s result. Jepperson (1991) 
proposes, as do Burns & Scapens (2000), that routines are a necessary precondition for 
institutions to arise. They allow for institutional reproduction, without conscious action 
aimed at this reproduction. Jepperson (1991) stresses that an institution is able to resist the 
blocking efforts of single individuals, hence the attention to collective action. 
Furthermore, he observes that institutions are relative to particular contexts. Primary 
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levels of organisation can operate as institutions relative to secondary levels of 
organisation. A microcomputer’s basic operating system appears as an institution relative 
to its word processing program etc. Furthermore, whether an object is an institution is 
relative to a particular dimension of a relationship, as well as its relation to centrality. An 
example would be the Eiffel tower in Paris, which may count as an institutionalised 
landmark, based on its attractiveness and its associations with all that the city has to offer, 
but it is no institution when it comes to its aesthetic qualities. In short, institutions are 
dimensional and relative to context. 
 
A further feature of an institution is that it is typed by a reproductive process (as noted 
before). Jepperson (1991, p. 145) puts it as follows: ‘institutions are those social patterns 
that, when chronically reproduced, owe their survival to relatively self activating social 
processes’. The distinguishing factor is that institutions are able to reproduce, without 
conscious and sustaining action. Institutions can therefore include persistent, but 
unintended consequences of social interaction. Although reproduction is an essential 
property of institutions, not all reproduction relates to institutions. Jepperson argues that 
conscious action can be a reproductive process, but that it is not institutionalised. He 
opposes institutionalisation and action as two different forms of reproduction. This is a 
very important distinction in delineating what constitutes an institution. A social pattern is 
reproduced through action, when persons constantly intervene and are mobilised in 
processes that secure own their persistence. These processes are sustained and supported 
by the action of individuals. Jepperson talks about what we earlier called action routines, 
which are not accompanied by scripts. Although action might be repeated to support the 
reproduction of the pattern (think of the earlier example of the yearly move-in in student 
dormitories), it does not involve the absence of conscious action, and it cannot be typed as 
a self activating process, since it needs conscious intervention. Institutions, on the other 
hand, are able to reproduce without such intervention. Routinised behaviour can embody 
institutions, although these routines are primarily limited to the scripted invoked routines 
that were discussed in section 3.2.3. Routine action patterns that are invoked 
‘automatically’ as part of a script performance, are not addressed reflectively by the 
individual. But consciously selected repeated actions do not embody institutions per se, as 
these actions are reproduced through conscious intervention. Jeperson has addressed this 
action vs. institution argument: ‘this institutionalisation/action contrast is a central one. If 
one participates conventionally in a highly institutionalised social pattern, one does not 
take action, that is, intervene in a sequence, make a statement. If shaking hands is an 
institutionalised form of greeting, one takes action only by refusing to offer one’s hand. If 
attending college has become an institutionalised stage of the life course, a young person 
takes action more by forgoing college than by enrolling in it. The point is a general one: 
one enacts institutions; one only takes action by departing from them, not by participating 
in them.’ (Jepperson, 1991, p. 148-149).  
 
Burns & Scapens and Barley & Tolbert as well as Berger & Luckmann propose that 
institutions arise partly because of the duality of structure and action. This has been 
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translated into the interaction between rules and routines in the Burns & Scapens (2000) 
framework. They argue that rules may lead to routines, but that persistent routines can 
also be formalised into rules to facilitate easier access for new entrants. A nuance relating 
to the importance of rules to institutions must be applied. Rules (formal procedures fixed 
in manuals and operating procedures) have little direct influence on institutions, in the 
sense of the term “institutions” as used here; but they do influence them indirectly. As 
argued by Burns & Scapens (2000), rules either serve as an occasion for the conception of 
routines or as a result of them. Rules themselves affect institutions in a large part by 
means of the influence they have on routines. 
 
A further feature of institutions can be found in their ability to increase predictability. The 
presence of institutions yields predictability for actors in constraining action choices as 
well as enabling them. Institutional arrangements are legitimising in the sense that they 
allow for action choices that are considered acceptable to the majority. The value of 
institutions lies in the fact that what constitutes an acceptable response is known 
beforehand. Therefore, the presence of institutions limits the need for retrospective sense 
making because it enhances predictability of expected responses to action. In other words, 
the existence of institutions promotes the use of the routines that form its very fabric. 
Consequently, we come to the same conclusion as above: institutions are able to 
reproduce, without conscious action choices. Moreover, institutions allow for 
predictability. For example, March (1994) observes that people can rationalise their 
decisions and actions by referring to common expectations and preferences that are shared 
by a group of people, and which are formed in the past through a collective process of 
generic sense making or even as a product of the forming of culture. On a macro scale, the 
group belongs to what Grit (2000) refers to as a value sphere: the political value sphere 
and the economic value sphere are examples of social entities that have similar values and 
beliefs on how to obtain legitimacy from the entity.  
 
From the above a view of institutions emerges: institutions are collective and routine 
patterns of action and cognition that are able to reproduce themselves without conscious 
intervention. Not all routines are institutions (Burns & Scapens, 2000), but all institutions 
are constituted by routines (and more). The notion that institutions reproduce without 
conscious intervention, points to the presence of scripted action. More specifically, those 
routines that are invoked through the performance of scripts do not require any high level 
of reflectiveness. Consequently, these ‘automatically reproducing’ routines are more 
likely to influence institutions and institutional change than consciously invoked routines. 
Moreover, ‘automatically’ invoked collective routine actions are likely to be taken for 
granted, as they do not require elaborate reflection on their appropriateness or necessity. 
Therefore, particularly those routines that do not involve conscious interventions to ensure 
the flow of actions may have institutional characteristics. Additionally, whether something 
is institutionalised depends on context. More specifically, institutionalisation is contingent 
upon its level of organisation, its centrality and the type of relation. It is through the 
individual as well as the collective invoking of routines that institutions are collectively 
3. Stability & change 
 59
enacted. Institutions are thus the outcome of collective as well as individual invoking of 
routines. Change in institutions thus begins with the breakdown of routine behaviour at a 
collective and individual level. 
  
3.2.8 A framework of scripted action 
This section will offer a synthesis of the previous sections, with the purpose of offering a 
conceptualisation of action decisions under conditions of stability that include individual 



















Figure 3-5: Scripted action 
 
The framework depicts decisions as triggered by cues; simple familiar structures that point 
to specific possible scripted courses of action. These scripts are readily available, but 
since more possibilities exist, a choice needs to be made. The existence of these scripts 
depends on three general elements: role, identity, culture. Moreover, the existing set of 
institutions play an important role. First, this section will briefly review the three 
elements, then the effect of institutions will be discussed.  
 
Role: roles are the patterns of expectations that belong to specific positions in formal 
structures. They relate to the innate, learned behaviour that belongs to that position. Roles 
promote stability in behaviour, just because of the predictability that accompanies role 
fulfilment. Roles are based on mutual expectations that are associated with a number of 
scripted action possibilities. Therefore, role-incumbents have a number of learned scripts 
at their disposal that have been determined to be acceptable action alternatives. 
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Identity: a number of properties can be attributed to roles; that is, they are essentially 
external to the incumbent, but in order to come to purposeful action, identity needs to be 
taken into account (see Figure 3-1). Identity refers to how we see ourselves. For example, 
the image we have of our purpose in the organisation is an example of our identity. 
Identity and ego-identity are therefore drivers of behaviour. In terms of the above 
conceptualisation identity relates to script selection based on an image that one has of 
oneself. As in previous sections, it is important to stress that identity is private, but it is 
conceived by virtue of the environment of the actor. Who we are is observed by others’ 
reactions, rather than a private determination of who we want to be. Identity thus is a 
privately held view of oneself, which affects the selection of proper scripts. Indirectly, this 
choice is not at all private as identity is conceived with the help of interaction and 
communication.  
 
Culture: As argued earlier, culture is a collective phenomenon, but individuals carry it 
forward in time by five types of schemas: Self schemas; Person schemas; Organisation 
Schemas; Object/Concept schemas and Event schemas. For these cognitive structures to 
become culture, they have to be shared to a certain degree. But, as indicated before, these 
have the tendency to become similar between individuals because of the sharing of cues 
and socialisation into social entities such as departments or networks. 
 
Institutions: as noted before, institutions are self-activating social patterns that are 
externalised from individual actors. Yet, actors find themselves under their influence, but 
actors usually do not perceive themselves as able to change institutions. They simply are 
taken for granted as “the way things are”. This taken-for-grantedness is akin to scripts that 
appear to be fixed to the individual (e.g. a recurring performance review). Institutions can 
prevent actors to be aware of all possible action alternatives. Moreover, action alternatives 
may be tacitly known to be unacceptable, and may therefore not enter an evaluation of 
scripts at all. This holds for different situations and for different degrees. Since institutions 
are dimensional and relative to context, social patterns that are self-evident in a work-
environment may have no institutional characteristics in a family setting. Institutions 
enhance predictability as they involve acceptable means to ends. For example, actors may 
not be able to change the purpose of the accounting system in an organisation. This 
purpose is an inherent property of the system and it is accepted as such without 
questioning. This does not preclude actors from forming expectations regarding outcomes 
of the system and consequences thereof. Institutions therefore limit the number of 
applicable scripts as well as enhancing predictability by making potentially variable 
factors fixed. Institutions thereby reduce environmental complexity, by reducing the 
number of variables. Moreover, they are able to fill in blanks about future behaviour. Any 
assessment of the future is then greatly facilitated, but since much is then based on 
assumptions, accuracy is sacrificed for simplicity. 
 
The framework introduced in this section shows an arrow pointing from the institutional 
realm to the cue, to indicate that the perception of what constitutes a cue, is, at least in part 
3. Stability & change 
 61
institutionally determined. Some environmental signals have ready-made scripts 
associated with them, while others are ignored, as they do not represent any meaningful 
information. As the above discussion indicated, institutions allow some scripts to be more 
available than others; therefore, the framework also contains an arrow pointing from the 
institutional realm to scripts. This arrow (a) represents the view in this chapter that scripts 
constitute institutions, in a similar fashion as proposed by Barley & Tolbert (1997). 
Institutions are encoded in scripts and scripts are externalised and objectified in 
institutions. This thesis uses the term ‘constitute’ to refer to this reciprocal relation 
between scripts and institutions. It is important to note that although I argue that scripts 
constitute institutions, it does not exclude different notions to be part of an institution. The 
term ‘constitute’ is used to in the meaning of ‘giving form to’. By this, I mean that 
institutions are sustained and given form by individual scripts.  
 
Arrow (a) represents the encoding of institutional principles in scripts. It also indicates 
that institutions continue to exist through the continuous reproduction of these scripts. It is 
important to point out that Barley & Tolbert saw in this reproduction of scripts a source of 
institutionalisation of new principles. They demonstrated this view by including a 
diachronic relationship between scripts and institutions, demonstrating changes over time. 
I have depicted the relation between institutions and scripts as a synchronic relation. This 
does not allow for changes, as it emphasises that institutions continue to exist because 
they are reproduced by scripts. Contrary to Barley & Tolbert, this arrow does not depict a 
process of change over time. Rather, the arrow focuses on the stability between 
institutions and scripts. Finally, the framework depicts an arrow connecting scripts and 
action. Action can result from the performance of a script, and as such it is the outcome of 
a process that starts with an event and the recognition of associated cues.  
 
This section explored the decision making process under conditions of stability; i.e., it 
addressed the decisions that are made ‘off the top of our heads’. This section has led to the 
relatively simple sequence of events that occur when making script-assisted choices. 
These revolve around the selection of cognitive scripts that are available for legitimate 
responses. The relevance of script-assisted decision making to this work lies in the 
recognition that routines (the repetitive occurrence of action patterns) themselves are not 
directly resistant to change, as Feldman (2000) has shown. The availability of action-
patterns in itself does not necessarily make other alternatives unreachable. As Feldman 
demonstrated, these routines can change from one iteration to the next. From this, it was 
concluded that statements on resistance to change in relation to routines need an 
explanation on the causes of invoking specific routines and the level of reflectiveness that 
accompany the invoking of a routine.  
 
Gioia & Poole (1984) argued that the more stereotypical a situation is, the more automatic 
the processing of scripts will be. It is under these circumstances that people can display 
‘resistance’ to change, simply because scripts that were suitable in the past are still being 
invoked. Under these circumstances, one cannot argue that individuals are malicious in 
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their reactions, but rather that people continue to use specific cues that point to proven 
scripts. Choice is then a tacit selection between different scripts. For example, an 
organisation that experiences severe fluctuations in sales may have found ways to deal 
with these fluctuations. The organisation can avoid distress in the months where sales are 
low, as it is used to these occurrences. It can take well-known measures such as sales 
promotions to increase sales. The cues (in this case, sales figures) lead to the performance 
of scripted action plans. The notion of cues in this respect is the trigger that causes action 
plans to be executed. The cues are simple and familiar structures (formal or informal) that 
are accompanied by action alternatives that present themselves quite naturally in response 
to the cue. In extremis, one could think of a car that pulls constantly to the left. The driver 
quite routinely, and without conscious choice, corrects by steering right to neutralise this 
effect. The cue here is that the car steers left. This causes an associated reaction: to steer 
right. The entire process may occur sub-consciously; and off the top of one’s head.  
 
How scripts are shaped and invoked depends on a number of elements in the social 
setting. I have defined identity and role, as well as culture and institutions. These all guide 
the unconscious selection of scripts and lead to the selection of appropriate courses of 
action. Now, if this process is triggered in situations that can be construed as stereotypical, 
then the entire selection is likely to be tacit. This means that the energy saving feature of 
routines is maximised, because they are invoked as learned responses, rather than 
consciously selected courses of action.  
 
If anything should be clear from this work so far, then it is that we all build structures to 
create our own predictable environment. We encapsulate ourselves in familiarity that 
allows us to reduce the probability of surprise. Yet, surprise is unavoidable and is at the 
core of change. Now that the primary conditions of social stability are known, the next 
step is to look at how change can occur under these forces that promote stability. This is 
the topic of the next section. 
 
3.3 Change in the face of persistent scripts 
The previous section has demonstrated the inherent stability of script-assisted decision-
making. Individually, actors make sense of their environment through schemas and scripts 
that allow them to give meaning to events without resorting to extensive search behaviour. 
Apart from the occasional sub-optimality that this yields, it is a highly efficient mode of 
information processing. At an organisational level, stability is served by the existence of 
institutionalised structures that go relatively unnoticed. These structures are self-
enforcing, and allow for information to be processed in terms of those institutions. This 
makes it unlikely that institutions can be easily challenged. Yet, no author denies that 
change is possible, but merely that it can be a difficult process. The existence of routines 
as expressions of inarticulate schematic decision-making challenges change agents. 
Therefore, this section will address how change is possible for an individual who operates 
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under the influence of scripts and schemas. The section will be structured as follows. First 
it will introduce how this chapter uses the term ‘change’. It will then present a theoretical 
framework of change, that is explained in the remainder of the chapter.  
3.3.1 Changes in scripts 
Changes in scripts can emerge through first order or second order change. First order 
change involves changes in behaviours while existing schemas remain in tact. Second 
order change refers to changes the in underlying shared schemas that provide 
organisational participants with meaning on the purpose of the organisation and their role 
in it. Bartunek & Moch (1987) define second order change as the conscious modification 
of present schemata in a particular direction. It is analogous to revolutionary change 
mentioned by Burns & Scapens (2000), as it typically begins with ‘a perceived crisis 
strong enough to “unfreeze” accepted interpretive schemes (Schein, 1980) for at least 
some organisational members’ (Bartunek, 1984, p. 364). Giddens refers to these shocks as 
‘critical situations’ that he defines as ‘circumstances of radical disjuncture of an 
unpredictable kind’ (1984, p. 61). Bartunek identifies several examples of such shocks; 
such as poor performance, unsuccessful management, or major shifts in power. These 
events are partially analogous to the concept of cue, coined by Weick (1995), which 
triggers the act of sense making. Weick includes examples such as unexpected cash drains 
and emergencies. Cues can initiate second order change, when they serve to ‘challenge the 
validity of organisation’s interpretive schemes’ (Bartunek, 1984), but they can also trigger 
the automatic use of schemas already in place, and therefore prompt first order change, 
rather than second order change. Busco et al. (2001) observed that an Italian company was 
taken over by General Electric, which served as a shock that cancelled out ontological 
security and had the potential to open up and redefine existing arrangements within the 
organisation. This would be an example of second order change. Weick (1995) argues that 
a breakdown of routines raises an awareness of the scripts that drive these routines, and 
cause actors to engage in more conscious sense making. Nielsen and Bartunek (1996) 
suggest that second order change processes involve a number of components: it is usually 
initiated in response to events that cause a sense of crisis or urgency, which lead powerful 
organisational members to perceive that established schemas are inadequate; it leads to the 
development of alternative schemas and; it could lead to possible conflict between the 
adopters of new schemas and the holders of older ones.  
 
Change, as it is regarded here, is the adaptation of existing scripts and the development of 
new scripts if deemed necessary. As noted above, Louis (1980) argues that revisions in 
cognitive scripts result from sense making. Therefore, this section will introduce a 
framework of sense making. It ties the above insights into a framework explaining how 
organisational members deal with an unexpected experience and a resulting failure of 
scripts at an individual level and routines at an organisational level to address events 
meaningfully. It is here that the second interpretation of sense making materialises. Sense 
making here is the creation of cognitive scripts that are able to deal with new experience. 
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This concept of sense making is likely to occur when a cue, a shock, or a critical situation 
occurs. In other words, a disruption precedes the act of sense making.  
 
3.3.2 Sense making of first and second order change: coping with 
ambiguity 
The framework is an adapted version of the one presented by Louis (1980), in which she 
models the sense making process of new entrants in an organisation. However, the 
framework is applicable to a wide variety of situations including the discontinuity of 
routines as both incorporate conscious, reflective action to deal with previously un-
encountered events. Consider this adapted framework in Figure 3-6: 
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The framework depicts the process of action choice, in conditions where cognitive scripts 
are inadequate for guiding action decisions. In this sense, it belongs to the left on the 
Gioia & Poole scale of automatic script processing (see page 48), which they refer to as 
controlled processing. The framework describes action choices under the condition that 
existing cognitive scripts break down, and are deemed insufficient to interpret new 
experience. This is relevant to the question of the breakdown of routines; for the 
recognition of the inappropriateness of scripted knowledge leads to the conscious 
assessment of the appropriateness of routines. Actors will therefore deal with newly 
encountered events in a different manner; as will be described below. Apart from an 
assessment of the process of action choice, the framework also yields a possible 
understanding of revisions to cognitive scripts. As Louis (1980) argues, updated 
expectations and revised assumptions are analogous to revisions in cognitive scripts. 
Before I turn to an explanation of the framework, a clarification needs to be provided. 
Comparing Figure 3-6 above with Figure 3-5, which depicted conditions of stability, one 
may notice that a component visualising institutions is missing in Figure 3-6, which 
depicts action choices without support of existing scripts. This is not because institutions 
are not important here. Rather, I am dealing with two theoretical situations: full stability, 
meaning that actions are fully governed by appropriate scripts; and change, meaning that 
individuals cannot use existing scripts. As scripts can constitute (parts of) institutions, and 
as scripts are assumed to be absent in situations of change, institutions are theoretically 
not present. However, scripts and institutions are never totally absent in human 
(inter)action. They are also seldom as dominant as assumed in my depiction of stability 
(Figure 3-5). Rather, these situations of stability and change are two ends of a continuum. 
  
3.3.2.1 Change, Contrast & Surprise 
Figure 3-6 starts with the introduction of change. Change in itself is no guarantee that the 
process of sense making will take place. Individuals are likely to subject surprising events 
to closer inspection. Surprise can emerge from change and contrast, including unexpected 
outcomes of actions. Where Burns & Scapens (2000) observe that some kind of ‘shock’ is 
necessary to open up existing arrangements, they refer to the consequences of this shock, 
such as surprise and anxiety. Weick (1995) refers to the events causing surprise and 
associated emotions as cues. Although cues can incorporate shocks, they can be more 
general. Extracted cues are simple, familiar structures that are the seeds from which 
people develop a larger sense of what may be occurring. Kiesler and Sproull (1982) 
specify cues more fully: ‘people attend to and encode salient material–events that are 
unpleasant, deviant, extreme, intense, unusual, sudden, brightly lit, colourful, alone, or 
sharply drawn. In the world of organizations, salient information includes unanticipated 
drains on cash flow, new taxes and regulations (unpleasant information), predictions of 
best and worst outcomes (extreme information), disruptions of routine and emergencies 
(intense, unusual, sudden information) and publicity and iconoclastic executives 
(colourful information).’ It was noted earlier that scripts provide the individual with 
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predictions of sequences of events as well as well as of their outcomes. This means that 
scripts provide prospective explanations. As long as the predicted outcomes are realised, 
no need exists for conscious evaluation. However, when the predicted outcome does not 
occur, it affects the individual’s cognitive consistency (Abelson et al., 1968). Discrepancy 
between anticipation and experience leads to a state of tension, which can serve as a cue. 
Hence, when a script fails, the individual develops ex-ante explanations for this 
discrepancy.  
 
Louis (1980) observed that these retrospective explanations are produced through the 
process of sense making. Although it may have been suggested that experience is singular, 
it is not. Rather, an experience is part of the experience stream. Actors take experience out 
of the ongoing stream, because they are triggered to do so. The concept of sense making 
emphasises that this attention to specific experiences occurs when a cue causes an event to 
be lifted out of the ongoing stream of experiences (Weick, 1995, p. 85). People are in the 
middle of ongoing experiences, and an interruption of those projects typically lifts them 
out of the ongoing stream. Weick argues that this interruption induces emotion; hence 
interruptions of experiences introduce the element of emotion in sense making. A 
necessary condition for emotion is the occurrence of arousal. Arousal occurs slowly, 
which means that it occurs retrospectively. Once arousal is noticed, actors try to link the 
situation that causes arousal to prior situations that make sense to them. Shocks cause 
emotions to be attributed to events. These emotions can then linger on as new occasions 
for sense making can cause individuals to refer back to the old sense making occasions 
that originally induced these emotions. Past events are reconstructed in the present as 
explanations, because they feel the same, rather than that they look the same (Weick, 
1995, p. 49). The actor is then able to recall the emotions associated with that previous 
occasion. Prasad & Prasad explained the attribution of emotion to the computerisation of 
the workplace as follows: ‘employee translations of managerial discourses contributed in 
some ways to the reduced appeal of the computer technology. These translations seemed 
to add a layer of emotional discomfort in working with the system because of the negative 
connotations they carried’ (2000, p. 400). Note that the concept of cues fits the notion of 
management by exception. It becomes management by the unexpected or the management 
by cues. Sense making by cues can also provide the trigger that is needed to abandon 
existing routines. This occurs when experiences are lifted out of the stream of experience 
and get emotion attributed to it. Cues can then be interpreted as those mechanisms that 
cause decision makers to reconsider their cognitive scripts. They cause specific 
experiences to be consciously evaluated. 
 
Two distinct processes, both of which are heavily depending on context, shape an 
extracted cue. Firstly, context defines what is extracted as a cue. Some potential cues are 
never picked up as such and therefore are not directly available for sense making. 
Secondly, context influences how cues are interpreted. The assessment of the meaning of 
events influences the importance and the meaning of a cue.  
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3.3.2.2 Prospective Sense Making 
I noted earlier that different authors have different opinions of the degree of conscious 
processing of situational information that it associated with sense making. I argued that, to 
this thesis, sense making is the conscious interpretation of events and experiences when 
scripts are insufficient to deal with particular events and experiences. Now, a second 
difference in the interpretation of sense making is discussed. The framework devised by 
Louis (1980) shows sense making as preceding action, while Weick (1993a, 1995) and 
Garfinkel (1967) have observed that sense making occurs retrospectively. It comes 
primarily down to a definitional issue. Louis argues that the result of sense making is the 
provision of meaning to surprise that leads to action1, while Weick notes the opposite: one 
of the products of an action is the attempt to make sense of the elapsed action. It must be 
clear that on occasions where there is no automatic script processing, people attempt to 
give meaning to events and attempt to formulate preferences prior to taking action. But it 
also is logical that actors interpret the results of their actions and then give meaning to 
these results. Casual observers may conclude that sense making occurs both prior to, and 
after action has been taken. This is sensible in light of Weick’s (1995) remarks that sense 
making is ongoing. Yet, it may cause confusion to this attempt to conceptualise the 
processes involved. Therefore, to facilitate the analysis of sense making, two concepts of 
sense making are introduced: prospective sense making and retrospective sense making. 
This is depicted by the following figure that indicates that sense making can be 








Figure 3-7: Prospective and retrospective sense making 
 
Prospective sense making involves the process of making sense of situational information 
before selecting action, in the absence of guiding and automatically invoked schemas and 
scripts (primarily voiced by Louis). Conversely, retrospective sense making occurs after 
action has been taken and is mainly championed by Weick (1993a, 1993b, 1995) and 
Garfinkel (1967). The latter comes closer to terms such as legitimation and justification. 
There is one important difference between prospective and retrospective sense making. 
That is the amount of information available. Weick (1993a) pointed to this phenomenon 
when he remarked that pre-decision behaviour differs markedly from post-decision 
behaviour. He remarked that: ‘during the pre-decision period, people pay equal attention 
                                                
1 In her own words: ’It is crucial to note that meaning is assigned to surprise as an output of the sense-making 
process, rather than arising concurrently with the perception or detection of differences’ (p. 241). 
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to alternatives in an effort to reduce their ignorance. If there is differential attention to 
alternatives, they pay more attention to the alternatives they eventually reject. This is the 
pattern of information processing that Daft & Lengel (1986) associate with uncertainty’ 
(p. 30). Retrospective sense making, that is the provision of meaning to elapsed action, is 
aimed at the provision of committed interpretation. This means that actors become bound 
to their behaviours. Weick argues that this involves committed interaction. Actors often 
invoke macro entities to justify behaviour, and in doing so, reify the existence of these 
entities (‘I did so, because head office wants me to’). Furthermore, retrospective sense 
making is more about interaction (see chapter 8 and 9), than action. It is inherently social, 
and thus the observable outcomes of other people’s actions are considered important, as 
those constitute the visible and shared features of action. Therefore, while prospective 
sense making is more about choosing action among alternatives (indeed much akin to the 
notion of bounded rationality), retrospective sense making is more about the justification 
of action to oneself and others, as well as the committing to this action. Apart from these 
differences, both types of sense making (prospective and retrospective sense making) 
relate to the process of giving meaning to equivocal information. 
 
Actors synthesise meaning under the influence of all events and experiences that are 
underway. This means that the main problem for actors is not too few meanings, for 
which more information should be made available, but rather too many. The problem for 
the sense maker is one of equivocality, rather than one of uncertainty. Therefore, the sense 
maker needs norms, values, priorities and opinions to help him to prioritise to which 
experiences he attends. ‘Clarity on values clarified what is important in elapsed 
experience, which finally gives some sense of what that elapsed experience means’ 
(Weick, 1995, p. 28). The retrospective nature of sense making is most clearly illustrated 
by Weick’s statement: ‘how can I know what we did until I see what we produced?’ 
(1995, p. 30). Action is a precondition to making sense. For example: speaking about 
events makes the events tangible and helps to define their contents. The action of speaking 
therefore influences the substance of the experience and clears the way for further sense 
making of the events.  
 
The stream of experiences is never ending, and so is the process of sense making. Because 
of the propensity of the sense maker to dig into previous events and experiences from this 
never ending sequence, the influences on sense making are nothing short of a mishmash 
of experiences and meanings that were once given to events. This quality of sense making 
is related to March’s concept of rule following in choice (see chapter 2). The matching of 
situations to appropriate responses is the act of making sense of that experience by 
matching earlier experiences to it. The selection of an imperfect routine to make sense of 
an experience is a satisficing, rather than optimising, response by the actor. Consequently, 
sense making is a chain of satisficing behaviours, which are, not surprisingly, far from 
optimal.  
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Sense making is plausible rather than accurate in that it attempts to provide meaning to the 
facts available at that specific time. As information is always incomplete, one can never 
be sure whether sense given to events is indeed accurate. Sense is perceived correct when 
it fits the observable facts. Where multiple meanings exist, sense making amounts to 
finding an interpretation that in later stages can be shared, and possibly becomes the 
dominant interpretation. The sense made of events is maintained until events occur that 
make this interpretation no longer sustainable. The individual has no certainty of the 
‘truth’ of his interpretation. Meanings are accepted, until they cannot be sustained when 
new information becomes available. In short, sense making results in plausible 
explanations for events. 
 
Sense making: Others’ interpretations 
Sense making is never solitary. Boland (1993) argued that people are able to draw from 
many interpretive schemes and norms that are capable of influencing their action choices 
at a given time, and thereby influencing the organisational arena. Arrington & Francis 
(1993) argue that our economic choices and actions are both conditioned by and 
consequential for others who share our status as citizens of moral-economic communities. 
Burns and Stalker have put this as follows: ‘In working organizations decisions are made 
either in the presence of others or with the knowledge that they will have to be 
implemented, or understood, or approved by others. The set of considerations called into 
relevance on any decision-making occasion has therefore to be one shared with others or 
acceptable to them’ (1961, p. 118). The presence of other is always near, even when they 
are not physically there. What a person does is always contingent on others, spread out 
over time. Past interactions affect current sense given to action. This is why it is very 
difficult to point to the chain of events that leads to the sense that is made of events. 
Weick (1995) observes that the alignment of acts within social settings does not 
necessarily occur, because individuals make equal sense of the events surrounding them. 
Rather, actions can be aligned despite the sense given to events. Co-operation can occur 
out of necessity, the need for help to achieve pre-set objectives, or because it is the 
outcome of compromise. Hence, co-operation may consist of workable relations, rather 
than shared beliefs and meanings. It does not require people to share interpretations of the 
various events. 
 
Sense making: Local interpretation schemes 
Rather than viewing the environment as an impersonal space objectively out there, it is 
action that enacts the environment, thus establishing a link between action and 
environment. Action causes changes in the environment and on a larger scale, action 
causes constraints to be present in the environment. Action creates stimuli, which in turn 
induce further action. In acting we change the conditions around us. Therefore, by 
definition, action (even performed by a single individual) yields dual results. We do not 
only make sense of it in terms of what it brings us, but also in terms of the changes in the 
environment it creates. This can be illustrated by the analogy of Newton’s Third Law of 
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Motion1. Action in itself is meaningless. Action is only as good as the reactions that it 
causes. We interpret actions by the outcomes that we can observe, but these outcomes are 
as much a result from our actions as they are from the interpretations of others.  
 
Prospective sense making is problematic in this respect. If action is a guide for the sense 
given to experience, then judgements made on possible action choices beforehand are by 
definition incomplete. Yet, individuals have access to various sources of information that 
allow them to make sense of their actions before they occur. Local interpretation schemes 
of the social entity to which actors belong can serve as a guide. In other words: elapsed 
action that moulded local frameworks of interpretation serves as one of the guiding 
principles in selecting action. As Louis (1980) argues, this is especially problematic for 
new entrants, who do not yet have an intimate knowledge of local interpretations. In 
simple terms, they do not know yet how to react to events within their environment.  
 
Sense making: Predispositions & purposes 
The most common form of sense making is making sense of self. The construction of 
identity is grounded in the actor’s interaction with his social setting. While dealing with 
others, actors constantly adapt the image of self they present, depending on what they 
perceive as the most appropriate one to display. But rather than being opportunistically 
engaged in matching an infinite number of selves to infinite number of different social 
settings, the redefinition of self influences how actors see themselves, as well as how they 
perceive the very social setting in which they operate. Hence the redefinition of self 
influences how the actor perceives the social setting. Thus, the interaction between the 
self and the social context works both ways. ‘Once I know who I am then I know what is 
out there’ (Weick, 1995, p. 20). Making sense of self stems from three major sources: (1) 
it can be triggered by a failure to confirm one’s self. The actor, who fails to confirm an 
image of self, is left with a gap in his self-image. This is highly unsatisfactory as it also 
affects his outlook on his environment. Social interaction is grounded in the self, therefore 
a lack of knowledge of the self influences the ability to interact with the environment. (2) 
The making sense of the self occurs whenever a discrepancy is felt between action and 
beliefs. Redefining self could reduce this discrepancy and thereby ease the accompanying 
anxiety. Again, whether this new image of self is displayed or not, it could potentially 
alter the outlook on the environment, and thereby alter the environment as it is presented 
to others. (3) Defining identity, which is part of the self, is not fully in the hands of the 
actor. By projecting identities in the environment and observing the reactions of others, 
actors learn about their own identities.  
 
                                                
1 Newton stated that for every action there is always an opposite and equal reaction. I do not suggest that this is 
neccessarily the case here, but Newton’s formule points to action and the associated reaction. This is relevant to 
sense making as I argue that individuals make sense of their actions by observing the reactions they produce. 
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Moreover, identity is partly defined by actions taken; not only those of oneself, but also 
those of others. The cues for identity come from the conduct of others, but as the actor is 
making a real effort to influence the actions of these others, by interaction as well as his 
own actions, he influences his image of self and identity, by the actions he undertakes and 
the effects this has on his environment. An example has been provided by Prasad & 
Prasad who discuss resistance to computerisation in a health maintenance organisation. 
They observe: ‘the act of wilfully and consciously resisting certain elements of everyday 
control constituted individuals’ own subjectivities as autonomous individuals in charge of 
their lives, willing to stand up for themselves if necessary. The researchers were struck by 
the frequency with which claiming resistance was also accompanied by explanations such 
as, “I have never been a passive kind of person”, or “I think I know when to speak up.” 
Interpreting their own actions as resistance thus seemed to affirm for many organisation 
members, their own identities as autonomous individuals, fully capable of participating in 
key organisational processes, even when officially excluded from doing so.’ (2000, p. 
396, emphasis in original). Indications of what one’s purpose is in an organisation, comes 
from role fulfilment, as discussed earlier in this chapter: role and identity are important 
influences on sense making efforts. 
 
Sense making: Past Experiences 
A number of studies have claimed that path dependency in processes of change plays an 
important role. When it comes to technical change (Antonelli, 1997; Dosi, 1997) or 
economic and institutional change (North, 1991; Denzau & North; 1994, Vromen, 1995, 
Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2001), path dependency seems to fulfil a pivotal role. March has 
argued that ‘decisions and outcomes in a particular environment depend not only on that 
environment but also on previous environments and the ways in which they have been 
experienced. The historical path makes some outcomes unrealisable in the future, 
including some previously realised’ (1994, p. 235-236). But the literature is not very 
explicit when it comes to assessing the actual importance of path dependency at the 
micro- (that is: individual) level and how it interferes with processes of organisational 
change1, although March and Simon (1958, p. 9) postulated: ‘The behaviour of a (human) 
organism through a short interval of time is to be accounted for by (1) its internal state at 
the beginning of the interval, and (2) its environment at the beginning of the interval. The 
two sets of factors, the initial state and the environment, determine not only the behaviour 
but also what the internal state will be at the next moment of time’ thus ‘the internal state 
of the organism, by the terms of the description, is implicitly a function of its whole 
previous history’. We do know that processes of organisational change within individual 
                                                
1 Path dependency has been an issue widely explored in industrial economics. Its impact in technological 
innovation has been especially acknowledged. Historical adoptions of new technologies that have been 
researched using path-dependency include the power source of the automobile (the internal combustion engine 
vs. the steam engine), the QWERTY keyboard and the VHS videocassette recorder. These approaches have 
focused on path-dependency mainly on a macro scale and have primarily directed attention to the area of 
technological innovation. 
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organisations are infused with path dependent behaviours. For example, the framework 
proposed by Burns and Scapens (2000) implicitly relies on path dependency to explain the 
evolutionary properties of institutions. Their framework would not explain ultimate 
routinisation of new procedures, if it were not for a temporal component that allows for 
reliance on past events. Allowing path dependency to become an explicit issue in this 
study, serves as an extension of theoretical insights on how routines function. As noted 
before, it is taken implicitly as an important property, but it may be fruitful to explicate 
the issue.  
 
Hopwood, in his discussion on the ‘archaeology of change’ concluded that: ‘the 
emergence of a particular account has been shown to be neither an unproblematic 
reflection of a more abstract intent nor a sudden discovery or transformation. Rather the 
cases have illustrated the more positive ways in which specific local origins moderated the 
path of accounting development and the multiple and even conflicting conditions of 
possibility that gave rise to particular manifestations of the accounting craft’ (Hopwood, 
1987, p. 227). Furthermore, Briers & Chua (2001) have observed that with respect to 
accounting change, its unevenness and materiality prompt questions about the 
preconditions and processes of change. They illustrate this by pointing to the substantive 
and lingering impact that distant (in both spatial as well as temporal dimensions) 
discourses and seemingly unrelated events may have on the organisation.  
 
Yet, explicit explorations of the notion of path dependency on organisational change have 
been very limited. ‘One would like to have some ‘theoretical tales’ … providing some 
guidance on the nature of the processes involved, and also helping in answering questions 
like: how important path-dependency itself is? Does it involve phenomena of irreversible 
lock-in?’ (Dosi, 1997, p. 1539). Not only do we need more theoretical explanations on the 
phenomenon, but also empirical investigations into the matter may be warranted. Indeed, 
‘the empirical evidence on the way in which path-dependent process develop over time is 
still meagre’ (Egidi & Narduzzo, 1997, p. 678). The above calls for more research on the 
topic all hold when related to individual routines as well as their collective, organisational 
counterpart. Although past experience may well be of importance, it is impossible to 
specify beforehand what aspects of an individual’s earlier experiences play a role in 
making sense of newly encountered events. This needs to be clarified by respondents in 
the actual investigation. This investigation will be presented in later chapters of this thesis. 
 
3.3.2.3 Attribution of meaning 
The outcome of sense making is the attribution of meaning. The event is placed in a 
context and emotions are associated with it. It is akin to consensus on what an event 
means for the organisation and the individuals involved. For example: an unexpected 
drain in cash flows may mean a greater emphasis on debt collection, and therefore may be 
of special importance to the finance department, but to the marketing department, for 
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instance, lower cash flows could also mean a need for increased sales. Whatever it may 
be, the attribution of meaning signifies the order in the chaos that unexpected events may 
have caused. The presence of subcultures is very important in this respect (Harris, 1994). 
Subcultures can be similar to the so-called “provinces of meaning”, as Schutz referred to 
them. A consequence of the presence of these provinces of meaning is that meaning 
attributed to an event might differ between subcultures. Then the stage is set for 
misunderstandings about the consequences of an event. The framework depicted in Figure 
3-6 suggests that the attribution of meaning occurs as a result of sense making and is an 
input for the selection of action alternatives. The attribution of meaning is therefore an 
important determinant of the action choice that will be selected, and, potentially, an 
important source of ambiguity and conflict.  
 
3.3.2.4 Selection of behavioural response 
I would like to emphasise that the individual is not a tabula rasa, who can select an 
optimal solution. Rather, in the theoretical case of change described in this section, the 
individual attempts to be reflective in a response to the presence of cues. However, he is 
influenced by numerous factors that affect the act of sense making and the resulting 
meaning given to the event. What is left is a decision based on the private meaning that 
the event has for him, rather than the event itself. In one sense, behaviour is the outcome 
of sense making processes. It involves the selection of a course of action from the wide 
repertoire that is usually available to the actor. From Figure 3-6, it follows that the action 
alternative that is chosen is a function of many considerations that include the meaning 
given to situations as well as a classical means-ends calculation on the part of the actor.  
 
3.3.2.5 Retrospective Sensemaking 
Sense making is not only prospective, but it is also retrospective. George Herbert Mead 
(1956, p. 136) observed that ‘we are conscious always of what we have done, never of 
doing it. We are always conscious directly of sensory processes, never of motor processes; 
hence we are conscious of motor processes only through sensory processes which are their 
resultants.’ Actions are known once they have been completed. Thus the actor is always a 
bit behind on his actions and of those of others. By the act of interpreting experience, 
actors make sense of the experience.  
 
Retrospective sense making implies that actors interpret experience once it has occurred. 
It also implies that current experience influences the act of sense making. Thus making 
sense is path dependent, but not restricted to the past. Current experience influences the 
meaning that is given to past experiences. Therefore, the retrospective sense given to 
experience holds more information, than was available at the time the experience 
occurred; i.e. before it entered short-term memory. Since the experience that is subject to 
sense making has elapsed, it only exists in short-term memory. Therefore, all events that 
3. Stability & change 
 75
influence the working of short-term memory will have an influence on how sense making 
occurs and what the outcomes are. The concept of retrospective sense making also makes 
problematic the often-used unit of analysis: stimuli-response. Within the reasoning of 
retrospective sense making the response (action) necessitates the fabrication of stimuli 
(reason) instead of the other way around.  
 
This effect of retrospective sense making was noticed by Garfinkel (1967). He observed 
that members of juries in court were inclined to formulate a verdict prior to formulating a 
sensible explanation for their verdict. They were effectively making sense of their 
decision retrospectively, using the facts at their disposal. Post decision outcomes are used 
to construct pre-decisional histories. This also happens on a smaller scale, when actors 
discover the nature of the situations in which they are acting. Actions are first order 
determinants of the situations in which actors find themselves. They serve as clues to 
interpret the environment. As such, actors are generally unable to account for their actions 
in advance. Rather, they engage in retrospective sense making, where they motivate 
actions in terms of facts that were discovered by virtue of their actions. 
 
When actors engage in retrospective sense making of acts, they are using outcomes that 
are only partially attributable to their specific identifiable actions. Moreover, the action 
could have changed the environment to such an extent that it changes the sense of the 
action in itself. Success and failure of any action is measured by the reactions of the 
environment. Therefore, the environment plays an important part in the type of rationale 
that actors provide for their actions. Moreover, the environment has already changed 
under the influence of elapsed action. Hence, the retrospective judgement of the action 
occurs in a setting with more information on the outcomes than when the action was 
conceived. In conclusion, it may be fruitful to acknowledge that action is only meaningful 
in relation to its impact on the surroundings of the actor, as well as the influence this 
impact has on the meaning that is given to the action. Additionally, the outcomes of the 
actor’s actions are likely to be visible to the outside world. Therefore, he is likely to be 
committed (commitment is the level of association) to the outcomes of the action. Actors 
make sense retrospectively by observing the outcomes of their actions, but so do others. 




Salancik (1977) offers a conceptualisation of commitment: ‘commitment is the binding of 
the individual to behavioural acts’ (p. 4). Commitment is about the degree to which 
someone can be associated with specific courses of action. Under certain conditions of 
change, new actions are invented and commitment helps to bind people to these actions. 
Salancik states that ‘people will tend to behave in ways that are consistent with the 
implications of their past behaviors’ (1977, p. 7). The more committed a person is to a 
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specific course of action, the more likely it is that the person’s future acts will be in line 
with the previous acts. The definition of commitment makes the sequential position of 
committed action clear. It occurs after the action. Action is a prerequisite of commitment. 
This becomes clear when the determinants of commitment are discussed: 
 
Explicitness. The more explicit an action is, in terms of observability and 
unequivocability, the more one can be assumed to be committed for it. This factor has to 
do with the undeniability and the precise nature of the action. To be able to be publicly 
committed to a course of action, there must be agreement that the action has occurred and 
that people have agreed on its traits. 
Revocability. Actions can sometimes be seen as tests. We try them, and see if they work 
out. Sometimes they do not, and we are at liberty to undo them. People can pull out of 
action, by revoking them. But one commits to some courses of action once initiated: 
‘Pulling the trigger of a loaded gun pointed at a friend commits all to its gross reality’ 
(Salancik, 1977, p. 4). Salancik argues that the ability to revoke action influences the 
degree of commitment to that action. The more revocable action is, the less one can speak 
of commitment.  
Volition. Volition is not absolute, but relative. There is always some degree of choice 
whether to enter into action or not. Even when confronted with violence, an individual 
may select between several courses of action. However, a number of elements can 
indicate volition: choice; the presence of external demands for action; the presence of 
extrinsic bases for action; and the presence of other contributors to action. The higher the 
perceived degree of volition, the more commitment may be observed for specific courses 
of action. 
Publicity. This is relatively easy. The more an individual is publicly responsible for a 
specific course of action, the more he is committed to defending this course of action. The 
action serves as a proxy for specific characteristics of the individual, since he is publicly 
bound to the action. He is not only motivating his action, but he is motivating his own 
traits and this could even be extended to include identity.  
 
Interpreting commitment from a sense making perspective has at least two consequences: 
first, commitment influences how people make retrospective sense of the experience they 
encounter as a result of their action. The degree of commitment influences the terms in 
which people justify their actions towards others1. And second, commitment is the root of 
further action. As noted above, people generally act in line with their previous behaviours. 
Commitment to specific behaviour (binding people to action) will therefore influence the 
options that one has when it comes to future action. In other words, committed action in 
this framework reflects the fact that people constrain themselves by committing to current 
                                                
1 It may even be possible to state that action to which one has not committed at all, does not require retrospective 
sense making. Moreover, one may argue that script driven action does not involve volition, and may therefore 
not be considered as committed action. Both arguments would imply that committed action and conscious action, 
as opposed to scripted action, occur in lock step. 
3. Stability & change 
 77
actions that limit their future action choices. It is unlikely that an individual will act in 
contradiction to earlier actions he was committed to. 
 
3.3.2.7 Updating of expectations and view of social setting, script 
modification and routinisation 
In this phase, the actor is in a unique position. He is not only able to see the results of his 
selected course of action, but he is also able to relate these results to his original 
objectives. Through retrospective sense making, the actor has already formulated 
explanations for deviations, but these ‘lessons learned’ can now be included in the 
cognitive structure of the actor. In the future, this helps the actor in formulating 
expectations, for similar classes of situations. The energies invested in retrospective sense 
making are therefore by no means lost. Rather, the experiences and elapsed actions 
(including the sense made of these experiences and actions) become part of the actor’s 
perception on how his social setting works, and how he can best deal with it. Future 
events will therefore be perceived in terms of current experiences. A social setting is the 
social group that is relevant to the actor at a specific time and place. Often, it is the group 
in which the actor has performed the action, but it can also entail a different group that is 
relevant. For example, although one ordinarily asks for a raise at work, the family may be 
a relevant group that defines the reason for the action of asking for a raise. A social setting 
can thus be broader that the time and space of the actual execution of the action. An actor 
tends to update his view of the social setting based on his experiences and the reactions he 
observes on his actions. In other words, views of social settings are likely to be altered as 
a result of elapsed experiences.  
 
The process I described does not lead to script modification per se. According to Gioia & 
Poole (1984) script modification is likely when the situation leading up the actions are 
infrequent. This means that the situation is relatively novel, but it is expected that it will 
become recurrent. Finally, when the adapted scripts are likely to be frequently and 
collectively performed, routinisation of the action may be observed. This explanation of 
script modification and routinisation is rather limited here, but it will be explored further 
in chapters 9 and 10 of this thesis.  
 
It might be construed that each experience that is lifted out of the experience-stream will 
follow a path as depicted in figure 3. This is probably not true. The figure is an analytical 
tool that helps to visualise a process that cannot be observed directly in these terms. It 
does however contribute to existing knowledge in that it attempts to translate the effects of 
a collective and self re-enforcing process of institutionalisation to an individual and its 
equivalent manifestations of regularities. 
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3.4 Discussion 
This chapter has addressed changes in routines and scripts at the level of the individual. 
Starting from the realisation that routines are observable representations of institutions, it 
explored how routines are susceptible to change. Knowing more about the resistance 
and/or susceptibility to change of routines is important in order to explain the effects of 
change processes on individuals in social settings. Although it is very helpful to discuss 
institutions and the institutionalisation of routines, this work focuses on the effects on 
individuals, as these are the observable units of analysis of organisations.  
 
The chapter suggests that routines can be resistant to change when they are accompanied 
(invoked by) scripts. These scripts themselves are important to this analysis as they 
prevent individuals from overseeing all relevant information that does not fit existing 
scripted knowledge. The Ford Pinto crisis was used as an example. It led to the realisation 
that only routines that are governed by scripted knowledge are essentially resistant to 
change, as these can be invoked with little conscious reflection. Then the chapter 
discusses the theoretical situation of stability, in which individuals can deal with events by 
the performance of scripts. It argues that specific cues are associated with specific scripts. 
This allows many actions to be performed without a high degree of reflectiveness. The 
chapter then discusses in Figure 3-6 the theoretical situation of change, where cues can 
cause emotional discomfort through contrast, surprise and change, as no scripts are 
available to allow the individual to deal with the events that the cues pointed to. People 
then attempt to make sense of their experiences and through this process of sense making, 
they provide meaning to these experiences. If the events leading to this process of sense 
making are recurring and their initial responses were satisfactory, people may introduce 
these responses in their cognitive frames. This means that they associate the cues with the 
action, which can be included in their repertoire of scripts.  
  
When seeking explanations for institutional change at the individual level, one essentially 
needs to explore changes in scripts themselves (first and second order change). Also, one 
needs to recognise that scripted knowledge may prevent actors from processing new 
information. However, when surprise, shock, and contrast cause actors to realise that some 
events cannot be dealt with by their current repertoire of scripts, they can engage in sense 
making. They can make sense of these events to provide meaning and to formulate 
appropriate actions. Under specific conditions, these actions can be included in their 
repertoire of scripts, which can lead to the emergence of new collective routines, if further 
conditions are met. Understanding how routines emerge is an important element in 
understanding institutional change (Burns & Scapens, 2000). The framework does not 
depict institutionalisation of routines, as that process takes place outside of the scope of a 
particular individual. It requires a focus on the collective, rather than the individual. 
Chapter 10 will develop a view on the process of institutionalisation of routines and 
scripts. Chapter 11 will include the ideas about both the individual and the collective in a 
framework that includes the findings from the empirical part of this thesis. 
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The framework presented in this chapter will allow us to explore a massive change 
program at the Dutch Rabobank. This change program entails the implementation of 
Results Oriented Management at most of the 350 local member banks. The program, 
which is a sophisticated method for the planning & control cycle at the Rabobank, was 
originally aimed at providing the tools for improved planning & control at the branches of 
this cooperative bank (first order change). But as the program proceeded, it exposed a 
need for behavioural changes at these banks; i.e. changes in beliefs concerning the 
purpose of the bank (second order change). As a result, at some banks, the program was 
implemented as a means to influence action choices of all organisational participants, and 
to allow them to act in a more ‘result oriented’ manner. The researcher will use the 
framework developed in this chapter to interpret the events surrounding the ROM 
program. Before turning to that topic, the case setting needs to be properly introduced. 
The Rabobank, being a cooperative organisation is somewhat different to the ‘typical’ 
stock exchange quoted organisations. The next chapter will provide a detailed description 
of the Dutch Rabobank; its history, its structure, and the precise nature of the ROM 
program.   
  80
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In his Raiffeisen speech in 1998, former Dutch Prime-minister Prof. Dr. Ruud Lubbers 
discussed his concern over the tensions between the ongoing globalisation of Western 
societies and the legitimacy of cooperation, collaboration and support for the collective. 
He suggested that globalisation leads to ‘economisation’ of Western society. By this he 
meant that:  
 
‘Corrosion of the quality of life by the forces of the economy alone is another aspect of 
globalisation in her primary form. I aim at the increasing emphasis on the economic 
dimension of life, as if all that is economically measurable is valuable and needs to be 
maximised. This has led to a strong dissemination and growth of market-type of thought’.  
 
If economic discourse has become one of the leading sources of legitimacy for 
organisations and individuals, then one could infer that organisations that appeal 
specifically to this economic dimension will gain legitimacy as they appeal directly to 
what is considered “true” and “right”, at the expense of organisations that have 
traditionally focussed on other dimensions. An example of the latter might be cooperative 
organisations, that appeal to more than economic value judgements, and often consider 
their members’ well being as an important objective.  
 
One of the Netherlands’ most prestigious cooperative organisations is the Rabobank. 
Being more than 100 years old, a market leader on many fronts, and having a balance 
sheet exceeding  403 billion in 2003, one might certainly say that this bank has earned 
public confidence.  
 
However, currently the Rabobank faces increasing pressures in terms of productivity and 
profitability. Although it makes a handsome profit, the management feels that profits need 
to be increased to successfully compete with other major banks in the Netherlands. Calls 
for greater efficiency and effectiveness often come from investors who require better 
return on their investment. Yet, the Rabobank is a cooperative, and as such, it does not 
have investors as its owners. Its owners are its members who do not necessarily have the 
same interest in the organisation as investors in the traditional sense. From a historical 
perspective, the cooperative’s raison d’être has been to serve the best interests of 
members, who were severely hampered by the absence of an effective and efficient capital 
market.  
 
4. The cooperative split 
 82
But customers are becoming less and less loyal and more individualistic. Although the 
Rabobank did restructure its cooperative governance structure to give local banks more 
influence over decision-making, the mere notion of the need for modernisation of the 
cooperative exposes one of the Achilles heels of the cooperative Rabobank. On the one 
hand, it realises that much of its success can be attributed to the fact that it has organised 
itself as a cooperative, while on the other, it has some difficulty in exploiting its structure 
to obtain economic benefits. This apparent contradiction in cooperation and efficiency is 
sometimes referred to as ‘the cooperative split’. In light of the discussions that are being 
held throughout the organisation on the nature of cooperative identity of the bank, the 
Rabobank is at a crossroads. The reason for its existence has become less obvious in 
recent decades as cheap capital has become more accessible for all. The bank now finds 
itself in the difficult position of explaining the relevance of its cooperative identity in an 
era of individualisation and market transactions. The bank feels compelled to show its 
legitimacy in an era where cooperation in itself no longer holds moral sway. In terms of 
Suchman (1995), the bank feels increasing pressures from shifting sources of legitimacy. 
This leads to a widening gap between the structural features of the bank and the sense of 
purpose of the cooperative and the legitimacy claims it can make in an environment where 
free market arguments win at the expense of logics valuing cooperation and solidarity.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is threefold: To provide the reader with necessary information 
on the Rabobank. Secondly, to explain why the cooperative Rabobank is increasingly 
concerned with efficiency enhancing concepts and techniques. Thirdly, to inform the 
reader of the paradox of a cooperative in a highly developed capital market: how does a 
cooperative bank combine responsibilities towards its members with efficiency and 
customer profitability? This paradox, ‘the cooperative split’, is important to this thesis, as 
the discussion of the cooperative was a central issue for member banks during the 
interviews. 
 
4.2 The Rabobank 
The Rabobank organisation is one of the top three banks in the Netherlands with a balance 
sheet totalling 403 billion euros and some 57.000 employees in 2003. Its extensive 
network of branches (1378 at the end of 2003) and its direct focus on the agricultural 
community are traditionally its strong characteristics. Moreover, it traditionally has had a 
very strong credit rating, reflected in its triple A status; as rated by all three major rating 
agencies. This has been a continuing source of pride for the Rabobank, as it is the only 
bank in the Netherlands that is triple A rated. It is especially well represented in the 
private mortgages market as well as in the agricultural and dairy and foods industry.  
 
The element that distinguishes the Rabobank most from other major banks in the 
Netherlands today is that it is a cooperative. Within this ownership structure autonomous 
local banks are the members of the cooperative. These member banks also have members 
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of their own, in the form of private persons from the local community. A number of these 
members also form the Board of each of the local banks. As such, the Rabobank has 
always been a democracy with three layers:  
 
                                           
Individual local members 




Figure 4-1: The Rabobank democracy 
 
Decision making and change within this democracy has always been a time consuming 
process (some have named the bank a Mammoth tanker, due to its inability to change 
quickly). Since local banks are essentially autonomous, part of the decision-making 
involves convincing and persuading local banks.  
 
Formally, the member banks are independent and have full decision autonomy, except for 
matters related to the supervisory role of the Dutch Central Bank, for which they have 
delegated responsibility to the supra-local organisation, Rabobank Nederland. This 
includes local intervention when solvency falls below legally stipulated levels, or in cases 
of gross mismanagement. But in most instances, the local banks are formally autonomous. 
They are organised in the “Centrale Kring Vergadering”, translated: Central Circle 
Meeting (CKV), which now has decision authority over all strategic matters concerning 
the Rabobank Group. The bank does not have stockholders and as such it does not pay out 
dividends. And, however time consuming its decision-making may have been, the bank 
has been very successful in the past. 
 
4.3 The traditional cooperative 
This section will describe why the cooperative Rabobank developed to become one of the 
largest banks in the Netherlands. This background serves to provide an understanding of 
the history of the Rabobank and its current position. 
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4.3.1 Self-interest as founding factor 
The Rabobank organisation itself can be traced back to 1898 when 46 local credit 
cooperatives were merged into two bank-like structures: the general Raiffeisenbank based 
in Utrecht, and the Catholic Boerenleenbank in Eindhoven. Both were primarily aimed at 
the agricultural community, but their roots differed to some extent. The Eindhoven Credit 
Central benefited greatly from the strong Catholic infrastructure and value system, while 
the Utrecht Central was an example of the application of the German concept of credit 
cooperative along the lines set by Wilhelm Raiffeisen, one of the founding fathers of the 
cooperative movement. While ideologically different, their objectives where the same: the 
emancipation of people to reduce inequalities. The basic idea behind these cooperatives 
was to reduce the dependency of local farmers on high-priced credit providers. The 
cooperation between the farmers in borrowing and lending money soon became known as 
the cooperative bank.   
 
The basis of the cooperative bank was the savings of its members. ‘Without a steady 
growth of these savings, a truely prosperous development of the agricultural credit 
provision is not viable. Experience has taught us that the deposits display stability to such 
extent that they consist of effective means for the provision of specific agricultural capital 
needs’ (Visser & Haverkamp, 1959). The deposits were primary used for loans to 
members; all that were not directly needed were deposited at the supra-local 
organisations: the central organisations, in respectively Eindhoven or Utrecht, to facilitate 
easy distribution between member banks.  
 
In its early days, the cooperative was highly successful in attracting customers. The credit 
cooperatives achieved this for a number of reasons (Sluyterman et al., 1998): First, 
agricultural communities had little choice of lenders. Usually, arrangements could be 
made to purchase land, as notaries would facilitate various forms of borrowing and 
lending. But for operational financing, farmers had to deal with their suppliers who would 
ask for exceptionally high interest rates, not only directly, but also indirectly, such as 
through compulsory minimum purchases. All in all, access to the capital markets was 
either unavailable or relatively expensive. Economic necessity thus provided a clear 
motive for the formation of credit cooperatives. Secondly, the cooperatives quickly 
became successful because of the high interest rates they offered on savings, while being 
able to ask for competitive rates on borrowings. They were able to do this because of 
Raiffeisen’s philosophy of low-cost management. This consisted of the idea that the 
management of deposits had to be done at zero or very low costs. So in the first half of the 
twentieth century, it was often the secretary of the town council who would set up office 
at his home or at the town hall. Although some costs were unavoidable, the cooperatives 
could be characterised as having extremely lean cost structures. They were then able to 
return these savings to their members/clients through competitive rates.  
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As indicated earlier, the Rabobank is a combination of two cooperatives: the secular 
Cooperative Raiffeisen bank and the Catholic Boerenleenbank. Both embraced the basics 
of cooperative banking. Both appealed to their respective communities by offering 
economic benefits that were not otherwise available to them at that time. The cooperatives 
thus succeeded in gathering support through the rapid creation of a large customer base, 
mostly from the agricultural community. One may conclude that one of the reasons for the 
foundation of the Rabobank, the provision of material benefit, quickly proved to be the 
primary source of legitimacy in those first decades. The economies of exchange dictated 
the success of the cooperative. It was simply the cheapest and, sometimes, the only source 
of capital. The clearest indicator of the importance of exchange for the cooperative banks 
is indicated below. Figure 4-2 depicts the growth of the cooperative banks in relation to 
the other major Dutch banks. 
 
Figure 4-2: Development of savings portfolio for different types of Dutch banks (data from: Visser & 
Haverkamp, 1959) 
 
Yet, the economies of exchange worked in two ways. Members of the cooperatives were 
the owners and the customers were members. Although cooperatives have recently been 
plagued by disinterest on the part of their members, the first fifty years could be 
characterised by some member involvement. People would voluntarily hold office in their 
farms and distinguished members of the community would be actively involved in the 
decision-making processes of the bank. The two credit cooperatives thrived in the first 
fifty years of their existence, because of their extremely favourable cost structure. Yet, at 
the same time, being a member of the cooperative held obligations, which were taken 
quite seriously. Through this mutual dependency, the cooperatives remained intact for an 
extended period of time.  
 
However, the mere need for open capital markets does not explain why many hundreds of 
cooperative banks were founded at the end of the nineteenth and the start of the twentieth 
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centuries (at its peak more than 1300 local cooperatives existed in the Netherlands alone). 
The need for local banks was already present for many years. Yet, it was only after the 
foundation of the Nederlandsche Boerenbond (NBB), governed mainly by the Catholic 
elite of that day, that the conditions were created for successful cooperative banking. 
Members of the NBB founded many local banks using the infrastructure of the NBB. One 
of them stated: ‘the purpose of the savings and loans bank is to ban usury, to assist the 
agricultural population, but also to encourage thrift, charity, diligence and moderation.’ 
(Sluyterman, 1998, p. 25). This held in particular for the southern cooperatives, which 
were rooted in the Catholic traditions of that era. The cooperatives located in the north of 
the Netherlands were based on the ideas of Raiffeisen, who was not Catholic, but wanted 
the same emancipation of the agricultural population. All in all, the mere demand for 
specific services was clearly not enough for the Rabobank to exist in the first place. The 
presence of wider institutional arrangements created the conditions for the emergence of 
the new cooperatives. These newly formed cooperatives were able to use the 
infrastructure of the NBB and other organisations, through which they could give form to 
the emancipation of farmers.  
 
In the early stages of the cooperative movement, the credit cooperatives based in 
Eindhoven and Utrecht obtained very little support from the established financial 
institutions, such as the Dutch Central Bank. For example, the Dutch Central Bank denied 
the Eindhoven cooperative access to its money market instruments. Moreover, the Central 
Bank explicitly expressed its unease with the low rates that the cooperatives were asking 
(Sluyterman, 1998). The credit cooperatives were a product of local concerns. As such, 
help was provided locally: influential landowners and leaders in the different 
municipalities would guarantee the debt positions of the banks with their personal capital.  
 
In all, the predecessors of the Rabobank provided services that were unavailable 
elsewhere. Supported by strong local roots and the available infrastructure (e.g. as 
provided by the NBB), the cooperatives succeeded in securing a large market share in 
specific segments of the local economies. However, after the Second World War, the two 
cooperatives continued to grow at a somewhat more modest rate, because of increasing 
costs and because they were now more directly competing with each other. In 1970, the 
‘Gezamelijk Bericht’ (Common Report) announced a merger between the Utrecht and the 
Eindhoven cooperatives. The considerations surrounding the merger included the growing 
mutual competition, increasing concentration of cooperative businesses and associated 
growth of lendings and borrowings, and improving branch policy. The resulting 
organisation was named the Rabobank (RAiffeisen-BOerenleenbank), with two 
headoffices, one in Eindhoven and one in Utrecht.  
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4.4 The current position of the Rabobank 
Organisations can claim legitimacy in the wider society by adhering to the rules and 
norms that are valued in that society and, more specifically, by specific institutions in 
society. An alignment between the logic of the institutions and that of the organisation is 
indispensable for organisations that want to underscore their legitimate position to those 
groups. 
 
The Rabobank addresses legitimacy issues quite directly in describing its position in 
society: ‘we open up our minds to the opinions of those for whom our services are 
meaningful. Customers that shape their commitment to the bank in a membership obtain a 
say in the direction of the bank and in the manner in which we contribute to realising the 
ambitions of these customers’ (Rabobank Group, Annual Responsibility and 
Sustainability Report, 2002). It has generally been accepted within the Rabobank Group 
that the primary raison d’être for the Group is the generation of customer value. But the 
Group as a whole is facing increasing pressures to keep up with the other major Dutch 
banks in terms of financial performance. This makes the following comment relevant: 
‘Nonprofits are less likely than proprietary firms to be oligopolists, less likely to be highly 
competitive, and more likely to depend upon institutional as opposed to technical sources 
of legitimacy’ (DiMaggio, 1991, p. 288, emphasis added). The source of legitimacy of 
business organisations is relatively stable. Efficiency as a limiting condition gives 
direction to the actions of business organisations. Non-profit organisations, however, are 
more dependent upon different external constituents, whose preferences are more 
politically determined. The Rabobank can be positioned between profit and non-profit 
organisations. It needs to act commercially and in a profit oriented way, but it is also 
accountable to the members who do not always agree with efficiency enhancing measures 
to improve the financial results of their bank. 
 
Grit argued that that the advance of the free market and the spread of neo-liberalism are 
features of the current modernisation of society. Neo-liberalism has a positive attitude 
towards the free market and an explicit emphasis on individual responsibility (Grit, 2000, 
pp. 5-11). However, both of these elements are undermining the traditional sources of 
legitimacy of the Rabobank. A cooperative operates best in the absence of perfect markets 
as well as in settings with a premium placed on cooperation. Both of which are under 
pressure through ongoing modernisation of society. 
 
The Rabobank used to be firmly and intimately surrounded by several formal and 
informal institutions that provided it with a legitimate position. Yet, as the economic area 
in society increases its domain at the expense of culture, solidarity and cooperation, it 
becomes more challenging for the bank to maintain the legitimacy of its cooperative 
structure and the resulting choices it makes. The next section describes some features of 
the Rabobank’s relationship with the current environment and indicates that the bank 
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wants to change to adapt to this environment, while at the same time, attempting to 
maintain its cooperative roots. 
 
4.4.1 Fierce competition 
Access to the capital markets is now assured for the traditional customers of the 
Rabobank. No longer can one speak of the systematic exclusion of specific agricultural 
groups. Thus in customers’ choice of a bank, availability of services is less of an issue. 
Products have become comparable across the range, as the All-Finanz strategy has been 
adopted by all the main Dutch banks. In a world with comparable products, consumers are 
becoming more price sensitive, but the traditional cost advantage of the Rabobank has 
disappeared. Consider Figure 4-3: 
 
Figure 4-3: Cost ratio to balance sheet total (source data: Sluyterman et al., 1998) 
 
The figure demonstrates the closer alignment of cost structures between the Rabobank and 
the trade banks which include ABN-AMRO, one of its main competitors. It shows that 
one of the pillars of its earlier competitive advantage, its cost structure, is no longer 
significantly different to its competitors. Therefore, it can not offer rates that are 
substantially lower than its competitors. However, the Rabobank does maintain a strong 
position on other fronts. By its charter, it still exercises a great deal of influence over local 
agricultural communities. The agricultural crises of recent years have allowed the 
Rabobank to re-enforce its commitment to the agricultural community. However, 
according to Figure 4-4, the total amount of farms has steadily declined in the last fifty 
years, thereby reducing the bank’s specific consumer base.  
 





Figure 4-4: Total number of agricultural enterprises in the Netherlands (source: Statline, CBS) 
 
However, this decline in the number of agricultural enterprises is not as dramatic as it 
seems, as the remaining farms have increased in size and have become more capital 
intensive. Although the Rabobank cannot distinguish itself as it used to, being the only 
bank for farmers, it still has a close relation with the agricultural community. Moreover, 
the local embedding of the Rabobank in smaller municipalities is still second to none. It 
attempts to rejuvenate its cooperative nature by appealing to issues that remain relevant 
(both nationally and locally) in the current society. One of these issues is durability. 
4.4.2 Durability as the right thing to do 
The Rabobank increasingly emphasises the manner in which it performs business. 
Especially in times of agricultural crises, it presents itself as partner to the afflicted 
farmers. Although, critics may argue that this is an example of decoupling (Powel & 
DiMaggio, 1991; the bank may present itself as socially engaged, while having no internal 
structures to back this up), it is undeniably an ongoing source of pride for many 
employees at the Rabobank. Besides an emphasis on its commitment to customers 
experiencing financial problems, the bank also stresses durability of conduct. It states: 
‘Durable entrepreneurship and responsible entrepreneurship go hand in hand. In both 
cases, it is about the balance between people, environment and resources, about social 
cohesion, dialogue and openness’ (Rabobank Group, Annual Responsibility and 
Sustainability Report, 2002).  
 
Because of the autonomous nature of member banks, they can deal with these issues in 
quite different ways. Some member banks encourage employees to engage in voluntary 
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community services, or donate money to environmental protection agencies. But apart 
from local efforts, that differ in intensity, depending of the local management’s stance on 
durability, the supra-local Rabobank Nederland uses its position in the financial markets 
to facilitate projects that are related to durability. Examples from 2002 are: the financing 
of the first public-private collaboration project in durable water management, the creation 
of the Greenhouse of the Future, the implementation of Global Compact of the United 
Nations (nine principles related to human rights, labour rights, and environmental 
protection efforts, aimed at a more just and social globalisation) and the creation of the 
first specific purpose account (the Pingi account, Pingi is short for Penguin, the 
proceedings of which are used for the improvement of animal houses in the Emmen Zoo). 
The bank is also becoming more explicit in the manner in which it wants to be durable; 
not only in its own business conduct, but also in its support of others.   
 
As noted above, in its earlier days, prominent figures in the municipality functioned as the 
personification of the qualities of the bank. However, this has declined somewhat in 
importance in recent years. Member banks still attempt to invite municipal leaders to join 
their decision-making bodies. But the image of the bank is increasingly determined 
nationally than locally, because of national advertising and the influence that the supra-
local organisation has on policies. Nevertheless, the Directors of the member banks are 
still a public figure, particularly in smaller municipalities. Although this role of the 
Director is different between the various member banks, it remains a local personification 
of many member banks.  
 
4.4.3 The inefficient cooperative 
As indicated earlier, the Rabobank was born out of economic and social necessity. But 
with the emancipation of its members, the banks advantageous position diminished. But it 
still has its identity as a cooperative, for which new objectives have to be found. It seeks 
to express its unique identity and its legitimate role in Dutch society through: (1) 
increased member contacts and members’ influence; (2) the local Director as the 
continuing personification of the bank in the local community; (3) recognition of 
favourable opinions about the concept of a cooperative, that could cause prospective 
customers to engage in long-term relationships with the bank; (4) confidence in its triple 
A rating; and (5) explicit communication of the meaning of being a cooperative bank in a 
commercial marketplace, including an emphasis on durability. However, economically 
speaking, the bank has come to resemble its competitors in terms of cost structure and 
profitability. Some say that the Rabobank has become somewhat complacent and so cost 
inefficient that, although it does not pay dividends, it is still unable to provide its services 
at lower rates than its competitors. The material benefit from having no shareholders is 
not translated into lower rates for members; rather it is used to maintain inefficiencies. 
The Rabobank has long been seen as a lifetime employer, with some of the best benefits 
in its sector. The manager of one bank remarked: ‘people do not see the fact that they must 
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contribute to the bank in order to earn their salaries. To some of them, the salaries they 
require and the effort they put in the earning power of the bank, those are two completely 
different things to them. For this bank, I think it is a good idea to make people realise that 
they have to give something in return for they salaries.’  
 
All in all, the Group realises that the cooperative nature of the bank has led to an absence 
of stringent financial and behavioural controls. As being a cooperative was the ‘natural’ 
choice and since it was doing exceptionally well, it has had little incentive to maximise 
efficiency. Although it is recognised that the cooperative structure continues to be its main 
competitive advantage, the absence of shareholders is also seen to maintain inefficiencies, 
instead of providing tangible benefits to members. The result has been that the full 
potential of being a cooperative has not been exploited, and the bank has not (yet) 
succeeded in differentiating itself from its competitors through excellent member service 
(the traditional forte of the cooperative). Rather, it has allowed itself to become similar to 
its competitors in many respects, as it does not have the economic leverage (because of its 
ongoing inefficiencies) to turn the absence of shareholders into material benefit for 
members. This realisation has caused an increased focus on efficiency and financial 
results within the Rabobank over recent decades. The notions of efficiency can still be 
fitted within the cooperative ideas, however: the argument is basically that a leaner and 
meaner organisation generates more residual income that can be used for the benefit of the 
members and the Group. Since residual income and efficient operations can be equated 
with the good of the cooperative cause, the path has been cleared for an explicit focus on 
efficiency and a results orientation. In this light, a program such as Results Oriented 
Management became essential. It must be remarked that not all member banks were 
convinced of the necessity for this increased focus on efficiency and financial results, and 
the various member banks have different views on these topics. However, to the majority 
of the member banks and to Rabobank Nederland, this increased focus on results and 
operational efficiency is necessary to have the resources necessary to give meaning to the 
notion of Customer Value1. Before turning to an explanation of Results Oriented 
Management, the next section will explain the structure of a typical member bank. 
Although member banks are formally autonomous, they have quite comparable structures.   
 
4.5 Structure of a typical local member bank 
A member bank is typically organised in a number of departments or segments, as they 
are referred to at the Rabobank. These segments are:  
- Client Advice: this is the segment for general customer service at the counter. The 
segment includes the personnel who provide over-the-counter services. This generally 
                                                
1 Customer value is one of the perspectives of the proprietary Balanced Scorecard of the Rabobank. The bank 
operates under the assumption that the provision of Customer Value is the ultimate objective for the cooperative. 
The other perspectives (Financial Stability and Employee Value) are enablers of this objective. 
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involves money transactions and administrative formalities. To most customers, the first 
face they see when entering the bank hall is that of an employee of Client Advice.  
- Financial Advice: This segment organises advisors specifically for the more wealthy 
customers (some banks also have included their mortgages operation as well as their 
investment services). These employees are specialists and are often responsible for their 
own portfolio of customers. 
- Business Advice and Corporate Clients: This segment is responsible for the provision of 
services to business clients. Business Advice is mostly geared towards SME’s (small and 
medium sized enterprises), while Corporate Clients is a centralised service for larger 
corporations. To capture these activities under one name, this thesis refers to this segment 
as Corporate Clients. 
- Business Administration: this segment is responsible for the primary internal operations, 
such as risk management, facilities management and financial control.  
 
Each segment is led by a manager, who is typically part of the management team of the 
member bank. The General Director, who is the face of the bank to the outside world, 
heads this management team. The governance of a member bank also includes a 
compliance board (“Raad van Toezicht”) and an executive board (“Raad van Bestuur”), to 
whom the General Director is accountable. These boards are made up of local members, 
individuals who have an interest in being an active member of the cooperative. A general 
members’ assembly is held once a year, or when extraordinary events (such as a possible 
merger) warrant more frequent meetings. Rabobank Nederland regards the General 
Director as responsible for the member bank. Moreover, the General Director takes part in 
regional circle meetings and sometimes in the National Central Circle Meeting (CKV), 
which is the primary governing body of the Rabobank Group. 
 
Over the years, member banks have had a somewhat ambiguous relationship with the 
supra-local Rabobank Nederland. On the one hand, they have recognised the role of 
Rabobank Nederland as the representative of the collective of member banks. On the other 
hand, they have had many concerns about the perceived interference of Rabobank 
Nederland in local affairs. These concerns have led to ongoing tensions over the member 
banks’ autonomy and the degree of service provision from Rabobank Nederland. The 
more services Rabobank Nederland has performed centrally, the more difficult it has 
become for the member banks to remain autonomous in practice. E.g. a centrally 
maintained IT infrastructure requires standardisation across all member banks. This 
effectively means that member banks surrendered their autonomy with regards to the 
selection of IT suppliers. Furthermore over recent years, a number of changes have been 
introduced in the governance structure of the Rabobank. These have led to (1) the 
collective of member banks (through the CKV) having more influence over the strategic 
direction of the Rabobank Group and consequently (2) a somewhat smaller role for 
Rabobank Nederland; this has led to (3) more pressures on member banks to comply with 
policies and programs approved by the CKV. As such, the individual member banks are 
more likely to be limited to the policies and programs that have passed through the 
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various committees of the member banks that represent the collective. One of the 
approved programs is Results Oriented Management, a program requested by the 
collective of member banks and developed by Rabobank Nederland.    
 
4.6 Results Oriented Management at member banks 
 
The national Central Circle Meeting (CKV) had requested Rabobank Nederland to 
develop the ROM program. The program is essentially a way to induce the member banks 
to be more aware of the economic realities in which they operate. Basically, the program 
uses the Rabobank management model as point of departure. This management model is 
an adapted version of the NKM model (Nederlands Instituut Kwaliteit), an application of 
the EFQM model (European Foundation for Quality). The Rabobank management model 


















Figure 4-5: The Rabobank Management Model (source: Management Manual Results Oriented 
Management) 
 
The model connects five organisational areas with three result areas. The idea is that 
operations in the organisational areas have an influence on the different result areas. The 
left-hand side of the model is also referred to as the quality of the organisation. The right-
hand side (the result areas) are similar to the three perspective of the Balanced Scorecard 
in use at the Rabobank, the so-called Compasses. The basic idea is that the bank needs to 
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perform well on the five organisation areas to be able to show better results on the three 
perspectives of the Compasses. Financial Stability is seen as the condition needed to 
achieve high Customer Value. Employee Value also reflects a necessary condition for 
Customer Value, which ultimately embodies the cooperative purpose of the organisation. 
The program Results Oriented Management itself consists of a number of steps: 
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Determine spearheads next 3 
years
Set out actions coming year
Translate actions to segments, 
staff & projects
Combine & adjust plans










Figure 4-6: Results Oriented Management (Source: Management Manual Results Oriented Management) 
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These steps yield a number of tangible outputs, such as budgets and different types of 
plans, but the member banks also expected the program to lead to a more result-oriented 
attitude. 
 
According to Rabobank Nederland, the objective of ROM is to ‘professionalise the 
management control within the bank’, but most respondents at the member banks also 
made references to the objective of finding a broad commitment to policies and plans 
resulting from ROM. The Rabobank Intranet of the bank describes the nation-wide 
objective of Results Oriented Management as follows: ‘The objective of Results Oriented 
Management is, through improving the quality of the business administration of the 
member bank (which is not limited to the segment Business Administration) to achieve a 
structural improvement in the result on any of the three result areas of the Compasses: 
Customer Value, Employee Value and Financial Stability.’ The program clearly intends to 
be more than the adaptation of a number of new structural features within the bank. It also 
envisages an attitude change. According to the Rabobank intranet: ‘Results Oriented 
Management is a way of thought and action, aimed at the improvement of results in the 
Compasses. It literally means “managing on results”. This stands for: the translation of 
the ambitions of the bank into measurable targets and action plans; to ensure that these 
plans are executed. ….. ROM actually strives for a cultural transformation that is typified 
by: measurement as an important quality and the ability to think in terms of results and 
concrete targets. Moreover, the transformation envisages the ability to confront each 
other about agreements and the continuous improvement of activities. ROM has thus 
everything to do with attitude and behaviour. One does not change this from one moment 
to the next and ROM needs to be seen as a development that requires much energy’ 
(underlining in original).  
 
Rabobank Nederland offers the program to the local member banks, who can buy into the 
program. Although the member banks have considerable discretion with regards to the 
timing and precise emphasis they place on the different parts of the program, the majority 
have implemented the program in some form. 
  
The program is offered with three modes of implementation: 
(1) Direct guidance: The member bank uses external1 advisors who offer support in 
applying the process of ROM and contribute to the embedding of its principles. The 
management team of the member bank does an initial interview with the consultant, in 
which they express what objectives they have for ROM. Then the consultant operates as a 
process supervisor throughout the meetings. The participants from the member bank make 
all choices in the process, the consultant simply facilitates. 
                                                
1 External advisors are often advisors on the payroll of Rabobank Nederland. Thus, although they are part of the 
Rabobank Group, from the perspective of the local member bank, they are external. 
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(2) Guidance at arm’s length: The member bank manages the process itself, but when 
necessary, people at Rabobank Nederland are available to assess the results. Moreover, 
workshops are available. These are primarily geared towards knowledge exchange about 
the program. The meetings concerning the program typically take place without the 
consultant, unless his presence is requested. 
(3) Do-it-yourself: The member bank uses the management manual, the supplied 
templates and information from the Rabobank Intranet (Raboweb) and the available 
helpdesk at Rabobank Nederland to implement the program itself. It has little or no 
contact with a consultant, and all activities, including process supervision, is done by the 
bank itself. 
 
This study focuses on 14 member banks, which have all used direct guidance. As 
indicated above, the objective of ROM according to Rabobank Nederland is to 
‘professionalise the management control within the bank’, in addition references were 
made earlier to the objective of finding a broad commitment to the policies and plans 
resulting from ROM. Later, chapter 7 will demonstrate that the objective of ROM is not 
self-evident to the member banks that participated. In fact, it will demonstrate that an 
objective of a program such as ROM is only one of many cues that point to a shared issue. 
This shared issue is then what ultimately determines the envisaged objective. But this may 
be quite different to the goals the developers of the program had in mind.  
 
With regards to ROM, virtually all banks interviewed used a team of people consisting of 
the General Director of the bank, the other members of the management team, and 
representatives of all segments of the bank–this team is termed the MT+ group. Basically, 
these MT+ groups went through the stages depicted in Figure 4-6. In doing so, the group 
produced several documents: 
(1) A SWOT analysis: a structured assessment of the perceived strengths and weaknesses 
of the member bank and its opportunities and threats.  
(2) A strategic plan: a plan spanning some three years that sets out longer term 
expectations and choices made by the member bank. 
(3) An annual plan: a somewhat more detailed plan for the coming calendar year, which 
includes priorities for the coming year. 
(4) Segment plans, staff plans, and project plans: these involve specific plans indicating 
how the individual segments and staff units will contribute to the priorities defined in the 
annual plan. 
(5) A Budget: this is drawn up based on the choices made in the different phases of ROM. 
This budget is used for internal purposes, but it is also sent to Rabobank Nederland.   
 
As noted above, Rabobank Nederland’s objective for ROM was to professionalise the 
control cycle within the member banks. Figure 4-7 depicts the desired development of the 
member banks’ planning and control. 
 
 





Figure 4-7: Axes of development of ROM (Source: ROM management manual) 
 
The program is meant to ensure that the member banks use Results Oriented Management, 
hence the project name. Results Oriented Management is a process of steering activities 
using appropriate ratios and a structured overview of the organisation and its 
developments. In order to be able to manage in a result oriented way, the philosophy of 
the Rabobank is that member banks need to go through a number of phases: 
 
(1) Financial justification: banks manage primarily on hindsight. Member banks manage 
on historical facts and only a handful of people are involved: the financial control 
department and the management team. 
 
(2) Financial control: justification has developed into control; meaning that member banks 
actively manage processes. In this development phase, member banks will have made a 
start with management by means of customer and sales data. 
 
4. The cooperative split 
 99
(3) Management control: management occurs through the use of a coherent set of 
indicators. As such, the member banks strive to balance three result areas: customer value, 
employee value and financial stability. Individual employees are now involved in the 
process of management. Management control is a systems oriented way of steering. 
Behaviour stems from a pro-active attitude.  
 
In order to be able to go through these phases, member banks need to implement changes 
in both structure and behaviour (see Figure 4-7). The former involves the application of 
new systems, such as PCK4, and new methods of reporting internally and externally. The 
latter involves the promotion of a result-oriented stance on the part of employees, as 
envisaged by the Deming circle: Plan-Do-Check-Act. This is a standard method for 
employees to constantly consider their behaviour and possible points for improvement. 
All in all, Results Oriented Management has a structural side as well as a behavioural one. 
Whereas Rabobank Nederland is communicating the structural side through manuals and 
the Rabobank Intranet, the behavioural side remains primarily the domain of the member 
banks and the consultants. Virtually all people interviewed at the various member banks 
felt that the behavioural side was especially critical to the program. As one respondent put 
it: ‘we are used to changing structures, and they do not really affect us. But we are not 
used to being asked to change our attitudes, as the bank has been good to us, without 
straining its demands on us. However, it is clear that something needs to be done, so I am 
curious to see how flexible we will prove to be.’  
 
In this thesis, ROM is the object of study. As it involves both structural and behavioural 
change in the member banks, it provides an interesting focus for a study on institutional 
change. As all member banks have considerable autonomy in decision-making and the 
implementation of ROM. Their different experiences with these changes, both structural 
and behavioural, provide useful information to this research. The following chapters will 
discuss the process of change associated with the implementation of ROM. As noted 
earlier, change at the Rabobank is a time consuming process due to its democratic 
structure and its long history. It is an environment that is filled with existing habits and 
traditions of how to do things; in other words, the Rabobank is a highly institutionalised 
environment. Yet, change can occur, although the process is difficult and unpredictable. 
Chapter 3 discussed how human agency in institutions may be possible. Human agency is 
important to explain institutional change. Therefore, the insights from chapter 3 will be 
used to inform the empirical study of the process of change at the Rabobank. The 
empirical study will be discussed in chapters 6 to 11. But I will first address the 
methodological foundations of the study. This is the topic of chapter 5. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced the Rabobank organisation, its cooperative structure and the 
role of the member banks therein. Furthermore, it has introduced the ROM program, 
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which is the object of this study. The next chapter will discuss the methodology which has 
been adopted. The research is concerned with how the principles of the ROM program 






This chapter on methodology is intended to help the reader to make sense of the words 
written in this thesis. The thesis places people in organisations at the centre of organised 
action. As their cognitive abilities do not allow people to address all environmental signals 
with equal rigour, they tend to create regularities in their social behaviours. People are 
able to deal with many commonly encountered events while expending little cognitive 
energy. This thesis argues that on the level of a social group and under additional 
conditions, these regularities can become institutionalised. Yet, institutionally constrained 
actors tend to perceive their environment and the sets of actions at their disposal, in terms 
of those same institutions. So how do individuals make a break from previously adopted 
institutionalised habit? This notion of human agency lies at the core of this thesis. It 
argues that, in the absence of appropriate regularities, people consciously attempt to make 
sense of their environment. These regularities and the act of making sense are influenced 
by many variables on which this thesis attempts to impose order. The thesis focuses on 
human agency, and it uses the individual as unit of analysis. These notions dictate for the 
most part the methodological choices made in this work. This chapter explains this 
methodological position.  
 
The scientific audience, at which this work is aimed, is not itself free of attempts at sense 
making. Sentences, paragraphs and chapters will be read by different people, extracting 
different meaning and imposing different qualities upon the work. Therefore, this chapter 
will clarify the methodological basis of the thesis. Failing to do so, would be akin to a 
Mertonian view of science that assumes universalism, communism, disinterestedness and 
organised scepticism on the part of the participants in the scientific process, which would 
pose a massive problem for this thesis. As this chapter will demonstrate, the method of 
data collection and interpretation holds the activity of sense making of many equivocal 
signals as central; it assumes that sense making is an integral part of human action. 
Making sense is an important characteristic of human nature and is independent of the 
specific nature of the activities undertaken. This holds for the people studied in the 
settings studied in this thesis, but also for the audiences for whom this thesis is written. 
The need for a clear methodological grounding thus comes from the need to influence the 
sense that people make of this thesis. The better the author succeeds in informing this 
sense making, the more uniform this sense will be. There can still be discussion about the 
thesis, but this discussion will not be confused by unspecified general assumptions about 
which readers are unaware and may not share. As Lowe (2004, p. 210) notes: ‘Within 
scientific fields of endeavour scientists may espouse the same theory, but what they mean 




5.2 The methodological position of this work: symbolic 
interactionism 
This section will argue that symbolic interactionism is an appropriate frame of 
interpretation for a study into the human agency of institutionally constrained individuals. 
So far, this thesis has argued that one of its main points of departure is Old Institutional 
Economics (OIE) and the work that has been inspired by the principles of OIE. As chapter 
2 explained, OIE uses diverse theoretical insights to provide a rich analysis of the events 
surrounding human interaction. Also, as argued in chapter 2, OIE was a response to the 
strict assumptions of human nature in ‘traditional’ economics. It allows for a richer and 
more detailed view of individuals. This is particularly needed for this work as it is 
concerned with human agency. As such, this work will accommodate: (1) a rich analysis 
of the process of institutional change; (2) an eclectic view (in the tradition of OIE) that 
focuses on individual behaviours and institutions; and (3) explicit attention to the 
unfolding of individual behaviours.   
 
Chapter 4 argued that the Rabobank provides a good opportunity to study institutional 
change. Being more than 100 years old, the Rabobank is highly institutionalised in a 
number of ways. It has embedded many rules and regulations enforced by the monetary 
authorities in the Netherlands. Also, the bank operates with various work processes that 
have existed for many years. And the bank has been shielded from many pressures to 
change by its local embedding. Yet, the Rabobank is experiencing rapid changes; with 
ROM being one of them. ROM consists not only of structural change, but also 
behavioural change–a desired change in mentality. People are affected by these changes in 
their day-to-day work, but how these changes materialise remains unclear. Moreover, 
people are able to react in most unexpected ways; especially in the Rabobank where most 
decision making remains located at the level of the autonomous member banks.   
 
In all, I need a frame of interpretation that supports the above views. The frame of 
interpretation discussed here is symbolic interactionism. To substantiate its relevance, the 
next section will explain symbolic interactionism and its properties. Then attention will be 
given to its implications for the current study. The chapter will close with a brief 
conclusion. 
 
5.2.1 Symbolic interactionism 
The term ‘symbolic interactionism’ has been used primarily as a label for a specific type 
of research into human life and human behaviour. As far as it can be traced back, it was 
first coined in Man and Society by Herbert Blumer in 1937, and has been used on a 
regular basis ever since. Symbolic interactionism (SI) holds that the meaning of things to 
humans is central to action. Although the role of meaning can be observed to be important 
in a number of theoretical streams, we will see that SI treats meaning central to action. 
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Symbolic interactionism has attracted a wide array of authors who have tried to clarify its 
meaning and contents. These include: George Herbert Mead, Charles Horton Cooley, 
Florian Znaniecki and Louis Wirth.  
 
Symbolic Interactionism is based upon three premises: The first premise is that human 
actions with regards to things are based upon the meanings that those things will have for 
people. Things in this respect are broader than physical entities, although they include 
them. One could think of trees and cars, but also of other people such as a mother or a 
colleague. Moreover, kinds of people matter such as friends or foes. Things also include 
institutions such as school or government and ideals such as independence and honesty. 
Furthermore, commands and requests by others are part of things as described here. 
Blumer (1969) observed that even the first premise was not an obvious one. One might 
say that the individual deals with things on the basis of the meaning that those things have 
for him, but Blumer noted that this simple point was overlooked by almost everyone in 
social and psychological science. Meaning has been seen as either self-evident and 
therefore it was considered unimportant, or it was considered a solely neutral connection 
between the factors responsible for human behaviour and the product of those factors. But 
Blumer (1969) argued that symbolic interactionism puts the meaning of things as central. 
He argued that neglecting to study the role of meaning in human action can result in 
incomplete and possibly incorrect inferences on the causes and consequences of human 
action. He argued that explanations of behaviour are better served by accounting for the 
meanings that events have for individuals, instead of these events themselves (to the 
current study, this means a focus on the meaning of ROM to organisational participants, 
instead of a focus on the functional properties of the program). However, the centrality of 
meaning is not a unique property of symbolic interactionism. Yet, the second premise may 
be considered to be a unique feature of symbolic interactionism. 
 
This second premise holds that the meaning of things is derived from the social structure 
in which the individual lives. Basically, one might see meaning as an intrinsic property of 
the thing that is known to have meaning. In other words, it may be a neutral part of the 
objective being of that thing. For example, a chair can be a chair in itself, a cow is a cow, 
etc. This view relates closely to the philosophy of realism. The meaning of things is 
derived from the objective state of the object, and is inherent to the object and not the 
observer. A second viewpoint sees meaning as a psychological property of the individual 
who creates the meaning. It is therefore a product of the individual’s psychological state, 
or state of mind. It remains private to the person providing meaning, and thus can occur 
independently from the group in which someone operates. A third view of meaning is 
given by symbolic interactionism. This is a position that states that meaning is the product 
of the social structure in which an individual operates. This implies that meaning cannot 
be given in isolation.  
 
The third premise is that meanings can be used and altered by an exploratory process. In 
this process, where the individual attempts to get a grip on the reality that he encounters, 
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the individual actively uses and modifies the array of meanings that are at his disposal. 
The use of meanings takes place in two separate processes: the acting person pinpoints the 
things that have meaning to him. Thus, the individual actually deals with himself; defining 
what matters to himself is to define his own properties. The individual communicates with 
himself, and through this process of communication, he discovers what matters to him. 
Secondly, through this process of self-communication, explanations evolve in a process of 
re-arranging meaning. This third premise basically states that people can re-arrange 
meanings to accommodate (to a certain extent) unexpected events and those new events 
that need explaining. 
 
Symbolic Interactionism thus proposes an active role for socially constrained actors. They 
are engaged in constructing their environment by virtue of the meaning that things have 
for them. At the same time, they are constrained by the social structure in which they 
operate. This type of dialectic runs through this thesis. People are enabled and constrained 
by institutions; routines are enablers of efficiency and constrainers of innovation; Acting 
and enacting change provides both the medium and the outcome of change. These ideas 
can perhaps be captured in the duality of structure (Giddens, 1984). Basically, this work is 
well aware of the problems and opportunities of the notion of duality of structure. 
Symbolic Interactionism provides it with what is essentially an interpretative perspective.  
 
Chua notes that the basic assumptions of an interpretative perspective are threefold (Chua, 
1986, p. 615; see also Philanto, 2003): 
1. Beliefs about knowledge: Scientific explanation of human intention is sought. 
Their adequacy is assessed via the criteria of logical consistency, subjective 
interpretation, and agreement with actors’ common-sense interpretation. 
Ethnographic work, case studies, and participant observation are encouraged, and 
actors are studied in their everyday world.  
2. Beliefs about physical and social reality: Social reality is assumed as emergent, 
subjectively created, and objectified through human interaction. All actions have 
meaning and intention that are retrospectively endowed and that are grounded in 
social and historical practices. Moreover, social order is assumed and conflict is 
mediated through common schemes of social meanings. 
3. Relationship between theory and practice: Theory seeks only to explain action 
and to understand how social order is produced and reproduced. 
 
The assumptions of symbolic interactionism, with its emphasis on the meaning of things 
to an individual, and the interpretative perspective, assuming that social reality is 
subjectively created, are to a large extent compatible. This thesis will address the question 
of human agency in the highly institutionalised environment of the Rabobank using an 
interpretative perspective. As earlier chapters indicated, this thesis is primarily interested 
in enhancing understanding of institutional change, primarily from the perspective of the 
individual. Its theoretical foundation, and work inspired by OIE, argues that social order is 
obtained through the enactment and reproduction of social structure. As such, people 
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actively create and recreate their own environment. The research method chosen for this 
study adopts an interpretative perspective. As will be explained in the next section, this 
research method is an ethnographic case study.  
 
5.3 Research method  
The primary research method for this work has been the case study. The case study 
approach focuses specifically on understanding the dynamics present within 
organisational settings (Eisenhardt, 1989). In particular, this study is interested in the 
dynamics of change in the organisation. Yin (2003) argues that within single case studies, 
multiple levels of analysis can exist. The case study presented in this thesis has been 
conducted on different levels. Although the primary unit of analysis is the individual in 
the specific social group in which he is located, it is specifically the interaction between 
this individual and the various social structures of which he is part that form the focus in 
this work. Basically, it addresses the duality of structure on many different levels, and as 
such the case demonstrates arguments on multiple levels.  
 
5.3.1 Ethnography 
With regards to the unit of analysis, the question is: does this work seek to contribute to an 
understanding of organisational behaviour, or does it want to elaborate on human 
behaviour? Basically, it aims at the latter. Under specific conditions, it provides 
explanations for human actions. Yin (2003, p. 26) argues that definitions and concepts can 
be used from earlier case studies in order to achieve some degree of comparable data. 
However, this would ignore the specific meanings that are given by the actors themselves. 
I therefore have chosen for a more ethnographic approach, where definitions and 
meanings are defined at the case site. According to Hammersley (1990), ethnographic 
social research as a method is characterised by a number of qualities: 
1. Behaviour is studied under everyday conditions, rather than under isolated, 
laboratory-like controlled conditions. 
2. Data is gathered from multiple sources, but observation and relatively informal 
conversations are the primary data collection methods. 
3. Data is collected in a raw form and relatively unspecified beforehand. 
Specification occurs in later stages. As Yin (2003) argues, this does not mean 
that preparation can be cut short. Rather, preparation is somewhat different in 
nature and focuses on broad theoretical understandings of the field of study. 
4. The focus is often on a single setting or group. The scale of research is thus 
relatively small. 
5. ‘The analysis of the data involves interpretation of the meanings and functions of 
human actions and mainly takes the form of verbal descriptions and explanations, 
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with quantification and statistical analysis playing a subordinate role at most’ 
(Hammersley, 1990, p. 2). 
 
This research qualifies as ethnographic on all five fronts. Its aim is to develop emergent 
theory (Eisenhardt, 1989), and this fits with the explanatory nature of the case. An 
ethnographic study was deemed appropriate for the topic of this research. The study 
attempts to provide explanations for the events in a change process. Because it recognises 
that change can proceed in unpredictable ways, it is impossible to identify the relevant 
variables beforehand. Therefore, the scope of the study needs to encompass multiple 
sources of data. Moreover, the study uses a theoretical foundation that explicitly allows 
for the role of interpretation and meaning given to events by the various organisational 
participants. These views are compatible with symbolic interactionism and the 
interpretative perspective which has been chosen.  
 
The Rabobank case is used to obtain empirical data on the changes that people experience 
in their day-to-day work. As the setting is not controlled, as a laboratory would be, the 
study is open to unexpected events and previously unrecognised processes of resistance. 
The theoretical framework, presented in chapter 3, serves as framework for understanding 
of the events at the Rabobank. This understanding will take further shape with the 
processes observed at the Rabobank. The ethnographic case study allows the researcher to 
be sensitive to a broad range of signals that may be relevant. This is important to the 
question of human agency in the Rabobank, as agency is expected to take its form through 
an unpredictable process that cannot be charted beforehand. Only through the study of 
individual perceptions of the events surrounding changes at the Rabobank, can I attempt 
to unveil the ways in which agency takes its form. 
  
The research at the Rabobank is a single case study at multiple sites. The study has been 
conducted at 14 member banks and at Rabobank Nederland. Although one could argue 
that the study is a collection of 15 cases, this cannot be sustained for an ethnographic 
study. Ethnography involves the understanding and interpretation of meanings of human 
action (see discussion on page 105). This interpretation is problematic with the results of 
interviews of one case site. Rather, the interpretations of actions at the various sites 
influence each other to a great extent, and it is therefore more accurate to speak of one 
ethnographic case study with 15 sites (including Rabobank Nederland).  
 
This emphasis on understanding day-to-day processes makes the selection of the case 
setting an important element of this study. Therefore, the selection of the Rabobank will 




5.3.2 The Rabobank as case site 
 
The selection of the Rabobank as case site is not particularly obvious. On the one hand, it 
does not qualify as a small and medium sized company, because the member banks are 
undeniably part of a larger entity with many responsibilities and benefits. But on the other 
hand, it does not qualify as a typical large decentralised corporation, as the member banks 
have much more autonomy than decentralised units that are legally owned by a single 
parent. Nevertheless, this causes the Rabobank to have some desirable qualities for this 
research.  
1. The bank can be typed as a highly institutionalised setting. Being more than a 
century old and operating in a market that has placed a strong emphasis on 
structure, procedure and habit, many of its ways of working have become 
habitual to the extent that they have become taken for granted; i.e. 
institutionalised. 
2. Member banks have considerable decision autonomy. The collective of member 
banks assigns tasks, such as project development, to the supra-local Rabobank 
Nederland, but each individual member bank can subsequently choose when and 
if to implement the programs offered by Rabobank Nederland. It is therefore 
expected that decision processes concerning the adoption of such programs at the 
member banks will be more explicit in this organisation. Also, the choice of the 
exact form of the programs and deviations from the implementation templates 
offered by Rabobank Nederland are expected to be enlightening in the way that 
these changes take place.  
3. It is known within the Rabobank that many differences exist between the 
member banks; in terms of enthusiasm, speed and thoroughness with which they 
embrace programs of organisational change, including programs of accounting 
change, such as the ROM program. Therefore, I expect to be able to contrast the 
results of studies at different member banks and to extract conclusions from 
comparisons between them. This approach avoids the critique of Yin (2003, p. 
53) in which he argued that single case research designs are vulnerable to 
unexpected and disturbing events. At the same time, the approach chosen here, 
fourteen member banks from the same organisation, maintains the research 
benefits of having the common traits of a single organisation. Therefore, the 
selection of case sites enables us to draw conclusions about behaviour in a large 
cooperative organisation, while local structures and histories are expected to 
remain important. 
 
This type of selection is an example of what Eisenhardt (1989) calls theoretical sampling, 
where the cases are selected on the basis of their expected addition to theory, instead of 
their ability to confirm or falsify existing theoretical insights. To generalise the findings of 
this study use has been made of theoretical generalisation. Scapens (1990) argues that 
theoretical generalisation is based on a logic of replication, where repetition may or may 
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not lead to a re-occurrence of the phenomena we are interested in. It is therefore akin to 
the method of experimentation. Theoretical generalisation differs from statistical 
generalisation in that the latter is based on a sampling logic, which means that 
generalisation comes from a well-chosen representation of the population. The sample, if 
selected correctly, has similar qualities as the population, and as such, we can learn about 
the qualities of this population by examining the sample; a much easier task than 
attempting to understand an entire population.  
 
However, Scapens (1990) implies that statistical generalisation has limited value when the 
sample size is too small, as is often the case with case study research. The logic of 
sampling would suggest that a very small sample would be unlikely to be a faithful 
representation of the entire population. However, this objection is not relevant under a 
logic of experimentation. Under this logic, replication comes from peers who find 
theoretical explanations useful in their case settings and their replication extends the use 
of the theoretical principles to other case settings. It has some relation to a Popperian1 
view of science, with the notable exception that theoretical generalisation does not 
necessarily seek falsifying empirical evidence, but rather repetition or additions to earlier 
results to enhance understandings of the phenomena under study. Eisenhardt (1989) 
formulates a similar point when she notes that theory building involves examining both 
conflicting literature and similar literatures, thus both conflicting points-of-view as well as 
supporting ones are useful in the process of theory building. 
 
This study is also characterised by a holistic approach. This means that it supports ‘the 
belief that social systems develop a characteristic wholeness or integrity and it is 
inappropriate to study their individual parts taken out of context’ (Scapens, 1990, p. 271). 
In a more practical sense, it means that the study does not only need to explore the 
attempted accounting change itself, but also the circumstances and social setting in which 
it takes place. Much time has to be spent beforehand in the theoretical explorations; see 
chapter 3. In a holistic study, these theoretical explorations are necessary to allow the 
researcher to recognise the nature of the context that may have consequence for the object 
or topic of study. Because of this theoretical preparation, the interviews held at the various 
banks were semi-structured; but although a questionnaire underpinned the initial 
questioning, deviations frequently took place. The reasons for these deviations were two-
fold: (1) although I knew what I needed to look for in theoretical terms (sense making, 
routinisation of action etc.), I could not predict the practical form I would find at any 
specific member bank. Therefore, deviations from the questionnaire could occur at any 
time a respondent was prepared to expand on his/her situation at that bank. (2) Since some 
questions were rather personal, and I had still a strong preference for recording the 
                                                
1 Karl Popper is well known for his concept of falsification, in which he argued that it is the scientists’ task to 
attempt to find empirical flaws in existing theories. As long as such flaws have not surfaced, a theory cannot be 
refuted. He therefore emphasised the role of the community of scientists in the process of falsification, just as the 
notion of theoretical generalisation leaves room for the role of the community of researchers. 
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interviews1, I wanted to create an atmosphere of trust. Therefore, the meetings had the 
characteristics of informal conversations. One respondent remarked that she had expected 
a clearly delineated question-and-answer session. She indicated that the fact that this was 
not the case allowed her to be more at ease and to focus better on the points that she felt 
that were important.  
 
5.3.2.1 Selection of participating member banks 
At the time of study, there were more than 300 members of the Rabobank cooperative in 
the Netherlands. The selection of the fourteen member banks to be studied was left up to 
consultants at Rabobank Nederland who supported ROM implementations (see chapter 4 
for a clarification of the role of consultants). This was done for a number of reasons: (1) 
there was no way for me to know which banks had undertaken Results Oriented 
Management, except from the personal experience of the consultants. As discussed in 
chapter 4, there are three modes of participation in ROM, two of which are somewhat 
independent, with only limited support from Rabobank Nederland; (2) the case selection 
was done in an attempt to extract a number of empirically rich case sites. I could not 
determine this beforehand, and so it was left to the people who had first hand experience. 
The case sites were selected based on the impact that the program had locally; either very 
high or very low; both of which were expected to provide case sites that would provide 
opportunities for studying the events surrounding institutionalisation (or the lack thereof). 
Indeed, some banks reported that the program had triggered intense emotional reactions in 
its participants, while other banks were going through the motions without much visible 
effect. The consultants were asked to provide a subjective classification of the impact the 
program had on the banks they were advising. The subjective criteria are listed in Table 
5-1.  
 
                                                
1As noted in paragraph 5.3.1 ethnographic research involves the collection of relatively unspecified data. This 
was greatly facilitated by the use of recording devices, so that the precise words of the respondents could be 




1 Meaning: participants indicate that ROM has a real impact on their day to day work 
2 Meaning: the execution of ROM has triggered emotional responses such as dispute or a 
degree of sorrow 
3 Meaning: participants see ROM as new and challenging; this in contradiction to attitudes 
that reflect a hesitation to engage in ‘again a project’  
4 Meaning: participants are prepared to alter their routine ways of working; this in 
contradiction to remarks such as: ‘I have always done it like this…’ 
5 Meaning: ROM is carried by a large group of people that have taken ownership of the 
project 
6 Meaning: participants indicate to search for an attitude change rather than a change in 
structures and systems 
7 Time: the program was adopted soon after it became available 
8 Time: participants understand that the program takes time and this has been structurally 
cleared by the participants 
9 Time: the implementation at the local member bank is proceeding successfully 
10 Objectives: the local member bank has ambitious objectives for ROM 
11 Objectives: ROM is well underway to become a self-evidence within the member bank. 
There are examples available to demonstrate this 
12 Objectives: ROM leads at the member bank to a change in attitude in that people are 
more prepared to confront each other on results achieved 
Table 5-1: Subjective criteria for case selection 
 
The consultants were asked to answer each question with “yes” or “no” for each bank they 
were involved with. From this list the top seven (those with the most “yes” answers) and 
the lowest five banks (those with the most “no” answers) were selected and approached. 
Because a small minority of member banks did not want to cooperate, additional banks 
were selected from the list up to the point where twelve banks had been found that wanted 
to cooperate1. Another two member banks were added through personal contacts. These 
two banks, Rabobank West-Drenthe and Rabobank Groningen agreed to allow the 
researcher to be extensively involved in the process of Results Oriented Management.  
 
5.3.2.2 Data collection 
Interviews were held at 14 member banks and at the supra-local Rabobank Nederland. 
However, there were different research activities at different sites. Therefore, this section 
will explain the ways in which the data was collected. The timeline of the various 
interviews and other activities is given in Figure 5-1. 
 
                                                
1 The ranking of the banks was not a variable further used in the research process. Once the member banks were 
selected, no use was made of the consultants’ subjective opinions on these banks. The primary purpose of this 
data was to aid in selecting rich sites. Any other use of this data would suffer from validity issues as the 
consultants could have an interest in the outcome of the study. 
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Total duration of period of data gathering 
May 2002 July 2003 August 2004
Involvement with Rabobank Groningen
July 2002 July 2003 August 2004
Involvement with Rabobank West-Drenthe
April 2003 May 2004
Interviews held at 12 member banks and Rabobank Nederland
May 2002 August 2003
 
Figure 5-1: timeline of data gathering 
 
The timeline shows that the total period of data gathering ranged from May 2002 to 
August 2004. The emphasis was initially on interviews at Rabobank Nederland and 12 
member banks, located throughout the Netherlands. Additionally, access was secured to 
Rabobank Groningen and Rabobank West-Drenthe and the emphasis shifted accordingly. 
 
Figure 5-1 shows the order in which the activities took place at the various sites. The 
period of data gathering started with a number of interviews at a few member banks. 
Although these were not intended to be pilot studies, I made minor adjustments to the 
interview guide, based on these early experiences. Subsequently, the period in which I 
conducted many interviews at member banks coincided with the early stages of ROM at 
the Groningen bank. I was therefore involved in the activities surrounding ROM at the 
Groningen bank as well as conducting interviews at various other banks. Later, from April 
2003 to August 2003, the research activities also included observations about the early 
stages of ROM at the West-Drenthe bank. Then the interviews at other member banks 
were concluded, but the observations at the Groningen and the West-Drenthe banks 
continued.  
 
As many studies at different sites took place in the same period, it gave me the 
opportunity to cross-reference the results from interviews and the observations at various 
case sites. Cross-referencing means that I could use the results of one set of interviews and 
observations as input for interviews at other sites. Apart from the fact that this served as a 
form of triangulation, it also sensitised me to remarkable and uncommon events, 





The total duration of the planned interactions was just over 200 hours. For a complete 
overview of these planned interactions, see the table in Appendix 1. A total of 81 formally 
planned interactions were attended, which included 59 interviews, mostly conducted at 12 
member banks and Rabobank Nederland; but the interactions also involved presence at 
strategy meetings and informational events. Not counted here are the twenty interviews 
that were not planned beforehand, but that arose from informal discussions while I was at 
the member bank. These will be discussed in the section covering the Groningen and the 
West-Drenthe banks. An estimated 1400 pages of transcripts resulted after the interviews 
and other activities, as well as some 7 binders with additional data obtained from the 
various case sites.  
  
The next section will explain the data collection at 12 member banks and Rabobank 
Nederland. Then I will discuss the collection of data at 2 additional banks (Groningen & 
West-Drenthe), where I had secured extensive access. Therefore, my involvement in these 
2 banks was greater than in the other member banks studied. 
 
Interviews at 12 member banks and Rabobank Nederland 
A total of 38 interviews were conducted at 12 member banks and at Rabobank Nederland. 
Table 5-2 shows which member banks participated: 
 
 













Table 5-2: participating member banks 
 
At these member banks and at Rabobank Nederland, the number of interviews per 
organisation was approximately three. The interviews were preferably held with the 
following individuals at each bank: -1- the General Director; -2- a commercial manager, 
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that is a manager of one of the segments: Corporate Clients, Financial Advice or Client 
Advice, these are the primary ‘customers’ of the program; and -3- the Manager of 
Business Administration, who is frequently the designated project leader. However, in a 
number of situations, not all individuals who were approached were available. Moreover, 
in those cases where the manager of Business Administration was not the project leader, 
an interview was held instead with the person who performed this role. The interviews 
were semi-structured. A set of questions based on the theoretical framework discussed in 
chapter 3, were at hand to guide the discussion. A copy of these questions can be found in 
Appendix 2. 
 
All but three of the interviews were recorded on minidisk and transcribed literally. On one 
occasion, permission for recording was denied, so the researcher made notes and 
transcribed them himself immediately after the interview. These notes were then 
submitted to the interviewee for checking and approval. They were returned with minor 
adjustments and included in the database of transcriptions. On two other occasions, the 
interviews were arranged at the last minute, so no equipment was present. The study at the 
12 member banks and Rabobank Nederland could be typed as retrospective, as 
respondents were asked about their involvement in past ROM activities. Physical presence 
was limited to a few visits per bank, but the interviews spanned several years of the 
respondents’ experiences at their member bank.  
 
Interviews and extensive presence at 2 member banks: Groningen and West-Drenthe  
At two additional other member banks, Groningen and West-Drenthe, similar interviews 
as those discussed above were held. But, in addition, the entire process of Results 
Oriented Management was followed from its inception, for a period of two years at the 
Groningen bank and for a period of more than a year at the West-Drenthe bank. This 
involved 43 planned interactions: 21 recorded interviews and 22 other events such as 
meetings and ‘strategy days’. Furthermore, informal interviews were conducted with 
employees from various segments. Many of these interviews were not formally arranged, 
because the talks were subsequent to ROM activities (such as meetings or lunches). An 
estimated further twenty such interviews were conducted. These interviews were not 
recorded and they are excluded from the overview of formal interactions presented in 
Appendix 1. Rather, they can be regarded as informal discussions. 
 
Special attention was given to avoid ‘the Veranda model’ type of research (Scapens, 
1990). The ‘veranda model’ originally stems from anthropology, where researchers would 
sit on their verandas, taking the local inhabitants away from their regular social setting 
and in surroundings that were more familiar to the researcher than to the interviewee. In 
the current research, virtually all interactions physically took place at the organisation 
under study. Moreover, thanks to my presence at many formal and informal meetings, I 
was able to make extensive (‘fly on the wall’) observations, so that valuable clues were 
gathered on social interaction between organisational participants, specifically related to 




Also, managers at multiple levels were questioned as well as others who were not part of 
the management team of a member bank. At the Groningen and the West-Drenthe sites, 
the study may be designated as a longitudinal study, as its time span ranged over more 
than respectively two and one years, encompassing several program cycles (a program 
cycle is the period that a bank performs the entire program once, this program cycle is 7 to 
9 months, depending on the planning of a member bank). All phases in these program 
cycles were observed, because of the excellent access secured to these case sites. As noted 
earlier, the researcher was able to be present at most events concerning the program.  
 
I had full access to the Rabobank Groningen, including access to the relevant computer 
systems, such as the local intranet, minutes of board meetings and the Raboweb, the 
national information source for all member banks. Access was secured to all 
documentation regarding ROM, through Rabobank Nederland. Moreover, a consultant of 
Rabobank Nederland kept the researcher informed of additional information during the 
two years of the empirical study. All in all, besides the interviews and formal and informal 
meetings, another twenty days were spent at this member bank reviewing all the available 
information, as well as observing the dynamics of employee interaction. This bank also 
allowed me to be present at board meetings. I attended those that had ROM on the agenda. 
Finally, this bank proved to be a valuable base for my research within the Group as a 
whole, as I was provided with an internal e-mail address and all the necessary accounts to 
facilitate communications with all other member banks within the Rabobank Group. The 
period of my involvement at Rabobank Groningen was from May 2002 up to August 
2004.  
 
Rabobank West-Drenthe also offered the opportunity to be present for more than one year 
(this constituted two project cycles). I was present at virtually all meetings that were held 
for the ROM project. Moreover, I had access to all documentation relating to their 
implementation of ROM, including the quarterly results of the bank. In addition, I had the 
opportunity to discuss all results of ROM with the Rabobank Nederland consultant before 
and after each meeting. It provided an opportunity to become acquainted with his hopes 
and aspirations for this bank and the reasons why he did the things he did. 
  
The extensive contacts I was able to build up from my presence at these two banks proved 
to be very valuable to this study. Being present during the activities at these two banks 
meant that I was also present at the social activities that surrounded them; mostly lunches 
and drinks. These occasions were excellent occasions to discuss various topics with 
different people in settings other than the formal ones. These formal and informal 
contacts, documentation such as e-mail and minutes of meetings, the extensive 
observations, and other sources of information all served to triangulate the findings. 
Triangulation is a method that allows for observations to be confirmed by other sources of 
information such as artefacts, minutes of meetings and interviews with others. Tolbert & 
Zucker (1996) argued that the combination of archival sources and data collected from 
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semi-structured interviews is most appropriate for analysing institutional processes over 
time. 
 
5.4 Making sense of the data 
 
The vast amount of data collected in this study was of such a magnitude that a method 
was needed to order the data and to make sense of its contents. This section describes the 
choices made with respect to the classification of the data and the manner in which 
meaning was extracted from the raw data. 
 
5.4.1.1 Data analysis 
As noted above, most interview data was recorded and transcribed. The data was 
subsequently coded by using the Atlas computer program for qualitative analysis. 
However, this coding was only done in very general terms, as the issues needed to arise 
from the case material. Too much detailed prior coding would reduce the opportunity to 
identify issues that were in the data. The first coding was done to identify the phases of 
the change process in the member bank. Four types of codes were used to identify this 
phase: one set of codes indicated statements about the selection of the program; a second 
set indicated statements about the ROM program itself and the selection of particular 
action; a third set of codes indicated the presence of shared routines; and lastly, a fourth 
set of codes identified statements about whether the program was long lasting or was 
increasingly being ignored. These four categories were derived from the theoretical 
explanations in chapter 3 and, during the analysis, they were combined to provide 
explanations of the institutionalisation of accounting practices. The application of these 
four categories of codes effectively cut the story four-ways. In order to identify the topics 
that were primarily relevant to the events at the Rabobank, the decision was made to 
introduce this hierarchy in the data. The extensive studies at the member banks of 
Groningen and West-Drenthe were to be used to inform both the selection of relevant 
topics and the creation of the context in which these topics would be placed to clarify their 
meaning.  
  
The data gathered was so extensive that it was at times difficult to handle. Yin (2003) 
provides an example in a multiple case study setting where 9 to 12 cases are sufficient to 
obtain sufficient confidence about the issue being researched. Eisenhardt (1989) speaks of 
a number between 4 and 10, where ‘with more than 10 cases, it quickly becomes difficult 
to cope with the complexity and volume of data’ (p. 545). This thesis works with 15 sites, 
but it qualifies as one case study for reasons outlined on page 106. Nevertheless, the 
complexity of the data gathered at the 15 sites (including Rabobank Nederland) was 
massive. One criterion was definitely met by this research: the point of ‘theoretical 
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saturation’ was reached around site twelve. Theoretical saturation is ‘the point at which 
incremental learning is minimal because the researchers are observing phenomena seen 
before’ (Eisenhardt, 1989). I used a form of cross-referencing to use outcomes of earlier 
interviews in later research activities to become more sensitive to specific events at the 
Rabobank. During the interviews at the final two member banks, it became clear that the 
descriptions and the explanations that the respondents gave were not new to me and these 
explanations gave little impetus for further cross-referencing. Rather, they were alike to 
the explanations given by other respondents. As such, the conclusions of this thesis would 
not have changed substantially if the total of case sites were thirteen instead of fifteen.   
 
Chapter 6 of this thesis will provide an in-depth description of the process of change at the 
two main research sites, Groningen and West-Drenthe. The issues that were identified as 
having relevance in their change efforts will then be further explored in subsequent 
chapters. These subsequent chapters will address the issues further using the entire set of 
member banks that were interviewed. Through this data hierarchy, order was created 
through levels of detail. This approach follows the method originally suggested by Van 
Maanen (1979) and applied by Labianca et al. (2000) and Balogun & Johnson (2004). The 
method involves two levels of analysis: A first order analysis and a second order analysis. 
First order analysis is a ‘thick description’ of the events and background from the 
perspective of the participants. It is used to identify emerging issues that will be addressed 
by the further development of theory. Moreover, Van Maanen (1979) argues that the 
information from the first-order analysis is useful to the reader to provide the necessary 
background to generalise the findings to other settings. The second order analysis is a 
further analysis of the events in terms of emerging theory. It attempts to provide 
explanations of the case using theoretical understandings of the ideas that emerged from 
the first order analysis. These explanations could involve the active analytical 
involvement of the researcher in the issues emerging from the case. Second order analysis 




                                      
First order analysis: "thick case 
description" for issue identification
Ch. 6
Second order analysis: explanation of 
case events through the development of 
a theoretical framework 
Ch. 7-11
 
Figure 5-2: First and second order analysis 
 
The method employed to make sense of the collected data is thus a two-stage process. 
First, a case description from the perspective of the organisational participants is created. 
This description will be organised in a number of chronological episodes and it will allow 
the identification of emerging issues related to the implementation of ROM at the 
Rabobank. This first order analysis can be found in chapter 6. Then a second order 
analysis will address these topics in detail in chapters 7 to 10, in order to create a 
theoretical framework that can contribute to the explanations of the events surrounding 
ROM at the Rabobank. The theoretical framework which emerges, and the implications 




This chapter has described the methodological underpinnings of this work. Scapens 
(1990) argues that ‘to study management accounting as social practice, it is necessary to 
look at the relationship between day-to-day social action and the dimensions of social 
structure. This will involve locating structures in both time and space, i.e. setting them in 
their wider social context and examining how they have evolved over time’ (p. 268). This 
work emphasises two elements touched upon by Scapens. Firstly, the relation between 
action and structure; and secondly, the temporal nature of accounting change. The latter is 
addressed by the longitudinal case studies reported in chapters 6 to 10.  
 
The methodology used here was dictated primarily by the nature of the question. Being 
interested in the processes of change, this thesis uses a case study that can be typified as 
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longitudinal (Rabobank Groningen and West-Drenthe) and retrospective (the other 
member banks). By allowing the researcher to get close to the object of study, the method 
allows us to avoid a ‘veranda’ study. This thesis benefits greatly from the many 
observations and interactions made at the Rabobank. Being able to observe organisational 
participants in their work environment provides valuable insights into the influence of 
social interaction on accounting change. These insights would be lost if a veranda-type of 
method had been used.  
 
The case sites were selected with an interpretative methodology in mind. This selection 
was left to organisational participants who were able to rank case sites based on a set of 
subjective criteria and their own experience. This way of selecting increases the 
probability of selecting empirically rich case sites. An empirically rich case site means 
that ROM either had a high impact on the member bank or a very low impact. Both were 
considered valuable as the processes surrounding ROM were expected to have 
distinguishable features. Seeking these sites without sufficient knowledge on where in the 
organisation they may reside would have been a cumbersome exercise. It must be stressed 
that the selection of these rich case sites in this manner merely increased the chance of 
actually encountering them; there was no guarantee that these would be the empirically 
richest sites. However, a selection procedure such as the one described here increases the 
chance of finding these sites.  
 
The method of analysis is in line with the research questions. A longitudinal and 
retrospective case study approach, using semi-structured interviews, is suitable for this 
type of research as the dimensions of change can be extracted from the case itself. It was 
for this reason that both first-order and second-order analysis was used. The first-order 
analysis helped to distil the issues from the case. The holistic ideal of ‘letting the issues 
emerge from the case’ was served by this approach. A second-order analysis explained the 
events that were observed through the development of a theoretical framework.  
 
The next chapter will describe the first-order analysis of the Rabobank. Rather than 
attempting to capture the meanings of the participants at all fourteen member banks, the 
chapter will confine itself to the two member banks that have been tracked thoroughly in 
their efforts to implement the new system and the philosophy of accountability: Results 
Oriented Management. It will describe the events at the Groningen and West-Drenthe 
banks in chronological order. Although this description may appear to follow the 
theoretical framework described in chapter 3, it is important to stress that this is not 
intentional. The first order analysis provides a case description of the events as they 
unfold to the people in the organisation. As the theoretical framework of chapter 3 is not 
part of their reality, it is no part of the first order analysis. Chapters 7 to 11 will describe 
the second order analysis. These chapters will present explanations of the observations 
through the development of a theoretical framework that will be discussed in chapter 11. 
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6 A first order analysis of ROM at the member banks 
of West-Drenthe and Groningen 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter will describe the process of ROM at two member banks in the Netherlands: 
Rabobank Groningen and Rabobank West-Drenthe. These two different member banks, 
both decided to implement the ROM program, but each in their own manner. Many 
differences in their practices can be observed. They qualify as extremities in many 
respects and thus serve as a good basis for understanding the processes of Results 
Oriented Management. This chapter qualifies as a first-order analysis (Van Maanen, 1979; 
Balogun & Johnson, 2004) of the events that occurred at the member banks. In turn, this 
first-order analysis of the events at these two member banks leads to the definition of a 
number of elements that play key roles in the settings described. These elements will be 
explored further in the later chapters through a second-level analysis to create a 
comprehensive understanding of the processes of change at the various member banks of 
the Rabobank Group. 
 
It is the purpose of this chapter to trace the sequence of events at both banks to be able to 
identify relevant topics that have played a role in the dissemination of change throughout 
the member banks. This case description will be structured chronologically, as the events 
unfolded at the two banks. It will describe four phases in the process of institutionalisation 
of change: the conception of a need for change; the selection of behavioural responses by 
the various organisational participants; routinisation of action patterns and 
institutionalisation of these routines. These four themes are the chronological phases in 
which ROM unfolded.  
 
The chapter is structured as follows: the next section will give general information about 
the member banks that are the focus here: Groningen and West-Drenthe. These two 
member banks engaged in the program with very different results. The chapter will then 
provide a discussion of the processes of change around the four themes mentioned above: 
the conception of the need for change; the selection of behavioural responses by the 
various organisational participants; routinisation of action patterns and institutionalisation 
of these routines. The chapter will close with a conclusion. 
 
6.2 Rabobank Groningen & Rabobank West-Drenthe 
As the collective of member banks became aware of the growing competition in their 
local markets, they became increasingly receptive to instruments that promised to provide 
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a more efficient and effective management of their operations. This included the member 
banks in Groningen and Drenthe. These two member banks both participated in the 
“Results Oriented Management” program (see chapter 4 for a discussion of ROM). This 
program was offered uniformly to all member banks. It consisted of manuals, templates, 
web pages, and the support of consultants in the service of Rabobank Nederland. The 
change program that was about to unfold thus had many common traits among the various 
member banks. Nevertheless, the changes unfolded through different paths and followed 
different sequences of events for all the banks involved. The chain of events that was 
witnessed at the two banks in Groningen and West-Drenthe were no exception. These two 
organisations, both belonging to the same Group, and both engaging in a change program 
that has similar initial properties for all participating organisations, yielded quite different 
results.  
 
Rabobank Groningen can be described as a provincial city bank. It has a number of 
branches, all situated in the city of Groningen. Apart from branches in the classical sense, 
it also provides a financial service centre and a financial advice centre, located at the 
head-office in Groningen. At the time of the first contacts with the bank, the balance sheet 
total was some 613 Million Euro. In 2002, at the time of the first exploratory talks, the 
bank was economically in a deplorable state. Some members of the management team 
claimed that the bank was ‘technically bankrupt’; meaning that it could exist only by 
virtue of the support of the Rabobank Group. Although still making a small profit, this 
was insufficient to maintain its legally stipulated minimum levels of solvency; thus 
forcing Rabobank Nederland to act as the bankers’ bank. Rabobank Groningen had a five 
person management team, consisting of the manager Business Administration, the 
manager Client Advice, the manager Home & Mortgages and the manager Corporate 
Clients, led by the General Director. In addition, the bank was supervised by a board of 
local members. In 2002, the General Director had been in office for some two years, 
previously he had been General Director of a member bank in Brabant (the southern part 
of the Netherlands). The majority of the members of the management team were all 
people who had been employed at this bank (i.e Rabobank Groningen) for a long period of 
time (at least several years).  
 
Rabobank West-Drenthe is a rural bank. It has five branches in five different localities. It 
was the product of a recent merger of four smaller banks and the current management 
team includes some of the previous directors of those four banks. The General Director of 
this newly merged bank does not have a long history within this member bank, but he did 
occupy various posts in other banks that were part of the Rabobank Group. He had been 
recruited from another member bank to allow the post-merger member bank to build a 
common culture among the people who were formerly employed by the four separate 
banks. The manager Corporate Clients is also not from the area. He was appointed 
temporarily to make the segment more productive and to reduce the risk of its portfolio. 
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There are some commonalities between these two banks. Both are situated in the north of 
the Netherlands and, at that time, both had a large proportion of employees who had 
worked in the bank or its constituent parts for a considerable amount of time. Moreover, 
both were performing rather poorly in financial terms, although both were still making a 
profit. However, some differences can also be noted: Rabobank Groningen is a bank in a 
city that is typified by a large population of students; a large proportion of SME’s (shops) 
and a small number of large and multinational companies. Rabobank Drenthe is situated 
in four rural areas that have many agricultural enterprises. Apart from these agricultural 
entrepreneurs, there is a considerable recreational industry developing, although this is 
largely restricted to many small-scale enterprises. The Drenthe area is in demand by so-
called ‘Drentheniers’, (early) retiring people who move to Drenthe for its forests, its rural 
environment and its affordable farmhouses. In response to this influx, the provincial 
authorities have severely restricted the construction of new houses, thereby limiting the 
mortgage opportunities for the bank. It thus has limited the opportunities in the region in 
terms of numbers of inhabitants and the financing of new housing. In contrast, the city of 
Groningen is developing a number of new suburban areas as well as business districts that 
are expected to expand both the economic activity and the number of potential customers 
in the area.  
 
The activities surrounding the programs for both member banks are depicted in the 
following table: 
 
Phase Rabobank West-Drenthe Rabobank Groningen 
Initial discussions Early 2002 Autumn 2002 
First year of activities 2002 (Management team 
only) 
2003  
MT+/strategy meetings June-September 2003 May-June 2003 
Segment meetings October 2003 September-October 2003 
Budget preparation October-November 2003 October-November 2003 
Control agreements December-January 2003-
2004 
December 2003 
 Table 6-1: General timeframe of the program for the two member banks 
 
Rabobank West-Drenthe was quicker than Groningen in its decision to adopt Results 
Oriented Management. In 2002, the bank decided to implement the steps of the program 
using only the management team of the bank and a consultant; no further employees were 
involved in that year. Since the people in the management team were relatively new to 
each other, the program would be a good opportunity to acquaint them with each other. 
The bank bought in consultants from Rabobank Nederland to support this process. Around 
this time, Rabobank Groningen was also looking into the possibility of introducing ROM, 
but it explicitly decided to delay it for a year. According to the Director of the Groningen 
bank it did not make sense to implement the program, before the bank had a clear idea of 
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how to embed it within its wider change efforts. In particular, the Director was very 
concerned by the fact that the ROM program could easily become a one-time activity, 
without a real commitment to the long-term changes, which he so explicitly sought. 
Basically, to introduce the program in isolation would, in his opinion, not lead to an 
increased commitment to the agreements that would result from ROM. Reaching 
agreements was not the problem, it was ensuring an enduring commitment that was 
crucial to the Groningen bank, and at this time, ROM did not offer a sufficient solution to 
that issue. However, in 2003, the Groningen bank decided to introduce the program, albeit 
in an adapted format.  
 
6.3 Phase 0: The selection of Results Oriented Management 
This section will start at the beginning: it uses the situation at the Rabobank to provide a 
description of how ROM entered the two banks. Both member banks announced their 
interest in the program Results Oriented Management at roughly the same time (Spring, 
2002). As ROM was already in operation for a few years, the Rabobank as an organisation 
already had some experience in the workings of the program. As noted earlier, the 
objective of the program, as stated by its developers is to professionalise planning and 
control in the member banks in terms of structure and behaviour. Although both member 
banks studied in depth referred to a desire to professionalise their planning and control, 
many interviewees referred to ‘the feeling that they were not equipped to be able to 
understand deviations from expectations’ (Financial Controller, Rabobank Groningen). 
Although the desire to professionalise operations may have stemmed from this feeling, 
this desire was not ‘out there’. However, the specific circumstances of both banks fuelled 
the desire to put effort into a program that would facilitate greater predictability of results 
and improved ability to explain deviations on the one hand, and a result driven attitude on 
the other. However, the rationale of the two banks for introducing the program varied 
considerably. In addition, the two had different philosophies underlying the execution of 
the program.  
 
Rabobank Groningen 
As noted earlier, the Groningen member bank was in a quite deplorable financial state. 
Nevertheless, the interviewees at the bank were not under the illusion that the program 
would immediately lead to increased financial performance. The management of this bank 
did not see the program as an isolated project. According to the General Director, the 
program was too structurally oriented, while in his opinion the Groningen bank needed a 
balanced change that consisted of both structural changes and behavioural or cultural 
changes. This was no easy task, as the General Director indicated; he felt rather alone in 
those early stages in his attempts to communicate exactly what type of bank he envisaged. 
Illustrative here is the difference in definition that the General Director and a commercial 
member of his management team gave to the term ‘result orientation’. Whereas the former 
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emphasised an attitude that would connect action to results, the latter primarily referred to 
structures of planning and control that would allow priorities to be set.  
 
Related to a lack of result orientation was a strong feeling that the organisation suffered 
from a lack of engagement. People would decouple from commitment as easily as they 
had accepted it. In the eyes of the General Director, people were insufficiently aware of 
the contribution they needed to make to the organisation in order to make their 
employment economically viable. To the General Director, this was more of a cultural 
trait than a structural feature of the organisation, and as such it could not be directly 
resolved by ROM. Rather than simply accepting the program as Rabobank Nederland had 
offered it, the General Director decided that, if they were going to introduce Results 
Oriented Management, it needed to be adapted to the needs of the bank as he perceived 
them. The objectives that were set out for the package of measures that comprised Results 
Oriented Management were multiple and relatively unspecified. However, it was decided 
that an all-encompassing change program would be set-up, under the guidance of the 
human resources manager, who was not formally part of the management team, but 
nevertheless present at management team meetings.  
 
A number of notable choices were made in the early stages of the change program. Firstly, 
a person from the human resources function was selected to spearhead the program. 
Whereas the ROM program traditionally belonged to the domain of accounting personnel, 
in Groningen, it became the explicit responsibility of human resources personnel. 
Secondly, there was to be a substantial integration of ROM and other change efforts; all 
were tied together under the single label of ‘change program’. Thirdly, the entire effort 
was primarily aimed at the creation of a new culture that could be deemed ‘result 
oriented’, and only secondary at the improvement of short-term financial results. The 
General Director, who in the Rabobank is ultimately responsible for the performance of 
the bank, primarily drove these choices. It was the General Director who drove the re-
conceptualisation of ROM as an all-encompassing cultural reorientation. As such, it was 
an instrument for a wider scheme of change. In this episode, the HR manager began to 
play a key role. Having had experience of the technicalities of lay-offs and being able to 
understand the requirements for the new organisation posed by the General Director, he 
was given the role of leader of the ‘change program’. This was not without some 
disruption at the interpersonal level. The financial controller of the bank expected to lead 
ROM as a self-contained effort, but it became increasingly clear that it was to be part of 
the wider change efforts led by the HR manager. Apart from the implications that this had 
for the financial controller, it publicised a clear hierarchy in the envisaged objectives. It 
communicated the message that structures were meaningless without associated 
behavioural change.   
 
Rabobank Drenthe 
The fact that this member bank was the result of four recently merged member banks 
accounts for some of its characteristics: Firstly, the General Director’s task revolved 
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mainly around integrating the four parts into a culturally homogeneous bank. He was 
therefore a stable and reconciling force, smoothing out possibly conflicting differences 
between these four parts. The fact that this remained an important issue throughout the 
introduction of ROM is demonstrated by its strategic course1: ‘Intensifying customer 
relations….. by increasing commercial strength, …..through a close mutual cooperation 
between the segments.’ (Annual plan 2004, emphasis added). Secondly, the participants in 
the management team were from very different backgrounds. As was noted above, some 
were previously managers of the merged banks and one manager was a temporary 
manager hired from Rabobank Nederland to reorganise the Corporate Clients department. 
For this bank Results Oriented Management was a quite logical exercise. The General 
Director explained that the management team perceived the program as an opportunity to 
set a direction for the future, with the new post-merger team. It was the first major 
undertaking in which people from the four merged banks worked together. However, the 
managers of the bank also sought a more fundamental change, in that a common 
economic logic needed to be established. The interim manager of Corporate Clients 
argued that the banks’ employees needed to act more according to Deming’s circle: Plan-
Do-Check-Act. In his opinion, ROM could contribute to this change.  
 
Interestingly, the management teams of both member banks defined their aspirations for 
the program based on the needs they saw for their bank, instead of the purpose that was 
formulated for its development. The needs of both banks were also rather different. 
Groningen sees a role for the program in a wider change effort, primarily geared towards a 
stronger results orientation and an increased engagement on the part of all organisational 
participants. The management team of the West-Drenthe bank saw the merits of the 
program, because it offered the opportunity for a group of people from very diverse 
backgrounds to engage in a collective planning exercise; to forge some element of unity 
and a collective definition of the future direction of the bank. The individuals at Rabobank 
Nederland, tasked with the development of Results Oriented Management, described the 
purpose of the program as a provision of a way to ‘professionalise the planning & control’ 
of member banks; i.e. to be better equipped ‘to manage coherently’. The two banks have 
some common points, but their basic aspirations for ROM were different. This is 
remarkable, as the ROM program was communicated to all member banks in exactly the 
same terms. Communications included management manuals and intranet (Raboweb) 
pages that were similar for all member banks.  
 
Although the communicated purpose and content of the program was similar for all banks, 
their interpretations of the purpose of the program differed. In turn, this local 
interpretation affected local aspirations and goal formulation with regards to the program. 
The two banks discussed here, had similar sources of information at their disposal, but 
they selected the program on quite different grounds. This selection of the program 
                                                
1 The Rabobank calls its strategic statements ‘the strategic course’, a shipping analogy comparable to the name 
of its Balanced Scorecard: the Compass. 
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provides an example of the relationship between the common purpose of a change 
program and the local circumstances in which it is set, as local member banks are free to 
adapt, extend or postpone any program developed by Rabobank Nederland.  
 
Selection of the program at both member banks 
Events at both member banks suggest that the ROM program is not accepted merely for 
its own merits. Rather, it is accepted as a result of the decision makers’ abilities to connect 
its features to local issues. The situations at the two member banks were not particularly 
similar. Their concerns were different and they had different outlooks on what were the 
banks’ most immediate tasks. However, for the managers at both member banks, it was 
not the ‘professionalisation of the banks’ business administration’ that triggered ROM. 
Their sense of purpose for the program came from the current state of the member bank. 
More precisely, there was some unease present in both member banks, of which managers 
and employees were aware, but for which they did not have any solution. The program of 
Results Oriented Management created by Rabobank Nederland allowed the participants of 
both member banks to reframe their concerns in the terminology of Results Oriented 
Management. Therefore, the program proved to be interesting to the managers of both 
banks, even though they had different objectives for the program. Not because it promised 
to solve their problems beforehand, but because it allowed them to state their concerns in 
a more objective manner: in terms of a program that addressed and defined that feeling of 
concern. For, now that it was named, it was out there and people could deal with it.  
 
An issue of power was an additional reason for the acceptance of ROM at the West-
Drenthe and Groningen banks. As both were performing rather poorly, there was pressure 
from the Rabobank Group to improve performance. ROM was aimed at improving the 
results on the Compasses and as such, it was a logical way of demonstrating commitment 
to improving results. The program’s objectives were therefore not only instrumental, but 
also ceremonial in demonstrating compliance to the demands of the Rabobank Group. 
However, this recognition is insufficient to account for the selection and acceptance of the 
program. The program appealed to local frames of reference at both member banks. The 
General Director of the Groningen member bank argued that the program was accepted by 
the Central Circle Meeting for nation-wide roll-out with remarkably little resistance on the 
part of the General Directors. The General Directors all agreed on the need for a program 
of management that emphasised the result orientation that many member banks were 
lacking. Apparently, the ROM program was stated in very broad terms and as such it 
appealed to many of the General Directors. It succeeded in forging a connection between 
the local frames of reference and the logic of the entire Group (‘result orientation is an 
attitude that needs stimulating’) as communicated by the head offices in Eindhoven and 
Utrecht. In short, the following issues appear to have had an influence at the member 
banks of Groningen and West-Drenthe.  
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Issue Rabobank West-Drenthe Rabobank Groningen 
Discomfort Cooperation between 
segments and individuals 
was primary concern 
No feeling for results 
leading to uneasiness on 
predictability of near 
future; lack of commitment 
Predominant (local) frame 
of reference 
Program fits current 
concerns 
Program itself does not 
address primary concerns; 
however, it does appeal to 
local issues 
Past actions Program seen as logical 
sequel to merger; In its 
early stages it is defined in 
terms of that merger. 
The choice for the program 
is no direct consequence of 
past choices; rather 
discomfort of specific 
managers is leading. 
Power; autonomy and 
economic performance 
Doing the program 
demonstrates:  
adherence to Group policy 
attention to poor financial 
situation 
It yields increased 
autonomy and decision-
space. 
Doing the program 
demonstrates:  
adherence to Group policy 
attention to poor financial 
situation 
It yields increased 
autonomy and decision-
space. 
Table 6-2: Issues leading up to acceptance of ROM 
 
6.4 Phase 1: The collective development of action 
Once the decision had been made to proceed with Results Oriented Management, both 
member banks invited Rabobank Nederland consultants to elaborate the program. Note 
that the decision to go ahead was made before this elaboration. Although the managers of 
the banks were in a position to abandon the program if they did not like the outcome of 
their discussions with the consultant, this did not occur. In light of the previous section, 
this is understandable as the reasons for acceptance of the program were locally 
determined, and to only a limited extent dependent on the precise content of the program. 
A further elaboration of the merits of the program according to Rabobank Nederland was 
useful, but not necessary for acceptance.  
  
Rabobank Groningen 
At the Groningen member bank, the management team was in favour of a massive turn-
around on all fronts. Rather than focusing on an isolated project, the General Director in 
particular wanted cultural and organisational changes that included, but were not restricted 
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to, the ROM program. This can be illustrated by the fact that during the period when the 
program was operational, virtually the entire management team was replaced, which was 
not a requirement of ROM: First, a new manager of Corporate Clients1 was hired, as the 
former incumbent had not functioned properly.  
 
This new manager played a vital role in the events that were to follow, as he quickly 
started to redefine ‘proper’ and desirable managerial behaviour. His overt critique of the 
quality of his own segment and other segments differentiated him from the other members 
of the management team. As noted earlier, the General Director felt rather alone in his 
attempts to radically change the cultural and structural traits of the bank. When the time 
came to hire a new manager of the segment Corporate Clients, the appointees personal 
qualities were deemed more important than experience. For, he needed to function as an 
ally of the General Director and a catalyst for change. The selected manager was a former 
sales manager from ING-bank; a technocratic organisation that focuses strongly on 
financial results through extensive performance measurement systems. The manager 
himself could be described as an open, speak-your-mind, type of person. This in itself was 
somewhat of a revelation to the bank, where most people attempted to keep personal 
relations pleasant, at the expense of result orientation. He had gained experience at the 
ING, and he was considered a good asset, because of his personal traits: open, tough on 
people, and an outspoken philosophy on how a bank should operate. In addition, the 
manager of Corporate Clients felt very strongly about accountability. In his opinion, 
agreements with people had to be followed up. He and the General Director argued that 
people too often had excuses for why they could not fulfil their commitments. The bank 
needed a change in mentality.  
 
The manager of Corporate Clients quickly started to reorganise his segment so that people 
negotiated targets and they were held accountable for their achievements. A number of 
lay-offs resulted. This led to increased tension in the segment. People did not feel safe 
anymore, something extraordinary for a bank that prided itself in having the best working 
conditions in the banking industry. People from other segments asked employees of the 
Corporate Clients segment if they would still have their jobs in the morning. Every 
employee at Corporate Clients discussed his ambitions in relation to the expectations that 
the manager Corporate Clients expressed clearly. A number of job rotations resulted. All 
in all, it was a time of much uncertainty for the department. However, successes were 
celebrated quite explicitly, which was not done previously. The acquisition of a new client 
was announced to the bank, cakes would be provided and praise given. After the episode 
of lay-offs, which lasted almost a year, the manager explicitly communicated that he 
wanted to continue with the remaining team. The actions of the manager led to short-term 
decreases in costs (as reported in the accounting system, and this played an important role 
                                                
1 Actually, the manager served businesses in the area of the bank and headed a regional unit for the larger 
enterprises in a wider area. Only the latter is formally designated Corporate Clients. However, to avoid 
confusion, the entire function is here called manager Corporate Clients. 
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in publicising successes)1, thereby improving segment results. In all, comments made by 
organisational participants on the Corporate Clients segment became more positive; the 
bank was aware that the segment was obtaining better results. More success stories 
emerged, and with the publicised successes, the tension amongst the segments’ employees 
started to decrease, although it could not said to be relaxed. However, they became an 
example of the process that all segments had to go through. And it was again the manager 
of Corporate Clients who showed the managers of the other segments what needed to be 
done. By virtue of the short-term success of his segment, he had gained the moral ground 
to speak to other segments. His philosophy was that managers needed to be each other’s 
‘sparring partners’, and confront each other with their successes and failures. He had 
demonstrated he could achieve successes with his modus operandi, so he could confront 
other managers with the performance of their segments.  
 
The manager of Financial Advice was also relieved of his duties and given other tasks, 
outside the management team. And further on in the process (around mid 2003), the 
manager Business Administration was replaced. The General Director of the Groningen 
bank, wanted to have a Business Administration department that was more pro-active, 
rather than simply facilitating. The manager who was hired had a strong philosophy on 
how to organise and manage a Business Administration segment. Then, finally, the 
manager Client Advice accepted a job at Rabobank Nederland, and the manager HRM, 
the project leader of the change program, replaced her. The management team of this bank 
had thus become more dynamic than before. In addition, the replacement of managers 
conveyed a strong message to the work floor; nobody would be excluded from the new 
demands of the organisation.  
 
At the Rabobank Groningen, the management team was ambivalent about the merits of 
the program in its standard form. It was searching for applications of the program that 
fitted its desire to communicate an all-encompassing cultural change. Consequently, this 
member bank decided not to use the Rabobank Nederland consultants; the management 
team feared that they would be focused too much on structure instead of attitude. Rather, 
they employed a consulting firm that had experience at various member banks seeking 
attitude changes.  
 
The basic features of the change program at the Rabobank Groningen were defined by the 
following: 
-1- Establish a plan of action 
-2- Measure customer satisfaction: to be used as input for the change program 
-3- Formation of MT+, determined by management team, based on a shortlist 
                                                
1 Here is the text of a typical e-mail sent by the manager Corporate Clients to the entire bank: ‘You have to share 
success! With some pride I can report that the barometer Businesses (a measure of gross contribution, 
organisation, and distribution quality) has achieved the highest level ever……I realise that music is made with 
the entire orchestra. Therefore, there will be cake for the entire bank today.’  
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-4- Interviews with MT+ members and with external constituents conducted by program 
leader and external consultant 
-5- Starting ceremony for the entire bank 
-6- Measurement of employee satisfaction 
-7- Panel/arena discussion with members of the bank (to be explained below) 
-8- Formulation of strategy (in Rabobank terms: strategic course) 
-9- Presentation of the strategic course to the board of members 
-10- Creation of plans and actions on segment level leading to budgets for the coming 
year 
 
At this point, the manager HRM was leading the program, and it was he who conducted 
the contract negotiations with the external consultant firm. He explained later: ‘I hoped 
they would come with fresh ideas on mobilising our people, and at first I thought that 
came across’. The consultants would initially lead a member meeting as well as a number 
of strategy meetings. The former consisted of an ‘arena forum’. The setting was such that 
a number of members of the Groningen cooperative were placed in the middle of a room 
with various employees of the Groningen cooperative placed around them. The idea was 
that these members would confront the staff with their experiences of the bank. The 
discussions mainly revolved around the bank being not sufficiently entrepreneurial, 
bureaucratic and slow. The perceived slowness was not necessarily a bad thing, as the 
forum appreciated the image of reliability and thoroughness of the bank.  
 
A number of strategy meetings followed this meeting over the next few days. These 
followed the structure laid down by ROM quite closely. Group discussions were 
encouraged to discuss the purpose of the organisation in Groningen; its desired longer-
term objectives and the actions that would be needed to achieve them. The strategy days 
were structured as follows: First, the consultant gave an introduction. Then, the members 
of the MT+ were asked to discuss a part of the strategy in small groups and these would 
typically be written on large flip-over charts or put together as a collage of small sticky 
papers. This form of information collection was complemented by large poster boards that 
depicted ideas for the strategic direction of the bank emanating from the board of 
members (the body that supervises the bank on behalf of the members of the local 
community), the management team of the bank and the MT+. In this phase, the MT+ 
members were working on solutions to various sub-questions leading to a hierarchy of 
elements that were deemed important for the bank. The outcome of this phase for 
Rabobank Groningen was that the bank wanted to be: ‘A Partner in Ambition’ and it 
identified as core values: ‘Openness; Reliability; Commitment; Entrepreneurial; Result 
Orientation’. The establishment of these core values was not an exercise in merely 
discussing what people thought the bank needed to be. Rather, it was a search for 
definitions and meanings of shared sentiments that participants had about the future of the 
bank. At first, these were hollow phrases to most people. Only in their frequent use, (their 
reproduction) did the terms come alive. The project leader at the Groningen bank was well 
aware of the pitfalls of imposing a mission (in Rabobank terms: ambition) and a number 
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of ambiguous core values on the bank. He therefore placed much emphasis on influencing 
the manner in which people reproduced these principles. The program had now become a 
two-tier package along the lines of the following figure: 
 
"Change program" Rabobank Groningen
Structure leading to budget and 
year plans
Culture of accountability, openness 
and result-orientation 
Emphasis on structure and culture
 
Figure 6-1: The change program at the Groningen bank 
 
The management of the bank worked to establish new habits through the establishment of 
new structures as well as through a redefinition and ongoing emphasis on the principles 
presented as the core values of the bank. The two tiers were mutually supportive, as the 
structures of planning and evaluation that were set up were to introduce a culture of 
accountability and result-orientation. The structure of planning and control also benefitted 
from changes in culture, in that planning and control took a more central position in the 
bank. Certainly, in those early years of operation planning and evaluation structures 
proved to be vulnerable to neglect and diminishing use, as they appealed to a culture of 
result orientation that was only just beginning to emerge. But because these structures 
were given legitimacy by the wider cultural developments in the banks, their ongoing 
reproduction was facilitated.  
 
Rabobank West-Drenthe 
In the Rabobank West-Drenthe, similar sessions were held, which were supported by a 
Rabobank Nederland consultant. With regards to the structural features that include 
SWOT analyses and mission statements, there was not much difference in the ways the 
two member banks (Groningen and West-Drenthe) mobilised people to participate. They 
were asked by the consultants to split up into small groups and thus contribute to the 
generation of ideas. The participants found a number of structural characteristics that they 
wanted to improve, and a number of behavioural and cultural qualities. Related to the 
former, the MT+ group was aware of the limited customer satisfaction the bank had 
gained in the market. They were also aware of the financial position of the bank, but the 
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MT+ group was not convinced that the financial results needed to be improved in the 
short term. The consultant’s role was rather peculiar in this phase. It was much more than 
an advisory role. On numerous occasions, the consultant challenged the conclusions 
which the MT+ group extracted from the information at hand, as well as inducing them to 
alter the decisions they had taken. For example, the disappointing financial performance 
of the bank had encouraged the bank to participate in the so-called ‘Benchmark 
Improvement Potential’ program, which compares classes of member banks and offers 
insight into best practices. This benchmarking revealed that the bank was overstaffed in a 
number of areas. The management team was very uneasy addressing the notion of lay-offs 
to the rest of the MT+ group, fearing that this might cause unrest. Instead, they left the 
matter untouched, much to the dissatisfaction of the consultant who wanted to force 
clarity on the matter. He therefore kept presenting the matter as something that needed to 
be addressed. In the course of the days to come, the results of the Benchmark 
Improvement Potential program were objectified to such extent that no discussion existed 
on if there were too many people in the organisation, only on how to deal with it. The 
group now felt compelled to address the need for staff reduction, something that was 
explicitly brought forward by the consultant.  
 
The MT+ group at the West-Drenthe bank was very concerned with commitment. It 
realised that it could produce many plans, but that it also needed to work on the 
behavioural aspects of change. Therefore, as a follow-up to the MT+ meetings, they 
organised sessions per segment. In these sessions, feedback was sought about selected 
strategies, the mission, vision and future outlook. Furthermore, the segments were asked 
to translate the strategic choices of the bank into actions that were relevant to their 
segment. All segments worked actively towards the generation of ideas for actions in line 
with the bank-wide plans devised by the MT+ group. Both the managers and the 
consultant were very pleased with this phase. There were four meetings of this kind, 
respectively with: the segment Corporate Clients; the segment Client Advice; the segment 
Financial Advice; and the segment Business Administration. All in all, the objective was 
to reach out to the entire population of the member bank. And whereas the Groningen 
member bank did this by organising quarterly information sessions for the entire bank, the 
West-Drenthe bank did this per segment. In doing so, the consultant and the MT+ 
members from that segment created an explicit opportunity to appeal more directly to the 
concerns of and matters unique to that segment. People were enthusiastic about this 
approach. Some remarks made in the evaluations were: ‘we are glad to have had the 
opportunity to get involved with ROM; although we have heard of it earlier, now we can 
understand better what it means’.  
 
The effect of defining actions on a segment basis was that the segment members were 
exposed to the logic, language and associated meanings of the MT+ group. Apart from 
having the feeling of being involved, they had the opportunity to catch up with the MT+. 
And they did so quite enthusiastically. The employees of the various segments were eager 
to contribute to the generation of ideas. A downside was that they were constrained by the 
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processes the MT+ team had already gone through. For example, discussions on market 
position were cut short, as similar discussions had already taken place in earlier stages. 
Moreover, some participants expressed their disappointment with the fact that their 
involvement had a fragmented character. They might contribute now, but once they 
became more interested in the matter and developed ideas on how to continue with the 
program, they were not called upon anymore. A participant put it like this: ‘We knew the 
program was underway, and in order to gain our commitment, we were here tonight, and 
that is fine. You have our attention now and I am eager to continue to have an influence of 
the policy decisions of our bank. And after tonight you are going to say ‘thank you for 
your troubles and you will see what we made of it?’ In my opinion that is a waste of 
commitment and energy’. The decision to involve the segments was very well received. 
But there was little consideration of the ways in which this increased commitment could 
be channelled. Once people were challenged to participate, they expected to contribute 
more. At the West-Drenthe bank, there was nothing more for the segments to do. People 
thus left the segment meetings with mixed emotions. On the one hand, they were pleased 
to have been able to participate in the sessions and to be confronted with new types of 
questions. On the other, they did not understand what would happen with their input as 
well as why their commitment was so important if it were to be ignored later on in the 
process.  
 
A second observation was that the dynamics in the individual segments were very 
different. It suggests that the culture of a member bank is a collection of segment cultures. 
As such, a member bank does not have a single culture; it is a collection of sub-cultures 
that are affected by the day-to-day experiences of its employees. So the people at the 
segment Client Advice were very keen on their participation. Being the employees mostly 
bound to service counters serving the mass consumer market, they did not have many 
opportunities to contribute to bank policies. Moreover, for them it was an excellent 
opportunity to get attention for the problems of a segment such as theirs. The atmosphere 
was different at the meetings of the segment Financial Advice. The segment did not 
express similar enthusiasm about participating. One typical comment in this segment was 
the following: ‘You are asking us to participate in policy matters, and you suggest that we 
have an influence on the direction of this bank, but we are embedded in the banking 
regulations, the guidelines of Rabobank Nederland and the requirements of the 
management team of this bank. We do not have as much influence as these sessions 
suggest’. To some people in the segment, the validity of their efforts was doubtful. 
Whereas the segment Client Advice was eager to contribute to the process, the segment 
Financial Advice explicitly addressed the limited decision space a member bank has 
within the Rabobank Group. This is not to say that the segment did not contribute, but it 
did so with some reservations. People often referred to their own position in the bank to 
formulate their expectations of ROM. The participants at the segment Client Advice were 
pleasantly surprised that they could participate in the policies of their member bank. They 
did not see themselves or their work as having much influence outside the confines of 
their own segment. The outlook of the people at Financial Advice was much more 
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oriented towards business management. They indicated that part of the exercise was a 
waste of time, as they felt they were able to oversee the actual decision space the local 
member bank had.  
 
Group dynamics were also heavily influenced by the preferences of the segment manager. 
Although these managers generally kept a low profile, all segment members knew their 
manager’s position on the program. This influenced the individual participant’s stance on 
the project. It provided hints about acceptable behaviour, which could affect the position 
of the entire segment and the MT+ group. The consultant at West-Drenthe understood 
these dynamics. He noted: ‘It is crucial to tilt any meeting such as this one to my side as 
soon as possible. I usually come in somewhat early to talk to people so I know whose 
stance is favourable. I then start off with those people so they can create a positive 
atmosphere. However, this does not work when people have intimate knowledge of each 
others’ position beforehand’. At the segment Financial Advice, the manager had some 
doubts concerning the program. The primary reason was that his segment was very 
advanced in using these instruments. To him and his team they were repeating a number 
of activities they had done before. Basically, their level of knowledge was relatively high 
and the process was therefore not particularly stimulating to his segment. The segment 
manager expressed this on several occasions, and so his opinion was widely known. This 
appeared to be a powerful clue to behaviour for the group. In this episode, when the ROM 
program called for discussions within the segments, two elements became clear: firstly, 
the identity of the participants played a key role in how they approached the selection of 
action. And secondly, they were well aware of how to behave in the presence of their 
manager and co-workers. 
  
Action generation at both member banks 
The impact of the individual at both member banks swiftly became subordinate to the 
influence that was mediated by group processes. Because most activities were undertaken 
in MT+ groups in those early stages, it was this group that defined many actions to be 
taken. Group dynamics were therefore key in this phase. This caused some concern to the 
Groningen General Director who asked the consultant: ‘Do we need to be concerned by 
the fact that this is all group-wise? I do not want to have so much collectively; I am 
seeking more personal commitment’. Sub-groups were discovering what they were doing 
and why. At both member banks the consultant and project leader gave meaning to the 
activities that were being undertaken in the various sub-groups. Because every activity 
was part of a larger project, of which the structure was clear to the project leader and the 
consultant, people tended to tailor their solutions to the cues that were given by those in 
charge. For example, a consultant could argue that the bank needed to reduce the number 
of counter transactions. This suggestion would virtually always find its way into the inputs 
delivered by the sub-groups in the MT+, simply because there was considerable ambiguity 
on the part of the participants. Few cues were available about how to behave. This 
ambiguity diluted the social choice processes. Items such as why people were there, how 
their activities fit into the entire program, and what would be the socially accepted mode 
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of operation, were under collective development. Interestingly, ambiguity increased when 
project leaders emphasised that everyone needed to be frank and open. The social space in 
which people could move was enormous, and since it was the first time for most people in 
such a setting, only general conventions were in place to give guidance on proper ways to 
act and to behave. Also, the MT+ groups consisted of people from different parts of the 
organisation, both geographically and hierarchically. These people were not used to 
working together. So, a second source of ambiguity was the unspecified relationship to 
each other.  
 
Indeed, where some of the existing behavioural templates were less appropriate, the ones 
that were still deemed valid in the sub-groups gained in importance. Frequent references 
were made to issues that were unique to the member bank. Apart from creating a sense of 
unity between the participants, it also effectively excluded the consultant. This was 
especially noticeable at the Rabobank West-Drenthe. Here, frequent private jokes among 
the participants, including the management team members, left the consultant without 
knowledge about how to place them in the context of what they were trying to achieve in 
those early phases: to create a strategy and to define a mission. Interestingly, this was less 
of an issue for the Rabobank Groningen participants, as the management team was more 
explicit in their support for the activities undertaken in those strategy meetings.  
 
Whether the assignment was to make a SWOT analysis or to determine targets, 
discussions often included the identity of the bank. For example, how relevant is the 
creation of a mission for the member bank if it only has limited means to express the fact 
that it is a cooperative. Not only did the identity of the banks play a part in these 
discussions, but also, and even more so, did the sub-identities of the individual segments. 
‘We’ vs. ‘they’ arguments were often recorded. These comments pointed to people 
perceiving their role just as much in terms of their segment as they do in terms of the 
member bank as a whole. Identities were crucial in the course of the program as people 
tended to fit their collective experiences into their conception of the bank, the segment 
and the role they fulfil in them.  
 
The consultant at the Groningen bank showed a video, demonstrating a transformation 
process at the Spanish railways. This involved a reorientation to a back-office front-office 
type of organisation. The primary message of the video was that the more efficient the 
back office, given the support of as much information technology as possible, the more 
resources were available for customer contacts in the front office. The logic that was 
involved: do everything outside of the scope of the customer as efficiently as possible so 
that customer service can benefit. This logic appealed particularly to the MT+ group. It 
accommodated the cooperative mission of improved customer service, while it also 
appealed to a desire for greater efficiency. As such, the video was frequently referred to 
throughout the process.  
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Moreover, the consultant who argued that the ‘identity of the organisation is more 
important than the direction the organisation chooses to take’ directly identified the 
identity of the bank as an issue. This was well received by the General Director, who was 
searching quite deliberately for a change in identities as part of the all-encompassing 
cultural change. Basically, organisational identity were powerful influences in the 
collective decision making process at the Rabobank Groningen. However, in these initial 
stages people were still searching for meaning. As noted earlier, meaning was extracted 
from the available sources of information: the clues provided by the consultants, the group 
assignments, and the habitual ways of behaving in the Rabobank, but this was insufficient 
to make individuals confident about their understanding of the situation in which they 
found themselves. As a result, at both member banks, project leaders and consultants were 
rather disappointed by the lack of enthusiasm and frankness with which people 
approached the program. Both the consultant and the project leader in Groningen called 
the MT+ group ‘weary, flat and tired’. At West-Drenthe, the consultant was similarly 
concerned about the lack of active participation after those early meetings. Participants 
later on indicated that they were unsure on what to think of the early strategy meetings. 
The respondents appreciated the opportunities they were given to take part in the process, 
but they were not sure what to expect, and what was expected of them. They were placed 
in a new role, without being given a manual for that role. The people who were 
interviewed were not surprised to be classified as weary or flat, as they felt it themselves. 
It was a learning experience, as many more sessions were yet to come.  
 
The participants found more clues for what was expected from them in this setting from 
two sources: their social micro-environment and salient others. The social micro-
environment relates to the social group of which they are part. At various meetings, 
people tended to interact especially with those they knew. Close colleagues and friends 
were the primary referents. These informal groups developed attitudes and modes of 
behaviour during the sessions. These were rather independent of hierarchical position. 
Within these micro-groups, people took on their role as opinion leader, as they would in 
an ‘ordinary’ work setting. Opinions were formed on the use of the program they were 
participating in, and people extracted information out of those early sessions on what to 
expect and how to behave. Although informal opinion leaders may be defined as salient 
others, powerful people, in a hierarchical sense are also salient. And although the 
management teams of both member banks repeatedly indicated that the participants 
needed to disregard the formal power differences, this was easier said than done. 
Preferences expressed by managers carried weight, not so much because everybody 
needed to agree, but because they served as indications of desired behaviours and 
opinions. They served as clues for the near future for the MT+ group. This is not to say 
that discussion would not follow, because it did. However, I would argue here that 
discussion could arise because of the pointers to expected behaviours that participants 
extracted, not despite of them. Without templates for behaviour (scripts), the meetings 
were dull and uninspired. People were searching for patterns of acceptable behaviour. 
Without those, they were unsure of the proper reactions. Only when participants were able 
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to extract information on behaviour, opinion and social acceptance, did they have 
channels through which to express opinions. Paradoxically, it was through this ad-hoc 
structure that they could express their unease about structural features of the bank’s 
operations.  
 
There were differences between the two banks in terms of organisational culture. The 
consultant at Rabobank West-Drenthe often referred to the fact that the culture of the bank 
was rather rigid. Organisational participants, including management team members were 
in the habit of keeping much information private and they felt that pressure was high. 
Moreover, at this time (2003) there was little drive for massive changes in the bank. The 
management team had a strong preference for organic, evolutionary changes. It was 
therefore not concerned with creating a sense of urgency, especially in those early stages. 
The creation of a sense of urgency did not fit the task description for the General Director 
of the West-Drenthe bank. The priority for this member bank was stability, but for the 
General Director of the bank this did not exclude a change in mentality. However, the 
pace of change was a major difference with the Rabobank Groningen that did engage in 
massive change effort that proved to be both disruptive and productive.  
 
At both member banks, a first phase was completed with the definition of a mission and 
vision. After some discussion, a definition was chosen that described what the banks 
wanted to be. In line with the ROM program, these were necessary for later stages to 
prioritise between different courses of action. However, for the Groningen member bank it 
was much more than just a part of the ROM process. It was a collective choice of how 
people wanted to be and to interact. The General Director was very pleased by the 
outcome. Firstly, because it was the outcome of a collective effort that involved more 
people than simply the management team. Secondly, because he felt that the 
determination of the desired direction and the core values was a collective effort, the 
Director expected an ongoing commitment to the ambitions and core values.  
 
Similarly, at Rabobank West-Drenthe, the management team expressed their satisfaction 
with having a collectively determined mission for the coming years. However, a 
difference was that to the Groningen bank, the mission and the core values were not just 
steps that needed to be taken for the ROM program. Rather, they would become the 
backbone of a behavioural change. The mission: ‘A Partner in Ambition’ and the core 
values: ‘Openness; Reliability; Commitment; Entrepreneurial; Result Orientation’ would 
in the course of time become desirable personal qualities in the Groningen organisation. 
Whereas the West-Drenthe bank discussed the mission and the core values only in terms 
of the ROM program, Groningen departed from the templates as proposed by Rabobank 
Nederland. The project leader introduced a split along two axes: structural and 
behavioural. The ROM program as defined by Rabobank Nederland would be classified 
along the structural axis, while a further behavioural and cultural change would be set out 
along the behavioural axis. In Rabobank terminology, there would be plans for a ‘blue’ 
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(structural) and an orange (behavioural) change1. The discussions surrounding the 
program led to action choices that included those mentioned in the table below2: 
 
Rabobank Groningen Rabobank West-Drenthe 
Increase market share (mortgages, corp. 
clients, youth etc.) 
Improve exercise of control through ROM  
Provide attention suited to the type of 
customer 
Stimulate internet banking 
Increase customer satisfaction Increase risk awareness with employees 
Professionalise risk management After sales –standard within 1 month  
Improve banking productivity Evaluation talks: deal with employees in a 
mature/professional manner 
Table 6-3: A sub-set of actions that were defined in the course of ROM at the Groningen and West-
Drenthe banks 
 
6.5 Phase 2: Routinisation of interaction patterns 
For both the banks under study here, three types of results can be distinguished from the 
implementation of the ROM program: changes in structure; changes in templates of 
behaviour and changes in templates of interaction. However, the degree to which these 
results were embedded in the social environment differed substantially.  
 
Rabobank Groningen 
As described earlier in this chapter, to the Rabobank Groningen, ROM was part of a wider 
change effort. It had an explicit cultural component and it wanted to alter perceptions of 
acceptable and not acceptable behaviour. Therefore, the bank’s General Director opted for 
a combination of new structures and a number of ways to attempt to alter expected 
behaviours. The new structures were primarily aimed at accountability. During the 
meetings of the MT+ groups and the later discussions in the segments, action points for 
each segment were established. By this process, the priorities for each segment were set. 
This information then served as input during personal evaluations to confront employees 
with the question of how they could contribute to those priorities. The selection of actions 
was a collective process, and as such the managers at the bank felt that they established 
the legitimacy of those actions, because the people were given ample opportunity for 
feedback. The General Director argued that the direction of the bank as voiced by the core 
                                                
1 The Rabobank Logo has as primary colours orange and blue. It depicts an orange figure against a blue-orange 
background. The colour orange has come to represent the people orientation that the cooperation wants to 
express, while the colour blue has come to represent the structural features of the organisation. 
2 The bank defined dozens of actions. This is something that many banks did in their first year; some 
interviewees remarked that too many actions dilute the purpose of ROM as it tends to cause loss of focus. 
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values: ‘Openness; Reliability; Commitment; Entrepreneurial; Result Orientation’ was 
broadly supported by the employees of the bank. However, this became so only in later 
stages of the ROM program. The staff of the bank was constantly targeted with examples 
of accepted and not accepted behaviour. It was the explicit purpose of the program leader 
not only to allow people to participate in decision-making, but also to let them commit to 
the actions resulting from this participation. The bank therefore combined the ‘blue’ 
(structural) and the ‘orange’ (behavioural) programs. The Groningen bank was unique in 
this approach. As a result, people sometimes joked that someone was not ‘blue’ or 
‘orange’ enough. By naming changes ‘blue’ and ‘orange’, it was instantly clear what their 
objectives were. A number of additional change programs were introduced, and it was 
always clear if they targeted the ‘blue’ side or the ‘orange’ side. Put differently, although 
there were many different actions, programs and changes, it was clear to everyone what 
they represented in relation to the overarching ‘change program’. 
 
The result of these efforts was that a durable shift occurred in the actions of a group of 
staff that were not present at the strategy meetings. Similarly, as at the West-Drenthe 
bank, the Groningen member bank attempted to make the MT+ members function as 
ambassadors, with similarly limited success. However, they were supported by the wider 
efforts of the bank. They stood as the basis for what had become the most influential 
frame of reference at the bank. Therefore, their influence in their segments increased, 
which in itself aided the further implementation of the cultural transformation, supported 
by ROM.  
 
The events at the Groningen bank have led to a number of behaviours that could be said to 
be routinised; these involve both actions and orientations. Actions include: a structured 
planning and control cycle that was closely guided by the financial staff, following strict 
steps; repeated evaluation talks with staff and continuing emphasis on success and failure, 
which became magnified for all to see in the member bank. Orientations are behaviours, 
motivations and choices that people make. At the Rabobank Groningen, the original 
orientations were rendered useless and replaced by others. A combination of changing 
structural features of the organisation, new cultural features of the organisation, and 
sufficient opportunities for people to make sense of the events surrounding the 
transformation led to a redefinition of accepted logic. It was this logic that drove the 
legitimation of behaviour in the sub-cultures of the various segments. Scripted behaviour 
was altered and the explanation of behaviour was altered as well. It was this that was the 
biggest benefit for the bank. The most recent employee satisfaction survey demonstrated 
that an exceptionally high proportion of staff knows the mission, strategy and core values 
of the bank. Although a very small number knows them literally (virtually none outside 
the management team), most people can describe the essence of these notions and apply 
them to their own situation.  
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Rabobank West-Drenthe 
As noted before, people at the West-Drenthe bank were very enthusiastic about doing the 
program. However, to most participants in the ROM program, it was just that: a discrete 
program with questionable links to their day-to-day work. While the participants carried 
out the fragmented assignments given to them by the consultant, they continued to search 
for the meaning of these activities, as witnessed by the extensive discussions about the 
purpose of the activities.  
 
The participants were eager to obtain results they could communicate to their fellow 
segment members at the bank. However, they became disappointed by the fact that they 
could not enact the results of the strategies they devised, the plans they made and the 
results they hoped to achieve, as there was very little interest in the matter outside the 
MT+ team. Calls for the assistance of the entire staff of the member bank triggered few 
reactions, at best. One of the participants of ROM argued that: ‘the program is not alive in 
the bank. It does not appeal to many people, because it does not affect them’. The 
envisaged ambassadorial function of the MT+ members was therefore a difficult task. The 
MT+ members were expected to create commitment to the agreed courses of action from 
the people who did not see any relevance in the program. Moreover, MT+ members 
tended to communicate the message in terms that had no meaning to the rest of the bank. 
They took their job seriously however, as they did put their progress under the spotlight at 
work meetings and newsletters. However, they reported that they encountered numbness 
on the part of employees who were not part of the ROM program. The wider community 
of employees were ambivalent about the decisions taken by the MT+ group. One basic 
problem for the people not directly involved in the program was ambiguity: ‘what do we 
need to do with this information; what does it mean to me?’. At Rabobank West-Drenthe, 
there was little routinisation of the principles that were agreed earlier on. Because of the 
ongoing ambiguity over what the program would mean to the participants, they did not 
alter fundamental behaviours, as they did not fully see the use of the program. Instead the 
activities surrounding the program were for a large part ceremonial in nature as there was 
little follow-through on the agreements. Yet, with few exceptions, MT+ members were 
still enthusiastically working on the discrete tasks they were given by the consultant. They 
were witnessing progress in their short-term results, and these results provided clarity on 
the future direction of the bank, and clarity on what the program was supposed to do. 
Basically, the activities surrounding the program allowed people to understand the 
program, but they did not lead to lasting behavioural changes, as the program produced 
much ambiguity. It was an example of Plus ça change, plus ça reste la même chose (the 
more changes, the more stays the same). In the continuing ambiguous situation that the 
MT+ participants were in, they returned to existing habits with increasing rigor.  
 
In this phase, the consultant and the General Director of the West-Drenthe bank were 
somewhat concerned by the behavioural embedding of the results of the sessions: the 
execution of the defined actions and the embedding in behaviours. Some of these actions 
included: 
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- Improving mutual cooperation between segments 
- Implementation and continued monitoring of processes 
- Improving the quality of management information. 
- Increase customer profitability 
- Management by coaching and inspiring managers 
 
The impact of the envisaged changes on behaviours was doubtful to both the consultant 
and the General Director. Therefore, the decision was made by the entire MT+ group to 
devote an extra meeting to the question of organisational commitment: how could the 
behaviours that were desirable be assured? Although all agreed on the need and the 
relevance of this matter, the meeting was disastrous. The objective was to invent new 
ways to increase commitment and behavioural embedding at the entire member bank. The 
MT+ group had much trouble in coming up with ideas on how to embed the new desired 
behaviours. The ideas suggested all revolved around improved one-way communication 
(newsletter; presentations during segment meetings); but as one participant remarked: ‘it 
just is no issue to the people in the bank’. The MT+ group was disappointed that they 
were not able to come up with more sophisticated ideas and as such they felt that very 
little progress had been made. Only when they were asked to engage in more structurally 
oriented issues, such as the creation of action plans, people thought they saw progress, as 
they had tangible content.      
 
Routinisation at both banks 
A clear distinction between the West-Drenthe bank and the Groningen bank becomes 
noticeable in this phase. The emphasis of the program at the West-Drenthe bank was 
primarily on the introduction of a repeating sequence of actions to improve the planning 
and control cycle. Although the activities surrounding ROM were meant to re-enforce ties 
between managers and segments at the West-Drenthe bank, the focus of these activities 
were on structures to facilitate planning and control. The efforts at this bank to introduce a 
behavioural component failed because of the inability of the participants to relate to the 
terminology of the new vision and strategy. People at the bank were confronted with 
abstract notions of ‘the new bank’, without understanding what those notions mean. The 
MT+ group had spent many days developing a shared understanding of the meaning of the 
mission, vision and strategy, while the employees in the bank remained unaware of this 
shared understanding. The MT+ members were active in fulfilling their role as 
ambassador in their own segments, but the employees in their segments did not know 
what to do with the information. Interest in the program remained rather low. The way in 
which the program proceeded continued to have only limited influence on the 
organisational participants, outside the MT+. No incentives were given to employees to 
alter collective behaviours; employees had no indication of the apparent inadequacy of 
existing behaviours. This was rather different in the Rabobank Groningen.  
 
The program started out similarly as in the West-Drenthe bank. Strategy sessions were 
organised with a MT+ group, and a vision, mission and a strategic plan were defined. 
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However, from the beginning the emphasis was on behaviour and culture, rather than the 
implementation of structures. So while the Business Administration segment established 
new structures, they were supported by attempts to establish behavioural changes. 
Furthermore, the behavioural changes were supported by structural changes and both 
became mutually reinforcing. People were constantly confronted with a new reality that 
was not exclusively associated with a program, such as ROM. The ROM program was 
merely supportive of the new ways of reasoning. In combination with this support, the 
bank offered many opportunities for people to understand what was going on. Most 
organisational participants gave meaning to the events, as they unfolded. They had to, as 
the events were not isolated, but part of a structural and behavioural change (‘blue’ and 
‘orange’) that was everywhere. Apart from the introduction of new patterns of behaviour, 
the management team also rendered some existing behaviours unacceptable and therefore 
useless. At the same time, the bank’s management and the MT+ group (especially the 
project leader) were offering clear alternatives to the behaviours that were to be discarded 
(e.g. ‘to provide feedback to a colleague is a desirable action, to which the colleague 
cannot react any differently than with acceptance’).  
 
6.6 Phase 3: Institutionalisation of patterns of action and 
interaction 
Institutions are defined as practices that are taken for granted, and are external to any 




There was little indication of institutionalisation of new practices at the Rabobank West-
Drenthe. For the period up to the second part of 2004, the final phase of the research at the 
site, two conclusions can be drawn: Firstly, the bank has achieved some degree of 
institutionalisation of the ROM principles. In implementing the program, the members of 
the MT+ group learned much about the steps in the process. This primarily involved the 
reproduction of the steps in the program. The process in itself became a given for the 
MT+ group. However, the process was only partially reflected in the actions of group 
members. In other words, many actions were undertaken, but they were not enacting 
principles of behaviour that the MT+ group had agreed upon. There was action, but little 
enactment. Therefore, instead of denoting the events at the West-Drenthe bank as 
insititutionalised practice, the participants were engaged in learning the process of 
planning and control. It was group-wise learning rather than institutionalisation. Habitual 
action was unaltered. The consultant at the bank remained concerned that people were 
going through the motions right up to the end of his involvement, and that there was only 
very limited impact on the day-to-day affairs on the work floor. Nevertheless, the 
participants had learned a number of discrete actions, along the lines of the assignments 
given by the consultant. But this does not qualify as institutionalisation.  
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The General Director of this bank was pleased with the result. He had seen his people 
cooperate, and this was one of the primary objectives of ROM at this bank. From this 
point of view, it was definitely a success. The members of the MT+ group were 
developing a degree of mutual trust by working together on the ROM activities and as 
such one of the objectives of accepting the ROM program, as stated by this bank, were 
met. However, this did not lead to observable and lasting behavioural changes in the 
period of study.  
 
Rabobank Groningen 
The Groningen bank has gone through a transformation that respondents refer to as 
painful, and intense. From earlier descriptions in this chapter, it should be clear that the 
Groningen bank was searching for a mental transformation as well as a structural one. By 
the second half of 2004, a number of results were achieved:  
(1) The General Director indicates that he feels that the members of the management team 
have similar objectives for their actions, and they share a similar logic. The manager 
HRM confirms this feeling.  
(2) Several people report independently that the number of people who actively subscribe 
to the culture, defined by the core values, is still increasing, and at an increasing pace. The 
General Director remarks that he feels that the support for the strategic direction has 
become self-reinforcing, meaning that the social dynamics within the sub-cultures are 
positively influencing the stance of people towards the new characteristics of the bank.  
(3) People are actively making use of the core values of the bank in rationalisations 
towards their managers and each other. This means that the core values are used to explain 
actions and choices to each other. An employee of the Client Advice segment puts it as 
follows: ‘I often refer to the core values we have agreed upon, especially to my managers 
as well as to my colleagues. I feel that these are valid grounds to evaluate my, but also 
others’ behaviour’. 
(4) The self-enforcing nature of the cultural change is also emphasised by the General 
Director who notes that, apart from the fact that he feels that he is not alone anymore in 
his views, he is also dispensable. By this, he means that he is no longer needed to make 
sure that the cultural change will continue. The management team and the social processes 
in the segments are now the mainstays of the transition. An employee of the Client Advice 
segment: ‘It is clear to me in which direction the bank will move; and I agree with that 
direction. It is funny to see that we use the terminology of the program rather mindlessly 
these days in our segment. Perhaps that is, because we are already accustomed to the 
language, but I am not sure’.  
 
Although most parties agree that the bank’s management needs to continue to refer to and 
repeat the various results obtained in the change program, they also feel that the changes 
are irreversible. Many of the old ways of doing and rationalising actions have been 
rendered useless, as they are no longer acceptable means of expressing oneself in the new 
environment. The combination of changes in structure and culture have proved to be 
6. First order analysis 
 143
mutually supportive. The cultural transformation supported changes in structures in their 
vulnerable early stages, while later on it was the other way around. Then the changed 
emphasis on accounting structures actually helped people to make the new cultural traits 
of the organisation tangible. It helped them define what was expected of them. For 
example, evaluations of employees, and of managers were structured around the core 
values and the strategic course of the bank. These evaluations involved indicators that 
served as measurements of behaviour. In a nutshell, the bank rendered existing patterns of 
behaviour useless, but at the same time it offered easy access to new desirable patterns 
through the influence of new structures, designed to facilitate the cultural transformation 
(e.g. evaluations, more specified targets, subjective performance indicators, and so on). 
  
6.7 Synopsis 
This section summarises the various stages of change at the two member banks discussed 
here. Table 6-4 depicts the events in a concise manner and isolates some of the issues that 
were of importance at those stages.  
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Table 6-4: Thematic overview of issues 
 
In its first column, the table presents the four phases that guided the discussion in this 
chapter. It also shows the primary observations for the two banks in column 2 and 3. The 
fourth column is of particular importance. It shows the theoretical themes that emerge 
from the discussion. This column therefore provides the transition from first order 
analysis to second order analysis. Next, I will discuss these themes and the issues that 
emerged from this chapter. These will inform the next four chapters. 
 
Stage 0: the need for change 
Both member banks had different objectives for ROM. Although ROM appears to have 
accommodated many different objectives, the chapter emphasises the different reasons 
that member banks can have for implementing a program such as ROM. The West-
Drenthe and the Groningen banks qualify as highly institutionalised environments, and 
still they have decided at a certain point in time that changes needed to be made. For the 
West-Drenthe bank, the recent merger seemed to have been an important element in the 
decision to implement ROM. The merger represents a history of actions that influences 
decisions today, but this was not the case in the Groningen bank. For the Groningen bank, 
although past actions may play an important part, the primary reason for the ‘change 
program’ was the realisation that the culture in the bank was not suited to the ambitions of 
the bank. At both banks, the assessment of the situation of the bank and the choice for 
ROM was a process that was not easy to predict beforehand. This process may be 
dependent on how the managers see the bank, their environment and the need for change. 
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The need for change is especially difficult to predict. For some banks, the acceptance of 
ROM was not due to an acute need, but more the result of a growing unease, which 
needed addressing. Yet, it is unclear how this unease can build for the individual actors 
who are operating in a highly institutional environment, such as the Rabobank. Therefore, 
chapter 7 will explore further how institutionally constrained individuals can come to 
realise that changes are in order, even though they perceive much of their environment in 
terms of the institutions that constrain them. In different terms, chapter 7 will make a start 
on explaining how human agency is possible for institutionally constrained individuals.  
 
Stage 1: the development of action 
A similar question can be asked at phase 1. How can people come to a definition of 
collective action (especially action that is not habitual and not governed by scripts), if they 
are under the influence of institutions that are constituted by these scripts? The events at 
the two banks studied here point us to the importance of the notion of sense making. As 
chapter 3 explained, sense making is the cognitive process that gives meaning to 
experiences, especially when existing scripted action cannot be applied. For the members 
of the MT+ groups at both banks, ROM provided various sense making opportunities. The 
people in the West-Drenthe bank attempted to make sense of each other, to develop trust 
and new modes of cooperation. At the Groningen bank, sense making revolved around the 
behaviours that people needed to display to be a ‘valuable’ member of the team.  
 
In both banks, sense making was about attempts to make conscious decisions, while 
limiting the role of preconceptions and cognitive limits. Sense making was thus a way to 
reduce the role of scripts that govern many of the decisions at both banks. This was clear 
in the role of the consultants. Their role was a facilitating one; providing techniques to 
stimulate people to make sense of situations they do not encounter on a day-to-day basis. 
The consultants used techniques, such as free association and poster boards, which were 
all intended to facilitate sense making; i.e. to help people to develop new understandings. 
It is reasonable to assume that in the absence of scripted action, people need different 
processes to define actions. The West-Drenthe bank and the Groningen bank are examples 
of how this action definition may proceed, but further insights are needed to assess how 
collective action proceeds and to understand the role of sense making as the opposite of 
scripted action. This will be explored further in chapter 8. 
 
Stage 2: Routinisation 
Chapter 2 indicated that Burns & Scapens (2000) argue that institutions are encoded in 
rules and routines and that changes in these rules and routines can subsequently become 
institutionalised. This suggests that the routinisation of action a relevant topic. Differences 
could be observed between the routines emerging in the Groningen bank and in the West-
Drenthe bank. At the Groningen bank, routines were not simply emerging from formal 
rules. Rather, they emerged from a process where the likelihood of invoking these new 
actions was increased, while the old actions were gradually made unavailable. Through 
formal structures, such as performance evaluations and standard operating procedures, and 
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also through informal discussions, the new actions were increasingly considered to be the 
desirable action alternatives. At the West-Drenthe bank some degree of ambiguity 
remained. This ambiguity seemed to cause people to fall back on existing scripted 
behaviour. As a consequence, new behaviours were discarded, favouring existing scripted 
actions, yielding predictable results. Ambiguity played an important role in the 
routinisation of new actions. It is therefore necessary to assess how the interaction 
between rules and routines works, and the role of ambiguity in this process. This inquiry 
will be presented in chapter 9.  
 
Stage 3: Institutionalisation  
Institutional change was noticeable at the Groningen bank; primarily through comments 
pointing to features that define the presence of institutions. The General Director felt 
dispensable as the change had become self-enforcing; a shared understanding of the 
purpose of the bank and the behavioural consequences of the strategy had emerged and 
the changes had found their way into everyday language. The events at the Groningen 
bank point to the role of time and language among other elements. The Groningen bank 
was continuously emphasising the ‘change program’ to its employees. Many isolated 
projects, plans and structural adaptations were framed in terms of the ‘change program’. 
As a result, this program was an ongoing part of organisational interactions for a very long 
time. As a consequence, it appeared that the changes were not only carried by repeated 
actions of employees, but also by the way in which they interacted through language. At 
the Groningen bank, institutions were not only constituted by ongoing action, but also by 
the language that was being used. However, it is unclear how structure and new languages 
are related, and how they are able to give social principles their ‘rule-like status’. 
Therefore, chapter 10 will focus on institutionalisation of social practices.   
  
The phases of change described here, and the associated theoretical issues will be the 
starting point for the next four chapters. Each chapter analyses one stage of the change 
process and uses the pointers indicated here. The purpose of those four chapters is to 
provide an explanation of the form, contents and substance of these phases of change. The 
ultimate objective is to provide a plausible explanation of the events at the Rabobank 
organisation surrounding the implementation and use of the ROM program. This will be 
done by devising a theoretical framework that accounts for the issues identified in this 
chapter. As an outcome of the next 4 chapters, chapter 11 will present a theoretical 
framework that provides this explanation of the process of institutional change in the 
Rabobank. As discussed above, the next chapter will elaborate on the emergence of a need 
for change. It will focus on how a need for change manifests itself to institutionally 
constrained individuals.  
  148
 
7. Cueing for change 
 149
7 Cueing for Change: Entering Human Agency in a 
World of Institutions 
7.1 Introduction 
Many people have described working at the Rabobank as being in a warm bath, meaning 
that employees are surrounded by care and attention of their supervisors, without being 
held directly accountable for the results they achieve. Stemming from the desire of the 
national governing organ, the central circle meeting, to make member banks and 
individuals more accountable, Rabobank Nederland, the supra-local organisation of the 
Rabobank developed a program that aimed to professionalise the planning and control 
cycle. It was intended to make individuals within member banks feel and act in a more 
result-oriented manner, hence the name: Results Oriented Management.  
 
Results Oriented Management is a program that attempts to introduce a new structured 
planning- and control cycle in the local member banks. It introduces a strong focus on 
individual responsibility and an emphasis on accountability. It could be argued that this is 
a major step for member banks, as they typically do not have a particular history of 
individual responsibility and accountability. This new structure of responsibility and 
accountability is a major break with how things used to be. It also poses an interesting 
example of the progress of change in accounting practices that has structural features as 
well as behavioural features. Sinclair (1995) addressed the multiple aspects of 
accountability as an issue, where she finds that executives experience accountability as an 
issue that encompasses multiple and conflicting meanings. This is similar to the situation 
at the Rabobank. Here, Results Oriented Management can be seen as being rooted in a 
discussion on accountability within the Rabobank. And while many different issues are 
present at the Rabobank, some lead to action and others do not. As Seo & Creed (2002, p. 
224) note: ‘when and how do embedded actors individually and collectively come to that 
conscious point –presumably, a point where they recognise the need, the opportunities, 
and the appropriate courses for collective action for changing existing institutional 
arrangements?’ Applied to the circumstances at the Rabobank, the question becomes: why 
has the issue of accountability made it to a translation into action, and others did not?  
 
The accounting literature has developed a large body of descriptive and explanatory 
studies, informed by institutional analysis, aimed at accounting change processes (e.g. 
Seal et al., 2004, Soin et al., 2002; Burns & Scapens, 2000; Granlund, 2001; Brignall & 
Modell, 2000; also see Firth, 1996). These authors mostly argue that stability is 
attributable to the presence of institutions. They remain unclear however on the source of 
institutional change. Barley & Tolbert (1997) suggest that institutional change is a two-
stage process: first a sufficient contextual change may be needed to enforce the departure 
from existing patterns of behaviour and secondly a sufficient number of actors need to 
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consciously depart from established scripts to engage in new cycles of encoding and 
subsequent enacting of new patterns of behaviour. Seo & Creed (2002) see two 
unanswered questions in the Barley & Tolbert analysis: (1) Where does the contextual 
change come from? And (2) how do individuals and groups come to that point of 
conscious choice, a point at which actors realise that specific action is needed? Seo & 
Creed argue that institutional change results from institutional contradiction 
(inconsistencies in and between several institutions that have emerged in the past) as well 
as from human praxis (agency embedded in these multiple incompatible institutional 
arrangements). They focus on the notion of human agency in institutional theory, which 
sheds light on the processes of institutional change in general and the instigation of 
institutional change in particular. This chapter employs their ideas as starting point to 
explain how institutional change can begin in a situation where change cannot be 
enforced. It uses the notion of scripts as building blocks of institutions (Barley & Tolbert, 
1997) and it employs the notions of cues and issues from cognitive psychology to 
integrate human agency and praxis into a broader framework of routine and action. This 
effort uses the insights of Seo & Creed (2002), but it is applied at a more detailed 
(individual) level. This chapter discusses the way in which institutionally constrained 
actors at the Rabobank can adopt the ROM program through the inherent contradictions 
present in their institutional environment. 
 
It will do so by initially focusing on cues. Cues are the pointers for action that people use 
to engage in sense making processes. The notion is often used in theories on human 
cognition. Cues are the elements that point people to extraordinary events or situations. 
These may be of such magnitude that people will attempt to collectively make sense of the 
event. Cues thus are the onset to action. This can either be conscious action, or scripted 
action. Since I argue in this thesis that scripts are the individual representations of 
routines, and institutions are encoded in routines, it is especially conscious action this 
chapter addresses, as scripts ultimately represent existing institutional arrangements, while 
conscious actions represent possible changes or additions to the institutional realm. This 
chapter will conclude that the changes at the Rabobank were not enforced directly. Rather, 
the need for change was self-evident as an increasing number of cues pointed to the issue 
of accountability. Cues did not serve directly as action triggers; rather they enhanced the 
growing unease that was present. Seo and Creed (2002) refer to the cause of this unease as 
institutional contradiction. This unease found its expression in the growing salience of the 
issue of “accountability”. The managers and employees of member banks increasingly 
understood the necessity and relevance of an emphasis on accountability. Accountability 
towards various constituents could drastically affect member banks’ autonomy, which had 
been the foundation and basis of the banks’ actions for more than a century. So, the 
objective of this chapter is to answer Seo & Creed’s (2002) question quoted earlier. It 
provides clarity on what determined ‘that point’ at which institutionally constrained actors 
at the Rabobank came to actions that could potentially challenge and alter the existing 
institutional arrangements.  
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The chapter is structured as follows. The next paragraph will address the notion of ‘cues’ 
further and place it in a theoretical framework, which relates it to action. Then I will 
discuss the matter of cue salience: what makes cues powerful enough to induce action by 
people instead of letting them ignore the issue. These sections result in a framework of 
cue salience. Drawing on theories of cognition, the framework contributes to our 
understanding of purposeful action in management accounting change, by illuminating the 
onset of this change. The framework of cue salience will then be used to structure the 
explanation of the role of cues in the Results Oriented Management program. The chapter 
will then propose some refinements to the framework and it will conclude with a 
discussion. 
 
7.2 Cues and change 
This chapter will discuss the properties of cues in subconsciously selecting proper scripts 
as well as in recognising that ‘things are out of the ordinary’ and scripted behaviour is 
unsuitable for dealing with new and unexpected events. When it comes to change, cues 
are often depicted as general mobilisers that allow for the conscious or unconscious 
processing of scripts, or the creation thereof (Schank & Abelson, 1977; Bartunek. 1984). 
Schema theory argues that cues are usually the first indications to individuals that events 
need closer attention, or that specific scripts need to be invoked. As noted in chapter three, 
the relevance of scripts and cues to institutional theory is that institutions are enacted 
through specific scripts at the level of the individual. Collections of taken-for-granted 
scripted action are closely related to an institution (Barley & Tolbert, 1997). Explanations 
of institutional change therefore need to begin with the development of scripts and the 
cues that invoke their birth. The shaded parts in Figure 7-1 depict the position of this 
chapter in the wider framework of change (see Figure 3-6 on page 65 for the change 
framework in a larger size): 





































Figure 7-1: Change framework 
 
In the Rabobank, the program of Results Oriented Management needed to induce a break 
in existing patterns of habit. Initiated by a variety of cues, recognition emerged that 
‘something’ needed to be done to reduce the anxiety caused by the presence of cues. The 
purpose of this chapter will thus be to explore how the issue of accountability became 
sufficiently prominent to induce conscious action on the part of otherwise script-driven 
individuals. Put differently: how can agency occur in an unsustainable set of institutional 
arrangements or institutional contradiction (Seo & Creed, 2002)? This is in essence akin 
to the structure-agency problem, which was discussed by Giddens (1984), but its 
application is on a more detailed and less abstract level.  
 
Seo & Creed (2002) propose that inconsistencies and ruptures exist in the fabric of 
established social arrangements. Because of the ongoing production of new and complex 
institutions, some inconsistencies between them will come to exist. This ‘institutional 
contradiction’ is generating continuous tension and conflict that in turn may shape 
conscious action. They further propose that the resulting experience of contradictory 
realities can lead to the structural transformation of institutional arrangements by the 
actors who are under the influence of these institutions. This is what they refer to as 
human praxis. Seo & Creed propose four sources of institutional contradiction, which are 
summarised in Table 7-1:  
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A. Legitimacy undermining functional 
efficiency 
B. Adaptation that undermines adaptability 
C. Intrainstitutional conformity that 
creates interinstitutional incompatibilities 
D. Isomorphism that conflicts with 
divergent interests 
Table 7-1: Sources of institutional contradiction (Seo & Creed, 2002) 
 
A. Legitimacy undermining functional efficiency: Meyer & Rowan (1991) and 
DiMaggio & Powell (1991) have argued that a risk exists that adhering to 
institutional requirements can lead to functional inefficiencies. The possibility of 
loose coupling (see chapter 2) not withstanding, there can be a mismatch between 
the functional/technical requirements of the organisation and institutional 
requirements. This possible mismatch serves as a source of institutional 
contradiction. 
B. Adaptation that undermines adaptability: Following Zucker (1991) and Powell 
(1991), Seo & Creed (2002) argue that institutionalisation is an adaptive move: 
institutional isomorphism allows organisations to secure resources. However, 
once institutions are in place, they tend to be self-enforcing and taken for 
granted. Under these conditions it is unlikely that, once they are in place, these 
institutions are easily adapted. This tension between adaptation and adaptability 
is a second source of institutional contradiction. 
C. Intrainstitutional conformity that creates interinstitutional incompatibilities: 
Conformity to specific institutional arrangements often leads to conflict with 
alternative institutions. As the external environment is a heterogenous set of 
institutions, an organisational adhering to some, is bound to encounter conflict 
with others. These incompatibilities between institutions are a third source of 
institutional contradiction. 
D. Isomorphism that conflicts with divergent interests: There may be a potential 
conflict between particular forms of social arrangement and the interests of the 
social actors who enact and reproduce these social arrangements. ‘Specifically, 
proponents view those actors whose ideas and interests are not adequately served 
by the existing social arrangements as potential change agents who, in some 
circumstances, become conscious of the institutional conditions that leave their 
needs unmet and take action to change the present order.’ (Seo & Creed, 2002, p. 
229)   
 
These four sources of institutional contradiction are at the basis of institutional change. 
They form the general background against which people notice that something needs to 
change. But although these four sources of institutional contradiction provide an overview 
of the different sources of institutional change, they also remain on a rather impersonal 
level. For they do not indicate how institutional contradiction is presented to people in 
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their ‘iron cage’1. Therefore sources of institutional contradiction need further clarification 
along the line of their manifestation to various (groups of) actors.  
 
7.2.1 Cues 
Many theorists who share a common interest in organisational change have used the 
notion of “cues for change”. Cognitive psychology, research on individual information 
processing and organisational theory (Gioia & Sims, 1986), have recognised that cues are 
present early in change processes. Specifically schema theory hints at the sorts of 
information that people will notice and how they deal with that information (Lant & 
Hewlin, 2002, p. 376; Nooteboom, 2000; Lord & Foti, 1986; Schank & Abelson, 1977). 
Schema theory argues that much human behaviour is schema driven; where schemas are 
cognitive representations of the world. These representations are based on historical 
experience and contain information processing rules. They guide interpretation of past 
action, as well as provide direction for future action. Gioia (1986) argues that the script 
schema is the most likely to influence managerial action and it will thus be the focus in 
this chapter. The script schema is: ‘a cognitive structure devoted specifically to the 
retention of context specific knowledge about events and event sequences and to the 
guidance of action on the basis of that knowledge’ (p. 57).  
 
Weick (1995) describes ‘extracted cues’ as ‘simple, familiar structures that are seeds from 
which people develop a larger sense of what may be occurring’2 (p. 50). ‘Extracted cues’ 
relate to two sources of information: they hold information on events that warrant closer 
attention. If not, they would not be cues. And secondly, they hold information that helps 
people to make sense of what the event means. Thus cues generate attention and they are 
direction providing (which Weick called prospective sense making); Starbuck & Milliken 
(1988) distinguish noticing and sense making; Daft & Weick (1984) use the terms 
scanning for noticing and interpretation for sense making. The distinction between the 
attention directing component (noticing) and (prospective) sense making may be an 
artificial one. For, as part of the same process, these are inseparable. ‘Noticing involves a 
rudimentary form of sense making in that noticing requires distinguishing signal from 
noise, making crude separations of relevant from irrelevant. Similarly, sense making 
involves a form of noticing when a perceiver reclassifies remembered signal as noise, or 
remembered noise as signal, in order to fit a new interpretative framework’ (Starbuck & 
Milliken, 1988, p. 45). However, the separation has theoretical value, and I will follow the 
argumentation of Daft & Weick (1984), Kiesler & Sproull (1982) and Starbuck & 
Milliken (1988). The last pair of authors agreed that a distinction between noticing and 
                                                
1 The iron cage refers to the constraints that are associated to the presence of institutions. Institutions tend to 
reify their own existence, and as such they may exclude specific actions and choices. 
2 ‘Extracted’ cues refer to those signals that people pick up on, out of the constant stream of many signals. Other 
authors such as Chewning & Harrell (1990) and Gioia (1992) refer simply to ‘cues’, these notions of cues are 
used in a similar sense to the one coined by Weick.  
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sense making may sometimes be observed and that the theoretical separation is valuable. 
Noticing is relevant here as it provides a manner in which agency may arise from settings 
that have many of the features of an institutionalised environment. This chapter will 
therefore deal primarily with noticing, as a component of cues, while prospective sense 
making will be the topic of the next chapter. This chapter is predominantly concerned 
with the ways that people and groups realise that something out of the ordinary is 
occurring. For the purpose of this chapter, cueing is equal to noticing.  
 
Isenberg (1986) observes that managers tend to come up with ideas on how to act without 
full information or thorough analysis, even when they were fully aware that the additional 
information was available at no cost. Isenberg’s analysis illustrates that decision making 
is a game of “connecting the dots”, by which people take fragmented pieces of 
information and construct an explanatory cognitive frame that ties together the fragments 
of information as well as holds privately held theories on causal relations. The pieces of 
information are similar to the cues that this chapter addresses. The explanatory cognitive 
framework is akin to the notion of script.  
 
Lant & Hewlin (2000) offer three categories of cues: past performance related to 
aspiration levels; past decisions; and others/competitors actions. The first is akin to 
Simon’s boundedly rational individual, in that the cue only becomes salient when 
performance deviates from the aspiration levels that are previously formulated either 
consciously or unconsciously. In a world with an infinite number of signals, only those 
that are significantly different from aspiration or expectation will get noticed. Starbuck & 
Milliken (1988) argue that perceptual thresholds reflect experience. Experience can 
sensitise in that experience causes increased familiarity in specific domains, and as a 
result subtle changes in that domain get noticed. Starbuck & Milliken use the term 
adaptation levels, which are standards for evaluating or distinguishing stimuli. They note 
that people do not notice stimuli that resemble their adaptation levels or they act as if they 
are indifferent to such stimuli. In addition to adaptation levels, Starbuck and Milliken use 
the separation between foreground events and background events. Foreground events are 
likely to attract immediate and detailed attention, even when it involves stimuli that are 
relatively close to adaptation levels. But background events have to include dramatic 
change to be noticed. Moreover, foreground events may turn into background events, if 
routine and habit are the primary mechanisms for noticing. For, ‘Programs and habits 
make noticing less reflective’ (Starbuck & Milliken, 1988, p.48). The notions of 
foreground and background illustrate the cognitive boundaries of people in an 
organisation. Since there are limits to attention spans of people, they are drawn to stimuli 
in the foreground, or in this chapter’s terminology: salient stimuli. What consists of the 
foreground and what is in the background for an individual is key to making informed 
inferences on what cues will and will not be noticed. Foreground and background are 
theoretical notions, but they help to model the relative salience of issues. 
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An application of these ideas on cues is Cowan’s (1985) discussion of the ‘problem’: 
‘Problems are generally defined as discrepancies (or differences) between perceived 
reality and a desired state of nature. A problem comes to exist because of the recognition 
of this difference’ (p. 201). This category of cues also assumes that information on the 
event is known. It therefore relies heavily on Weick’s notion of retrospective sense 
making. He argues that one can only make sense of events after they have produced 
information, that is: the result or part of the result of the event is already known. 
 
The second category of cues Lant & Hewlin distinguish is related to the first. Past 
decisions and their outcomes provide information on causality. Past decisions are those 
decisions whose qualities are known, and are therefore available for repetition. Because of 
this availability, the probability of re-using the same types of decisions increases (Lant & 
Hewlin, 2000). Those types of decisions become scripted and are therefore more readily 
available. Organisations and individuals may therefore become experts on specific types 
of decisions. 
 
The last category of cues noted is that of others’ actions. Rather than engaging in action 
oneself and subsequently observing the results, one can observe others. This argument 
applied on an organisational- rather than on individual level, is being widely used by 
institutional sociologists under the term “isomorphism”. This is the tendency for 
organisations to copy each other’s practices while assuming that those practices are 
appropriate in a specific context. Other’s behaviour can also influence aspiration levels in 
themselves. As Kiesler and Sproull (1982, p. 556) note: ‘the behaviour and outcomes of 
competitors, of course, are sharply drawn –a figure against the ground’. Aspiration levels 
can therefore be induced by others and thereby increase cue salience.  
 
Isabella (1990) recognises that differences in perceptions of similar events can lead to 
different views on the urgency of action and the type of action required. She observes that 
different stages of interpretation of events lead to different interpretation strategies, due to 
a differently construed reality, set of interpretative tasks, and predominant frame of 
reference. She notes that in the anticipation phase, the phase that this chapter is concerned 
with, managers assemble rumours and other titbits of information to construct their ‘in 
progress frames of reference’ (p. 14). She notes that in this phase, the information consists 
of disconnected pieces of information, which are important to provide structure to 
organisational participants in their search for appropriate, socially acceptable responses.  
 
Gioia (1992) argues that cues are critical when it comes to the recognition of an event that 
warrants explicit attention. During his time, working in the recall department of Ford, he 
experienced the problems with the Ford Pinto first hand. He notes that he did not pick up 
on indications that something was wrong, as he did not have scripts ready to flag 
problems. In other words, cues must be linked to existing schemas in order to have 
meaning in themselves. Cues without any meaning are likely to interfere with the 
receptor’s sense of self, and thus need resolving. Also, Giddens (1984) argues that the 
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reduction of intelligibility of communication or other signalling leads to a reduction in 
ontological security. Moreover, ontological security, which finds its roots in Eriksons 
anxiety-controlling mechanisms (Giddens, 1984), hinges on confidence in predictable 
routines. The continuing reproduction of action from institutionalised habit is therefore a 
source of ontological security. Cues that have no relation to familiar cognitive structures 
are disruptive and produce uncertainty on the proper course of action, if any. In Gioia’s 
situation at Ford, one could argue that he did have much information to see a problem. 
Gioia argues that although information was there, it could not be placed in schemas that 
would point to the problem. Furthermore, the fragmented pieces of information did not 
yield sufficient emotional inconsistency to warrant definite action, although he mentions 
that the sight of incinerated wreckages caused him to undertake short-lived action. In 
short, Gioia argued that cues need existing schemas in order to be noticed. If this is not the 
case, cues can still warrant further sensemaking if they yield emotional inconsistency 
(Fiske & Taylor, 1984; see Gioia, 1992). In the absence of these qualities, events may 
proceed ‘uncued’, which could be construed as resisted. 
 
The mere recognition of a cue depends on many variables including schemas already in 
place. Cues in themselves must be path-dependent as the schemas that are already in place 
reify their own existence (an unrecognised cue is no cue and does not exist as such). For 
example, at Ford, Gioia had scripted knowledge on the traits of a possible recall scenario. 
These traits would serve as cues to initiate a recall procedure. The existing scripts thus 
influenced the cues that he was to accept. This is an addition to the argument that schemas 
are resistant to change, in that cues, or the mere recognition of events and problems, are 
scripted in themselves. The recognition of cues is partly dictated by the scripts in place, 
and cues thus inherit the properties of those scripts. This is in line with the expressed 
opinions of Levitt & March, 1996, Nelson & Winter, 1982 and Scott, 1987, who agree 
that recognition of issues is often hampered by current routines, habits or scripts. These 
structures focus attention, just as they should have done for Gioia, but along 
predetermined lines. Events that fall outside of the scope of what a ‘cue’ is, can therefore 
easily be ignored. 
 
When discussing newcomer entry, Louis (1980) discusses the changes associated with 
starting a new position in a new organisation. She notes that change is the ‘objective 
difference in a major feature between the new and the old settings…. The more elements 
that are different in the new situation as compared with the previous situation, the more 
the newcomer potentially has to cope with’ (p. 235). Her treatment of change is similar to 
the above definitions of a cue. However, she adds that a new situation will yield surprise 
and contrast. A cue is therefore not just any calculation of aspiration vs. outcome, but 
must have associated elements of surprise and contrast. A situation in which the outcome 
of an action is expected to be low, but it is the opposite, does qualify as a cue on the 
grounds that a contrast and possible surprise can be observed. This is much like other 
definitions of cues including that of Kiesler and Sproull (1982): ‘People attend to and 
encode salient material-events that are unpleasant, deviant, extreme, intense, unusual, 
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sudden, brightly lit, colourful, alone, or sharply drawn. In the world of organizations, 
salient information includes unanticipated drains on cash flow, new taxes and regulations 
(unpleasant information), predictions of best and worst outcomes (extreme information), 
disruptions of routine and emergencies (intense, unusual, sudden information) and 
publicity and iconoclastic executives (colourful information).’  
 
Louis (1980) recognises that conscious processing of information occurs when outcomes 
of acts are inconsistent with anticipated outcomes or when scripted processing requires 
too much effort (for example, when there is no script readily available to the actor to deal 
with the cued events). Abelson (1976) notes that conscious processing occurs when actors 
realise that they are in a novel situation. However, it must be clear that people do not 
always recognise situations as being new. Cues are thus rather complex, especially if we 
look at the qualities attributed to cues by the other authors noted here. Not only do cues 
need to involve surprise or shock, but they are also related to aspiration levels, others’ 
acts, past behaviour, existing scripts and emotional inconsistencies. Moreover, they often 
consist of rumour and disconnected pieces of information. This leads to a further 
operationalisation of the term cue: a cue is an event that increases salience of an issue 
through surprise, shock or emotional discomfort by others’ actions, deviations between 
related observable events and aspirated levels thereof, past behaviour and existing scripts. 
Cues are furthermore influenced by the receptors’ construed reality, his set of 
interpretative tasks, and the predominant frame of reference. The result of a cue is the 
conscious or unconscious ability and willingness to adopt the issue as deserving attention 
or action. I.e. invoking of appropriate scripts, or the controlled processing of situational 
and other variables. This process can be described by the individuals and allows us to 
examine the relation between cues, action and scripts. This is important to this thesis on 
institutional change, as human agency in institutions takes its form through unscripted 
action that is the consequence of the presence of cues. 
 
7.2.2 A framework of cues and scripts 
Gioia suggests that people possess specific knowledge about events, behaviour and 
actions that can be invoked by situational cues. These cues can then invoke routine 
behaviour, which relies heavily on tacit knowledge, or they can lead to more conscious 
information processing, in attempts to make sense of events that are not scripted yet. 
Observe Figure 7-2, which was originally presented in chapter 3: 
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Figure 7-2: A continuum of script development (Gioia & Poole, 1984) 
 
This figure suggests that the starting point for activity lies in the type of situation/event. It 
shows a continuum ranging from a stereotypical situation that can be addressed using the 
“mindless” invoking of protoscripts, to completely new situations that require maximum 
controlled processing by the parties involved. Cues can have two types of outcomes: (1) 
an individual is induced to use and if necessary adapt a script (Gioia & Poole (1984) refer 
to a cue that induces script execution as a ‘script pointer’); and (2) the individual is 
induced to invent/construct new modes of behaviour and interpretation to deal with this 
situation, possibly to become scripted in the future, but not necessarily so. The cue can 
thus either lead to the tacit invoking of existing scripts or it can trigger the adaptation or 
invention of new ones. The latter category is then followed by conscious prospective 
sense making, which is the conscious evaluation of the event to assess its meaning in 
relation to the broader set of organisational activities, individuals and contexts. Gioia & 
Poole (1984, p. 452) note that: ‘Performance of the script results in behaviour deemed to 
be appropriate for a given situation. As such, it is a result of some conscious or 
unconscious processing of organisational cues by the individual. The issues concerning 
whether script processing is a conscious or unconscious process is a significant one’. All 
in all the relationship between cues, unconscious script processing and conscious 
behaviour and script development is depicted graphically in Figure 7-3: 
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Figure 7-3: Relation cue-script 
 
The figure emphasises the point made by Starbuck & Milliken (1988) who argue that two 
modes of noticing exist: ‘one of them controlled and volitional, and one automatic and 
involuntary. Although the two modes interact on occasion, they operate independent of 
each other most of the time’ (p. 47). Cues thus lead to two states: either scripted action is 
triggered, and that proceeds as a largely predictable sequence of events and actions, or 
conscious processing of situational cues occurs, in that the person is induced to engage in 
prospective sense making; i.e. to scan for clues about what is going on.  
 
Figure 7-3 suggests that individuals pick up particular events as cues. Then a process 
determines if one is likely to invoke scripts or will process situational information in a 
controlled manner (see also: Gioia & Poole, 1984). The question that then remains is: 
what are the qualities in cues that determine script processing or controlled processing of 
behaviours and events? The discussion presented here is akin to the exploration-
exploitation thesis that remains relevant in the literature on organisational change 
(Nooteboom, 2000). For how are people induced to use efficient modes of operation 
(Exploitation: scripts) when appropriate and to search for new responses when innovation 
in behaviour is required (Exploration: conscious processing)? 
 
In discussing the traits of cues and the types of behaviour they induce, it is hard to avoid a 
brief introduction to procedural and declarative memory; two conceptualisations of 
different ways humans deal with recollections. Procedural memory is that form of 
memory that stores components of motor as well as cognitive skills. A second type of 
memory is declarative memory that stores facts, propositions and events (Cohen & 
Bacdayan, 1994). The former type of memory is relevant to this chapter as it holds 
information on the types of events that can be cued and processed as a script. I.e. scripts 
are likely to be stored in procedural memory. But when discussing procedural memory, 
associated difficulties become evident. Procedural memory is less subject to decay (one 
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never forgets how to ride a bike), less explicitly available (more difficult to communicate) 
and less easy to transfer to novel circumstances, than declarative memory. It is worth 
noting that all these qualities are known to hold for routines (March & Simon, 1958, Cyert 
& March, 1963) and for scripts as well (see: Cohen & Bacdayan, 1994).  
 
The primary difference between cues that trigger conscious processing and those that 
trigger scripted processing lies in the fact that the latter appeals to structures already 
present in procedural memory. A comparison is made on a subconscious level of the traits 
of the current event and emotions, feelings or actions and those of associated past events. 
Recognition arises that allows for similar types of action and interpretation. Given the 
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Figure 7-4: Revised relation cues and scripts 
 
The figure depicts the theoretical relations between events, cue salience and possible 
modes of cognitive processing: conscious, scripted or none at all. This theoretical 
framework informs the empirical investigation of the role of cues in the organisation-wide 
change program of Results Oriented Management at the Rabobank. The elements that 
influence the perception of cues are summarised in the below table; their application will 
be discussed in a later section. 
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Set of interpretative tasks 
Predominant frame of reference 
Table 7-2: Summary of dimensions of influence on cue acceptance 
 
Table 7-2 summarises the main dimensions from this theoretical treatment of cues. The 
elements in the table are identified to affect the acceptance of cues. Cue acceptance is 
basically the first step in the recognition that issues are salient. Salient issues are those 
issues that require closer attention. Because of the notions summarised in the table, the 
issues cannot be ignored, as the cues pointing to the issue(s) are either too numerous or 
simply cannot be dismissed. The table suggests that cues that cause emotional discomfort 
need resolving. Cues that cannot be related to past behaviours risk dismissal or they may 
increase emotional discomfort. Cues that can be associated to existing scripts can be dealt 
with according to procedures and expectations that are part of the script. The set of 
interpretative tasks addresses the degree to which the actor is used to making inferences 
based on situational cues i.e. the degree of search behaviour that the actor ordinarily 
displays. The predominant frame of reference refers to the preferences for specific 
explanations for events that social groups can display. Within social groups, some pointers 
for action are more salient than others, simply because of the social preference of the 
group.  
 
This section has yielded a number of elements that either make up cues or affect them. 
The next section will address these notions to explore how cues affected decisions to 
introduce ROM at the Rabobank, as well as how they shaped early phases of decision 
making in the course of the ROM program. Apart from an explanation of the increasing 
relevance of accountability at the bank, it also suggests that the action does not follow 
promptly from cues. I will suggest that cues point to issues and that cues cause issues to 
become salient. As a consequence, collective action may ultimately arise. Whereas the 
argument above has focused on cue salience, the next sections address issue salience. 
Cues point to issues and influence their salience. Seo & Creed (2002) argue that collective 
action arises from institutional contradiction and human praxis. I argue that institutional 
contradiction produces cues that in turn influence issue salience. The next section will first 
address the forces that made the issue of accountability more or less relevant to the 
different member banks. Then the process of how people deal with the different cues and 
how they affect their personal work environment are explored using the headings from 
Table 7-2.  
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7.3 Cueing for change at the Rabobank 
So what made people at the Rabobank aware of the change that awaited them; why didn’t 
they ignore the introduction of a new regime of accountability that would offer 
management clearer views of their performance? This section explores the introduction of 
this new focus on accountability. It describes and explains the processes behind the 
collective recognition of an issue that needs to be dealt with. It will explain the processes 
underlying issue recognition, using the framework set out in the previous section. In doing 
so, it is examining the idea of human agency in a highly institutionalised environment.  
 
Chapter 6 already discussed the notion of accountability and how this was important at 
most member banks. Because the notion will be used in this and other chapters, 
accountability will be clarified again. Accountability is the generic term for the desire at 
member banks to introduce an attitude that is driven by a commitment to ones actions and 
the well-being of the organisation. More precisely, accountability encompasses result 
orientation, risk orientation, and commitment, all of which are behavioural traits.   
 
Member banks have always had the formal authority to refuse programs developed by 
Rabobank Nederland. The result is that Rabobank Nederland cannot automatically impose 
change programs on local member banks. This makes this environment suitable for an 
exploration of human agency in institutionalised settings such as the Rabobank, where, in 
the absence of formal hierarchical relations, custom and habit are the basis of predictable 
behaviour in the Rabobank Group. Put differently, as the environment within the 
Rabobank organisation is highly institutionalised, it serves as a good case of how change 
can be initiated in that environment that is constrained by those same institutions. 
 
The next section will address how the focus on accountability came about at the 
Rabobank. It will use the notion of an “issue” as element that binds together different and 
potentially unrelated cues. An issue here is seen as events or occurrences that 
organisational participants collectively recognise as being of consequence for the 
organisation. It argues that, at the Rabobank, arrays of cues that cause issues to gain 
attention are the visible expressions of institutional contradiction.  
 
7.3.1 Cue Salience 
General Directors have dual roles in programs like ROM. As representatives of their 
banks in Central Circle Meetings, they ask Rabobank Nederland for the development of 
methodologies and projects. And later on, being responsible for a local member bank, they 
are charged with implementation of the resulting program. These are two completely 
different roles. A General Director of a member bank puts it like this: ‘In Central Circle 
meetings, we talk about the direction of the Group and our concerns. Sometimes an 
assignment to Rabobank Nederland is issued, but when we get the resulting program or 
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application that addresses these concerns it is often unrecognisable. We view it then from 
a different perspective: is it useful for our bank?’  
 
Generally, the management teams of the member banks under study felt a need for a more 
structured planning and control cycle. As one of the developers of the ROM program at 
Rabobank Nederland explains: ‘In co-making with local banks, a few years ago, we 
created a business plan that called for a more professional policy planning cycle. General 
Directors of member banks didn’t have a good feeling for the quality of the planning and 
control cycles of their banks. We then created Results Oriented Management that, in the 
course of its approval, passed through a number of different committees: Policy 
Preparation Committees and PVC’s (committees of member banks). Thus local banks had 
a say in the program during its development. Then the collective of member banks 
approves the program and decides to adopt it. Although this always has been like this, 
once the collective adopts a program, as member banks, they have to implement it, while 
traditionally banks could approve the development of a plan, but when they didn’t like the 
outcome, they just abandoned the idea.’ 
 
Once the committees have approved a program, it gets announced throughout the 
organization rather organically; that is through different formal and informal networks. It 
subsequently enters the bank through internal personnel that adopt the program and 
advocate it internally. When Rabobank Nederland released the ROM program, many 
banks had already heard of its existence. Several sources of information were available: 
Raboweb (intranet), informal reports from banks who served as pilot banks and reports 
from Rabobank Nederland. While the boards of all the member banks had an influence on 
the start of the program in their capacity as participants in the different forums, it soon 
became partly detached from their sphere of influence. Although member banks were 
invited to join the developing and steering committees, for practical reasons only 
representatives of a small minority of the member banks occupied these committees. At 
the member banks, information about the program Results Oriented Management was 
scattered and incomplete. Nevertheless, this information was only one cue that 
accountability was to become an explicit issue.  
 
A second cue for accountability as an issue was the presence of the so-called Compasses. 
Essentially a balanced-scorecard system, these Compasses had existed for some years. 
They offered a number of key-performance indicators that were to be assigned to 
managers. However, banks were using the Compasses very much at their own discretion. 
They could do so as budgets were submitted to Rabobank Nederland using different 
systems. However, these other systems were phased out at the time of study (2002-2004) 
and the Compasses were to become the primary reporting instrument in the years to come 
(2004-2005). In addition, a new version of the Compasses was introduced, for which 
training was provided by Rabobank Nederland. Although the system was far from error 
free, it allowed management accountants to relate policy choices to Key Performance 
Indicator outcomes in real time. Essentially, PCK 4 (abbreviation for: Planning & Control 
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Compasses 4) was a set of causal rules that predicted different outcomes when different 
policy choices were inserted. For example, a desired market share could be entered, and 
the system would yield predictions on mortgage revenues and cross-selling results. The 
introduction of the Compasses and PCK 4 allowed member banks to be compared. 
Moreover, the mere existence of the Compasses and PCK 4 directed the manner in which 
Planning & Control should proceed. As one manager Business Administration illustrates: 
‘I was in a class organised by Rabobank Nederland that was meant to teach us how to 
deal with the new features of PCK 4. Before we started, the consultant, who was teaching 
the class, asked us who did not participate in the program of Results Oriented 
Management. One person raised his hand, to whom the consultant noted: ’Then you will 
have a problem… We will come back to that later on’. It appeared that the class assumed 
a control cycle along the lines of Results Oriented Management, that effectively excluded 
those people from banks who did not participate’. 
 
A third cue for accountability as an issue was the fact that accountability was considered 
logically akin to professionalism. Many banks referred to the fact that they wanted to 
professionalise their operations. To these banks, being personally accountable for the 
actions one undertakes and the results that one achieves is an integral part of being a 
professional employee. This long-standing desire made the increasing emphasis on 
accountability an issue that was situated at the foreground of experience of local decision-
makers. The former financial controller of the Groningen bank describes the old situation 
as follows: ‘we have many bushes we could hide behind. If someone commits to specific 
results, and they are not achieved, it’s because of general market conditions, wrong 
estimates, or simply because we don’t know. People detach from commitment as easy as 
they attach to them. And everyone accepted this; we can always try again next time.’  
 
Fourthly, a shift in responsibilities occurred between the local member banks and 
Rabobank Nederland. Traditionally, the autonomy of member banks prevented Rabobank 
Nederland from becoming closely involved with the operations of the local member 
banks. However, two occurrences made Group-level involvement more acceptable: 
financial results and risk management. Financial results: underperforming member banks 
often have solvency issues, meaning that Rabobank Nederland will need to strengthen 
their balance sheets. This support from Rabobank Nederland to these underperforming 
banks comes indirectly from the stronger member banks that have their surpluses stored at 
Rabobank Nederland. This creates a dependency situation, which gives the collective of 
member banks moral justification for involving themselves to a greater extent in the 
operations of weaker banks. In periods where financial results are deemed unsatisfactory, 
this creates increasing pressure on the weaker banks to justify their results to the collective 
of member banks, as represented by Rabobank Nederland. Risk management: During the 
last decade, some damaging affairs have come to light. These had in common that 
although they initially involved only a few member banks, they soon grew to have nation-
wide implications in terms of damage to the image of the Rabobank Group as well as 
serious financial losses incurred. One of those affairs was known as “D’Anwas” (an 
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investment club which accused a local member bank of misinforming them; this was 
settled at high cost both in financial terms as well as in reputation damage) and another as 
“Eemnes”, after the local member bank that lent millions of Euros to business partners, 
without sufficient collateral or any other form of risk reduction. Again, this warranted 
collective action by member banks and increased interference in local affairs. As a result, 
risk became a focal point for many of the member banks, and intense pressure was 
exercised on them to demonstrate compliance with legislation and good practice. All in 
all, member banks became increasingly accountable to the Group. And again, the role as 
guardian of the interest of the Group was delegated to Rabobank Nederland.  
 
All in all, accountability became more important at the expense of the autonomy of local 
member banks. As such, the interests of the Group gained importance at the cost of 
decreasing autonomy of the individual banks. Multiple cues pushed the issue to the 
foreground and created fertile ground for a structural change that would induce 
accountability. Interestingly, the economically rational oriented literature assumes an 
issue to be equal to a cue (the issue is its own cue for action). Yet, at the Rabobank there 
was not one single cue that was salient enough to push action through the ranks. Rather, a 
compatible combination of cues pushed the issue to the foreground, thus increasing its 
salience. At a specific threshold level, which was different for all the participants 
involved, the issue was sufficiently at the foreground to require action. Some authors 
provide support for this point-of-view. Dutton & Dukerich (1991) note in their analysis on 
the changes facing the New York Port Authority: ‘Issues are events, developments and 
trends that an organisation’s members collectively recognise as having some consequence 
to the organisation. Issues can arise from changes inside the organisation, such as 
employees threatening to stage a strike or a new technology transforming a product or a 
service…. Which issues gain attention and how they are interpreted are important 
concerns, as issues represent focal points that galvanize interest and direct attention in 
organisations because of the consequences associated with action or inaction. In some 
cases, issues activate decisions; in other cases, issues incite neglect or intentional action.’ 
(p. 518-519; also see: Isabella, 1990; Feldman, 1989). 
  
Although the build-up of cues is not specifically discussed in the management accounting 
literature, it was observed at the Rabobank that different, in themselves somewhat 
insignificant, but compatible cues were responsible for the salience of an underlying issue. 
Therefore, it is arguably wrong to have designated this sub-section cue salience, for it is 
not cues that are salient, but issues become salient by virtue of cues. The conclusion then 
must be that at the Rabobank, the issue of accountability gained importance by virtue of 
seemingly isolated events (that were to serve as cues) that allowed for the building-up of 
salience of the accountability issue. Seo & Creed (2002) argue that these seemingly 
isolated events actually consist of ruptures in the fabric of social cohesion, and that once 
some threshold value is reached, people become uneasy with the array of current 
institutional arrangements. One may therefore propose that Seo & Creed’s notion of 
institutional contradiction can result in issue salience. Institutional inconsistencies at the 
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Rabobank led to the understanding that banks are less autonomous than previously 
believed. Several cues were present to point to that realisation. Institutional contradiction 
can therefore be seen as increasing the salience of issues as cues become available.  
 
To most banks under study, accountability as an issue became relevant and important. 
However, this explicitly does not mean that they all gave it the same meaning. Many 
employees of member banks interpreted the issue in a very different manner. Weick 
(1979, p. 91) argues that shared meaning is not needed to come to coordinated action. 
Similarly, Donnellon et al. (1986), argue that common ends and shared meanings may be 
the outcomes of organised action, rather than a perquisite to it. The situation at the 
Rabobank is an example of Weick’s point in that it demonstrates that different ideas on 
ends as well as different cues on what is happening may still lead to coordinated action. 
This section has concluded that different cues pointed to similar issues. The section 
concludes that the issue is the factor that binds together equifinal meaning and allows for 
subsequent coordinated action. In order to make this point, the next section will discuss 
the mechanisms underlying the process of interpreting the issue of accountability. It is the 
cognitive variant of human praxis as defined by Seo & Creed (2002). People in member 
banks could have been indifferent to the issue of accountability, or they could have 
applied existing scripts to that issue, or they could have processed the issue in a conscious 
manner. This is a purely analytical distinction, but one which is useful in separating 
between the various levels of cognitive awareness associated to the issue of 
accountability.  
 
7.4 Factors affecting cues 
The framework depicted in Figure 7-4 indicates a number of elements that are relevant to 
the manner in which people in organisations deal with cues. Conscious processing is of 
primary interest for this thesis. The thesis argues that conscious processing will be 
induced by cues that indicate the salience of an underlying issue. So far, this chapter has 
introduced a number of dimensions that have an effect on the acceptance of cues as 
meaningful indicators of the importance of issues. At the Rabobank, ROM found its roots 
in a desire to improve on planning and control. Additionally, most member banks added 
improved accountability as an additional objective for ROM. The current section will 
explore how accountability came to be in the foreground (salient) at the Rabobank. Why 
is it that accountability became sufficiently salient to induce further conscious action, 
while so many other signals continue to go unnoticed? This exploration will use the 
theoretical notions that this chapter has introduced.  
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7.4.1 Surprise, shock and emotional inconsistencies 
The program Results Oriented Management at the Rabobank did not cause specific 
emotional responses when it was announced. Rather, it appealed to a long-standing desire 
to structure the planning and control cycle. To most participants there was no shock, nor 
any surprise. To them, the program did not cause any emotional inconsistencies, but it was 
seen to resolve internal inconsistencies. This included particularly people who, by virtue 
of their training and sense of professionalism, were uncomfortable with the limited 
attention given to planning and subsequent control. As one financial controller of 
Rabobank Groningen explains: ‘We knew for a long time that the planning and control 
routine in this bank was not sophisticated, to say the least. Every year, we would make 
plans that were essentially additions of a few percents to last years’ plans, and during the 
year deviations to those plans would occur. We would recognise those deviations, but we 
had no true idea why those deviations occurred. This also led to the fact that no-one 
would take responsibility for deviations. Which was fine as the money poured in, but those 
days are over. Pressure is definitely building to perform better economically.’ 
 
The program Results Oriented Management especially found fertile ground among the 
ranks of controllers and managers in charge of business administration. It allowed them to 
address their feelings of unease, in that, previously, questions were asked which they 
could not answer. This inability to fully grasp deviations from expectations was illustrated 
by one of the Rabobank Nederland consultants tasked with helping with implementation: 
‘Before Results Oriented Management, I was at a member bank, which experienced quite 
suddenly an increase of deposits of 12 million euros. The General Director, by accident, 
got to see a table that showed this anomaly. He asked his manager Business 
Administration to investigate, but he could not find the cause for this sudden increase in 
funds. By that time already six million were already withdrawn, and after repeated asking 
by the General Director, the manager Business Administration investigated again and 
found the cause: a freefall of savings deposits of tax-exempt savings accounts that were 
added to the accounts of individuals at that Rabobank. By this time, practically all of the 
twelve million Euros were withdrawn. The General Director should have been informed 
automatically of such anomaly as well as better and quicker insight was needed into the 
causes thereof. If this had been done better, specific commercial action could have been 
deployed to target the recipients of these funds. Now we gave it all to our competitors, 
because we were too slow.’    
 
Therefore, it is no wonder that many managers Business Administration were 
championing Results Oriented Management as it appealed directly to an unease that was 
already there. This was different to other staff. Those who were less involved with 
planning and control initially did not perceive programs such as ROM as being of much 
use. The General Director of a Limburg member bank: ‘I had the feeling that we didn’t 
master the control cycle. No connection existed between what we planned and what 
happened on the work floor…..But I had a difficult time persuading the rest of our 
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management team. They felt that everything went well, the results were good, so why 
bother? I got them to at least agree on a first meeting with a consultant of Rabobank 
Nederland, and in the end, it was him who definitely sold them the program.’ 
 
It appeared that the employees and managers of member banks were more receptive to the 
need for improved planning and control when they could relate this need to broader 
notions that they had to deal with on a day-to-day basis. The propensity to deal 
consciously with the issue of accountability had little to do with a specific sense of 
urgency. Rather, the notion of accountability appealed to a long-standing desire to 
improve planning and control by the people working in Finance and Control. Other 
managers, especially commercial managers, were less inclined to accept the need for 
improved accountability at face value. Interestingly, they ignored the issue only to let 
personal relations in the management team influence their stance. To illustrate, consider 
the comment by a manager Client Advice at the Rabobank: ‘I accept change programs on 
the instigation of my fellow MT-members. I don’t need to know all the ins- and outs of a 
program. If one of my colleagues wants it, I trust him. In the past, we had a manager who 
didn’t do that well…. I mean, if I ask something to someone, in a sort of tit-for-tat kind of 
reasoning, and he lets me down too often, then I don’t trust the change programs that 
someone wants either. To me it stops being a routine Management Team decision; I really 
want to dig in the matter then, before I vote on the matter, simply because I no longer 
dare to follow his or her words’. 
 
This example constitutes a type of decision-making that occurred when managers had 
little role-specific interest in the program, or in the issue of accountability. It appears that 
they were projecting personal relations on the issue. One could say that this is a way of 
ignoring the issue. Templates of interpersonal relations within the Management Team 
replace the notion of accountability as driving cognitive processing. A number of 
managers did not care much for accountability, but one or more of their peers did think it 
mattered. Therefore some managers were triggered, not by the issue of accountability, but 
by the importance it had to some of their colleagues. This means that to these managers, 
the decision on Results Oriented Management was to some extent scripted. They applied 
known personal properties of the proposing manager and projected those on the proposal. 
It is a highly efficient style of decision-making that uses well-known personal qualities 
instead of the dimensions of an issue that is largely unknown to them.  
 
In short, at the Rabobank, one could not discern ‘shock’ or surprise on the part of decision 
makers. However, there was some emotional discomfort on the part of those who had a 
role-specific interest in the issue of accountability; for example, the management 
accountants and some General Directors. Those who did not feel any emotional 
discomfort, as their work-role did not require them to give much direct attention to the 
issue of accountability, were seen to attribute the personal qualities of the individual who 
proposed the ROM on the program. The people who could relate to the program itself 
were seen to engage in conscious processing of the set of cues. The people who could not 
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relate to the issue at this stage, employ a highly efficient mode of decision-making, 
whereby scripted images of individuals are placed on the issues themselves as templates. 
The manager proposing ROM as possible response to the (to some not-so-salient) issue of 
accountability thus gets closely associated with the issue and with the program as a side 
effect. This side effect was often reported on by those who proposed that accountability 
was an issue, and ROM was a possible resolution: ‘For an extended period, I was 
associated with ROM and its objectives, which is logical as I was visibly involved with the 
program. However, when I realised that this was happening, I attempted to withdraw a 
bit: I do not want it to be ‘my’ program, it must be part of everyone’s day-to-day 
experiences here at the bank’ (Project leader Rabobank Groningen).  
 
7.4.2 Past behaviour 
Results Oriented Management is an example of a ‘locked in’ program. The term, 
stemming from technological path dependence theory, describes how earlier choices make 
further choices and their outcomes to a large extent inevitable (Dosi, 1997, p. 1539). This 
is clearly observable at the Rabobank.  
 
Rabobank Nederland began to require member banks to submit their yearly estimates in 
formats that were consistent with Results Oriented Management. It became more difficult 
for member banks not to embrace Results Oriented Management than to accept it. One 
can therefore pose the question whether rejecting ROM constitutes more of a choice than 
accepting it? Apart from this sidestep, many references were made to the increasingly 
limited autonomy of member banks. A member bank close to the Belgian border has 
experienced this first hand. When a team-leader was asked if he felt that the bank was 
innovative, he responded: ‘Yes, at least we used to be. It becomes harder nowadays. You 
are being restricted by current legislation on equities trade, audits, organisational 
guidelines and so on…If you want to do something now, that falls outside of the scope of 
Group practice, then you have to be more convinced of its use. You have to persuade more 
parties that it is proper for the bank. This is hard for us at the border, as we have many 
Belgian customers who have needs that are not recognised by the Group.’   
 
A financial advisor within another member bank had a relevant point-of-view on how the 
past affected the present: ‘First we do FAST (a program to make service to customers 
more efficient and more effective), then we need reduce our headcount, as the program 
has caused us to do more with less people. As a consequence we have very strict planning 
involving just the right amount of people. Of course, during sickness or holidays we have 
problems getting our positions occupied. During the planning and control sessions of 
ROM, the MT+ group addresses this, which led here to the argument as translated by the 
Management Team to the employees: “we are vulnerable like this. We need to merge with 
sister banks to have a broader base, we do not have any choice, as we will not achieve our 
objectives if we cannot structurally occupy our positions, without having too much slack 
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in terms of FTE’s”. They might well be right, but we don’t have a choice now, because it 
has been made already in the past.’  
 
One of the people at Rabobank Nederland, responsible for the development of Results 
Oriented Management explained another effect of past decisions: ‘we have introduced the 
Compasses a number of years ago, essentially a Balanced Scorecard that was primarily 
meant to inform the governing boards of local member banks. However, it yielded 
questions to the banks’ management, as the information was highly abstract, I mean what 
does an average service consumption of 1.35 mean? Then we said, okay, if this is so, then 
we need to relate the Compasses to a control model and a management philosophy to 
connect cause and effect’ 
 
Apart from the quote above that indicates that answers to past questions simply yielded 
new questions, another bank had just completed a merger with other member banks. To 
the management team of this bank, it was important to go through an entire planning an 
control cycle in order to learn what to expect from each other, and to become fully 
accountable for the expectation laid out in the various plans. As the General Director of 
this bank explains: ‘I remember saying to our manager Business Administration: ‘this 
comes at exactly at the right time for us.’ We just merged with a number of sister banks, 
and it was time to undertake something with the new team. We had to make new plans for 
the future and we could do this under the philosophy of Results Oriented Management.’ 
Again at another bank, they had been experimenting with the model of the European 
Foundation of Quality. This model has many features in common with the Rabobank 
management model and ROM. The General Director indicated: ‘We came into contact 
with the EFQM model some years ago, back then as a consequence of quality 
improvement programs. It appealed to me to a great extent. So for us, ROM had a 
familiar ring to it. We were primarily using it to develop policy on HRM and process 
management, but then people from Rabobank Nederland came over to talk to us about it. 
Some years later it was more developed, but it was still clearly recognisable as the EFQM 
philosophy.’  
 
These and other commentators perceived the need for accountability through relations 
with current issues; those issues that they were already dealing with. Whether it was a past 
merger, a new management team, or a previously tried model, people framed the need for 
increasing accountability in terms of these existing issues and problems, which were a 
product of past decisions. All in all, accountability as an issue was cued by decisions 
taken in the past as well as the fact that local member banks were becoming more and 
more limited in their choices because of the requirements of the Group and the legislator. 
These limitations are more than overt requirements from the Group. They also include 
economic necessity1.  
                                                
1 Many General Directors indicated that their bank is not as autonomous as it appears as many choices are 
constrained by economic viability. A member bank can individually select Customer Relations Management 
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7.4.3 Existing scripts 
Scripts find their source in the past of an individual or group. However, it is a different 
category than Past Behaviour, as section 7.4.2 was labelled. Past behaviour can constrain 
current actions; they can make some subsequent actions more economically viable than 
others. Scripts affect how one picks up on cues. When one finds that results deviate from 
expectations, one may be cued that something is wrong. However, expectations are often 
based on scripts, which in turn affect the cues one picks up on. Past behaviour is thus 
about ‘locking in’ future action, while scripts affect decision making on a more tacit level, 
in that they affect the types of cues that one picks up on. 
 
Scripts can consist of routine patterns of thought and action. These patterns not only shape 
ideas, but also what one perceives as an issue that deserves closer attention. The opposite 
is also possible. Cues can get ignored when they have no relation with existing practice. 
This was often the case at many of the member banks. The General Director of one 
member bank explains: ‘It is hard to convince our people that something needs to be 
done. Our results have been satisfactory; we are a very good employer, so there are not 
many signals to people that we need to adapt’. Similar to the events at Ford, as described 
by Gioia (1992), the cues that pointed to the need for accountability were easily 
overlooked by employees and managers. At Rabobank Meijel, the management team 
members needed some persuasion as they felt that the bank was doing great. It was the 
consultant who brought in best practice. As the General Director explains: ‘He explained 
the program in terms of steps we never took. He talked about vision and SWOTs. He 
talked about the definition of core issues for our bank. We never did that. We didn’t define 
any core issues. Every day, we just went to work and we worked hard and then we went 
home. And we earned big money, but we didn’t prioritise, we just did it all.’ The notion of 
priority setting was just one of the items introduced by the consultant. In the early stages 
of the emergence of accountability as issue, available scripts were limiting acceptance of 
cues of accountability, as people were not able to place these cues in any meaningful 
framework. However, the consultant was often able to generate interest in the first 
sessions he had with managers at the bank. In those sessions, he explained how managers 
could interpret signals they received in the past. For example, one of the consultants 
working for the Meijel bank used to be a manager of a segment Corporate Clients in a 
member bank. One of the managers of the Meijel bank remarked: ‘It was a big help to 
have a consultant who had seen it from the other side. He knows what it was like to work 
in a position we are in now. He knew exactly the issues that we face every day, and he 
                                                                                                                      
software, differentiated interest rates and specialised products if it feels there is a the need. However, the costs 
associated with these non-standard solutions often cannot be borne by any single local bank. A member bank is 
therefore ‘locked in’ in many choices made in the past by the collective of member banks as it is economically 
‘bound’ to the outcomes of those choices.  
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could relate those to our sessions’. Similar comments were noted at the Rabobank West-
Drenthe, where the consultant was a former manager of a segment Client Advice.   
 
 
The consultant was not the only influence on scripted knowledge at the banks. Some 
reported on changes in shared scripts for different reasons. The Rabobank Zevenhuizen-
Moerkapelle provides an illustration. One of the members of the management team, in 
charge of business administration, describes what allowed him to pick up on signals that 
there was a need for a stricter form of accountability: ‘I am constantly confronted with the 
fact that people here look differently at many things than I do. It is an attitude such as: 
“don’t bother me with all this bureaucracy, I do not particularly care about these 
numbers. The customer is king”, that is the way many people perceive the professional life 
in this bank. And from my perspective that is not always the best attitude.’ Of all people, it 
is this manager Business Administration who is constantly confronted with disruptions in 
his expectations (captured in scripted knowledge) on proper procedure and the ways they 
often turn out. This section illuminates that scripted knowledge guides recognition of 
cues. At the Zevenhuizen-Moerkapelle bank a relevant comment by the General Director 
can be noted. The following comment illustrates that a lack of scripts guiding day-to-day 
operations was an additional motivation to focus on accountability. ‘we used to be a bank 
that lived from the ambition of working together with mutual trust and respect. It is on the 
back of my business card, and I am very proud of this statement. We didn’t make policies 
of this ambition statement, we just let this guide our decisions. We are talking about ’97, 
’98, we just went to work, without a policy plan and it worked out very nice (90% of the 
personnel could cite that ambition statement). However, for a number of employees, it led 
to unrest. It led to questions such as: ‘what do we stand for, how do I provide meaning to 
my role within the bank? What does this mean for the relationship with my customers’ 
Thus, in the following years, the proportion of employees that knew the ambition 
statement dropped and a need arose for direction and support that warranted a more 
explicit emphasis on the meaning of mutual trust, respect and togetherness.’ Again, the 
salience of accountability as an issue increased through existing scripted knowledge or a 
lack thereof. As a consequence the issue of accountability moved further to the 
foreground. 
 
Another way in which scripts can influence the salience of an issue, by focusing on 
specific cues is when multiple scripts appear not to be compatible. Consider the comment 
of one participant at a local member bank: ‘The relationship between our segment and 
that of Client Advice is severely stressed. There is a person over there who does 
everything by the book, but he doesn’t have the proper attitude. And this concerns us as it 
is our customers that they are treating inadequately.’ The complaint was that this 
employee was not flexible enough to deviate from the rules for the good of the customer if 
necessary. However, most people at his segment disagreed with this complaint as they 
were following strict procedures in order to be as efficient as possible in their customer 
service to the mass markets. They had become convinced that each deviation from the 
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standard process was costly and needed to be avoided. An employee of the targeted 
segment noted a few days later: ‘we are frustrated. We have been told that we need to 
refuse cash transactions, as customers need to be induced to use the cash machines. We 
can help them operate them, but we cannot provide them with over-the-counter cash 
services anymore. Now can you imagine how it feels if one of those guys (refers to 
Financial Advisor and Business Advisor) come to the counter with a client and say: ‘well, 
could you for this once give this customer some cash of his account?’ We will not do it, as 
procedures prohibit us. But then we get to hear that we are too inflexible for their 
customers?’ In their attempts to come to the departmental equivalent of a servicing script, 
that is an accepted sequence of thought and action that leads to what is considered ‘good 
service’, it appeared that their script was not fully compatible with other notions of good 
customer treatment. This issue was essentially a collision between scripts, and it became 
magnified in the course of the Results Oriented Management program. This event 
constitutes an example of institutional contradiction (Seo & Creed, 2002). This thesis 
argues that, under certain conditions, scripts can be seen as individual counterparts of 
institutions. Seo & Creed (2002) note that in the course of time ruptures can come to exist 
between the various institutions that form the fabric of social groups. These are called 
institutional contradictions. From an institutional contradiction a need may arise for 
changes in institutions. At the member bank discussed here, this institutional contradiction 
was expressed by conflicting opinions on scripts. Participants were targeted with 
inconsistencies that caused them to consider the source thereof. A discussion on 
accountability was seen by all parties as a possible way to resolve these inconsistencies.  
 
This section has elaborated on a number of ways current scripts can influence if and how 
organisational participants are picking up on cues for management accounting change. 
Firstly, it pointed out that scripts can prevent signals from becoming salient at all. As 
described by Gioia (1992), scripted tasks may cause individuals to oversee cues, simply 
because they do not fit the profile of a cue which is embedded in those scripts. In those 
early stages, the role of the consultant was important, because he often focused attention 
on cues in a manner that was sensible for the participants of those early meetings. 
Secondly, small but continuing disruptions in script-based expectations and outcomes 
were functioning as cues. Thirdly, a lack of suitable scripts for many day-to-day situations 
and consequential uncertainty led to a demand for clarity in organisation-wide vision and 
responsibilities. Fourthly, conflicting scripts lead to inconsistencies that call for clarity on 
priorities and responsibilities.  
    
7.4.4 Set of interpretative tasks & predominant frame of reference 
As noted before, an issue gains salience if there is an observable difference between actual 
levels of output from an activity and the aspired levels of output. When expected causality 
in action and output does not materialise, it causes a reconsideration of some of its 
underlying assumptions. Member banks did Results Oriented Management because of a 
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broad sense of something being not right. When scripted knowledge on how to deal with 
the signals is insufficient, people engage in sense making. Although the notion of sense 
making is detailed in later chapters, it is clear that the manner in which people interpret 
the signals that lead to the recognition of an issue is essentially a process of sense making. 
Sense making is then the process of placing signals in a meaningful cognitive framework. 
Although sense making is often associated with the selection of action (see chapter 8), it 
also involves a continuous process of low-level interpretation. By this, I mean that tasks, 
jobs and activities all require some degree of sense making. No task is 100% scripted, 
when the task is not exactly similar to the previous. Therefore, by virtue of sense making 
required for the execution of daily tasks, an individual is already making sense of the 
signals around him, without any inducement from specific events (cues). The source of 
this ongoing process of sense making can be found in the characteristics of tasks 
(managers find different signals of interest than customer service employees) and the 
wider frame of reference that people have come to develop, both professionally and 
privately (these can be referred to as private philosophies).  
 
The distribution of cues that were introduced in ongoing sense making processes was very 
uneven at most member banks as it was often the higher echelons of the hierarchy that felt 
confronted by the need for improved accountability. One manager Corporate Clients 
addresses the disappointing financial results: ‘Look, we are technically bankrupt. The 
Group is subsidising us, but if we were not part of the Group, I don’t think we would be 
able to make it. Therefore, there is not really a discussion on priorities for us. We can no 
longer expect the Group to cover for us; we need to take our own financial responsibility. 
We need to do this through cost-cutting and a strong sales-driven attitude with our 
people.’ To this manager, this is the only way to go. Being formerly employed by the ING 
bank1, he had inherited a strong result- and sales orientation, which affected what he 
considered as cues for action under conditions of questionable accountability. 
 
If one considers the contrast with the General Director of an economically successful bank 
in the west of the country, who expresses some of the influences on his day-to-day 
interpretations: ‘As a person I am shaped by my upbringing, my parents, and my religion 
in the sense that I have a specific portrayal of man and that I have a strong preference in 
how I want to treat others, including customers. This means that one does not want to 
perform better at the expense of others, nor does one earn money from them in such 
manner. Being accountable comes naturally then. People need to tell me when I make a 
mistake, it is a form of honesty and integrity.’ This is more than a set of values; it is a 
frame of reference that explains to the person how events are to be construed. The 
foundations of opinions are different between these commentators, as their philosophies 
serve not only as devices for interpretation, but also as templates to discern between parts 
of an issue. To separate between important, and less important; to identify right from 
                                                
1 The Netherlands based ING-bank is known for its strong emphasis on shareholder value and its well-developed 
systems of accountability and pay-for-performance schemes. This respondent calls the ING-bank a technocracy, 
with strong reliance on rational and formal systems. 
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wrong, and to distribute effort. These philosophies may be the result of upbringing, social 
class and lifelong sense making, but they can be seen as a given.  
 
As indicated in the introduction of this section and apart from any private philosophies of 
right and wrong, people tended to discuss the cues they were facing in terms of their role 
tasks. Many people at the Rabobank process information routinely as a part of their work. 
In this case, managers at the Rabobank are trained in and focus on signals that lead them 
to believe that action needs to be taken. Therefore, they scan their internal and external 
environment more routinely than their subordinates. This relates to the uneven distribution 
of cues that were touched upon on page 175. This uneven distribution of signals played an 
important role in those early stages of the recognition of the need for ROM, as it made the 
need for accountability almost self-evident for some, while for others, it was completely 
unclear where this need so suddenly came from. Often, managers and the General 
Director would illuminate potential problem areas, to make the solution (‘let’s focus on 
accountability’) more acceptable. For, to accept a solution, one needs to see the problem 
first.  
 
A participant of Rabobank West Zeeuws-Vlaanderen that serves many Belgian customers, 
notes in retrospect: ‘I think we did ROM because of the turbulence we are in. Not too long 
before the program, we got a new General Director. When he got in, his signal was: “you 
might think that this is such a wonderful performing bank, but it isn’t. If you dismiss the 
Belgian business, and you compare the remaining business with the remaining personnel 
and organisation and what we earn on the domestic market….” Actually it comes down to 
the fact that the Belgian business subsidised the domestic one for years. Previously, I had 
a feeling of “Eureka, we are doing great”, but since our new Director was here, we 
looked at ourselves in the mirror and realised that we weren’t doing all that good.’ For 
this specific bank it was the new General Director who redefined core beliefs on the 
position of this bank. This in itself was a process that was essentially unrelated to Results 
Oriented Management, but it supported the program in creating acceptance of the message 
that something needed to be done. As the West-Zeeuws Vlaanderen participant continues: 
‘His message was initially incredible, literally. I mean look around you: we have nice 
profit figures, great buildings. Everything would be done for the staff; we used to get gifts 
from the bank regularly. This all became somewhat rarer. Costs/benefits were deemed to 
be more important, also by Rabobank Nederland, who put increasing pressure on us to 
perform. Also, cost-savings programs were initiated; rumours on lay-offs were abundant. 
Now, it was not all that bad, but several signals from several directions made us slowly 
more sensitive to messages that were previously not believed.’ The same phenomenon 
could be observed at the Rabobank Groningen. Here the General Director conveyed the 
message to the employees of the bank: ‘Look, we are making a small profit, but that 
comes uniquely from ongoing business, yearly interest payments and so on. For that, we 
don’t need so many people and branches. We need them for the generation of new 
business. However, new business is generating losses if we attribute our costs fairly. 
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Ongoing business is subsidising new business, and that is not sustainable. Therefore, we 
aren’t doing very well at the moment’.  
 
Leaders in banks were actively involved in the re-definition of quality of the banks and 
the sense of realism they wanted the people at the bank to have. They are creators of cues 
and issues. Smircich & Morgan (1982) emphasised leadership by generating changes in 
frames of reference: ‘leadership lies in large part in generating a point of reference, 
against which a feeling of organisation and direction can emerge’ (see: Weick, 1995; see 
also Euske & Riccaboni, 1999, p. 478).  
 
7.4.5 Others’ actions 
Local member banks are swiftly becoming focused on their economic performance 
compared to other member banks. This has been greatly stimulated by the development of 
the BVP (Benchmark Improvement Potential), which aims to compare classes1 of member 
banks and thus promotes best practice. This information is available to the participants in 
the different classes and allows them to see on which elements they score high relative to 
other banks, and on which they need to improve. At least on one occasion, the results of 
the benchmark were used to influence the perceived need of the Results Oriented 
Management program. In the course of indicating the need for Results Oriented 
Management, one of the Rabobank Nederland consultants used the results of the 
benchmark to illustrate the position of the member bank relative to other member banks: 
‘Look, the BVP primarily indicates that the results for your area are good. You just 
achieve them with too many people, as the BVP indicates. Some tough choices are long 
overdue, and these choices need to be made within the ROM framework. The BVP sort of 
forces the bank to focus on those areas that need your attention, and for this bank that is 
the surplus in employees.’ 
 
In introducing the performance of other member banks, the consultant effectively set a 
baseline, a measure or a standard to which the member bank he was supporting did not 
measure up. He made the bank morally accountable to the others in the benchmark, by 
stressing that the bank’s inability to perform better, was withholding revenues from the 
Rabobank Group. Effectively, he introduced extra dimensions to the decision if and how 
to start with ROM (being accountable to others who performed better). In effect, he raised 
awareness on potential problems to which he had the solution. Just as paragraph 7.4.4 
argues that senior management actively influenced the perception of possible issues, it 
appears here that Rabobank Nederland consultants could do the same.  
 
                                                
1 In order to facilitate comparison between banks, they were classified in groups or classes that had similar 
properties, with regards to size, region and markets.  
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Others’ actions were also relevant in shaping the expectations for the program Results 
Oriented Management. Formal and informal contacts with individuals at other member 
banks, led to the salience of specific issues. For example, a project leader of a bank in the 
north of the Netherlands noted that he used to play squash with a friend who is a 
management team member at a bank that had already implemented ROM. He argued that 
he learned much from discussions with him. Not just how to do things, but also what to 
emphasise. Other managers had different contacts, but a substantial number of them 
formulated expectations, based on contacts they had elsewhere in the Rabobank 
organisation. Basically, others’ actions have an influence on the propensity to accept cues 
as meaningful to an issue by two dimensions: (1) directly, through focusing attention on 
issues that otherwise might have been overlooked (as the consultant did); and (2) 
indirectly, by influencing expectations by observing others’ results and experiences.  
 
7.4.6 Issue complexity 
When an issue is complex or difficult to grasp, scripted reactions to the issue as a whole 
fall short. Scripts reside in procedural memory (Cohen & Bacadayan, 1994), which is 
difficult to make explicit or applicable to novel situations. A complex issue would 
therefore be very hard to deal with based on scripted knowledge, as these tend not to be 
readily available for complex issues. Complex issues thus can be split up in multiple sub-
issues. This was clearly observable at the Rabobank. The issue of accountability became a 
collection of issues including: the purpose of a cooperative bank in a well-developed 
market; taking responsibility for ones’ actions; the importance of profitability vs. extreme 
customer orientation. It was a structural issue as much as a behavioural one. Some sub-
issues were downplayed, while others were addressed extensively. However, complexity 
cause the issue to be incomparable to previous experience. Therefore, one of the primary 
sources of scripted processing is not available. It is therefore highly likely that complex 
issues will lead to conscious processing on the part of the individual that is confronted 
with it, simply because he needs to understand the issue in itself. 
 
7.5 Discussion 
Basically, an event such as the introduction of Results Oriented Management is not salient 
in itself. Rather, it gains salience under several conditions, one of which is existing 
emotional discomfort. Although script theories have confirmed the fact that cues cause 
inconsistencies that warrant script development or the invoking of scripts, at the 
Rabobank it was mostly the reverse: for many reasons there were issues and concerns that 
weren’t clearly defined. These were feelings of unease, recognitions of ‘something that 
wasn’t right’ and uncertainty on future courses of action. When Results Oriented 
Management was presented, it basically presented a framework for people to reformulate 
their concerns in terms of that very program. It provided them with a way to channel their 
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existing concerns in a way that was compatible with ROM. All in all: it could promise a 
resolution to the equivocal nature of their concerns. This view of ROM illuminates 
multiple effects: it provided legitimacy for the program, as it seemed to address existing 
concerns; it also provided means for people to make issues more tangible. To a certain 
degree ROM focused on areas previously under addressed. This is explicitly not universal: 
it is role-dependent. Although much can be discussed under the heading of prospective 
sense making, which is the topic of the next chapter, it also points to the role one is 
playing. Role incumbents are subject to role-specific issues. This means that people can 
be assumed to be more sensitive to cues that relate to their roles in the organisation. As a 
consequence, issue salience can be considered contingent on role and role attributes. 
 
The main conclusions of the previous sections are summarised in Table 7-3: 
 
 
Variables affecting cue significance Form within Rabobank 
Emotional discomfort Very limited; Cue did not cause emotional 
discomfort; Rather discomfort already present 
made the issue more salient. 
Past behaviour Extensively mentioned in relation to 
increasing demand for accountability.  
Existing scripts Where the issue did not appeal to work-role 
specific qualities, templates of interpersonal 
relations gained importance. It appears that 
under conditions of uncertainty combined with 
limited perceived importance seemingly 
unrelated scripts may substitute unknown 
issue variables. 
Set of interpretative tasks Employees with role-induced external focus 
did not identify accountability as important 
issue. The issue became in later stages 
apparent to them, and they were lagging 
behind others with more internally oriented 
tasks. 
Predominant frame of reference Often set by leader (General Director, or 
segment manager), but also seen to be 
influenced by education, task-role, and general 
outlook on the world. 
Table 7-3: Summary of influences on cue acceptance in Rabobank 
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As a result of the insights obtained so far, a framework can be generated that depicts the 
way in which cues made the issue of accountability sufficiently salient at the Rabobank to 

















Cues find their source in:
* Emotional discomfort
* Deviation between aspired 
and actual levels: 'Problems'
Cues are influenced by:
* Past behaviour
* Existing scripts
* Set of interpretative tasks 





* Typicality of the situation
 
Figure 7-5: Revised relation cues and scripts II 
 
The framework differs from the framework in Figure 7-4 in two respects: (1) it depicts 
several cues that influence issue salience, as was the case at the Rabobank; and (2) issue 
complexity and the typicality of the situation are placed outside the issue salience box, as 
they influence the type of conscious cognitive processing (script development or isolated 
unscripted action) rather than that they affect the salience of an issue (see next section). 
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At the Rabobank, the issue of accountability did not merely result from deviations 
between a desired state and the actual state. Organisational participants were generally 
unable to specify the desired state, except in very general terms. The apparent absence of 
a ‘shock’ that could mobilise all institutionally constrained agents, led to a situation in 
which any individual cue had insufficient weight to forge awareness of the need for 
conscious action. However, the Rabobank case demonstrates that the absence of a single 
influential cue that points everyone’s attention to an issue does not mean that collective 
action cannot arise. People at the various member banks were constantly confronted with 
events that seemed to belong to similar cognitive categories, the most important being 
designated as ‘accountability’. Although the term accountability was only specifically 
defined in the course of the program Results Oriented Management, it helped individuals 
to put the things that were happening in perspective. By labelling the category of events as 
belonging to a certain cognitive class of events, people were able to define an ‘issue’ that 
was reified through communication and other forms of interaction (see chapter 10 for a 
discussion of the role of discourse). Put differently, through many small cues, an issue 
was born that, in turn, made collective action possible. The framework shown in Figure 
7-5 depicts ‘an issue’ as a collection of cues. But knowing what makes ‘an issue’ does not 
explain why and how the sets of cues were connected to the issue of ‘accountability’ and 
not to other issues. So how are issues arising from cues? 
 
In the framework in Figure 7-5, cues are mediated by a number of elements. Isolated cues 
can become many issues, yet people are able to select only one or a few issues. The 
interpretation of the meaning of cues, characteristics of people and the organisation play a 
pivotal role in the selection of the appropriate issue that fits the cues at hand. Existing 
scripts influence whether cues are perceived as such and the manner in which they are 
interpreted. The set of interpretative tasks, that is the manner in which people interpret 
information in the course of their work and the experience one has all have influence on 
the relative salience of an issue. At the Rabobank, people who were in a commercial 
function, had trouble understanding how and why the different events related to the notion 
of accountability. Those employees and managers who, by virtue of their role, were 
concerned with the management of responsibilities were quick to decide that the cues 
contributed to a need to focus further on accountability. 
 
An important observation at this stage was that at the Rabobank, the issue of 
accountability was brought to the attention of people through a multitude of small cues. 
Some of these cues could be relatively easily addressed by existing ways of doing things, 
or scripts, while for other cues, no readily available solutions existed. Consequently, the 
organisation had to improvise how to proceed as information became available. Moreover, 
accountability had a dimension that appealed to how people work together. Participants 
were ready to admit that a focus on accountability was a much-needed improvement for 
their bank as they were confronted regularly with broken promises, plans that were not 
followed up on and so forth. But, to them, this need for improvement applied only for the 
bank as a whole, and not directly to themselves. People were seen talking about ‘the bank’ 
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in general and what it needed, without stretching the implications thereof to their own 
situation. Discussing issues in abstract terms, allowed people to escape the definition of 
meaning. What it meant for individuals to be accountable might be of importance, but this 
was explicitly not accepted at face value. This held to a large extent for those not included 
in the activities surrounding those early stages. They were presented with an issue that had 
its basic features already defined. Those who were puzzling about the issue, were 
committed to the issue, in the sense that the outcome mattered to them, but they had few 
ready made scripts to fall back on. So little past experience in the matter and few existing 
scripts in combination with some degree of commitment could yield conscious processing 
on the part of the Rabobank employees. The case indicates that the difference between 
ignoring and conscious processing of situational information has to do with the degree to 
which people are bound to associated action: commitment. If the issue is related to 
previous action that one is bound to, commitment is being transferred to the new issue or 
its implications. Thus, conscious processing of information related to an issue can occur 
because someone is directly committed to the issue, or one is committed to some of its 
perceived implications. 
  
Emotional discomfort remains an important cue that something out of the ordinary is 
occurring. However, at the Rabobank, no single cue was sufficient to push action directly 
through the ranks. Rather, it was a collection of cues that created increasing awareness of 
what I designated as “an issue”. The cues functioned as increasing evidence that feelings 
of unease were already there for specific groups of organisational participants 
(management accountants, General Directors). Tangible events made intangible 
uneasiness open for communication and for sharing in the bank. At the Rabobank, this 
emotional discomfort was already there. Through the increasing visibility of ‘problems’ 
(deviations between desired- and actual state), people became more sensitive to the 
underlying issue. The precise nature of the ‘issue’ was still unclear to most, and differed 
wildly between respondents. It appeared that in this stage, managers only needed a general 
and abstract term such as accountability to classify their concerns. They gave the term 
various equifinal meanings, which accommodated their personal experiences as well as 
allowing it to remain compatible with the meaning given by others. The insights obtained 
from this case allows us to re-model cueing at the Rabobank.  
  
Some of the observations of this chapter are: (1) the realisation that accountability was to 
become a major issue came from many small, and sometimes seemingly unrelated cues; 
(2) cues affect issue salience at the Rabobank; they push the issue sufficiently to the 
foreground to warrant action; (3) when people did not have a direct interest in the issue 
(their position was neutral), they were able to project the traits of individual co-workers 
on the issue. What they felt for the issue, was then influenced by what they felt for the 
person who formally brought it to everyone’s attention. And (4), connections to 
previously committed action led to inherited commitment to the related issue.  
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Although Burns & Scapens (2000) emphasise the social rooting of management 
accounting, they accept the need for management accounting change as a given. The same 
with Busco et al. (2000), who saw the need for change as a massive disruption that forced 
the organisation to reconsider the basic assumptions underlying its actions. This chapter 
shows that “issues”1 can become salient without such a shock and that their salience is 
dependent on the social setting in which the issue arises. Once an issue has gained 
sufficient salience, the next step would be to explore how organisational participants make 
sense of that issue.  
 
It is clear that Results Oriented Management cannot be classified as radical change, given 
the response of the Rabobank Nederland project leader who noted that the program would 
take several years to spread throughout the organisation. However, it appears that change 
that proceeds at a somewhat slower pace is preceded by multiple and smaller cues. One 
may hypothesise that one of the differences in cues between radical change and more 
organic, slower change is the distribution of cues between participants (as noted earlier, 
some participants come across more signals that serve as cues than others). At the 
Rabobank the presence of these participants2 was important to the pace, the progress and 
the precise meaning given to change. Moreover, the cases are an illustration of Weick’s 
(1979) thesis that coordinated action is more a result of alignment on action than on the 
goals of action. The participants were primarily motivated by the immediate desirability 
of the action, rather than by the objectives of an improved planning and control as 
expressed by the Rabobank Nederland development team.  
 
I followed Barley & Tolbert (1997) in arguing that scripts are basic components of 
institutions. The matter of human agency in institutions (Seo & Creed, 2002) is therefore a 
matter of addressing the conditions under which scripts become questioned. This chapter 
has demonstrated that at the Rabobank scripts were questioned because of a volume of 
cues, events that may point to something out of the ordinary. It did not involve one major 
disruption that forced people to reconsider their existing habits. Rather, it involved many 
small events that a number of organisational participants could not order into a cognitive 
framework. However, under the notion of accountability, these could finally be addressed. 
With every cue, the issue of accountability gained salience to such extent that it made 
action both inevitable, and understandable. In this specific case, agency stemmed from 
incompatibilities between habitual actions (scripts), which were founded on a cognitive 
framework that in turn could not deal with the cues that were eminently present. This is a 
micro-perspective of institutional contradiction (Seo & Creed, 2002). Through this 
discussion, the chapter has proposed a more detailed understanding of the elements that 
influenced the collective creation of the notion of ‘accountability’ at the Rabobank.  
 
                                                
1 The remainder of this thesis will continue to use the term “issue” in the same way as it has been used in this 
chapter. The term “issue” thus continues to reflect the meaning that has been provided in this chapter.   
2 The role of these influential participants is explicated in the next chapter, where they will be referred to as issue 
elites. 
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Most of the member banks acknowledged that the issue of accountability was sufficiently 
pressing to warrant action. However, an issue does not lead automatically to a unique 
course of action. As the research framework in chapter 3 indicates, the selection of action 
requires a process of sense making and collective meaning creation. The next chapter will 
focus on how the various social groups at the Rabobank came to the collective definition 
of action.  
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The last chapter worked from the premise that issues are important to the opening up of 
routine behavioural patterns. They induce people to consider different possible courses of 
action. However, the chapter did not address how groups come to specific action, that in 
the future may become scripted, routinised and possibly institutionalised. That will be the 
function of this chapter. Basically, it will address the manner in which institutional 
determinism1 is circumvented in practice. 
 
Using scripts, the basic building block of institutionalised habit, several authors have 
argued that specific action does not follow directly from the identification of specific 
issues, as they were defined in the previous chapter. For example, Weick (1995) noted 
that coordinated action follows from different issues only when action in itself is 
compatible. Lau & Woodman (1995) offer the idea that, on changing events, people 
undertake action based on change scripts that guide their interpretation and the actions 
they select. These change schemas are ‘sense-making frameworks containing organised 
knowledge of change attributes’ (p. 538). Different approaches seem to exist in attempts 
to explain how people come to coordinated action. For this thesis it is important to explore 
how people come to coordinated action, as ROM was the background against which new 
actions were defined. The process of defining actions is thus part of the management 
accounting change that ROM represents. 
 
People spend time investigating the meaning of issues and actions. This process of sense 
making was key for the Rabobank as the ROM program can be construed as a sense-
making device that allows the people at the bank to make structural choices on the bank’s 
desired position in the market, the actions that need to be undertaken and the 
responsibilities everyone has. In short, accountability was the issue, while ROM was seen 
as a framework within which a solution could be formulated. Therefore, ROM provides a 
good opportunity to observe how individuals and groups come to coordinated actions in 
response to the issue of accountability. This chapter provides an analysis of how people 
give meaning to the stream of experience they are in, by exploiting the sense making 
opportunities they have. This is important to gain insights into the determinants of 
collective action.  
 
                                                
1 Institutional determinism relates here to the fact that the presence of institutions reduces the likelihood of 
change, as institutions tend to be self-enforcing. 
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The ROM program has the potential to become a formal platform for the creation and 
adaptation of meaning. In other words, it becomes a platform for the sense making of the 
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Figure 8-1: Relation between cues, issues and action 
 
This chapter will focus on the shaded parts of Figure 8-1, a figure that was introduced in 
the previous chapter. It will follow the sense-making processes at the Rabobank, which 
followed as well as accompanied the recognition of accountability as an issue. Sense 
making describes here the conscious dealing with the matter of accountability as opposed 
to scripted dealings that prescribe actions based on habit and routine as responses to past 
problems. Since this thesis is about the ways new action ultimately gets included in the 
institutional realm, it is the conscious processing that is of interest here as the resulting 
actions may become scripted in the future and eventually possibly institutionalised; that is, 
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they may become included in the institutional realm in some form. However, it would be 
overly simplistic to assume that people are able to fully detach themselves from their 
habits, conventions and their routines. Therefore, this chapter will propose a view of sense 
making at the Rabobank that is rooted in existing social regularities. Actors will attempt to 
use collective logic, regularities in choice and action that are known to have had the 
desired effect in combination with collective ‘invention’ of new practice. When the 
regularities fall short of achieving the desired result, the collective of participants attempts 
to ‘invent’ new acceptable action that will likely contribute to the desired state.  
 
As this is a localised process, the types of action that the program (and note that the 
program was functionally identical for all member banks) produced were different among 
the fourteen member banks under study. Basically, one program produced fourteen 
different outcomes at fourteen member banks, belonging to the same organisation. This 
chapter will explore how these differing outcomes resulted from local sense making 
processes. It will explore if and how organisational participants create a shared sense of 
meaning in participating in activities around Results Oriented Management. The shaded 
areas in the following figure that was introduced in chapter 3 (see Figure 3-6 on page 65) 
depict the positioning of this chapter in the entire line of argument of the thesis: 




































Figure 8-2: Research framework 
 
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, the ROM program will be readdressed briefly. 
Then, a theoretical discussion will be presented on sense making and the ways in which 
people provide meaning to the experiences they encounter. The section will propose an 
analytical separation between reason, which is seen as an expression of socially 
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acceptable regularities in explanations and the legitimation of possible actions, and 
invention, where the group departs from previously accepted arguments and defines 
actions and explanations outside the established frame of reference. Finally, this chapter 
will discuss the ways in which the people at the Rabobank were using the program to 
provide meaning to their role within the bank, the redefinition of expected behaviours and 
in so doing the provision of new meaning to the program in turn. Some conclusions will 
be that a change program gets defined in terms of the behaviour it yields, and thus it gets 
redefined in the course of change. This, again, is an example of the duality of structure 
(Giddens, 1984). The changes envisaged in the various member banks involved both the 
medium and the outcome of change. This means that, in the course of enacting the 
program Results Oriented Management (the medium), the outcomes, such as different 
outlooks on the bank and its purposes, reflect back on the medium and what it is that it is 
supposed to achieve. The role of ROM evolved as it produced results in the form of 
structures and behaviours. This duality makes the program as much subject to change as 
the results it attempts to achieve. The case demonstrates further that, although the program 
is essentially a structured set of activities, the participants mediate these activities through 
sense making processes. Sense making tends to make the program responsive to local 
concerns, although at the outset, it is similar for all banks. Lastly, the managers engaged 
in the program were primarily searching for behavioural changes on the part of the bank’s 
employees: for them to act accountable rather than to be accountable. The case of ROM 
demonstrates that actions do not follow the original objectives of a change program per se. 
Other, locally determined factors become increasingly important through collective sense 
making. Therefore, the chapter concludes that ROM was valuable as a sense making 
platform, rather than a change program, from which behavioural changes would naturally 
emerge.  
 
8.2 Results Oriented Management 
The Program of Results Oriented Management was explained in depth in chapter 5, but 
for the purposes of this chapter a number of elements in the program are revisited. The 
formal objective of the program is to translate the ambitions of the bank into targets and 
actions and the assurance that these actions lead to the desired result. The backbone of the 
program consists of the Rabobank management model that is depicted as follows: 
 

















Figure 8-3: the Rabobank management model 
 
The model consists of two main parts. The left hand side are the five organisation areas as 
defined by the EFQM model (European Foundation for Quality Management), the right 
hand side are the three results areas that are similar to the three perspectives of the 
Balanced Scorecard (Compasses) the bank operates. Basically, the model is a method to 
focus attention on specific parts of the organisation when deviations are observed in one 
or more result areas. This philosophy is the basic Rabobank Management model and it 
serves as the foundation of Results Oriented Management. Results Oriented Management 
(ROM) is intended to aid local banks implement a structured planning and control cycle. 
Many banks also used the program to forge a strong result orientation in the action 
choices of employees, by appealing to a strong sense of responsibility. It promotes the 
measurement of objectives and holding people accountable for the accomplishment of 
those objectives.  
 
The program needed to yield a number of tangible deliverables, such as year plans and 
budgets. Most member banks did the program with a so-called MT+; that is the bank’s 
management team reinforced by representatives of all segments of the bank. It was often 
assumed that these were a cross-section of the bank. The leaders of the bank had different 
purposes for the program, but one commonality was present: behaviour. Many member 
banks wanted to use the program to initiate a cultural change in their bank; to make people 
feel and behave more accountable for their actions. For example, consider this statement 
from a controller of the Leeuwarden bank: ‘At one point or another, we defined as a goal 
for our ROM efforts: we want our SPIRIT to resound in our targets, how we express them, 
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where SPIRIT is an acronym for the behaviours we want to promote’. The program 
actually consists of an attempt to introduce new ways of reasoning, new modes of 
behaviour and a new logic of accountability. For individuals and groups to define new 
ways of reasoning, new modes of behaviour and a new logic of accountability, they 
engage in sense making, which may potentially result in a series of discrete script-like 
behavioural patterns that in combination may form new institutions or influence existing 
ones. Therefore, tracking ROM and associated new behaviour is to possibly, but not 
necessarily, witness the birth of new institution(s). It explicitly invites participants to 
engage in sense making activities  
 
8.3 Sense making: theoretical viewpoints 
Sense making cannot practically be separated from any discussion on cues, but 
analytically a separation is logical as sense making is about the attribution of meaning and 
selection of behaviour on an issue that can be taken as a given. If cues and prospective 
sense making were to be combined into one section of this thesis, then any discussion on 
the manner to which people give meaning to possible future action would run the risk of 
being diluted by discussions on differences in issue salience and the impact of cues. 
Nevertheless, the reader should observe that there is overlap in concepts. This is logical, 
as we are talking about partially similar mechanisms.  
 
The framework presented in chapter 3 and repeated in Figure 8-4, makes a clear 
distinction between prospective- and retrospective sense making. The former occurs 
before the action or event, it is the attempt to ‘comprehend, understand explain, attribute, 
extrapolate and predict’ (Starbuck and Milliken, 1988, p. 51)1; the latter gives 
retrospective explanation to elapsed events or actions; it is the explanation of surprise 
(Louis, 1980). Prospective sense making is the attempt to select meaningful future action 
based on an issue or shock, while retrospective sense making is the provision of meaning 
to elapsed action. However, it appears that this distinction may not be theoretically valid, 
as sense making is never just prospective or retrospective; it is both. Prospective sense 
making of action (the selection of meaningful action) includes retrospective sense making 
of the associated issue. Each attempt to make prospective sense of a problem (rather 
similar to the notion of bounded rationality), includes retrospectively making sense of its 
source. Therefore the term retrospective sense making is unhelpful without indications of 
what the sense making is about. This chapter is about the sense making of action in light 
of retrospective sense that is made of the issues described in chapter 7. Prospective and 
retrospective sense making are two sides of the same coin. Chapter 3 depicted sense 
making as follows:  
 
                                                
1 Chapter 7 elaborated on this process of providing meaning to several, seemingly unrelated cues. 








Figure 8-4: Making sense 
  
This view on the bi-directional nature of sense making was also coined by Daft & Weick 
(1984) who note: ‘People are trying to interpret what they have done, define what they 
have learned and solve the problem of what they should do next.’ (p. 284). This points to 
the importance of sense making as a concept in itself. As Weick (1995) remarks: ‘The 
dominance of retrospect in sensemaking is a major reason why students of sensemaking 
find forecasting, contingency planning, strategic planning and other magical probes into 
the future wasteful and misleading if they are decoupled from reflective action and 
history’ (p. 30). Looking forward is interpreting backwards. At this point, Figure 8-2 is 
still considered to be valid in assuming that sense making occurs at multiple stages: to 
provide meaning to cues as well as to place elapsed action in a meaningful framework. 
Nevertheless, both instances are combinations of pro-and retrospective sense making. It is 
for this reason that this chapter will deal with sense making as a whole, instead of a 
distinction between pro-and retrospective sense making, which is still analytically useful, 
but of limited empirical significance.  
 
Sense making involves the placing of stimuli into some kind of framework (Weick, 1995). 
Weick describes sense making as follows, when he notes some properties of sense making 
related to a new medical discovery: ‘First, someone notices something, in an ongoing flow 
of events, something in the form of a surprise, a discrepant set of cues, something that 
doesn’t fit. Second, the discrepant cues are spotted when someone looks back over 
elapsed experience. The act of looking is retrospective. Third, plausible explanations … 
are offered to explain the cues and their relative rarity. Fourth, the person making the 
speculations publishes them in a tangible journal article that becomes part of the 
environment of the medical community for others. He or she creates an object that was not 
“out there” to begin with but now is there for the noticing’ (1995, p. 2). The presence of 
cues was extensively discussed in the last chapter. This chapter is on the creation of 
plausible explanations for accountability and the extension of their individual and 
collective frame of reference where people attempt to reformulate the purpose and 
meaning of their daily activities in terms of accountability.  
 
In the process from issue recognition (chapter 7) to collective action definition, sense 
making is key. The following sections will discuss how an externally developed change 
program may in effect serve as a collective sense-making device, partly to provide 
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meaning for its own existence1. In this, it illustrates the point made by Weick (1993a, 
1995) and Garfinkel (1967), who note that sense making and action often occur in 
reversed order, hence Weick’s (1995, p. 18) quote: ‘How can I know what I think until I 
see what I say?’. It emphasises that the object of judgement alters judgement in itself.  
 
There is one challenging aspect that needs elaboration: collective sense making does not 
occur in isolation. It draws on cognitive scripts that are available, similar to purely 
scripted action, but it also uses invention, that is the development of new actions as a 
result of a process of inventing acceptable and legitimate explanations for those actions2. 
The sense making of ‘new’ experience thus differs from the sense given to familiar 
experience in the degree of invention needed to relax the emotional discomfort the 
experience causes. Both instances draw on existing scripts. The process of sense making 
can be visualised as shown in Figure 8-5:  
 











Collective sense making for first order change
Collective sense making for second order change
 
 
Figure 8-5: collective sense making in action definition 
 
                                                
1 The case will demonstrate that the further ROM progressed, the more clarity it yielded information on what it 
was supposed to do. 
2 This is in line with Weick’s (1993, 1995) and Garfinkel’s (1967) argument that actions are often defined before 
their rationalisation and legitimisation. 
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The figure shows two instances of collective sense making. The upper part depicts 
collective sense making in first order change. First order change is about behavioural 
adaptations that are considered appropriate within an organisation or an organisation’s 
subgroup’s set of beliefs on how the organisation needs to act (Bartunek & Moch, 1994). 
The lower part shows collective sense making in second order change. Second order 
change ‘refers to changes in the cognitive frameworks underlying the organization’s 
activities, changes in the deep structure or shared schemata that generate and give 
meaning to these activities (Egri and Frost, 1991; Gersick, 1991)’ (Bartunek & Moch, 
1994, p. 24; see also Bartunek & Moch, 1987, Moch & Bartunek, 1990, and Frost & Egri, 
1994). The primary difference between these two is that first order change involves the 
use of shared understandings on how the organisation needs to operate and how the 
objectives of any change program need to be achieved. These shared understandings will 
be used to come to collective definitions of actions, but they are not challenged 
themselves. First order change therefore refers to outcomes, while underlying assumptions 
remain unaffected. This relates to collective scripted processing, that was used in Figure 
8-1 of this chapter. Established beliefs (including those embedded in the cognitive 
properties of scripts) and expectations are not challenged. Rather, they are being used to 
come to coordinated action. As a consequence, this action always results from the 
application of shared logic, and the use of shared scripts that appeal to the issue at hand1. 
There is no need to invent new ways of reasoning; existing modes of interpretation are 
applied.  
 
This need is present in the lower half of Figure 8-5. This half shows collective sense 
making in relation to second order change. Second order change not only involves 
observable behavioural changes as the outcomes of the group process, but also the 
underlying assumptions that people use in formulating expectations of future states are 
being altered. In order to resolve the issues that bring people together in workgroups or 
project teams, sometimes following existing habits and conventions do not produce a 
result that alleviates the emotional discomfort that the issue causes. In those 
circumstances, participants will have to formulate actions with only limited guidance from 
the underlying assumptions and expectations that allows the group to operate. I will refer 
to this process as invention. Invention is a process of collectively developing new actions, 
without the extensive support of existing habits, scripts or negotiated conventions from 
the past. From invention, new schemas can emerge if the characteristics of the situation in 
which invention occurs, are recurring (Gioia & Poole, 1984). However, sense making can 
never be accomplished by invention alone. As Schott (1991) notes: ‘an important fact 
about perception is that it is rarely if every “neutral”. … We precondition or perform the 
interpretation of sensory information through expectations, emotional states, level of 
stress, belief systems, or sexual mores. Contrary to John Locke, we are not a tabula rasa’ 
(p. 59). We are simply unable to operate socially, if we do not have a basic understanding 
                                                
1 This does not mean that new scripts cannot emerge. Rather, new scripts will be in line with existing beliefs and 
assumptions. 
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of histories and conventions to make our understandings intelligible. Therefore, as the 
lower part of Figure 8-5 depicts, sense making in second order change will remain 
dependent on that schematic knowledge that remains unchallenged. As such, the social 
entity, such as a working group or a team will work from a number of shared assumptions 
that make the act of invention effective as intelligibility remains unchallenged.   
 
The implications of the above views on meaning provision is that the discussion of sense 
making at the Rabobank will proceed along two types of arguments: one viewing sense 
making as the application of existing schemas (‘collective reason from shared schemas’ in 
Figure 8-5) and one viewing sense making as the act of invention (‘inventing’ in Figure 
8-5). The discussion of sense making and action definition at the Rabobank will be 
structured along these lines. 
 
However, before I will present a discussion on how collective sense making efforts led to 
the definition of action, first a brief discussion follows on which actions resulted from 
these sense making efforts. The reason for this reversed chronology is that the question of 
how collective action was defined is more important to this chapter than which actions 
were selected. By first clarifying the types of actions selected, it prevents confusion later 
on in the chapter, when the generic term ‘actions’ is used. Therefore, the next section will 
present a discussion of a number of actions that followed from the interactions in the MT+ 
groups at the various local member banks. 
 
8.4 Action following from MT+ interactions 
Following the discussions in MT+ groups, a number of member banks produced 
documents describing the types of action choices that had been made. The purpose of 
these documents was two-fold: to act as formal records of the agreed courses of actions 
and to facilitate dissemination to employees who were not involved in the MT+ 
discussions. Some of the collectively decided actions can be found in Table 8-1. 
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Category Action/behaviour 
Customers Be a professional discussion partner 
 Obtain knowledge on employees’ capacities 
 Improve on domestic market share 
 Top priority on market share mortgages 
 Maximise customer satisfaction/ 0-errors 
Employees Agreements are documented and honoured 
 Cherish people with ambitions 
 Clarify mutual expectations 
 Increase risk orientation 
Financial Strive for financial autonomy 
 Focus on Banking Productivity 
 Accept poor solvability for now 
Cooperative Be a part of relevant networks 
 Institute a permanent panel of members 
 100% of meaningful clientele is a member of 
the bank  
Table 8-1: Intended actions/behaviours resulting from MT+ sessions 
 
These actions were then introduced in the segments of the banks, with the request to 
produce segmental action plans. This was rather problematic at a number of banks as there 
was considerable time pressure in formulating these actions. Even more importantly, 
many employees whose co-operation was sought, were not present at the initial MT+ 
meetings, they were uninformed on the circumstances in which the above action choices 
were being made. They lacked the sense making history, which is essential for the 
provision of meaning.  
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Action does not follow objectively from an issue. Issues do not dictate an objective 
‘optimal’ action choice. Issues do not present themselves as objective truth, they are 
dependent on shared sense making histories. Issues do not hold all information to be 
uncovered by the application of mere logic. As Schott (1991) notes: ‘the capacity for 
rational, deliberate thought is essentially a second-order phenomenon which occurs rather 
late (if at all) in the vast stream of cognitive processing’ (p. 69). The argument presented 
in this chapter is that a combination of the application of known rules that lead to 
acceptable outcomes (schemas) and social processes (invention) allowed the participants 
of the MT+ groups to come to co-ordinated action choices. The chapter argues that co-
ordinated action choices do not arise solely from applying universalistic1 logic to the issue 
at hand, but that the social characteristics of the setting in which the action decisions are 
being made are equally important in the determination of the action that ultimately arises.  
 
In order to substantiate these claims, the next section will address how some of the actions 
that were described in Table 8-1 came to be. It will address both schemas and invention to 
argue that MT+ participants used both inferences from collectively defined appropriate 
behaviour, and inventions to come to a collectively acceptable list of actions. This entire 
process can be referred to as organisational sensemaking.   
 
8.5 Making sense of Results Oriented Management 
The primary vehicle of collective sense making at the Rabobank was the MT+ meeting. 
An MT+ group consisted of the bank’s management team and representatives from all 
segments of the bank. Initially, these MT+ groups were going through the steps of the 
program often guided by a Rabobank Nederland consultant and an internal project leader. 
Through the discussions that followed a sense of collective action emerged. This chapter 
argues that co-ordination did not emerge from sharing the envisaged objectives of ROM; 
rather, it arose from the short-term alignment of actions, stemming from the sense 
resulting from the discussions in the MT+ groups. This is an illustration of Weick’s 
(1995) argument of co-ordinated action as a result of compatibility of action, rather than 
the alignment of objectives. The process of action definition was as much a search for the 
meaning of the program as it was a search for appropriate action in response to the issue 
of accountability. In order to determine how collective sense making contributed to the 
collective definition of action, this section will address the two dimensions of sense 
making that were introduced earlier in the chapter in Figure 8-5: collective reasoning from 
shared schemas and the invention of action. The former relates to the influence of existing 
schemas on the sense making effort, while the latter relates to the ways in which social 
entities come to coordinated action when schematic understandings of the organisation are 
inadequate for the resolution of current issues.  
                                                
1 Universalistic refers to the assumption that similar logic can be applied to similar issues: this would mean that 
logic is not situational.  
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8.5.1 Action definition: collective reasoning from shared schemas 
Lau & Woodman (1995) argue that so-called change schemas guide processes of change. 
The argument is that interpretation of events and experience is done through the presence 
of schemas which are defined as ‘a cognitive structure that represents organised 
knowledge about a given concept or type of stimulus. A schema contains both the 
attributes of the concept and the relationships among the attributes’ (Fiske & Taylor, 
1984, p. 140). These schemas guide understanding of the changes that are occurring. Lau 
& Woodman call the change schema a ‘sense-making framework containing organised 
knowledge of change attributes’ (Lau & Woodman, 1995, p. 538). The notion of change 
schema offers a way of conceptualising the manner in which an issue affects 
organisational sense making. 
 
A schema, including change schemas, has three general dimensions: causality, valence 
and inferences. Causality relates to the capacity of a schema to provide people with a 
frame of reference that addresses causal links between events and people. Related to 
change, causality aids inferences on the cause of change and the need thereof. Valence is 
about the relative importance of the changes. People are assumed to have identified the 
event attributes that include meaning and significance. They have formed theories on the 
valence of these events. Valence includes significance of persons, events, processes and 
relationships. Lastly, inferences relate to the fact that schemas allow persons to make 
inferences about the future, by specifying the likelihood of events occurring in a future 
period.   
 
Lau & Woodman also offer a conceptualisation of the relationships between theoretically 
accepted and empirically derived dimensions of change schemata. They basically relate 
the dimensions found in the literature to those used in survey constructs, meant to 
operationalise the dimensions for use in questionnaires. Moreover, they relate these to the 
dimensions named in panel discussions. Consider the following figure that depicts these 
relations: 
 














Literature Survey Discussion groups
 
Figure 8-6: Relationship between various dimensions of change schemas (Lau & Woodman, 1995, p. 543) 
 
These dimensions thus define the change schemata that guide the responses that 
experienced organisational participants can display. Put differently, these dimensions (in 
part) define the action repertoire of organisational participants related specifically to an 
issue that serves as cues. The issue(s) trigger a partially scripted repertoire of action 
choices. Therefore, causality, valence and inferences can usefully be seen as the action 
generating characteristics of an issue (a cue). As issues gain sufficient salience (see 
chapter 7), they merit attention on the part of organisational participants. Causality, 
valence and inferences are those schematic attributes that affect organisational sense 
making, leading to the definition of actions.  
 
Causality: At the discussions held at the various member banks, very little attention was 
given to how the ROM program was going to address the issue of accountability. 
Causality was hardly addressed. As soon as the MT+ structure was formed, the program 
itself was inevitable. In fact, the people who participated were present because of the 
existence of the program; questioning the use of the program would be questioning their 
presence, and only a handful was prepared to do so. (e.g. a few participants of the West-
Drenthe bank overtly doubted the added value of doing a program such as ROM, as they 
perceived their influence more limited than the program assumed). Additionally, in order 
to question causality, participants need to have a clear understanding of what it is that the 
program is supposed to do, while in fact, this became only clear in the course of the 
program. The ROM program as Rabobank Nederland offered it had different objectives 
for the member banks, than for Rabobank Nederland. To clarify this, consider Figure 8-7: 
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Results Oriented Management
'Professionalise planning & 
control of local bank'
'Define local strategies for local 
needs and actions leading to 






Figure 8-7: Envisaged objectives of participating in the ROM program 
 
The Rabobank organisation as a whole developed ROM to ‘teach’ local member banks 
how to engage in structured planning and control activities1. Note that the organisation 
(read: Rabobank Nederland) does not formally state what the outcome should be; in 
principle, it does not interfere with the type of strategies or results stemming from the 
program. To a local member bank, the program is a template for making structured 
choices. The emphasis is on the strategies and resulting actions that come from engaging 
in the program, and not the precise format in which those choices are made. A 
consequence for the member banks is that the purpose of doing the program is an integral 
part of this program. Put differently, only in the course of the program, does it become 
clear why the program is appropriate for the bank, what strategies are selected, which 
choices will be made and what the resulting action choices will look like. It was therefore 
only a few participants who were able to link the ROM program to a pre-specified 
objective.  
 
The purpose of the program was defined in the course of the program. The ‘how’ question 
as posed by Rabobank Nederland (How do we professionalise planning & control) was 
sufficiently salient for most managers Business Administration, the managers charged 
with accounting and control. It appealed to their feelings that something was not right. ‘I 
am very glad with ROM, as it addresses the uneasiness I am feeling. I do not believe that 
we are fully in control, that is aware of potential threats and act upon them’, as one 
                                                
1 This objective was well underway to being met: ‘As a project leader, you do many practical things. Apart from 
that, it was a learning experience, because the consultant, who was process supervisor taught me how to 
supervise a full program such as ROM’ (Controller, Leeuwarden bank). 
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manager Business Administration admitted. And to a number of management teams of 
member banks, this was sufficient motivation for doing the program1. In all, causality with 
the previously identified issues had only limited influence on the action choices made in 
the course of the program. The fact that a number of managers Business Administration 
were interested in the improved possibilities for planning and control, had little influence 
on the action choices within the program. For doing the program in itself was already part 
of the solution to their concerns.  
 
With regards to the actions defined in the course of the program itself, it was a rather 
different matter. In the early stages of the program, participants were aware that they were 
present to participate in the strategy setting of their bank. However, with the exception of 
the management team members, they did not have a clear notion of the issues challenging 
the bank. These issues were emerging from the discussions they had in the course of the 
ROM program. The management team of the bank was an exception in that it did have 
clear objectives for the program. This led to an initial inequality between the Management 
Team and other participants. The Project leader of the Groningen bank indicated that he 
had a rather good idea of what many of the outcomes would be. A participant at the West-
Zeeuws Vlaanderen bank admitted that ‘they are often simply better informed, than we 
are. So they have the mental baggage to follow a certain line of argumentation. And if 
you, as a regular employee, are participating, you have to be very capable to be able to 
make your mark. And not everyone can do that properly.’ This relates closely to the 
notion of ‘issue elite’, a notion of informal power, which will be explained in section 
8.5.2.2 below. Causality as indicator of schematic processing of environmental signals 
only appears to be important for the higher-level managers at the various banks. These 
were the only ones who were able to link any predefined objectives with a range of 
possible actions that could be seen as desirable and ‘rational’.  
 
Valence relates to the significance of the issue and the subsequent ROM program. More 
specifically, valence points to the ability to evaluate the significance of the ROM effort by 
means of present schemas, which in itself was rather problematic to some of the 
participants in the MT+ groups. Taken from the various segments, they were asked to get 
involved in determining the planning for the coming years. These participants were aware 
of the fact that this was an extraordinary request so no one refused to participate. Planning 
had ordinarily been a task for the managers of the different segments. The large-scale 
involvement of other staff was rather new. However, in participating the new participants 
were unsure about their role, the things expected from them and the types of actions that 
were deemed acceptable. They had little previous experiences or shared theories on what 
they were supposed to solve and what actions that would accomplish. Those who had, 
picked up on their theories somewhere else as the following statement from a participant 
at West-Zeeuws Vlaanderen illustrates: ‘in first instance, I did not fully understand what 
                                                
1 As the reader may recall, chapter 7 noted that a number of management teams adopted ROM primarily because 
only one or two of their members felt it was important. This was sufficient for the rest of the managers. 
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the meaning of ROM was, until it became clear to me that it was just a system of strategic 
planning. I have studied Commercial Economics and I was really surprised that it was 
presented here as something new..... I remember thinking to myself, this is something that 
Procter & Gamble has been doing for many years’. This respondent had difficulties 
understanding the relevance of the ROM program, until he could relate it to more generic 
notions that provided information that he needed to make sense of the program. His 
previous experiences helped to fill gaps in his knowledge, by assuming for those gaps that 
the ROM program was similar to what he knew on systems of strategic planning. 
However, many participants lacked previous experiences to allow them to make sense of 
the program or the issues underlying the program in a similar fashion. Therefore, these 
participants in the MT+ groups were unsure of the significance of the program as they 
lacked the schemas to make sense of their activities beforehand. This led to immediate 
‘borrowing’ of other people’s sense making structures (including those brought in by the 
consultant)1. To managers in general and managers Business Administration in particular, 
valence was self-evident. These managers were more familiar with change processes, and 
during the preparatory stages of ROM, they had developed a shared managerial view of 
the significance of the program in light of the future developments they foresaw for the 
bank. They were therefore in a position to assess the significance of the program. Indeed, 
the choice to go ahead with ROM was made by the management teams. This in itself is 
evidence of a positive evaluation of the valence by the various management teams of the 
member banks. As this section has shown, the evaluation of valence was less positive for 
those MT+ members located outside the management team. 
 
Inferences are about the perceived consequences of the issue. As Lau and Woodman, 
1995, argue, schemas help the participants of ROM to predict the most likely 
developments in the program. In doing so, scripts belonging to these schemas can help 
people to make inferences about future developments that stem from identifying issues, 
such as those from chapter 7. At the Rabobank, these schemas were problematic as the 
issue of accountability was one that was rather new to many banks. A new issue can be 
expected to have few, if any, scripts attached to influence the behavioural repertoire of the 
people involved: ‘Novel situations (e.g. appointment to a newly created position) require 
intensive conscious processing to decide appropriate behaviour and action. Such action 
involves little or no script processing - no script for behaviour exists’ (Gioia & Poole, 
1984, p. 453). A new issue means that people did not have any opportunity to develop 
successful behaviours. However, the notions underlying the program’s inception from the 
point-of-view of Rabobank Nederland were to demonstrate how a successful planning and 
control cycle could be done. For this purpose also, no behavioural scripts were available, 
but here the Rabobank Nederland consultant demonstrated the desired behaviours in a 
step-by-step manner. Therefore, the participating member banks did learn a methodology 
of planning and control. Put differently, they were using the consultants’ scripts of how to 
successfully complete the ROM program. Witness to this statement is for example the 
                                                
1 This will be explained below, in the section covering Inferences 
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remarks made by one management accountant of the Leeuwarden bank: ‘I have a rather 
critical perspective on the bank, in my role as a management accountant, while as a 
process supervisor of ROM, you need to stay neutral. These multiple roles were a bit 
problematic for me. I was very glad that we had the Rabobank Nederland consultant to 
guide us, because I could not have done it alone for the first time. The consultant taught 
me how to guide processes like this one.’ 
 
As noted earlier, in the course of the program, the participants were asked to define the 
problem areas for their bank as well as their ambitions for the bank for the coming years. 
The various MT+ groups were very able to do so. However, since the issues that were 
identified in the course of the program were rather new, no scripts existed to make 
predictions about future states as related to the desired future states of the member bank. 
Especially the non-MT members of the group were excited to be involved, but they were 
unable to define the courses of action that were needed to achieve the ambitions they had 
expressed as no scripts existed to guide these choices.  
 
This in itself led to a paradox at a number of local member banks: scripts are needed to 
allow participants to define collective action resulting from the recognition of issues 
(chapter 7), while the ROM exercise was primarily aimed at the development of new 
scripts of behaviour; i.e. scripts were needed to come to the realisation that scripts needed 
to be developed. This paradox leads to the conclusion that issues are meaningless without 
at least a rudimentary ability to associate the issue to earlier experiences. It is this point 
that Gioia (1992) makes when noting that ‘problems’ are especially recognised when they 
appeal to existing mental structures. For a number of participants, it was problematic to 
relate the new requirements to existing scripts, and it led at least at one bank to a number 
of people leaving or being laid off. These lay-offs and subsequent hiring of new staff were 
meant to get an inflow of people who had the ability and knowledge to relate to the things 
that the bank wanted to achieve (such as result orientation and people being accountable). 
This was clear in the Nijmegen bank, given an article in a Dutch newspaper (Het 
Financieele Dagblad, February 17, 2003) in which the Director of Private Clients of the 
Rabobank Nijmegen argues that the bank let go a number of people as they did not have 
the proper sales attitude and replaced them with others ‘with a strong sales orientation’. 
The director of this bank notes that ‘those who do not make it, will be removed quickly 
from the processes in the organisation. Otherwise, chances are that the effects will be 
short lived. The organisation will fall back into old patterns and much effort will have 
been in vain.’ Although this bank did not participate in the current study, the article 
emphasises that apart from attempts to alter existing scripts of current employees, some 
banks opted for bringing in new people who could more closely relate to the changes in 
attitudes and cultures. Of the fourteen banks in this study, only the Groningen bank went 
through a similar process. Most managers did not see the need for lay-offs. As the next 
sections will demonstrate, most participants of ROM at many banks were very well able 
to define collective action as they went through the program, i.e. they were able to 
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develop shared opinions on the proposed changes and to come up with meaningful actions 
(a process I refer to as invention).  
 
This section has argued that organisational participants need schemas and scripts to be 
able to associate issues to meaningful action. This was a condition that was not met for 
specific groups of MT+ participants. Many were unfamiliar with the workings of change 
programs in general and with Planning and Control in particular. As a consultant who was 
perceived as particularly knowledgeable on the program supervised the discussions, many 
participants followed his lead concerning the steps in the program. They learned (read: 
updated expectations on appropriate actions) as they went along. However, with regards to 
the choices that needed to be made within those steps (what are our local threats, which 
opportunities do we see, how do we deal with them?), many were at a loss as no 
schematic knowledge was available. Moreover, the consultant did not make those 
decisions for the MT+ participants; he was guiding the process of their decision-making. 
The current section will conclude with a schematic depiction of the role of schemas in the 
selection process. It is given in Figure 8-8: 
Results Oriented Management
'Professionalise planning & 
control of local bank'
'Define local strategies for local 
needs and actions leading to 





Collective action equals 
participation in ROM program:
Collective action stemming from 
scripts 'borrowed' from 
consultant.
Schemas in place: 
stemming from previous 
eperiences and explicitly 
discussed objectives for 








Schemas not in place: 
Initially, few shared 
theories of how and why 
the ROM activities were 
undertaken. These were 
being developed during 





Figure 8-8: Collective action definition resulting from schemas in place 
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The figure shows ROM as a response to different perceived needs and a different result 
related to scripts that could provide solutions. From the perspective of Rabobank 
Nederland, the program was meant to help member banks to engage in structured planning 
and control activities. Participation in the process, with the help of the Rabobank 
Nederland consultant, was the sort of collective action that was to fulfil the objective of 
learning how to participate in structured planning & control activities. But from the 
perspective of a local bank, participation leads to the recognition of the banks’ position in 
the local market and the definition of problem areas (‘our position on the mortgages 
market is insufficient’). These are issues that are locally much more interesting. These 
issues arose in the early stages of the program, from attempts to chart the current and 
future positions of the member bank.  
 
Schematic knowledge was only partially motivating the actions selected. Action did not 
follow promptly on the recognition that issues were present. The different objectives 
attributed to the program by Rabobank Nederland on the one hand and by many member 
banks on the other led to differing expected outcomes. From the perspective of Rabobank 
Nederland, the required actions that needed to be undertaken were merely participation in 
the program. The absence of scripts guiding action choices was not particularly grave to 
the objectives forseen by Rabobank Nederland; the participating banks were using scripts 
provided by the consultant, who guided them through each decision that needed to be 
made.  
 
With regards to the issues that the MT+ groups defined as a part of executing the program 
(‘we need to be more pro-active’), the objectives of ROM on a local level, things were 
more complicated. From the issues that came forward in the early stages of ROM 
(accountability, commitment and result/risk orientation), few of the action choices 
depicted in Table 8-1 emerged ‘automatically’. Rather, extensive search behaviour 
occurred (sense making attempts), which were dominated by characteristics that could be 
typified more as ‘social search behaviour’ than ‘schema-driven’, as few participants had 
useful previous experiences that could be used to connect the issues to actions. Rather, a 
social re-negotiation needed to take place to collectively agree on meanings and 
consequences. Moreover, in the absence of decisive and compelling signals from a 
collective analysis of issues (because of the emergence of new issues or conflicting 
opinions regarding their meaning), MT+ groups were using their social coherence as a 
group and members of an organisation to transfer their knowledge on possibly acceptable 
schema’s of the situation and scripts for the definition of action. Put differently, when the 
issues do not point convincingly to appropriate actions, the group invents new ways to 
come to meaningful action, by sharing and recombining people’s schemas of the issue and 
the situation and introducing new behaviours that can be added to the repertoire of 
possible behaviours. This act of inventing, sharing and recombining is a social process 
that exhibits specific characteristics. How these social characteristics of the ROM process 
affected collective sense making will be discussed in the next section. 
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8.5.2 Action definition: invention 
That it was difficult to derive action from the issues does not mean that collective action 
was not possible. Rather, the decisions for specific actions were a result of a process that 
was different from the mere application of schemas. This section will elaborate by 
proposing a number of notions of social interaction in the MT+ groups that were seen to 
be of influence for the emergence of collective action.  
 
Daft & Weick (1984) propose four modes of organisational interpretation that depend on 
assumptions about the environment of the organisation as well as organisational 
intrusiveness. Based on these two elements, four modes of organisational interpretation 
can be discerned. These four modes are based on four different configurations of the two 
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Figure 8-9: Modes of organisational interpretation (Daft & Weick, 1984) 
 
These modes of organisational interpretation suggest how collective sense making 
proceeds. As such they are relevant to any observation of organisational meaning creation.  
 
Undirected viewing: is a passive mode of organisational interpretation that is founded on 
the shared assumption in the organisation that the environment is too complex to analyse 
at length. Therefore, managers act on limited qualitative information to form their 
environment. Little formal management systems exist and those that do exist are of 
limited significance. 
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Conditioned viewing: This mode of interpretation is not intrusive, just as undirected 
viewing. However, here the organisation assumes that the environment is objective and 
benevolent and to a certain extent predictable. Interpretation relies on many data gathering 
systems and information collection routines that have been developed over the years. 
These systems and routines condition the manner in which the organisation construes the 
environment.  
Enacting: Organisations that create their own environments are enactive of this 
environment. They attempt behaviours and then see what happens. They are therefore 
actively involved in constructing their environment. They test, experiment and try 
different modes of behaviour. They are not particularly concerned with precedent, rules 
and traditions. Rather, they enact the environment; they make it up as they go.  
Discovering: This mode of interpretation is as intrusive on the environment as is the 
‘enacting’ one, but it revolves around the discovery of the true nature of the environment. 
Here, there is no matter of ‘inventing’ the environment by action and enactment, but here 
it is about the revelation of an objective environment that is probed by carefully designed 
systems, such as market surveys and forecasting tools.    
 
Traditionally, local member banks have relied largely on “undirected viewing”. Although 
there are no indications that the management of member banks feel that the environment 
is too complex, as Daft and Weick argue, the limited development of information systems 
and internal accounting procedures are pointing to this category. Keeping in mind the 
commercial success and the limited risks local banks ran, the limited attention to internal 
reporting and accountability is evident. However, the discussions by MT+ groups were a 
mix of enactment and discovery. In the Strength-Weakness-Opportunities-Threats 
analyses they prepared, attempts were made to chart the local environment. Also the 
introduction of PCK4, a sophisticated Balanced Scorecard that could present scenario 
analyses based on many different variables, suggests attempts at discovery. 
  
Since the transition from “undirected viewing” to “discovery” was in full swing during the 
ROM program, it justifies the conclusions from the previous section, in which it was 
argued that very few scripts were available to the participants to make sense of the issues 
and to formulate actions accordingly; script development was a part of the process itself. 
The process of “discovery” was accompanied by a process of “invention”, in that the MT+ 
groups were inventing new behaviours and actions to cope with the new information that 
emerged from the discussions.  
 
The consultants’ invitations to active discovery1 guided the short-term search activities. In 
participating in the discussions of the MT+ groups, people were quick to learn what ROM 
meant in their bank, and the extent of their influence on policy setting. This section argues 
                                                
1 The consultants were stimulating people to think about the environment of the bank and the role of the bank 
therein. Using the experiences that each participant had, they were collectively building an image of the bank in 
its environment that was less fragmented and more coherent. 
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that this social process allowed a number of MT+ groups to come to meaningful actions, 
despite the concurrent transition from “undirected viewing” into “discovery”.  
 
8.5.2.1 Invention: Organisational identity and image affecting the meaning 
of accountability for the member bank  
Dutton & Dukerich (1991) found that the New York Port Authority, facing a situation in 
which the organisation was attempting to make sense of the issue of homeless people, 
organisational identity and image played an important role. They argue that organisational 
image, that is how members think others see the organisation, and organisational identity 
that is how organisational members see it themselves, play ‘a key role in constraining 
issue interpretations, emotions and actions’ (p. 542). They argue that identity helps 
organisational participants to make sense of the issue. The same holds for the 
organisational image (Dutton et al., 1994). Gioia & Thomas (1996) come to similar 
conclusions. They argue that, under conditions of change, management team members are 
especially influenced by current identity and image and desired future image. They note 
that image and identity are important to the sense making process as they serve as bridge 
between internal context and the team members’ issue interpretations (p. 370). By this 
they propose that image and identity can serve as mediators between issue interpretation 
and the sensemaking context (p. 385). Basically, identity and image can affect how issues 
are interpreted and given meaning through sense making processes. Dutton & Dukerich 
(1991) and Dutton et al. (1994) produced a similar conclusion that organisational identity 
and image is important to collective sense making efforts.  
 
At the Rabobank, frequent references to the identity of the organisation could be recorded. 
As noted earlier in this thesis, the Rabobank is a cooperative. It distinguishes itself by its 
ownership structure, its local positioning, and its function in society. Although it should 
be clear how these qualities arose from the past of this organisation, it still is an ongoing 
source of pride for the participants of this organisation. For example, consider this 
comment of the General Director of Rabobank Meijel: ‘The Rabobank distinguishes itself 
by its local roots. In being relatively autonomous, we can make decisions on a local level 
that our competitors cannot. And since we do not have to pay out dividends, we are able 
to contribute to the local setting in which we do business. In doing so, we share part of 
our gains with the local community that yielded us this gain. We strive for ongoing 
interaction between the bank, its members and customers and the rest of the local 
community we do business with’.  
 
Virtually all respondents identified this strong emphasis on the local community and the 
extended decision space of member banks as the primary distinction between the 
Rabobank and its competitors. However, economic reality is also a factor. The Rabobank 
model is not particularly efficient and decision making in the group is rather slow. This 
contradiction gives rise to constant tension between the Rabobank identity and its 
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economic interests. This was continuously visible in the group processes surrounding 
ROM. Topics of discussions within MT+ groups included:  
- To whom are we accountable (members, Rabobank Nederland, local 
community)? 
- Do we emphasise customer value or financial stability? 
- What degree of local policy do we create vs. the following of national policy? 
 
During the discussions at the various banks, the participants developed their own 
philosophies around the apparent paradox of cooperation and efficiency. The Rabobank 
Meijel1, for example, opted for the following logic: it will look after the members’ interest 
best by saving on costs. In doing so, it improves its economic results, such as returns and 
solvency. Having sufficient economic results conveys the message to the collective of 
member banks that the size of Rabobank Meijel is viable. Thus it could maintain an 
acceptable degree of service to its local clients. To the General Director of this bank, this 
line of reasoning is specifically geared towards the cooperative. Favourable economic 
results are used to assure its independence vis-à-vis the other members of the group. 
These favourable results allow the bank to counter arguments of small-scale inefficiencies 
that threaten the member bank’s autonomy. Autonomy is crucial to this bank as the 
management team feels that its current scale best serves its members’ interests. Economic 
arguments play an important role to maintain the position of the Meijel cooperative within 
the group (optimisation of economic results thus only indirectly benefits members). In the 
perception of Rabobank Meijel, economic success leads to enduring autonomy on its 
current scale, which, in turn, it feels to be in the best interest of the members of the local 
bank. To the member bank in Meijel, the cooperative advantage it wants to yield to its 
members is the maintenance of an economically sub-optimal scale, as this is believed to 
be in the best interest of its community.  
 
To the Rabobank Groningen, the autonomy argument also played a role, but it was not 
small size that it needed to support. In the philosophy of the management of the bank, the 
cooperative needs to provide a full set of services for local needs and it needs to offer a 
very high quality in these services. In order to fund these ambitions and to remain 
autonomous, the Groningen bank needed to improve its solvency, which was rather low. 
As noted earlier, the cooperative does not need to pay out dividends, thus apart from its 
payments for the services rendered by Rabobank Nederland, it can plough back its 
revenues to its local community and its members. Where Meijel chose to support a sub-
optimal scale, Groningen attempted to improve its solvency so that it could improve 
quality (by expanding its services) and price setting without financial support from 
Rabobank Nederland. The Groningen bank needed to increase its financial resources to 
fulfil its cooperative mission. To the bank, this is the rationale to attempt to reach optimal 
financial performance. For each inefficiency or each lost commercial opportunity leads to 
                                                
1 Rabobank Meijel is a small rural bank that experiences much pressure from the group to merge its activities 
with other member banks. The bank so far refuses as it feels that that would deteriorate customer and member 
service. 
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a slower improvement in solvency, and in turn, a lower rate of growth in the number of 
services and in quality, which it has defined as its cooperative mission. Put differently, the 
better the bank performs economically, the more it can fulfil its role as a cooperative. It is 
this line of reasoning that brought the General Director of this bank to the statement: 
‘cooperative banking equals commercial banking, as the cooperative can only express 
itself locally by virtue of the distribution of its surpluses’. Another manager made a 
similar statement: ‘if you do not have money, you do not have a cooperative identity’.  
 
The primary commonality between the two banks was the cooperative identity as driving 
the interpretation of economic performance. Both moulded their conception of the 
cooperative so that it was compatible with current economic realities. The manner in 
which they adapted the concept of the cooperative and the types of action that resulted 
was rather different. Meijel was interested in keeping the Group at arm’s length through 
satisfactory results, so that it could maintain a service level that was higher than standards 
of efficiency promoted. Groningen was more directly interested in achieving good 
economic results, as it wanted to have the means to express its cooperative nature to the 
outside world; although at the stage of the MT+ discussions, employees did not exactly 
know how. 
 
The participants of the MT+ meetings at the banks under study were reconciling their 
identity with the outcomes of the MT+ discussions. The study of Gioia & Thomas (1996) 
found that a projection of desired future image could forge changes in current identities, 
which in turn affected issue interpretation and organisational sense making. The 
participants in the MT+ groups were explicitly invited to express desired states for the 
bank (it was part of strategy formation), and from these desired states deductions were 
made about what this meant for the identity of the bank. In a similar fashion to the 
examples of the Meijel and the Groningen bank, MT+ groups were seen to be moulding1 
their notions of organisational identity to be supportive of the desired future state of the 
bank. This slight adaptation of identity led to the different participants relaxing the 
institutional contradiction2 and the tension they felt in addressing the notion of economic 
accountability that was at odds with the autonomy that the member bank had stood for, for 
more than a century. In the collective reasoning during MT+ meetings, people made this 
notion of accountability more acceptable as it was assimilated into their understanding of 
organisational identity. As shown for the Meijel and the Groningen banks, this process 
contributes to the alleviation of institutional contradiction and it influences acceptable 
actions, but along different paths and through different philosophies.  
 
                                                
1 I deliberately use the term ‘moulding’ to indicate that some elements of identity were emphasized, while other 
were downplayed. However, the core meaning of identity underwent only minor changes. 
2 Institutional contradiction (Seo & Creed, 2002) relates to the tension that can come to exist between institutions 
that have contradictory features. At the Rabobank, institutional contradiction was present from the increasing 
importance of achieving superior economic results vs. the cooperative identity that focused on local presence, 
autonomy and small-scale service to local members. The MT+ meetings actually reduced this institutional 
contradiction somewhat by reconciling cooperative identity and the emphasis for economic performance. 
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To the Rabobank, image is not so different to identity. What people at the bank feel the 
bank is, is very similar to the image it projects in the market. Consider the excerpt from 
the television advertisement that was broadcast in the Netherlands: ‘Rabobank is a 
cooperative bank, which was established in the late nineteenth century by farmers. We are 
a bank of principles. So at the Rabobank it is not all about making a profit. Because 
Rabobank doesn't have shareholders. Instead, Rabobank has members who have a voice 
in its decisions.... And we are the only private bank in the world that has been awarded a 
triple A rating’. During a quarterly meeting for all employees, in the early stages of ROM 
at the Groningen bank (2002-2003), the project leader presented the outcomes of a study 
that he had learned of. This study asked consumers to compare some of the largest 
competing Dutch banks to animals, to get an insight in the attributed qualities of the 
various competitors. It was presented to reflect how customers see the competing banks. 
Table 8-2 shows some of these qualities that were presented to the employees that 
evening: 
 
Bank RABOBANK ABN-AMRO ING BANK POSTBANK 
Animal 
selected 





















Table 8-2: Presented image of Dutch banks 
 
The information triggered a discussion on how people saw the Rabobank in relation to 
other banks. Although a presentation such as the one above has little to do with ROM, it 
was seen to be a recurring topic in MT+ discussions as image in general, and the animal 
analogies in particular, served as references to future states. The presentation therefore 
provided a ‘cognitive handle’ to allow people to communicate what the bank should 
become and what values it needed to reflect. By ‘cognitive handle’ I mean that people 
could relate to a discourse that included a view of how people perceived the bank. To the 
participants of the MT+ meetings, image served as a virtual future state of the 
organisation, a sort of horizon to which all could orient themselves. Image (how others 
were viewing the organisation) was the mirror that confronted the participants with their 
actions. Member banks presented this mirror of external perceptions of the bank and its 
staff in different ways.  
 
The notion of image was also introduced earlier on at the Groningen bank, where the 
evening before the series of MT+ meetings, a member panel meeting was organised. A 
member panel is a discussion by members, on how they perceive the service and 
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performance of the local bank. This discussion was observed, but not interrupted, by the 
participants in the MT+. Additionally, the project leader presented the results of 
interviews held with stakeholders of the bank (the board, supervisors) that provided 
further information on how they perceived the bank. These notions of image were often 
referred to in assessing the merits of action proposals made in the MT+ group. Somewhat 
less explicit was the West-Drenthe approach, where they included one member of the 
board, who was external to the bank, in the MT+ group. His opinions were valued as he 
provided an idea of what the expectations were for the future. In a similar fashion, the 
Enschede-Haaksbergen bank included its board and the supervisory board in various 
stages of their program. In all cases, future image was a benchmark to which the MT+ 
group could orient itself. Through frequent references to this future state, a common 
ground was created that was to be used to allow shared actions to develop.  
 
Basically, the effects of image and identity for organisational sense making were to some 
extent similar to the New York Port case of Dutton & Dukerich (1991). Both at the New 
York port and at the Rabobank, organisational identity shaped the manner in which 
participants interpreted the issues. Identity was used and adapted to assess the importance 
of the issue and shaped interpretation accordingly. Dutton & Dukerich (1991) observe that 
issues may threaten key elements that make up organisational identity, and thus invoke 
action. At the Rabobank, the increasing importance of accountability increased the unease 
about the traditionally celebrated autonomy of the member banks. The sense making 
processes were thus revolving around the reduction of this unease. However, it did not 
only involve the formulation of action, but also adaptation of identity to accommodate 
these actions. There was a relation between sense making and identity, in that 
organisational identity facilitated sense making, but through these sense making efforts, 
statements of identity were adapted to accommodate resulting actions. This is clearly 
visible in the above examples. The groups working on the ROM program were effectively 
inventing an acceptable way of viewing the cooperative bank, which included financial 
accountability as an important notion. The resulting outlook on the bank and its purpose 
were therefore interplays between identity and issue, geared towards a desirable future 
image of the bank. This was the case both at the New York Port Authority and at the 
Rabobank.  
 
8.5.2.2 Invention: Power differentials 
Mills (2002) argues that meaning generation depends in part on the social environment 
where one spends most of ones working time. Although applied to a factory environment, 
Mills draws a useful lesson from the influences that affect the way in which people make 
sense. He observes that the social microenvironment, in which one spends most of ones 
time, is a primary influence on the social component of sense making. Ibarra & Andrews 
(1993) expand on this notion in stating that that perceptions of meaning are heavily 
affected by salient or relevant others. Salience and relevance in turn are dependent on 
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interpersonal similarity or closeness as well as power differentials. Thus apart from 
closeness, e.g. in the workplace, interpersonal similarity and power differentials are seen 
to be of influence. Festinger (1954, see Ibarra & Andrews, 1993) notes that these types of 
socially derived interpretations are increasingly important when ambiguity is high. Put 
differently, when signals are ambiguous and action does not follow logically from the 
issue by the mere application of ‘universalistic’ logic, then socially derived interpretations 
will become more important. As noted in earlier sections, this is relevant at the Rabobank, 
as action did not follow promptly from the definitions of issues.  
 
Marshall & Rollinson (2004) point out that collective sense making is heavily influenced 
by the politics of interpretation. They note that enactive sense making (‘a struggle over 
meaning’) ‘are neither wholly determined by pre-existing rules, norms and interpretative 
resources, nor purely the outcome of locally situated engagements between strategically 
acting and interacting agents’ (p. 72). Marshall & Rollinson continue to suggest that 
sense-making occasions are opportunities for attempts to privilege specific meanings over 
others and thus constitute specific forms of power (see also: Pfeffer & Salancik (1974) 
and Ibarra & Andrews (1993)). This is related to the Foucaultian concept of power (Fox, 
2000). In this concept, power is not just an overtly exercised hierarchically sanctioned 
difference in formal rights, but power is embedded in networks and relations. It is difficult 
to chart as this sort of power is less overt than the formal power described in the 
organisational chart. As noted earlier, the hiring of a new manager of Corporate Clients 
was a major break at the Groningen bank. One of the sources of power that he could draw 
on was this embedded power. He noted that in his relation to the General Director, he 
valued similar things: ‘we are on the same track. Of course, he is the General Director, 
and I am somewhat unruly, but I permit myself to be, because I am somewhat younger. 
And I believe that I need to be. For, if you want to make some changes happen, then you 
have to overdo it somewhat’. In 2003, the manager shared his vision on how he would 
restructure his segment by presenting a document that appealed much to the earlier 
experiences of the General Director. The document stated: ‘An important plus of this 
segment is the employees’ willingness for learning and for change (though currently only 
expressed in words). It is therefore necessary to accomplish a cultural transformation, 
which would mean a fundamental change program’. He arrived at conclusions that the 
General Director had arrived at as well.   
 
Rabobank West-Drenthe had decided in accordance to Vision 2005+1 that it intended to 
merge with a sister bank. The time path was set so that a possible merger could take place 
in 2006 or 2007. The time horizon of this bank was therefore immediately shortened to 
this time span. In terms of the General Director of this bank, the rationale for the activities 
leading to increasing accountability was as follows:  
                                                
1 Vision 2005+ is a document that discusses the optimal structure for member banks. Basically, it works from the 
premise that local banks need to have more competences in-house, instead of those being available from 
Rabobank Nederland. This means that local banks need to increase their size to make these additional 
competences economically viable; ergo: it promotes mergers for many member banks.  
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‘The merger will be a fact….It is only a question of the way in which we will enter in this 
merger. In the condition we are in now, we will be the weaker party. As such we cannot 
enter negotiations and expect to attend to the interest of our members, employees and 
customers. Therefore we need the coming periods to strengthen our financial basis as well 
as our leadership capabilities and we have to have clear policies, to demonstrate that we 
have a clear focus on the future and desires that potential partners need to account for. 
Therefore, our planning processes are crucial now.’ 
 
At this member bank, the actions it wanted to undertake were heavily influenced by the 
banks’ position vis-à-vis other members of the Rabobank Group. Specifically, it brought 
the issue of accountability closer to the bank. As such, there was little discussion on the 
need for action, or the type of action; the need was there for all to see. The intended 
merger brought these power differences between banks to the foreground. In this, the 
outcomes of the ROM process needed to have a positive influence on the relative power 
of the bank vs. potential candidates for the merger. So the influence of power on action 
choices is rather broad. In some banks, it was primarily inter-organisational power that 
affected the definition of action in the course of ROM, while in others it was power on a 
personal level that gave the participants in the MT+ an indication of the value of the 
opinions of the various participants. 
 
Apart from the notions of power addressed above, there was one form of power that was 
present at each bank engaging in ROM, and that is power by inclusion. This involves the 
collective creation of meaning and discourse by virtue of being present at MT+ meetings. 
This power comes to exist due to the imperfect ability of the MT+ groups to disseminate 
the meanings they created to the wider community of employees. Essentially, the more an 
MT+ groups undertakes in meaning creation, the more it develops its private discourse 
and meaning that cannot be adopted by others, without similar types of sense making 
processes. This is one reason for the somewhat uninterested stance of people outside the 
MT+ groups. One of the most outspoken opinions follows: ‘I have seen this before. Even 
more so, the program Vision 98
1
 wanted many of the same things, and now we are a 
number of years further in time, and we do it again. I will wait and see, but I think 
tomorrow we will see some other issue and the day after tomorrow again another…’.  
 
Many comments like this could be noted, but they were primarily from people that had 
little role-induced interest in the issue, and were not a part of the social structure in which 
participants could project personal qualities of the proposer on the issue. The social group 
that can, and which I designate the issue elite, is the group that is able to define the issue 
as salient for the organization and influence the degree of formal attention. Comments that 
indicated an attitude of ‘wait and see’ were thus primarily from people who were outside 
the issue elite, and who did not have a specific, role-bound interest in the issue. However, 
it is important to recognise that the issue elite is not a static group of people. They change 
                                                
1 A program that had an explicit focus on efficiency, and it had accountability as a key component. 
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in composition. For example, in informal discussions as well as formal meetings people 
can link to the issue and exercise influence. If they get involved on a frequent basis, they 
can become a part of the issue elite.  
 
However, a basic embedding in informal networks must already be in place. Otherwise, 
the individual will not have the means or the information to become actively involved in 
the issue elite. In this respect, the term ‘network proximity’ may be a good description. 
Ibarra & Andrews (1993) argue that network-mediated processes influence the 
information processing capabilities of organisational participants. The importance of 
network proximity and the presence of issue elites is argued as follows by Ibarra & 
Andrews: ‘Perceptions are shaped by the opinions of salient or relevant others. Salience or 
relevance, however, may be based on different criteria, including interpersonal similarity 
and closeness or, instead, power differentials and deference, which are associated with 
different types of informal networks.’ (p. 278). Issue elites are temporary network-like 
organic structures that exercise influence on the organisational perception of an issue.  
 
All in all, at the different Rabobanks, the issue elites differed in composition, but all 
members were situated closely to proximate networks. This becomes increasingly clear in 
these comments of project leaders on their selection of employees asked to serve in the 
MT+ (consisting of MT members and a cross-section of the bank): ‘I select those 
individuals that have demonstrated a keen sense of commitment to the organisation and 
its objectives. They are the people that speak up and engage themselves with the matters 
that are current.’ Another said: ‘I select the MT+ members based on their informal 
position in their department. Those that stand out will be asked to join.’ The issue elite is 
a strong network that develops shared logics around the issue. Those who are not part of 
the issue elite, have no part in the development of the logic. Ibarra & Andrews (1993) 
relate to this in stating that: ‘specific network contacts provide opportunities for 
comparing and interpreting perceptions, which in turn influence information saliency and 
subsequent perceptions’ (p. 280). Those not involved in the issue elite miss this 
opportunity to influence the issue in itself. Moreover, not being a part of the elite to begin 
with, they simply lag behind in information. The Rabobank Groningen project leader 
explains the importance of the logic of the issue elite: ‘I already know much of the 
outcomes. Within all the boundaries laid down by the Group and legislation, there often is 
only one possible response feasible. I let the group come to the same realisation so we can 
continue from basically similar starting-points’. Those who are not a part of the issue 
elite, and do not have a role-bound interest in the issue, are practically never exposed to 
the issue. At the Rabobank, these groups demonstrated the ability to ignore these wider 
developments during their infancy. In some member banks, people were only exposed to 
ROM in information sessions, without having the opportunity or the information to make 
sense of what was going on. The evidence obtained at the Rabobank, using the concept of 
issue elite, points to differences in power that develop by virtue of inclusion and exclusion 
in shared activities. These activities produce sense making opportunities, that one can 
draw power from. To those that were located outside the issue elites, ignoring the issue 
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was an often seen response in the phases where the MT+ were attempting to disseminate 
their results. The notion of exclusion and inclusion were important at the various banks. 
Section 8.5.2.3 below will address another effect of this, namely ambiguity. 
 
8.5.2.3 Invention: Private sense making causes ambiguity for excluded 
groups 
As a result from the differences in the opportunities for collective sense making, the gap 
between those involved in the program, and those who were not, widened. 
 
By motivating people to participate in the planning and control cycle, the member banks 
hoped for more results orientation as well as an increasing sense of accountability on the 
part of the participants. The program forced people to address questions they had never 
addressed before. People were confronted with an array of matters that previously were 
not part of their work. Lower ranking personnel were especially at a loss on many 
occasions. To demonstrate this point, consider the following two cases: Entrepreneurship 
at Rabobank Groningen and Mission formulation at Rabobank West-Drenthe. 
 
Entrepreneurship at Rabobank Groningen: The MT+ members of Rabobank Groningen 
determined in their strategy sessions that they wanted to be more entrepreneurial. It was 
this realisation that was accepted swiftly, and with much enthusiasm. As described in 
section 8.5.2.1 above, the bank had a member panel consisting of entrepreneurs that 
expressed their desire that the bank should act more as they did. They projected an image 
of the bank that would be more ‘entrepreneurial’ in its actions. As the participating 
employees were well aware that they were the prime asset of the bank, the MT+ group 
needed little convincing that they needed to be more ‘entrepreneurial’. One would say that 
this was it, but it appeared that the term ‘entrepreneurial’ came back again and again to 
haunt the MT+ members in the course of their ongoing discussions1. These discussions 
were constantly diluted with definitional matters. Many times, the issue was raised how to 
interpret ‘entrepreneurial’. To some it meant the opposite of bureaucracy; to others it 
meant different forms of supervision, and to others again it was thinking in terms of 
opportunities. Differences in meaning of what it means to be entrepreneurial came to the 
foreground every time an effort was made to create a broader framework of interpretation. 
This effort revealed a constant mismatch of different conceptualisations of 
entrepreneurship and the experiences of daily work that individuals had. The issue was put 
to rest when explicit attention was given to how to interpret the term. Entrepreneurship 
was to be: ‘Being creative in seeing and taking opportunities; to create’. An effective 
                                                
1 These had the nature of discussions in small groups before flip-over boards that contained information collected 
up to that point. 
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baseline was set that not all agreed with, but that had become the generally accepted 
element that the group would continue with. Equifinal1 meaning was created.  
 
However, this equifinal meaning only existed for the participants of the MT+ meetings. 
People outside the MT+ did not have access to the meaning available to the participants. It 
led to ambiguity in that employees could not relate to the terminology on equal terms with 
the participants, who had spent an extensive amount of time investigating the meaning of 
entrepreneurship. However, this was not a real problem at this bank, as there were many 
activities and informal discussions that would disperse meaning and terminology beyond 
the MT+. But this was not the case at other banks. The exclusion of organisational 
participants from sense making efforts was often dictated by practical considerations and 
it could also be observed at other banks, such as the West-Drenthe bank. But these banks 
regarded ROM in a more fragmented manner, meaning that ROM was a separate project, 
and not explicitly connected to other change efforts in the bank. In these banks, the 
exclusion of specific groups from sense making was more damaging, as there were not 
many opportunities for people to engage in collective sense making outside the MT+. A 
number of banks did acknowledge this, and they organised meetings involving all 
employees, inviting them to engage in specific sense making; for example, the West-
Zeeuws Vlaanderen bank hired a school building to allow discussions between MT+ 
participants and other employees. The West-Drenthe bank had sessions, held by segments, 
to induce similar discussions. These efforts were reported to be highly successful, with 
regards to the level of involvement of all employees. However, these were short-lived 
structures that were insufficiently effective to fully close the gap between MT+ and other 
employees. Ambiguity remained at those banks and as a consequence, sense making 
remained privileged for the MT+. 
 
Mission formulation at Rabobank West-Drenthe: Ambiguity was almost instantly 
observable at this bank. According to the original calendar, mission formulation needed to 
be completed in a few days. At this bank it was not finalised for six months. Interestingly, 
discussions were mainly about the inclusion or exclusion of specific words. For example, 
the bank is situated in a rural area, where ecological considerations are deemed important. 
Originally, an earlier version of the mission, or ambition statement as it is called in 
Rabobank terms was: ‘Your committed and able financial partner, that wants to build with 
you on a mutual durable and profitable relationship for our common ‘natural’ future’. To 
an outsider, these may seem like a collection of buzzwords, but to the participants, heated 
discussion existed on the inclusion or exclusion of words. The mission statement tended to 
grow larger and larger, because it needed to accommodate the input of all parties 
involved. People tended to agree with a proposal for a mission statement only if it seemed 
to confirm the role of the bank according to their preconceptions. Now, this was not the 
end of it, as the consultant deemed the resulting mission statement too long and 
                                                
1 Donnellon et al. define equifinal meanings as interpretations that are dissimilar, but that have similar 
behavioural implications (1986, p. 44). 
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unworkable. Additional discussion on things such as: ‘Is a mission for use internally or 
externally?’ and ‘How does this relate to strategy?’ also came up. All in all, the mission 
creation at this bank was a messy and long process of trial and error. Finally, under strict 
guidance of the consultant it was decided that the mission would be: ‘your financial 
partner, that wants to build together with you on a durable and profitable relationship’. 
The strategic plan of this bank included a description of the terms ‘durable’ and 
‘profitable’ that were respectively: ‘also the partnership effect’ and ‘profitability is 
important for the bank as well as for the customer’, both were hardly clarifying to the 
layperson. However, as the group did not encounter further definitional issues related to 
the mission, it did not warrant any further attention. Ambiguity was relaxed by group 
interaction, in that collective interpretation led to a shared understanding of the mission 
and what it stood for. Also, the interpretation led to a shared understanding of the meaning 
of the various terms being employed. Not everyone agreed with the chosen 
conceptualisations, but they allowed continuing group action.  
 
On a more abstract level, one important premise arises from the situations at the two 
member banks: both sets of experiences at the MT+ groups are not easily reproducible to 
others. Employees that were not in the MT+ groups were not able to follow what had 
happened. Where the original participants had been able to collectively alter frames of 
expectations and had had time to place the results in their cognitive frames, the people 
who did not participate were left behind. Their comments indicated a lack of 
understanding about what had happened there, and an inability to relate to the plans that 
arose from the group. One employee (a member of an MT+ group) remarks: ‘it just does 
not come alive in the bank. People know it is going on, but when I tell them about ‘A’, it 
can be very well, that people think I am talking about ‘B’. What it means that we are 
doing is just not very clear to most.’ Moreover, collective sense making efforts often 
resulted in equifinal meaning that sufficed to keep the group process going. This could 
have exposed the banks to potential problems in the interpretation of missions, visions and 
strategies, as equifinal meaning does not mean consensus of meaning. 
 
ROM asked a number of questions that people could not answer off the top of their heads. 
In meetings the group came to a workable (Weick, 1995) solution so that they could 
proceed. Those who were excluded from these sessions of collective sense making 
experienced a gap in what they considered to be logical. Thus although ROM sessions 
decreased ambiguity on the part of the MT+ participants (it allowed them to come to 
workable meanings), it increased ambiguity on the part of other organisational 
participants. MT+ groups effectively took a sidetrack in developing a more private set of 
understandings that were unavailable to the people outside the MT+.  
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8.5.2.4 Invention: Communication patterns 
Gephart (1991) argues that stories are the preferred sense-making currency in 
organisational situations. Stories are relevant here as they are composed of several 
elements, one of which is a forged link between the exceptional and the ordinary. Stories 
are exchanges between people where past or interpreted experience is re-interpreted. They 
are relevant as stories are the mechanisms by which people collectively make sense of 
occurrences. Story telling is effectively similar to collective sense making. Donnellon et 
al. (1986) argue that organisational sense making occurs especially by virtue of specific 
communication patterns that allow for equifinal meaning to arise. They confirm that 
single, coordinated action can arise from intensive group induced sense making.  
 
At the different member banks, two major patterns of communications could be 
distinguished: formal and informal. Formal communications were primarily in the form of 
newsletters and minutes. They were typically distributed to the entire member bank by e-
mail and intranet. The newsletter and minutes were essentially describing the conclusions 
of the MT+ meetings. Some banks also organised sessions in which MT+ members 
explained what they were doing in their sessions of ROM. Informal communication was 
very limited at a number of banks. Colleagues never discussed the implications of ROM 
and it hardly ever came up at the lunch table (see also the discussion of the production of 
texts in chapter 10). To many banks, the program was carried by formal communication 
alone. To people who were not a part of the MT+ this led to the following comments: ‘I 
have tried to read the minutes and I have attempted to understand what they were doing 
over there. But I simply don’t understand what it means. They make plans and those plans 
become budgets, okay, but what does that have to do with me? I am doing my job, and it 
will probably pass.’ Being no part of the MT+ group and then being targeted with 
communications that were at the level of the logic of those MT+ members and not at the 
level of people who did not have the opportunity to engage in collective sense making, 
was a difficult combination for those member banks. Instead of closing the gap between 
the MT+ group and the rest of the staff at the bank, formal communication was 
misunderstood and led to a reinforcement of the idea that ROM was a private program, 
which other staff did not need to concern themselves with. It widened the gap, instead of 
closing it.  
 
One can speculate that informal communication might offset this effect as it allows people 
to make sense of what is happening outside the formal structures. Some pointers for this 
statement can be found at the Rabobank Groningen. The Rabobank Groningen was 
different to the other banks in that it engaged in a comprehensive ‘change program’, of 
which ROM was a part. Apart from ROM, the change program had features that focused 
on a change in attitude, behaviour and culture on the part of all employees and managers. 
The staff of this member bank was constantly being targeted with expressions of being 
accountable in behaviour (a deal is a deal). Moreover, accountability as a desirable 
personal quality was becoming part of personal evaluations. On all levels, this yielded 
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intense discussions among people as it yielded something they instantly could relate to 
(everyone knew of examples in which ‘someone’ did not keep up to his end of the 
bargain). Here, the informal channels compensated for the lack of formal sense making 
opportunities. Although this led to a high degree of engagement with ROM and the 
‘change program1’, the bank did not have much influence over the manner in which 
people made sense of the events that had elapsed and those that were to come. But at the 
Groningen bank at least, stories started to develop. Everyone knew somebody working at 
the segment Corporate Clients. At lunch, much discussion emerged on the merits of the 
approach of the manager of this segment. Stories were swapped on who was laid off and 
why. In later stages, stories were exchanged about the successes of the segment. These 
stories were powerful sense making mechanisms, which allowed non-MT+ participants to 
make sense of what happened at their bank. The differences between the Groningen bank 
and some of the other member banks leads to the proposition that collective sense making 
can occur not only through formal opportunities (MT+ meetings), but also through 
informal opportunities2 (gossip, rumours, lunch-time exchanges). Formal communication 
failed on a number of occasions when the messages were insufficiently intelligible, as 
they reflected the sense made by the MT+ groups, which set the other employees already 
behind. Informal communication can then compensate, although the organisation has less 
influence over these sense making opportunities, and the outcomes of them are then less 
predictable.  
 
8.5.2.5 Invention: Organisational Culture 
Chapter 3 argued that organisational culture is both manifested in and maintained by 
individuals’ sense making efforts and actions (see also Harris, 1994). It described five 
types of schemas that are especially relevant to individual-level sense making in relation 
to organisational culture. See Table 8-3, for an overview of these schemas and some of 
their features.  
 
                                                
1 This bank actually named the program ‘Change Program’ to be clear about its objectives. 
2 It is likely that the process of informal sense making influences the process of formal sense making, and vice 
versa. Even more so, when formal sense making occasions do not allow participants to define meaningful 
actions, informal sense making occasions can be expected to be decisive for the selection of actions, if any. It 
must also be stated that the distinction between formal and informal only relates to the opportunities of sense 
making. The actual act of making sense is very private, and a separation of formal and informal sense making 
would contribute little to this thesis.    
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Type of schema: Features: 
Self schemas Generalisations about the self in relation 
to the organisation 
Person schemas Impressions on traits, behaviours and 
expectations of other people and 
organisational roles 
Organisation schemas Subset of person schemas; involves the 
‘generalised others’: communities/social 
groups within which the individual is 
embedded. 
Object/concept schemas Knowledge about the stimuli that are not 
particularly social, such as office space; 
guide interpretation of cultural artefacts 
Event schemas Guide interpretation of particular events 
and behavioural artefacts including rituals 
and ceremonies. 
Table 8-3: Types of schemas maintaining organisational culture 
 
It is the argument of this section that the influence of culture on the sense making 
processes manifested itself primarily through these schemas. More specifically, I argue 
that managers and employees were defining acceptable actions by freely drawing on the 
different schemas and recombining and adding to them to arrive at acceptable actions.  
 
In order to make this point, this sub-section will address the different schemas that 
appeared to be used in the various MT+ groups. The manner in which organisational 
culture affected sense making of the participants of the ROM program varied per member 
bank. However, it is clear that a distinction existed between the non-personal schemas 
(organisation-, object/concept- and event schemas) and the personal schemas (self 
schemas and person schemas). To most banks, the latter was basically one of the reasons 
for doing ROM. People needed to act more committed, be more accountable and so on. In 
the context of ROM, one can argue that the person-schemas called for more 
accountability; i.e. they encompassed those qualities that were regarded as the problems 
that needed to be resolved by a cultural transformation. Person schemas are ‘organised 
memories, impressions, and learned expectations regarding the traits, goals, behaviours, 
and preferences of particular individuals, groupings of people, and organisational roles’ 
(Harris, 1994, p. 312; see also Fiske & Taylor, 1984). The person schemas represent the 
views of employees and the groups in which employees are organised. These person 
schemas were being used in a problem-reinforcing capacity. This means that impressions 
of people, groups and roles were being used to demonstrate what did not go well with the 
bank. The consultant at the West-Drenthe bank often referred to cultural traits that people 
from Drenthe region were supposed to have. In 2002-2003, the managers at the Groningen 
bank were rather explicit, ascribing the lack of result orientation and commitment of 
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groups of employees as reasons for the required cultural transformation. At the 
Zevenhuizen-Moerkapelle bank, one manager had exactly the opposite opinion regarding 
the cultural traits of people at his bank: they were so oriented on ‘closing the deal’ that he 
felt a stronger orientation on the risks associated with those deals could be a positive trait. 
In fact, person schemas seem to have been a fundamental reason for the calling for a 
cultural and behavioural change that accompanied the ROM program in many banks. The 
arguments for using ROM for a behavioural change were often found in shared 
impressions of how people and groups operated1 in the past and the set of expectations 
that were produced as a result (person schemas).  
 
Organisation schemas involve the ‘generalised other’ that was an important notion during 
the ROM transition. The ‘generalised other’ was expressed through statements that 
include ‘they’ and ‘them’. Participants were frequently unable or unwilling to pinpoint 
individuals or groups in descriptions of desirable or undesirable practices. Through an 
abstract ‘generalised other’, participants were still able to express how they saw action 
sequences were usually proceeding. These action sequences are basically examples of past 
events, which represent something that is wrong or right at the bank. This thesis uses the 
example of two segments at the West-Drenthe bank who argued that ‘the other’ was 
mistreating their customer. These past events were being reified to become a sequence of 
expected behaviours. These behaviours of the unspecified ‘generalised other’ were 
fuelling the process of action definition. The ‘generalised other’ was often a benchmark 
against which proposed actions were mirrored. Although Harris (1994) primarily defined 
the ‘generalised other’ as a social grouping to which an individual is a part, it is useful to 
extend the notion. The generalised other can be ‘the customer’, ‘the member of the bank’, 
‘the competitor’, and even Rabobank Nederland which also represented a collection of 
features, against which the bank was measured. The Groningen bank used the ABN-
AMRO, one of its major competitors, in its creation of its mission. The discussion came to 
the term ‘ambition’ that needed to be included in the mission. Ambition had been used for 
a long time by the Rabobank organisation, nation wide, but now the term had appeared in 
the slogan of ABN-AMRO. This served as a re-enforcement for the participants that 
‘ambition is a good starting point, if it has even been adopted by the ABN-AMRO’. Apart 
from using competitors to define qualities of their own group, a number of banks were in 
the process of developing member panels and customer panels, which were basically 
devices to chart expected customer/member preferences and behaviour. These panels were 
set up, in attempts for ‘discovery’ (see Figure 8-9). The charting of expected behaviours 
under specific conditions is essentially the creation of an organisation schema. At the 
Groningen bank, ‘the member’ was a significant generalised other. The member panel 
meeting, preceding the strategy meetings, created the organisation schema belonging to 
‘the member’ (that is set of expected features associated with the member as entity). This 
                                                
1 This makes sense as the Rabobank has often attempted to achieve its economic objectives by adapting its 
structure, while allowing staff to be low on engagement (General Director Rabobank Groningen). As a result, 
advances in cultural aspects of cooperation have not kept up with advances in structure and technology. It makes 
this aspect of culture stand out from other aspects. 
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entity was to appear in the discussions on a regular basis. Similarly, other segments were 
also seen as relevant generalised others, which could influence the processes of action 
definition at particular segments. One of the managers of the Groningen bank: ‘It was 
strange, the remarks that indicated that the bank has achieved its cost savings goals, and 
that we now need to focus on revenues. My people are bummed out. First this whole 
segment is turned inside out, and now “Customer Services” escapes again. Yes, a very 
wrong signal, that affects my segment.’    
 
Apart from taking or developing a ‘generalised other’, there was one other very powerful 
organisation schema relevant: the cooperative identity (see also section 8.5.2.1 above on 
identity and image). Across most member banks, especially General Directors had clear 
ideas about what the cooperative was and how the member bank needed to fit in with that 
image. This notion of the cooperative was not similar for all banks. Therefore, it affected 
action choices on a local level. At one bank, the General Director noted that he had 
published an opinion in a local newspaper stating that if the local community wanted the 
bank to continue its presence in the small municipality, the population had the moral 
obligation to be purchasing multiple products to allow the bank to remain economically 
viable. Although this statement was not met with positive sentiments everywhere, it 
appealed to a familiar problem for many Rabobanks. To many member banks, its local 
presence is a strong expression of its cooperative nature. However, as individuals become 
less and less loyal to their bank (see chapter 4), they tend to use the convenience services 
in their local municipality, while they shop around for more expensive services such as 
mortgages and savings accounts. This perceived problem fuelled actions at this bank. At 
the Monnickendam bank, the General Director was aware of this problem. He noted that 
‘when people see that we have added value here, I am morally allowed to ask for 
contributions to keep the cooperative alive. This does not need to be financial, everyone 
has a talent that someone else can use. Therefore, our cooperative can serve as a 
mediator between talents in our community’. As a result of this point of view, the notion 
of volunteer work is well developed at this bank.  
 
The point made here is that all banks share the same governance structure: the 
cooperative. Yet, the influence of the cooperative on action definitions is at a local level 
as it represents different things. Therefore, its influence on the definition of ‘generalised 
others’ is also locally determined. For example, the ‘customer’ as generalised other is 
heavily influenced by ones stance on the cooperative. Therefore, one can say that 
organisation schemas are able to influence other organisation schemas as well as action 
choices being made in the MT+ groups. 
 
Object/concept schemas & Event schemas: object schemas seemed to be of limited 
influence on the discussions that were to lead to action. As noted earlier, some of the 
people at the West-Zeeuws Vlaanderen bank felt initially that the bank was in excellent 
shape. ‘The presents we would get and the nice buildings, I mean look around you’. In the 
first instance, these notions were serving as proof of the belief that all was well with the 
8. Accountability in the making 
 223
bank. The buildings and presents represented the state of the bank, and initially, this was 
convincing proof that everything was not that bad. However, the General Director of this 
bank quickly discouraged references to these types of schemas; they were rendered 
unacceptable rather swiftly. Apart from this example, object schemas and event schemas 
did not play a major part in the ROM program, as many participants were inexperienced 
in these programs. People therefore simply had little schematic knowledge on similar 
processes that they could manifest.  
 
Summarising, culture was primarily manifested through two types of schemas: 
Self/Person schemas and Organisation schemas. Self/Person schemas were one of the 
reasons why the banks decided to give the ROM program an explicit behavioural 
component. Managers at member banks felt that the cooperative identity has led to 
undesirable forms of interaction between employees and managers. The ways that people 
saw each other are in essence person schemas. Organisation schemas were influencing the 
broader meaning of the organisation and ROM within that organisation. The General 
Directors, in particular, had a clear idea about what it meant to be a cooperative. This idea 
of the cooperative influenced the action choices made, as well as the expectations that 
people had about ‘the generalised other’. Together, these were ways in which local culture 
manifested itself through schemas during the ROM program.  
 
8.6 Discussion 
Results Oriented Management has many similar features for all fourteen member banks 
under study. The program is the same, and the type of support they received was very 
similar. Moreover, they are all part of the same organisation, with similar pressures. 
Therefore, one could be inclined to conclude that the program needed to serve similar 
purposes and would lead to similar actions. However, this chapter proposes that there is 
evidence to support an opposing argument. The ROM program was given purpose at the 
local level. This purpose was not necessarily the same for all participating member banks. 
Given the issue of accountability, and given the local setting, member banks redirected the 
program to serve objectives that were not intended by the development team at Rabobank 
Nederland. Behavioural change, merger preparation or teambuilding were some of the 
local translations of ROM. The actions defined at the local level depended as much (or 
even more) on local sense making than on the directions of Rabobank Nederland.  
 
The relevance for this thesis lies in the fact that organisational sense making serves as an 
essential step in the institutionalisation of meaning and associated action. For, before 
meaning and action are institutionalised, they must first be developed. Then, in the course 
of enactment and re-enactment, possibly institutionalisation may occur. This chapter 
shows how action that is enacted comes from episodes of organisational sense making; 
something that a number of institutional approaches to management accounting change 
take for granted (e.g. Vaivio, 1999; Burns & Scapens, 2000; Busco et al., 2000). 
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There were some focal points in the program that appealed to virtually all member banks. 
The program made assessments of the economic situation of the member bank 
unavoidable, and as such all programs included some actions that were intended to benefit 
the member bank economically. However, even if the general aim was similar across the 
board, the precise actions differed wildly. Compare for example these two cases: the 
General Director of the Meyel bank who was very pleased to have saved some hundreds 
of Euros on buying framed posters to save on art leasing, where he deemed the true value 
to be that this idea came from the staff of the bank. And secondly, the Groningen bank 
that decided and executed a major reduction in FTE’s, yielding unrest and massive short-
term savings.  
 
The Rabobank case suggests that sense making of issues, that is, fitting the issue into a 
(collective) frame of reference, preceded the definition of actions at the member banks. 
The Rabobank Group, as represented by Rabobank Nederland might have envisaged a 
clear action path for all member banks. However, action materialised only after extensive 
sense making. The outcomes of these occasions varied wildly and these defined the course 
of action chosen. This chapter identified a number of factors, which can be seen to 
influence this definition of action. Although not exhaustive, these were observable at the 
various member banks as having an influence on the actions that followed episodes of 
sense making.   
 
The program in itself was functioning as a direct sense-making device that offered 
different results geared towards the local circumstances. However, some intriguing 
observations were made in this chapter: The people involved in the MT+ were developing 
private logics. This private logic made their arguments and results increasingly more 
difficult to understand to those who were not a part of the MT+ groups. The chapter 
argues that the issues underlying the acceptance of the ROM program were too ambiguous 
for the participants of the MT+ groups to define action merely from existing scripts. This 
does not mean that collective action was not possible. Rather, because the issue 
characteristics left ambiguity about the desired action choices, the MT+ group turned to a 
distinctive social process of selection and prioritisation of actions. The accounts given 
here, suggest that action selection is neither a rationalistic process, based on the problems 
defined beforehand, nor an example of institutional determinism, where actors are the 
willing prisoners of their own created social harnesses (see: Weber, 1976; DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983). Rather, when the issue is ambiguous, the participants of the MT+ groups 
used a combination of existing scripts that had some bearing on the issue and a process 
that I have called invention, to come to action definitions. Although the participants never 
knew beforehand that their actions were going to pay off, they found assurance in their 
collectively developed rationalisations.  
 
The dimensions that affect action definition, discussed in this chapter, are summarised in 
Figure 8-10: 


















Figure 8-10: Summary: overview of dimensions influencing action definition 
 
This figure shows that actions were defined through two supportive processes: the use of 
shared schemas and the process of invention. Both contribute to the definition of 
appropriate actions, but to this thesis, only invention is part of current sense making, as 
schematic knowledge is the result of past episodes of sense making.  
 
The next chapter will take the argument one step further. Theorists employing an 
institutional perspective often argue that the routinisation of action precedes 
institutionalisation. This thesis discusses the institutionalisation of practice at the 
Rabobank. Therefore, routinisation of action is an area that needs to be covered. Chapter 9 
will address if and how actions were routinised at the various member banks.   
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The last chapter has focused on the way institutionally constrained individuals defined 
actions in the course of the ROM program. The current chapter will address how these 
actions can become routinised. This matter is important as institutions are encoded in 
routines. As such, new practices can become institutionalised through a process of 
routinisation; or more specifically, a process of interaction between rules and routines. 
Moreover, changes in routine behaviours affect, or are affected by the institutions present. 
As such, routines are an important element in the process of institutional change.  
 
Chapter 5 discussed routines at the West-Drenthe and the Groningen banks. That chapter 
argued that the two banks were interested in behavioural changes, in terms of a change in 
acceptable behaviour. The Groningen bank especially wanted to change the manner in 
which people perceived their work and the way in which they interacted internally and 
responded to the outside world. It wanted to make people feel accountable to and 
responsible for the bank and its achievements. The degree to which the various banks 
succeeded in altering the forms of interaction between organisational participants in 
general and in the management team in particular differed. Some member banks appeared 
to be receptive to interventions in existing routine patterns of interaction, while in others 
its effects were disappointing to the member bank. Chapter 5 suggested that the 
Groningen bank was pleased with the behavioural transformation it went through. That 
chapter further suggested that the results achieved were at least in part attributable to the 
combination of a transformation in structures, as proposed by programs such as ROM and 
FAST, and a transformation in desired behaviours. The chapter therefore concluded 
tentatively that behaviour and structure were mutually supportive at the Groningen bank. 
These two modalities of organisational life will be the focus of this current chapter. Not 
only because chapter 5 argued that both are important, but also because the interaction of 
structural features of the organisation (rules) and behaviours (routines) are essential parts 
of institutional change (Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Burns & Scapens, 2000).  
 
This chapter argues that the ROM project sought to alter routine interaction patterns 
within member banks. The chapter essentially explores the relationship between rules (the 
formal requirements of the management of the various banks, the formal ROM program, 
and actions resulting from ROM) and routines, which include habitual interactions 
between people. In line with chapter 3, this chapter argues that scripts serve as individual 
                                                
1 This chapter benefits greatly from the comments on an earlier version received from the participants of the 
Routines Network Conference at the University of Nice. Especially the comments and questions of Sidney 
Winter, Brian Pentland and David Kirsh highlighted its weaknesses in a clear manner and motivated me to 
critically re-assess the chapter. The current chapter includes what I believe are improvements of the lessons 
learned at the Nice conference. None of the participants have seen the chapter in its current form.  
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representations of routines. It therefore states that an exploration of the relation between 
rules and routines becomes an exploration of rules and scripts at the level of the 
individual. The chapter will focus on a specific category of scripts: scripts of interaction. 
These scripts govern habitual interactions between people. Habitual interactions are of 
special interest to this chapter, as these were especially targeted by the desired changes in 
attitudes. Member banks wanted their employees to be more accountable for their actions. 
As one is always accountable towards something or someone, it is therefore this category 
of scripts that the proponents of change were targeting. These scripts do not only govern 
the interactions themselves, but they also contain codified information on each other’s 
expectations relating to the interaction. The program’s focus on accountability was 
therefore aimed at altering these scripts of interaction. 
 
The chapter will discuss a number of instances where relations between rules and scripts 
are analysed. It will come to the conclusion that ambiguity plays a central, but dual role. 
The chapter will argue that in some instances ambiguity caused people to revert to 
existing scripts, as they attempted to interpret the meaning of new rules by the use of 
existing scripts governing their interaction. As a result, existing interaction scripts were 
reinforced rather than new ones being developed. However, ambiguity also caused people 
to experience increased emotional discomfort and led them to consciously make sense of 
the causes of this ambiguity. This could be observed especially when the bank’s change 
agents rendered existing scripts unusable. In this last instance, people could be inclined to 
exchange their existing scripted knowledge for consciously collected knowledge on 
alternatives that they find to be valuable. The resulting process, which I referred to as 
invention in Chapter 8, was important for the creation of new meanings, and new ways of 
interacting. At the Rabobank, this process of invention was essential to the new modes of 
scripted interacting.  
 
The next section will briefly review some relevant features of ROM. Then the chapter will 
discuss rules and routines, and elaborate on the choice of the specific type of script 
discussed in this chapter. Then the relation between rules and scripts in three separate 
events are explored. Finally, the implications of these events are discussed.  
 
9.2 Background 
ROM had a number of structural features that are akin to those found in standard 
operating procedures (SOP’s). Among other things, ROM consists of a number of discrete 
rules concerning how to plan, how to be result oriented and how to be in control. To most 
member banks, these rules were useful for their intended effects on employees’ behaviour. 
The rules found in ROM were to influence patterns of behaviour, including interactions 
and decisions, in the individual banks. 
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The interaction of the rules that make up ROM and the types of behaviours that people 
display in relation to ROM is an example of structuration as proposed by Giddens (1984). 
Structuration argues that structure exists by virtue of the actions that enact them. As such, 
institutions exist by virtue of the repeated occurrence of certain action patterns. However, 
Barley & Tolbert (1997) critique the lack of attention to the temporal nature of 
structuration, and its inability to account for human agency in the development and 
maintenance of institutions. They offer an alternative view that addresses these concerns. 
This view is adapted and employed by Burns & Scapens (2000) to provide explanations of 
institutional change. These authors argue that institutional change occurs through the 
interaction of rules and routines. Rules are formal regulations such as standard operating 
systems, the formal parts of the accounting system, and indeed the program ROM as 
proposed by Rabobank Nederland. Routines are the behavioural regularities that are 
affected by rules. Burns & Scapens (2000) argue that institutional change arises from a 
dialectic of institutions and action, mediated through rules and routines. However, the 
management accounting change literature remains unclear how this rules-routines 
mediation manifests itself to actors in the organisation. Whereas institutions exist by 
virtue of the collective, and actions can be individual expressions of institutions, it is 
reasonable to assume that rules-routines as mediators of institutions govern the interaction 
between the individual and the collective. This chapter seeks to contribute here. It 
addresses the relationship between the formal arrangements in the member banks (rules), 
which include the formal regulations embedded in the accounting system and the formal 
properties of the ROM program, on the one hand, and behavioural patterns (routines) on 
the other. Its relevance lies in a broader understanding of the changes in institutionalised 
behaviour. As institutional change occurs through a process involving rules and routines, 
this process needs to be explored before institutional change itself can be addressed.  
 
The next sections will clarify the meanings of rules and routines. Then a framework of 
interaction between the two will be proposed. This model will serve as a framework for 
explanations of the events at the various member banks. The events at these banks will 
also be used to refine the proposed framework. Finally, the framework will be used to 
sketch some preliminary implications concerning institutional change.  
  
9.3 Rules 
Burns & Scapens (2000) define rules as the ‘formally recognised way in which “things 
should be done”’. Rules are part of the existing institutional order and they are carried 
forward in time by both existing practice/ routines and in the structural features of the 
organisation, that include standard operating rules, manuals and accounting regulations. 
For this chapter, the program ROM also introduces many new structural features, or rules, 
such as a clear sequence of steps that each yield a specified result. It is important to 
clearly distinguish between rules and routines, to avoid confusion concerning their 
interaction.  
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Chapter 3 discussed that Sharp (1994) suggests that Standard Operating Procedures 
(SOP’s) can be construed as routines that facilitate decision making in the face of 
complexity and uncertainty. Cohen & Bacdayan (1994) and Burns & Scapens (2000) 
make an explicit distinction between rules and routines. They perceive routines to be the 
informal counterpart of formal rules of behaviour. They separate Standard Operating 
Procedures from routines-in-use. From their perspective, rules are the formalised 
statements of procedures (Burns & Scapens, 2000, p. 7).  
 
Rules also include expressed managerial preferences and guidelines. These are formal 
rules that are sanctioned by the organisational authorities empowered by their hierarchical 
position in the organisation. Widely publicised managerial preferences are therefore much 
akin to the traditional notions of rules. Rules in themselves are unable to influence 
institutions, as institutional arrangements are altered only through collective behaviour 
changes. A rule that is ignored is incapable of forging institutional change. This means 
that rules can instigate institutional change, but only indirectly through their effect on 
behaviour, habit and routine.  
 
9.4 Routines 
Barley & Tolbert (1997) and Burns & Scapens (2000) argue that routines as expressions 
of habitual behaviour combined with formal arrangements are the basic components of 
institutions. Therefore, in order to understand institutional change, it is important to 
understand these components. However, there are considerable differences of opinion in 
the precise meanings of routines. Therefore, this section will provide a notion of routines 
that is empirically meaningful and fits the terminology of institutional change. 
 
The literature addressing routines mostly discusses routines as strategies or attempts to 
achieve competitive advantage. Questions such as: ‘How can replication be a strategic 
practice’ (Winter & Szulanski, 2001); routines as uncertainty reduction (Becker & 
Knudsen, 2004); and organisations as vehicles for carrying routines (Hodgson & 
Knudsen, 2004) are addressed using an evolutionary logic. This stream of literature is 
rooted in discussions stemming from evolutionary economics; it regards the organisation 
and its participants as impersonal parts of differing evolutionary strategies that lead to 
either extinction or to replication of successful practice (see Nelson & Winter, 1982). 
However, the authors mentioned here also point to some qualities of routines that can also 
be observed at the micro level of the organisation, that of individual participants.  
 
Routines allow actors to make complex decisions, without resorting to extensive search 
behaviour for alternatives and preferences. The value of routines lies in the reduction of 
the ‘complexity of real-world decisions to manageable levels by limiting the scope of the 
“problemistic search” for solutions’ (Sharp, 1994, p. ). Nelson and Winter (1982) argue 
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that routines reduce decision complexity by providing a narrow range of environmental 
signals (cues) that indicate possible causes for action (see also March & Simon, 1958). 
The price that one has to pay for increased simplicity is that actors are not overseeing all 
possible alternatives, thereby leaving some unattended. Giddens (1984) sees routines as 
the very fabric of structure. Structure exists because of the continuous production and 
reproduction of action. Yet, at the same time, routines enable the continuity of the 
personality of the agent. In different terms: routinisation enables structure as well as 
personality of those operating under the influence of structure. Barley & Tolbert (1997) 
have modelled the relationship between episodes of interaction (social behaviours) and 
institutional principles. They argue that social behaviours constitute institutions 
diachronically, while institutions constrain actions synchronically. Put differently, today’s 
institutions constrain today’s actions that affect tomorrow’s institutions and so forth.  
 
Stein (1997) notes that the cognitive processes of reduction and elaboration can lead to 
choice biases, as well as influence the sensory inputs to which we attend and to which we 
don’t. The decision maker’s capabilities are then better described as bounded-rational 
rather than full fledged rational. Moreover, if decision makers are incapable of capturing 
all available information, and they use cues to direct their attention, then the consequence 
is that decision makers are satisficing creatures rather than optimising (Simon, 1957). 
Satisficing behaviour implies that decision makers are not constantly trying to increase 
efficiency or hunt for the optimal solution, but only do so when conditions fall below a 
certain threshold (or cues) that ‘force’ decisions to be taken.  
 
As discussed in chapter 3, routines have much in common with the notion of script. 
Barley & Tolbert (1997) argue that scripts are behavioural regularities. They consist of 
‘observable, recurrent activities and patterns of interaction characteristic of a particular 
setting’ (p. 98). Routines or habits can be expressed individually by the invoking and 
performance of scripts. This notion of routines as scripts is empirically sound, as 
according to this definition scripts are observable and bound to specific social settings, 
both of which are abundantly present at the Rabobank. Moreover, the focus on scripts is 
justifiable in this work, because scripts ultimately reproduce institutions (Jepperson, 
1991). An exploration of the processes influencing the relationship between rules and 
routines can therefore become an exploration of the relationship between rules and scripts, 
as routines are scripted patterns of interaction specific to a setting.  
 
For this chapter, it is important to clarify the terms: habits, routines and scripts. As noted 
above, scripts are ‘observable recurrent activities and patterns characteristic of a particular 
setting’ (Barley & Tolbert, 1997). Habits are more or less self-actualising dispositions or 
tendencies to engage in previously adopted or acquired forms of action (Hodgson, 1993) 
and routines are ‘those patterns of thought and action which are habitually adopted by 
groups of individuals (Burns & Scapens, 2000, p. 6). From these definitions, it follows 
that one cannot take scripts to be equal to routines. For, the notion of routines focuses 
explicitly on the collective of agents in a social setting, as well as some degree of self-
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actualisation or habitual invoking of repetitive actions. Therefore, only those scripts that 
are shared to some degree with other agents and those that are habitually invoked may 
qualify as counterparts of routines in the above definition. To clarify these relations, 














Present themselves to the individual through specific scripts
 
Figure 9-1: Habits, routines and scripts as individual representations of routines 
 
The figure shows that routines are akin to scripts. But more specifically, for this thesis, 
routines are akin to those scripts that are invoked mindlessly (self-actualising), and that 
also involve interactions, or other collective phenomena (collective patterned action). So 
this chapter argues that these specific types of scripts are the individual representations of 
routines. This thesis is about institutional change. Burns & Scapens (2000) argued that 
institutional change is mediated by an interaction of rules and routines. This chapter has 
reformulated this interaction by arguing that routines manifest themselves in the 
individual by specific types of scripts. Therefore, a logical consequence is that 
institutional change is mediated by the interaction between specific scripts and rules.  
 
But how this process of routine- or script change proceeds is not yet clear. To what degree 
are routines or scripts able to change? As noted earlier, routines have been considered 
resistant to change because of the fact that they tend to be invoked somewhat 
automatically even in inappropriate conditions. But Feldman (2000, 2003) questions the 
assumed stability of routines by referring to the continuing evolution of routines at a 
student-housing organisation. She points out that routines are not resistant to change per 
se. Rather, she argues, following structuration theory arguments, that performances, 
including routines and scripts, create and recreate understandings of how the organisation 
operates. In turn, these understandings guide performances in specific routines, which 
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affect further understandings of how the organisation operates. She argues that the 
agency-structure duality proposed by Giddens and Bourdieu also holds for routines: 
relevant performances, including routines, guide understandings which in turn enable and 
constrain specific relevant future performances such as other routines. Basically, Feldman 
argues that routines are susceptible to change if existing understandings on the 
organisation (which are akin the notion of institutions) support the change. Her argument 
has much in common with the Burns & Scapens (2000) argument on institutional change. 
Both propose a diachronic relationship between routines and institutions. Therefore, one 
can conclude that routines and scripts are susceptible to change, when supported by wider 
institutional arrangements. As noted above, self-actualising scripts, that are scripts that are 
being invoked tacitly, conceptualise the way in which routines represent themselves to the 
individual. Feldman (2000) argues that the propensity to change of a routine, depends on 
whether the routine is invoked consciously or not. This leads to the proposition that the 
property of self-actualisation is important to the perceived ability of routines to change. I 
will adopt this quality to include scripts. This argumentation will be explanined and 
expanded in section 9.5 below. 
 
The current section has presented the view that many properties associated with routines, 
also hold for scripts (see chapter 3). Scripts are recurrent activities and patterns associated 
with a specific setting. The notion of script is useful here, as it provides a 
conceptualisation of individual representations of routines, and ultimately institutions. 
Therefore, the chapter will primarily continue with the analysis of scripts. The next 
section will argue that scripts are not necessarily resistant to change, but this depends on 
the degree of tacitness of the scripts and the manner in which they are invoked. The matter 
of resistance to change is important, because once we know what determines resistance to 
change, we can focus on those elements to analyse change or a lack of change resulting 
from the interaction between scripts and rules.  
 
9.5 Degree of tacitness of scripts 
Scripts are particularly resistant to change if they are invoked unconsciously based on 
tacit criteria. Feldman (2000) provides an example of routines that are accompanied by 
extensive reflection. Feldman (2000, 2003) and Feldman & Pentland (2003) argue that 
routines are indeed more susceptible to change than previously thought. They attribute 
this to the fact that people are often consciously assessing the situation in which they find 
themselves. In so doing, they are able to select between various scripted responses. 
Scripted decision-making can be the basis of actions, but it can also instigate a review of 
earlier results and subsequent adaptation of routine behaviour. In Feldman’s (2000) case, 
the selection of a course of action was not uniquely determined by following scripted 
knowledge. As the previous section noted that routines present themselves to individuals 
in the form of scripts, it seems logical to assume that the selection of scripts is equally 
important for the scripts’ propensity to change. This recognition points to the fact that 
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scripts/routines may be susceptible to change if they are not taken for granted, and not 
selected tacitly on a day-to-day basis.  
 
Chapter 3 and the above argument discuss that routines are resistant to change when they 
are made up of tacit scripts, which are local representations of these collective routines. 
Therefore, two categories of scripts can usefully be distinguished: tacitly invoked scripts 
and consciously invoked scripts. The former consists of patterns of action and interaction 
that are invoked rather mindlessly (the restaurant script of Shank & Abelson, 1977). The 
latter involves the conscious enactment of actions with predefined purposes, such as the 
scripts defined by Feldman, or those seen on aircraft carrier flight decks (Weick & 
Roberts, 1993). This distinction is important as this chapter is interested in the interaction 
between scripts and rules; and for rules to affect scripts, we need to address when these 
scripts are sensitive to new formal signals, captured in rules. 
 
9.5.1 Tacit scripts 
Cognitive scripts as guiding and regular principles of behaviour can provide an 
explanation for the occasional sub-optimality of decision-making, as noticed by Simon 
(1957). This sub-optimality refers to the propensity of people to habitually fall back on 
past action choices, for current issues that warrant different actions. Gioia & Poole (1984) 
note that ‘the recall of events for a similar or prototypic situation provides the decision 
maker with the script for understanding and predicting the outcome of the decision. 
Scripted decision making, therefore, is efficient decision making, but not necessarily good 
decision making. The scripting of decision situations has an obvious drawback: it can 
induce a failure to be aware of the fine-grained differences that distinguish a current 
decision problem. … This is because the process of deciding is based on a protoscript, 
rather than a step-by-step accounting of the uniqueness of events relevant to the present 
situation’ (p. 454). The implied regularity of script based decision-making, thus leads to 
occasional sub-optimality. Harris (1994) proposes that the schema-directed nature of the 
perceptual process (of which scripts are part) ‘lessens the frequency with which schema 
inconsistent information is discovered and made conscious. The very nature of schemas 
act to ensure that drastic challenges to their validity seldom arise.’ (p. 311). This is 
because new knowledge is usually fitted in existing schemas. New knowledge is 
formulated in terms of old schemas, and therefore helps to sustain these schemas, as this 
greatly reduces the odds that this knowledge will challenge existing schemas.  
 
An example of these types of scripts was the recall schema at Ford. Gioia (1992) reports 
that full recalls of problematic types of cars would only occur if their defects fit 
recognisable patterns, e.g. cues. Any deviation in the types of accepted signals would not 
trigger appropriate action. The inability of the recall coordinator and his team to invoke an 
appropriate script led to the fact that a faulty product was not recalled, simply because the 
problems did not fit existing patterns of what a recall case should be. Although many 
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instances of the invoking of scripts are less dramatic, they always run the risk of being 
invoked on the wrong occasion. These scripts are not accompanied by moments of 
reflection, and they present an issue (see chapter 6) in terms common to the script. They 
are therefore difficult to change, as these types of scripts affect their own perceptions: 
they are self-actualising. An alternative type of scripts is the consciously invoked script, 
that is scripts that involve at least some degree of reflection that accompanies its invoking. 
For example, Louis’ (1980) description of newcomers in organisations is an illustrative 
contradiction. Newcomers have little knowledge of cues and associated scripts, so they 
learn much of this matter in their first weeks in the organisation. They consciously attempt 
to make sense of the events in their new settings, and they thus learn about the types of 
cues that warrant the various behaviours. Newcomers learn to use scripts that they invoke 
consciously in those early stages. 
  
9.5.2 Consciously invoked scripts 
Consciously invoked scripts are those scripts that involve a degree of sense making before 
and during execution. Apart from the example of organisational newcomers, there are 
various examples in the literature. Weick and Roberts (1993) use the concept of heedful 
interrelating to argue that actors in specific systems understand the relations between their 
actions and those of others (representation), as well as their contributions to the system of 
which they are part (subordination). Weick and Roberts (p. 357) argue that variation exists 
in the heed with which individual contributions and representations and subordinations are 
interrelated. Their example of an aircraft carrier flight deck can be used to illustrate an 
environment where most scripts of interaction are consciously invoked. Feldman’s 1980 
discussion of the yearly move-in student dormitories is another example of a series of 
consciously invoked scripts.  
 
It is important to recognise that routines as collectively shared scripts of action are able to 
change when they are to some degree invoked consciously. As discussed earlier, routines 
can be expressed individually either by tacitly invoked scripts or by consciously invoked 
scripts. Only through the latter can openings in routine action patterns be forged. The 
rules-routine relationship is thus not a one-to-one relation. A discussion of the effects of 
routines and rules is basically a three-tier argument along the lines of Figure 9-2: 
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Figure 9-2: Relation between rules and routines 
  
Figure 9-2 depicts the fact that routines are expressed individually through tacit scripts 
and conscious scripts. The line between scripts and rules expresses the relation of routines 
with formal rules. It demonstrates that rules do not have a direct influence on tacitly 
invoked scripts per se. Rather, rules work on consciously invoked scripted knowledge, 
rather than on tacitly invoked scripts. Rules affect routines through their influence on 
consciously invoked scripts. Therefore, rules and routines are not equally meaningful in 
the rules-routines relationship to explain changes in the institutional realm of an 
organisation. The argument is somewhat different. Rules affect consciously invoked 
scripts, which may in turn affect tacitly invoked scripts. Rules cannot directly affect tacit 
scripts, as these scripts are unavailable to formal addressing. However, rules can alter 
consciously invoked scripts, as shown by Feldman (2000). These can, over time, become 
tacitly invoked scripts. As a consequence, rules cannot alter institutions directly, but only 
through habitual behavioural expressions, i.e. scripts. More specifically, rules can only 
directly affect those scripts that people are aware of and are able to change consciously. In 
other words, rules can appeal directly only to consciously invoked scripts. These scripts in 
turn affect or even become tacitly invoked scripts, which, under additional conditions can 
alter parts of the institutional realm.   
 
The next section will explore this challenging notion further. It will use the events 
surrounding the ROM program at the Rabobank to assess how rules, scripts and routines 
interact.  
 
9.6 Interaction scripts 
This chapter focuses on one particular category of scripts: the interaction script. This 
section explains what this category is, and why this category is of special interest. 
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As noted earlier in this thesis, a number of member banks used the ROM program to 
influence the behaviour of employees. More specifically, the people present at the MT+ 
meetings felt that individuals needed to display accountability with regards to results and 
risks. The MT+ members argued that people disengaged from responsibilities too easily. 
In addition, the participants felt that the arguments by which people were to disengage 
from responsibilities were accepted too quickly. In all, accountability was positioned as a 
principle underlying various sorts of behaviours, both internally and towards customers. 
Accountability was meant not to lock in specific actions; i.e. accountability was not a set 
of instructions about how people needed to act in various situations. Rather, accountability 
was a principle of behaviour that allowed people to address a variety of different events in 
a coherent manner.  
  
It is important to note that accountability is not a script in itself1. Although various sets of 
scripts were associated to accountability as a desirable behavioural feature, accountability 
does not represent a script in itself on any level. People were required to remain flexible, 
entrepreneurial and innovative, while they needed to take overt responsibility for their 
actions. At the Rabobank, accountability can therefore be thought of as a desired attitude 
intended to have a bearing on associated scripts. This view is proposed by Abelson, who 
noted that an ‘attitude toward an object consists in the ensemble of scripts concerning that 
object’ (1976, p. 41).  
 
The notion of accountability as a desired attitude calls for a clarification of the ‘ensemble 
of scripts’ that are associated to this attitude. This section argues that this ‘ensemble of 
scripts’ at the Rabobank is represented by the category of scripts I refer to as scripts of 
interaction, or interaction scripts. Interaction scripts are those scripts that govern specific 
interactions between individuals. They hold information on ‘appropriate’ responses and 
expectations of the most likely behaviours of the other parties involved in the interaction. 
I argue that the interaction script is especially relevant for our focus on accountability at 
the Rabobank as someone is always accountable to someone or something.  
 
Frink & Klimoski (2004) emphasise the social embedding of the phenomenon of 
accountability. They argue that various definitions of accountability are clustered around 
two themes: (1) the context of accountability, who and what is involved; and (2) the 
notion of evaluation and feedback. They note that ‘accountability involves an actor or 
agent in a social context who potentially is subject to observation and evaluation by some 
audience(s), including one’s self’ (p. 3). Erdogan et al. (2004) propose a definition that is 
akin to the one above. They define accountability as ‘the feeling of responsibility, 
obligation, and the need to justify one’s actions to others or to one’s self’ (p.19). They 
continue to argue that accountability is ‘a part of the organisational tapestry and weaves 
                                                
1 Zohar & Luria (2003) address in this respect the meta-script (see Shank & Abelson, 1977). The meta-script is a 
higher-order script encompassing some abstract features to be shared by various lower-order scripts belonging to 
the same hierarchy. In a similar fashion, Nooteboom (2000) mentions the subscript and superscript, which also 
reflect a nesting of scripts in various levels. 
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itself through virtually all individual behaviours and decision making activities’ (pp. 19-
20). This latter definition of accountability includes more than formal systems of 
evaluation and control, but all focus on the fact that accountability involves some form of 
formal or informal obligation and responsibility towards some entity.  
 
These features of accountability, involving a degree of obligation and responsibility 
towards some entity, justify the chapter’s focus on interaction scripts. At the Rabobank, 
accountability was to become a desirable behavioural feature. In line with Abelson (1976), 
this feature was to be expressed through associated scripts. Accountability is thus 
expressed particularly by scripts that affect interactions with other entities, hence the 
focus on interaction scripts. It is important to note that these scripts are not the only scripts 
that are associated to accountability. One can also think of self-justification as a possible 
set of scripts that is associated to accountability to oneself. But interaction scripts serve as 
a useful set of scripts as they are overt and observable. Nevertheless, it must be clear that 
interaction scripts are only one set of scripts that are associated to accountability.  
 
So far, I have argued that a number of member banks have strived for a change in attitude 
towards accountability. Attitude is consisted in a set of scripts. I have identified one 
particular category of scripts that is associated with accountability: the interaction script. 
 
9.7 Scripts & rules at the Rabobank 
The next section will address the changes in a number of scripts belonging to the set of 
interaction scripts at the Rabobank that are related to changes in formal rules: the formal 
outcomes of the management accounting system in general and ROM in more detail. The 
section highlights two events in which attempts to alter scripts-in-use had rather 
unexpected results, or no results at all. Furthermore, the events at a different bank where 
changes in scripted interaction patterns did seem to have occurred are also highlighted to 
contrast the two events that produced unexpected results.  
 
9.7.1 ‘All is well and it will pass’  
This script involves interactions that people at a number of member banks have in reaction 
to adverse conditions or when they are confronted with bad news. They proceeded in a 
similar manner on a variety of occasions. The scripts follow the following profile at the 
various member banks:  
 
1. A piece of adverse information reaches one or more organisational participants. 
2. This information is given meaning through experiences with earlier information. 
The meaning given often differs from the message that was conveyed originally. 
From group processes, people use rationalisations of why their ideas on the 
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limited severity of the situations are justified. They downplay the implications of 
the information.  
3. People respond either not at all to the bringer of the news, or in a somewhat 
relaxed manner that reflects the redefinition of the personal threat they feel from 
the news. 
4. Logical inferences stemming from the information are not well understood by the 
parties affected as they have made a different ‘mental translation’, a different 
meaning has been provided. 
 
The Rabobank Zevenhuizen-Moerkapelle provided an example of this script. The 
management team of the bank decided to shut down its travel agency primarily because it 
could not achieve a banking productivity ratio of 1.3, meaning that for each euro in cost, it 
needed 1.3 euro in revenues to remain sustainable on the longer term. However, 
recognising that this was not realistic for the travel branch, and considering the additional 
traffic that a travel agency generates, the managers decided that the travel agency needed 
to be at least self-supporting. However, the accounting system produced a productivity 
ratio of between 0.7 and 0.8, which was instantly unacceptable to the management team. 
The travel agency needed to be closed. But the people working there maintained their 
belief that things were not that bad. Consider this self-critique of the General Director of 
the bank: ‘This was our situation. It was clear to everyone that this was not sustainable, I 
thought. We needed to closely look at the costs and our revenues to see if we could 
approach the 1.0 productivity. If we could do that, or we saw light at the end of the tunnel, 
then we would go for it; otherwise we needed to pull the plug. Looking back, I must say 
that it was sufficiently clear to me, but I haven’t repeated it sufficiently to the people. I 
mentioned the types of choices we needed to make, but my people have thought: ‘It will be 
fine, so many people are working on the issue, calculating to establish the sustainability of 
the travel agency; The bank is obtaining good financial results, it has operated nicely 
over the years; it will all be fine…’ That is where the source of the massive unrest lay 
when we decided to shut down travel operations indefinitely. With regards to 
communication… the facts have been stated to the people involved, but they placed the 
information in a context that I now can vividly understand, but that was not meant to.’  
 
From his position and role as a General Director, he made judgments that were 
extensively communicated to the members of the management team, and to some extent to 
the employees involved. However, the mere fact that the available information was placed 
in a group defined context that was different from the one of the management team, is not 
always problematic. In the above situation it was, because the meaning provided by the 
travel agency employees was not compatible with the sense of urgency that the 
management team felt as a result of the low financial ratios. Similar issues arose at the 
Rabobank West-Zeeuws Vlaanderen. An employee of the segment Client Advice notes 
that messages that the bank was not doing as good as it should, given the size and number 
of employees, was simply unbelievable. ‘We honestly thought we were in great shape, our 
office building, the presents, the many Belgian customers, amongst ourselves, we were 
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convinced that we were doing marvellous.’ However, the management team used the 
efforts in ROM to provide counter evidence that did not fit with current conceptions. 
‘When Results Oriented Management produced the realisation that we were not doing so 
well on the domestic market, compared to other sister banks, we could not believe it. Cees 
(the General Director) confronted us many times with the performances of our sister bank 
in Baarle-Nassau and provided evidence from the accounting system, such as averages of 
services provided per year, but it took us some time to realise that our assumptions may 
have been inaccurate.’ 
 
The ‘all’s well’ script is a mode of interaction between people that relies heavily on the 
shared assumption that their organisation is in an optimal condition. The events they are 
finding themselves in (see Weick, 1995) are interpreted and given meaning under the 
assumption that they are not related to the current state of the organisation. Others, often 
managers and directors, are providing information that they find compelling proof of their 
point. However, at the various member banks, the proof was discussed instead of the point 
it was making. Every time managers and consultants used accounting information from 
the ROM process to indicate their take on the state of the bank, people would argue that 
the accounting information was either faulty or irrelevant as it contradicted their 
understanding of the economic position of the bank. Basically, the ‘all’s well’ script of 
interaction was founded on an institution. This institution, a taken for granted shared 
assumption about the state of the bank, was the pivotal element that allowed the ‘all’s 
well’ script to prevail. People were able to develop interactions by virtue of similar 
understandings they had with regards to the position of the bank. In this light, the 
messages of managers and consultants were literally unbelievable, and this was reinforced 
by interactions of people, outside the management teams, who all shared the assumption 
that, whatever was going on, it couldn’t be something that had to do with the state of the 
bank.  
 
The ‘all’s well’ script is a script that reduces ontological insecurity on the part of 
organisational participants, especially under conditions of uncertainty. As respondents at 
Rabobank Zevenhuizen-Moerkapelle and West-Zeeuws Vlaanderen indicated, the script 
remained in full operation even when the formal signals indicated that all was not well. 
The Zevenhuizen-Moerkapelle member bank was showing massive losses on their travel 
operations; West-Zeeuws Vlaanderen was demonstrating that the bank was severely 
overstaffed for servicing the domestic market. These signals, created by the use of 
accounting information, were ignored in large part by the organisational population, as 
they found contrary evidence through their own sense making processes. The formal rules 
were downplayed by a collective sense making process that yielded completely different 
results: ‘Managers are working hard to improve results, therefore it will be fine’. The 
output of the accounting system and the managerial interpretations called for a 
mobilisation of people. Employees were for a large part ignoring the accounting 
information they were presented with, and they even created evidence to the contrary 
through their collective sense making processes that were based on scripts already present. 
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Even stronger, in the face of adverse information, the scripts gained salience for the 
organisational participants who were affected by the formal changes, such as the closing 
of a travel agency. The situation was typified by increasing ambiguity and employees who 
were prone to share their take on the situation with their peers. They tended to use the 
collective scripts to interpret, or make sense of new information. As a result, major 
differences in meaning arose as managers were employing different scripts for meaning 











Formal arrangements (incl. rules) 
 
Figure 9-3: Ambiguity between rules and routines 
 
Figure 9-3 depicts an ambiguity between the formal messages conveyed by the accounting 
system and their managerial interpretations, and the scripted interaction patterns that are 
in place. This ambiguity forces organisational participants to downplay either side to 
resolve the apparent contradiction between formal signals and their collective interaction 
patterns. At the member banks under study, people most often opted to downplay the 
importance of the signals stemming from the accounting system. At the same time, they 
interpreted organisational action in terms of their dilemma: ‘People are working to resolve 
this situation, therefore, it must be alright’. The sentiment that formal systems were 
producing invalid signals was re-enforced by the scripted patterns of interaction that in 
turn were self re-enforcing their importance for guiding behaviours and interpreting 
organisational events. Put differently, the ambiguity resulting from a misalignment 
between existing patterns of interaction and the signals from formal systems led to the re-
enforcing of the existing patterns at the expense of the perceived validity of the formal 
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systems. As a result, organisational participants were not prepared to consider the 
ramifications associated with the chance that the formal systems were valid sources of 
information.  
 
9.7.2 The absence of a confrontation script 
This discussion is not about a script that was present, but one that was not present at a 
number of member banks. This chapters’ interest in these types of scripts was fuelled by 
the frequent references by respondents at various banks to the banks’ inability to confront 
each other about the results obtained. They indicated that they were especially 
disappointed by the fact that there was very little control over the agreements made in 
terms of the ROM program. This was a weak spot throughout the program, given the 
adaptations in the second version of the Management Manual: ‘Many local member banks 
have successfully created policy plans over the last few years. The real challenge however 
is to realise these policy plans by which we can achieve better results. It is for this reason 
that this management manual emphasises Control on the execution of the policy plans’. 
Although the formal documentation of Rabobank Nederland speaks of improvement of 
control as a discrete routine (plan-do-check-act), many respondents talked about the 
notion of control on a much more personal level (‘do what you promise’). To them, 
managers and employees, control was a behavioural notion, not one that one could be 
enforced by structures. To most, control was about confronting people with the results 
obtained, offering support to those who need it, and learning from those who appeared to 
be successful in their tasks. These were patterns of behaviour that were not embedded in 
day-to-day interaction. Rather, the organisation had been for a long time satisfied with 
limited knowledge on the causes of many deviations.  
 
The reason for the absence of such a script of accountability, so common in the business 
environment, can be attributed to the absence of a need to be accountable. Many member 
banks had been almost “monopolistic”, given their presence in local communities. This 
strong embedding in local communities sometimes gave them local market shares 
exceeding eighty percent. Moreover, customers used to have a close relationship with the 
local member banks, whose staff is from the same communities and whose general 
director is often a notable member of that community. The fact that the member bank is 
part of a cooperative, owned by its members, had consequences for internal relations in 
the bank. The cooperative flourished for many years, where the local assembly of 
members exercised control; through its board of members and a board of supervision. 
Both of these groups are not professional managers. Moreover, they possess only a 
fraction of the information that the General Director of a bank and his management team 
have. This leads to the situation in which control of the member bank, by its owners, i.e. 
the members, is incomplete. The slack that member banks had, due to their comfortable 
market position and the inability of the control organs to exercise their control in a proper 
manner, led to inefficiencies at member banks. Organisational members have therefore 
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developed modes of interaction that focused on friendly communication, where 
addressing someone about his results was seen as an undue intrusion into personal space 
and a denial of the valuable position that someone had in the organisation. 
 
People indicated that they were making plans, with which they were quite pleased. But 
when it came to control over those plans, i.e. the check on the achievements of those 
plans, people were more critical about the results. Not only managers, but also other 
employees, reported that the execution of agreed action plans was severely hindered by 
the absence of a control routine. When managers of the Leeuwarden bank, which was 
quite active with ROM, were confronted with questions related to how they organised 
control over the agreed actions, the response was one of surprise, as they had largely 
overlooked the notion of control. This was similar for other banks. The manager Business 
Administration of the Monnickendam-Waterland bank: ‘we did not get as much out of it 
as we could that time. We stopped short of a proper control methodology.’ The member 
banks in West-Zeeuws Vlaanderen, West-Drenthe, Groningen, Leeuwarden and 
Zevenhuizen-Moerkapelle were all aware of the difficulties they had in shaping a control 
routine, both in terms of structures and in attitude. The comments at the Leeuwarden bank 
illustrated these difficulties. ‘We have never talked about how we would deal with control. 
We were just finished; the strategic plan was ready, and so was the year plan. And now 
we could track the numbers, that was the feeling then. And so we went. But how we were 
going to do that and what we would do if deviations from planning occurred, we did not 
discuss that.’ A similar comment was made by the General Director of the Zwolle bank: 
‘Look, we are not that consistent with what we call “check and act”. We have a plan, we 
execute it, but checking its results and steering accordingly, that needs to have our full 
attention’. Another respondent at this bank confirmed its importance: ‘Since there are so 
many different persons, with so many different frames of reference, control is an 
important stage as it structures the way you can think about deviations: “is it me, or the 
processes, or leadership….”. It is rather childish, but this is the way we need to learn to 
think. And at a certain moment, you are used to it and it has become a standard of 
behaviour’. 
 
Yet the people were just not familiar with confronting each other over the results they 
achieved. This was a problem on multiple levels: it affected relations between managers 
and employees, between employees, between managers and even between customers and 
the bank. Witness to this last point is a statement by a financial controller of the 
Groningen bank: ‘differences between banks become visible … for example when debtors 
default. The citeria are not always clear, but I am sure that interpersonal elements play 
their part. We have had such an issue with someone. And we stuck by him. I have always 
wondered what it was that made us decide to continue with that person: was it because we 
felt that his business was viable or did we not dare to confront him with the fact that we 
did not believe in his venture anymore.’ Indeed, for many member banks, it was very 
difficult to maintain a strict separation between its business mission and its local 
assignment.  
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The absence of the control scripts was nothing new, but ROM exposed this absence as a 
problem. The fact that whole groups of organisational participants did not know how and 
when to appeal to each other’s responsibilities made many efforts surrounding ROM 
useless; a fact that a number of participants discovered after the first cycle of ROM. To 
the managers of some member banks, the absence of a script that dealt with being 
accountable to ones peers and ones managers was a cultural trait that needed changing. 
Therefore, a number of member banks started to implement more explicit control 
structures in the hope that this would lead to behaviour that included more explicit 
accountability towards each other. The effects of these control structures were 
unpredictable as the organisations responded differently to the introduction of these new 
routines that were enforced from the higher echelons of the member banks. The new 
control structures that were observed were the following:  
 
- Systems to administer personal targets and the achievement thereof. 
- Personal evaluations, attempting to confront people with their ‘production’. 
- Financial evaluation and incentive schemes. In Rabobank terms, this is called the 
‘Employee Value Plan’. 
 
These formal procedures were basically formal rules that were meant to induce new 
behaviours and scripts. The earlier mentioned ‘all’s well’ script is an example of formal 
rules and specific scripts that were not fully compatible. Here, with the absence of a 
control script, is an example of the introduction of formal rules that do not have a 
foundation in behaviours or patterns of interaction. There is no reconciliation between 
scripts and the formal structures that were formed, simply because there were no scripts 
that supported the formal rules and structures in development. None to contradict, but also 
none to support the new sets of rules.  
 
In the absence of a control script, that is a pattern of behaviour dealing with feedback 
about previous action, member banks attempted to introduce such mechanisms by means 
of formal programs. This situation is different from the one described in section 9.7.1 
above, as here there are no competing scripted behavioural patterns; rather it was the 
absence of scripts that was problematic. The formal procedures the banks launched had 
some indirect short-term effects. People at several banks were being evaluated on their 
contributions to the organisational goals according to a program called Result Oriented 
Rewarding; a spin-off of Results Oriented Management. To make people personally 
accountable for their objectives was new to most member banks. However, as a 
respondent at a participating member bank remarked: ‘the targets per employee, that is 
almost impossible… Now we are stuck with a system in which employees must tally their 
own production. And based on that, we have to determine if people are achieving their 
targets. So there isn’t a system in which a sales person enters the savings accounts he has 
just sold, and those sales get added to the status of that person. Rather, one needs to enter 
the customer in multiple systems, then you add something for your own file about the 
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customer, and then you need to establish your sales. So basically you can tally as much as 
you want. We do have guidelines, but some people will tally their activities sooner that 
others. So that is difficult to measure. And now the bank is talking about performance 
related pay, but with the current systems, that is not really feasible’.  
 
Related to the attempts to influence behaviour through performance related pay, a 
respondent from the West Zeeuws-Vlaanderen member bank noted: ‘We do have the 
Employee Value Plan, but no-one is seriously considering this, except in March, when we 
learn how much we will receive. But there is no-one who thinks: “If I try real hard the 
coming month, then there will be something extra for me next year in March.” The 
Employee Value Plan, in my eyes, it does not make any sense.’ Indeed, on the occasions 
when the researcher was present and the amounts were announced, no one outside the 
management teams made any reference to performance in relation to the rewards. 
  
If we consider managerial action to be expressions of a desired formal state, then more 
sources of ambiguity are present: ‘There has been much uncertainty, much change. It has 
been said that Client Advice needs to decrease in numbers of employees, now the project 
FAST is approaching so Financial Advice needs to decrease in size. It has been said that 
the fiscal harmonisation will be a threat to the bank, Investor Relations needs to reduce its 
size, but nothing actually does!’  
 
In these situations the formal rules embodied in the systems and those formal rules 
embodied in formal evaluations are not compatible with themselves. The management of 
the various banks wanted to improve the accountability of its employees. These formally 
expressed desired rules of behaviour were to be enforced by specific accounting 
techniques, such as control systems and performance related pay. However, both, in their 
current form, are unsuitable to support the formal aspirations of the management team. 
One could therefore conclude that the formal arrangements in themselves are causing 
ambiguities.  
 
Moreover, due to the absence of a history through which scripted interaction patterns 
could develop, there are very few, if any, practices that can support the formal rules of 
control in their early stages. So the situation is very unstable by virtue of contradictory 
formal structures and the absence of appropriate behavioural patterns.  
 










Formal arrangements (incl. rules) 
Rules: Accounting 





Figure 9-4: Ambiguity between rules 
   
Figure 9-4 demonstrates that the formal requirement of accountability was problematic in 
its own right. The systems and formal procedures meant to support these requirements 
were not yet fully operational, and this fact signalled that accountability did not rank 
highest on the list of priorities. The ambiguity between formal systems and formal 
procedures signalled a shift in priorities that may not have been intended, but was still 
there for all to see. Since managements were sending very mixed signals, the message did 
not even reach the scripted patterns of interaction. 
  
So far two situations have been highlighted: Firstly, ambiguity between formal rules and 
existing scripts (which form the fabric of routines) caused employees to rely strongly on 
their preconceptions captured in their existing scripts (see the graphical representation in 
Figure 9-3). Secondly, ambiguity between formal systems and procedures undermined 
from the outset the effects of these formal arrangements on behaviour. Ambiguity was 
caused by contradictions in formal signals. The link between scripts and formal rules is 
depicted in Figure 9-4 with dotted lines, as the formal changes had little effect on routines 
as scripted regularities were not altered; they were actually reinforced. The next section 
discusses a different situation where the alterations in the rules-script dialectic resulted in 
changes in routine interaction patterns.  
 
9.7.3 Actual changes in the script-rules relation 
The managers at the Groningen bank were well aware of the problems associated with the 
introduction of new formal rules in the stable social environment of the bank. Especially 
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the General Director, by virtue of his previous experiences, was focused on finding ways 
to enable formal structure to penetrate habitual behaviour, as well as the interactions 
between employees. Therefore the ROM program was implemented somewhat differently 
at this bank. As chapter five described, the Groningen bank did not rely entirely on the 
program to forge changes in attitudes and behaviours. Rather, it used a combination of the 
program and additional instruments, including formal instruments and creative 
expressions1 that something was going on. The program and the efforts of the MT+ group 
at this bank were deployed in the early stages of ROM, just as it was at the other banks. 
However, whereas some of the other banks relied heavily on the ‘ambassadorial’ function 
of the members of the MT+, to disseminate the results of their efforts, the Groningen bank 
used additional techniques. 
 
The objectives of these additional techniques that were used by the Groningen bank can 
be divided into two categories: dissemination and endurance. Dissemination relates to the 
attempts to communicate the conclusions of the MT+ discussions to all employees at the 
bank. Endurance refers to the embedding of the new principles of accountability, result 
orientation and commitment into the socially acceptable ways of doing. It relates to the 
taken-for-grantedness of the new principles of behaviour within the Rabobank, This 
chapter is about dissemination, while the next will be about endurance. A number of 
events were occurring at the Groningen bank that facilitated the inclusion of the outcomes 
of ROM into existing scripts. These events were: (1) continuously disappointing financial 
results; (2) Lay-offs; of both employees and of managers; (3) Evaluations in terms of 
accountability, commitment and result orientation; and (4) Efforts to change identity and 
pride in the organisation. These will be discussed shortly below. 
 
Continuously disappointing results: The Groningen bank has had a history of low market 
shares and continuing solvency problems. This can partially be attributed to the fact that it 
is operating in a city environment that is typified by a rather low level of welfare, 
compared to the rest of the country. Moreover, the city houses many students who require 
substantial investments from the Rabobank. Although the Rabobank Group as a whole 
reaps the benefits from this investment as the careers of former students make them 
valuable customers from a commercial point of view, the Groningen bank does not 
necessarily reap these benefits as most students move away from the Groningen area. 
Besides, the bank has also had rather low market shares in various other areas. The 
traditionally strong products of the Rabobank Group, especially mortgages, are also under 
pressure in the Groningen area. This is not the explanation in itself, but it provides the 
background against which the following events unfolded. 
 
Lay-offs: with the presence of the new General Director, little change was initially 
noticeable. As noted before, the General Director felt rather isolated and he had difficulty 
                                                
1 These creative expressions are discussed in the next chapter in some detail; they included several temporary 
changes to the exterior and interior of the head office and various other expressions that could be deemed 
‘creative’.  
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in communicating his intentions for the bank to his managers. He argues that they were 
lacking the type of pro-active attitude the bank needed. It was not until a new Corporate 
Clients manager was hired that the new views began to gain leverage within the 
management team. This newly hired manager explained: ‘frankly, I was surprised to be 
hired here. I mean, I am a sales person, very commercially oriented, but I have had very 
little experience with managing a team. But I do know what I want and how I want it.’ 
However, to the General Director, he was the man for the job as the Director’s selection 
criteria focused more on commercial attitude than on experience or skills. The new 
manager was given considerable freedom in re-organising his segment and deploying 
structures such as an improved credit control and new cash management ventures. As part 
of his reorganisations, he began to hold the employees of his department more strictly 
accountable for the results they achieved. As a result of the reorganisation of the segment, 
a number of people were laid off. The way this new manager went about this 
reorganisation, made his employees unsure about their future at the bank. Even outside the 
segment the effect was noticeable. The lay-offs and the uncompromising attitude of the 
manager led to some tension in the bank. The manager was clearly providing a preview of 
a direction for the future that appeared to have the full support of the General Director.  
 
The increased tension at the bank caused people to realise that something was going to 
change. The increased ontological insecurity resulting from the series of lay-offs and the 
uncompromising attitude of the Corporate Clients manager concerned many employees. 
The ambiguity between the existing ways of interaction, and the new practices of the 
Corporate Clients manager (at this stage, these had the status of rules) was resolved by the 
extended ROM program. It was here that the Groningen bank was rather different to the 
other banks studied: it simultaneously made existing routines undesirable, and at the same 
time, it was very explicit about the desirable alternative, and made its selection very easy. 
Not selecting the new behavioural alternatives would take more cognitive effort on the 
part of the individuals, as the results of old behaviours were not necessarily as logical as 
they used to be. This view can be substantiated by referring to the support provided by the 
more stringent system of formal evaluations.  
 
Formal evaluations: In support of the drive for more accountability, result orientation and 
commitment, the Corporate Clients segment, and later on the other segments, introduced a 
system of formal evaluations. The system was essentially a series of agreements between 
the manager and the employee about the results to be achieved, as well as how the core 
values of the bank would be expressed in the manner the results were achieved. These 
latter agreements focus on the formal evaluation of the core values that were defined in 
the ROM program, but only by members of the MT+. With the benefit of hindsight, one 
can say that the evaluations served two purposes: firstly, they provided an opportunity to 
influence the individual sense making processes of the employees. Secondly, evaluations 
did not necessarily facilitate the new practices; they just made reverting to the old ones 
harder. Again we need to recognise that the efforts to make new behavioural principles 
more acceptable actually worked by making the alternatives more unacceptable.  
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Changing pride and identity: At the time of these events (2002-2004), the General 
Director of the Groningen bank was continuously emphasising that the bank had much 
potential and that people could be proud of what it would become. In acting as a sort of 
visionary, laying out the future of the bank, the Director sketched the outlines of the new 
bank. He called for pride in this new future. Although this was not very effective, as 
employees were pounded by mixed signals, he did succeed in explaining why the current 
events were necessary. Put differently, in providing a vision of the bank in, say, ten years, 
he effectively altered the background against which people were making sense of the 
concrete measures taken by the managers. The actions of the General Director effectively 
provided new information for sense making efforts so that employees could relate more 
easily to what was going on and to understand why. It is important to note that employees 
were not particularly impressed with the calls for more pride in the bank. It did not appear 
to influence the identity that individuals attributed to the bank. However, it did provide 
additional information that was used by employees in their sense making processes. The 
quarterly meetings for all the banks staff, which were used by the General Director in an 
effort to boost morale, were not particularly successful in the short term. But again, it 
helped the sense making efforts and it provided the information, which allowed 
employees to understand what was going on and what was to be expected from them. In 
essence, it gave them fuel for interpretation.  
 
The above discussion of the presence or absence of specific scripts at the Rabobank 
illustrates the interaction between scripts, patterns of behaviour, that may or may not have 
tacit features, and the formal rules which are embodied in a new way of making people 
accountable. The dynamics between these scripts and the formal rules were rather 
different at the various member banks. Some member banks were actively influencing 
interaction patterns of the employees, by emphasising the importance of their 
accountability to each other, while other banks were mainly concerned with the 
implementation of the structural features of the model. The member banks were situated 
somewhere along the following continuum: 
 
 
Emphasis on structural features Emphasis on behavioural features
 
Figure 9-5: Continuum of emphasis on structure and interaction 
      
This chapter has proposed a method of exploring how formal rules and guidelines affect 
people’s propensity to alter routine interaction patterns. It did so by exploring the effects 
of rules on scripts. In the Rabobank setting, three mechanisms were identified that had a 
bearing on the effects that rules have on scripts and vice versa. Different formal structures 
were set up, including evaluations, reward schemes and control systems, which were 
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meant to influence the ways in which people interacted. These routine interaction patterns 
are for the most part governed by scripts, just as other routines are. The chapter therefore 
focused on a relation between (interaction) scripts and rules that were meant to alter those 
scripts. Using the method proposed, a number of implications can be drawn. 
 
The most striking feature of the efforts at the various bank was that managers were using 
formal structures, e.g. rules, in attempts to influence the routine interaction patterns in 
place, while employees were frequently prepared neither to follow these rules nor to 
integrate them in their daily practices. However, these rules often had a profound indirect 
effect. The rules served to signal a possible change in individuals’ experienced realities. It 
was their symbolic function that was to become part of the sense making processes that 
people used to determine if interaction patterns were still appropriate. It was through the 
indirect effects on sense making that managerial interference got its results. At various 
member banks, where the sense of urgency was low, managerial interference worked 
more indirectly through collective sense making efforts. The outcomes of these sense-
making efforts were very unpredictable, as shown by the case of the travel agency 
discussed in paragraph 9.7.1 above, as managers can have only a limited influence on 
employees’ sense making efforts.  
 
But although the outcomes are less predictable, they are more lasting, because extensive 
sense making can lead to alterations in scripts. This thesis has argued that once 
organisational participants are induced to engage in activities of sense making, they can 
consequently alter existing scripted knowledge. The events described in the above 
sections point to differences in sense making occasions. The events described in 
paragraphs 9.7.1 and 9.7.2 both demonstrated that people did not include new formal rules 
into their sense making efforts. Rather, they used existing scripts to reduce the importance 
of formal signals (9.7.1) or the formal signals themselves were ambiguous, thereby 
allowing people to dismiss them (9.7.2). Paragraph 9.7.3 addressed the events in the 
Groningen bank, where ambiguity was low and existing scripts were rendered useless. 
Additionally, many opportunities were given to the collective to make sense of the new 
formal rules. Although the banks attempts to influence the outcomes of sense making 
partially failed, the call for accountability became part of a specific type of script, which I 
term the interaction script. This script governs the expectations we have of others and 
how we interact with them in our social group. It allows us to make inferences about the 
reception of arguments we make and the sorts of responses that are likely. Basically, the 
interaction script holds information on the validity of our arguments, in relation to others 
in our social group. The Groningen case indicates that interactions involving result-
orientation and accountability as arguments were gaining legitimacy at the expense of 
arguments involving personal decisions and the cooperative nature of the bank. At the 
Groningen bank, scripted interaction changed, whereas these were not altered at the other 
banks mentioned in this chapter.   
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9.8 Dynamics of rules and scripts 
 
The events described above have focused on the relation between rules and scripts as 
observed at the Rabobank. Paragraph 9.7.1 and paragraph 9.7.2 discussed instances where 
people were not apt to alter their previously adopted scripted behaviours. The ways in 







Ambiguity causes reverting 
to existing scripts → little 
emotional discomfort
 
Figure 9-6: Ambiguity preventing script adaptation 
 
The discussions in the paragraphs 9.7.1 and 9.7.2 pointed to situations in which people 
were not prepared to alter scripts in use. In the Zevenhuizen-Moerkapelle bank, people 
experienced ambiguity between the formal messages conveyed by the banks management 
and their preconceptions on the functioning of their departments. In other banks, new 
formal rules were contradicting other formal arrangements, thereby forcing organisational 
participants to choose to which rules they gave priority. In all instances described in the 
two paragraphs, the behaviours were comparable, in that existing scripts helped 
participants to make sense of an ambiguous situation. Although the formal rules in various 
forms were meant to alter employees’ behaviours, they actually reinforced existing 
behaviours, because the rules caused ambiguities, which were interpreted by existing 
scripts. As a consequence, little behavioural changes were observed. Figure 9-6 depicts 
the reverting to existing scripts, by the double-sided arrow, that connects the block 
designated ‘ambiguity’ to the set of existing scripts (routines). This indicates that existing 
scripts reduced emotional discomfort from ambiguity1 and as a consequence no need 
existed for the production of new behaviours and new scripts.   
 
                                                
1 See March & Olsen (1982) for an extensive discussion of organisational decision making under conditions of 
ambiguity. 
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The situation was somewhat different at the Groningen bank (see paragraph 9.7.3 above). 
The formal messages at this bank also caused initial ambiguity. And they too caused 
people to attempt to make sense of these messages using existing scripts that aid 
interpretation. But this sense making effort could not rely solely on existing scripts, as the 
meetings in the ROM program had made it clear that new criteria were to be used to 
evaluate each others’ actions. What used to be defendable forms of behaviour were now 
open to discussion. Together with a series of formal systems to render existing behaviours 
unusable, these new criteria of ‘good’ behaviour led to emotional discomfort, as existing 
sets of interpretation could not necessarily be used. As chapter 7 and 8 indicated, 
emotional discomfort can lead to sense-making efforts, which in turn produce the new 









Ambiguity causes reverting 
to existing scripts; Yet 
existing scripts are rendered 






Figure 9-7: Ambiguity leading to conscious sense making 
 
The figure shows that the introduction of new formal rules caused ambiguity on the part 
of employees of the Groningen bank, in a similar fashion to the employees of other 
member banks. However, whereas employees of other banks reverted back to existing 
scripts (especially existing scripts of interaction), the employees of the Groningen bank 
could not do the same, as many aspects of their scripts in use were rendered useless. As 
the reader may recall, the Groningen bank was engaged in an all-encompassing change 
program, meaning that many aspects of the organisation could no longer be taken for 
granted, but were subject to much uncertainty. As a result, emotional discomfort could not 
be alleviated by the act of interpretation using existing scripts. Rather, people engaged in 
conscious sense making in attempts to reduce the emotional discomfort that was still 
there. People did this by using the signals and information at their disposal, to develop 
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new expectations of each other. The management of the Groningen bank made sure that 
many signals were present to aid this interpretation (see also chapter 10 for a review of 
these signals). 
 
In the above discussion, I touched upon the main difference between the events described 
in paragraph 9.7.1 and paragraph 9.7.2 on the one hand and paragraph 9.7.3 on the other. 
The Groningen bank engaged in a massive structural and cultural transition, and it used 
ROM in a supportive, yet subordinate capacity. This means that most organisational 
participants were confronted with the principles of accountability and results and risk 
orientation independently from the ROM structure. At some of the other banks, ROM was 
positioned as an isolated program, which was expected to have a similar impact on 
behaviours as at the Groningen bank. But at these banks, it was relatively easy for 
participants to find other sources of confirmation that their existing preconceptions and 
resulting behaviours were proper. Existing scripts of interaction reduced the ambiguity 
caused by ROM. It was possible to dismiss the program largely because of this ambiguity.  
 
Basically, this chapter argues that ambiguity can lead to interpretations through (1) 
reverting to existing scripts (using existing scripts to provide meaning); and (2) conscious 
sense making using signals from ones immediate environment as scripts are rendered 
unavailable. A variety of rules discussed here (managerial directives, the ROM manual, 
the formal accounting system and its outcomes) are rules, because the formal hierarchy 
sanctions them. The rules themselves are used to achieve specific goals (direct objectives), 
but they also convey messages about wider preferences and future strategic directions 
(indirect objectives), which are subsequently interpreted by sense making processes. This 
is important to recognise, because conscious sense making efforts take the symbolic value 
of rules into account; put differently: when people cannot fall back on existing scripts to 
guide their interpretations, they use the symbolic value of rules as one of the sources of 
information to make sense of these rules (e.g. ‘tallying production helps us to improve our 
sales technique’ vs. ‘tallying production is yet another tool of management to limit our 
decision space’). 
 
This chapter elaborated on these indirect objectives and explored how they get their 
meaning through interpretation. Managers have little influence on this interpretation, and 
this interpretation is rather unpredictable in its effects on social groups. At the Rabobank, 
especially where ambiguity between the direct objectives of various rules was high (i.e. 
rules contradicting each other), the role of sense making gained importance. Interpretation 
of rules became a collective process, which management or consultants could not always 
fully influence. For example, at the West-Drenthe bank, people at different segments 
reacted very differently to the perceived influence they had on the strategic direction of 
the bank. The Customer Service segment was enthusiastic about the requests for their 
participation, whereas the people at Financial Advice were more sceptical. The latter 
viewed their increased room for participation against the background of diminished local 
autonomy of the entire bank. As a result, they were prone to question the impact of their 
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involvement in local decision-making. The different points of view regarding the 
segment’s ability to influence policies, resulted from different sense making processes and 
as a result, different meanings attributed to the activities surrounding ROM.  
 
In all, the relation that this chapter discusses is that of rules-scripts, sense making and 
ambiguity. It argues that ambiguity may fuel conscious sense making, but ambiguity can 
also contribute to the importance of existing scripts used to reduce this ambiguity. As a 
consequence, sense making accounts for different interpretations and meanings of events. 
This is relevant for the institutional perspective on management accounting change, 
because it provides a more detailed view on the interaction between rules and routines 
(scripts), which are seen as an essential part of this perspective (Burns & Scapens, 2000).  
 
The events observed at some banks of the Rabobank Group pointed to the complex nature 
of the rules-routines interactions. It appeared that the newly devised formal rules had 
different impacts on different routines on each occasion. There did not exist “a” rules-
routines relationship as such. Rather, the relation can come to exist either by virtue of the 
existing scripts which allow for interpretation of new rules or by the processes that lead to 
adaptation of existing scripts to include actions in response to these new rules. 
 
9.9 Discussion 
This chapter has addressed the manner in which the formal properties of change and 
routine interaction patterns affect each other. The literature on management accounting 
change provides much evidence that this interaction must be present, but it shows few 
attempts to unravel this mutual influence. Burns & Scapens (2000) argue that this 
interaction is an essential part of the process of institutional change, but are unclear how 
this interaction proceeds. 
  
This chapter showed three instances of the interaction between the formal rules and 
existing behavioural regularities. Rules include the formal requirements of the ROM 
program, managerial preferences, accounting systems, and the reports to be delivered. 
Routines are envisaged here as scripts of habitual interaction. Paragraph 9.7.1 was on the 
failure of management and employees to interact as a result of differences in perceived 
meanings of the various signals. The scripts in place allowed the affected employees to 
maintain ontological security by interpreting formal signals through the scripts in place. 
As a result, alarming figures from the accounting system had a profound effect on the 
management team members, but they did not trigger similar reactions in other employees. 
These employees collectively decided that the potentially threatening accounting figures 
were outweighed by the search for solutions by the management team of this bank. This 
was an instance of contradiction between formal properties and consequences of the ROM 
program and the routines in place. The formal signals (travel operations are producing 
losses) were dismissed, as they were incompatible with existing interactions that 
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convinced the employees involved that managers would find a way to keep the travel 
agency open, ‘as they had always done’. The discussion in paragraph 9.7.2 shows that 
rules can sometimes have very little effect on existing scripts. It shows that when formal 
rules are so ambiguous, they can have a very limited effect on routine interaction patterns. 
Moreover, due to the ambiguity of the formal signals, in this instance people turned to the 
existing interaction patterns to make sense of what these ambiguous rules meant. 
Paragraph 9.7.3 offers a discussion of the events at the Groningen bank. Formal rules did 
have a profound effect on many organisational participants, because of the combination of 
rendering existing scripts more difficult to use and offering many explicit sense-making 
opportunities. Figure 9-7 depicts the manner in which rules affected routine behaviours at 
this bank.  
 
This chapter was concerned with the manner in which rules and routines interact, as this is 
an essential part of an institutional perspective on management accounting change. This 
chapter argues that ambiguity plays a central part in this process. Ambiguity led people to 
dismiss new rules altogether, it also caused them to fall back on existing scripts to aid the 
interpretation of the new rules. As a consequence, ambiguity between new rules and 
existing scripts prevented new script development. However, the chapter also described 
instances in which existing scripts could not resolve ambiguity, either because they were 
rendered useless or because they were non-existent. In these circumstances, ambiguity 
leads to increased emotional discomfort that can lead to sense making in attempts to 
reduce this discomfort. Therefore, rules can influence routines either directly (when new 
rules are fully compatible with existing patterns of behaviour) or indirectly, because of the 
ambiguity it causes. However, whether rules have a profound effect on routines depends 
also on the availability of existing habits and the occasions for sense making that people 
have.  
 
Although this chapter indicates that the changes following ROM may yield unexpected 
results, it does not mean that institutional change at the Rabobank was not observed. At 
some banks, new practices were embedded in day-to-day interactions. As such, 
institutionalisation of behavioural principles did occur. The phase of institutionalisation 
theoretically follows the phase of routinisation (see the research framework in chapter 3), 
so the next chapter will logically elaborate on this phase: the inclusion of new behavioural 
principles in the institutional realm at the Rabobank. 
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10 Changes in the Institutional Realm 
‘I am not needed here anymore, and that is a great feeling’ 
10.1 Introduction 
So far, this thesis has discussed that changes in routine behaviours depend on issues that 
cause groups to be willing to undertake change in the face of the complex relationship 
between agency and embeddedness (Seo & Creed, 2002) (chapter 7); the manner in which 
those action choices result from local sense making efforts (chapter 8); and the ways in 
which existing routine patterns of interaction can conflict with the rules and associated 
actions resulting from a new accounting system (chapter 9). This chapter will illustrate 
how several member banks succeeded in introducing newly shared principles underlying 
acceptable behaviour. At these banks, the institutional realm was altered, albeit in 
sometimes unexpected ways. This chapter reports on these changes. It is the final stage of 
a lengthy process that involved the recognition of a need for conscious intervention; 
multiple sense making processes; and confrontations between existing interaction scripts 
and the new rules resulting from doing the ROM program. This chapter does not argue 
that the ROM program itself was institutionalised. Rather, ROM contributed to the 
introduction of several new principles of acceptable behaviour: accountability, 
commitment and result and risk orientation. In earlier chapters, accountability as an issue 
was shown to be already relevant to most, if not all, the member banks under study. 
Additionally, commitment and result- and risk orientation were also found to be of 
importance to both banks that are the focus here.  
 
This chapter has some similarities with Soin et al. (2002) who were also concerned with 
the process of management accounting change. They were interested in the manner in 
which accounting changes in a British bank could be explained by the use of an 
institutional perspective. Although Soin et al. were concerned with the implementation of 
an Activity Based Costing system, some similarities exist between their study and the one 
reported on in this chapter. Both took place in a bank. Indeed, the characteristics of the 
‘Trafalgar bank’, the made-up name of the bank Soin et al. studied, are rather similar to 
those of the Rabobank. A low emphasis on management accounting, a strong employee 
orientation and a history of somewhat paternalistic employee relations (Soin et al., 2002, 
p.256) are characteristics that describe both banks. Also, parts of the institutional 
environment of both organisations, consisting of regulatory bodies and financial markets 
are similar. However, there are also some notable differences. The Rabobank is a 
cooperative bank, which implies a number of specific characteristics, including an 
emphasis on the personal freedom of employees and a high degree of local autonomy.  
 
Soin et al. (2002), Burns & Scapens (2000) and Barley & Tolbert (1997) all agree on the 
importance of the interaction of rules and routines, as well as their diachronic relation 
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with the institutional realm. Yet, discussions of accounting as institutionalised practice are 
often limited to a perspective that fails to clarify the precise nature of this relation. Zucker 
(1991) notes that institutional analysis has focused primarily on the effects of 
institutionalisation, instead of on the process of institutionalisation, that remains to be a 
‘black box’. This still holds, as Seo & Creed (2002) have called for further explanations of 
the processes underpinning institutional change. This chapter proceeds with the approach 
that was introduced in the previous chapter, which argued that specific routines at the 
Rabobank are better seen as scripts of interaction, which are local manifestations of 
institutions. This is in line with Barley & Tolbert (1997, p. 98) who note: ‘the institutions 
relevant to a particular setting will manifest themselves in behaviours characteristic of that 
setting, and, hence, will appear as local variants of more general principles’.  
 
This chapter will provide a more detailed description of the processes of institutional 
change that could be observed at the Rabobank. I view ROM as a set of rules and 
practices, that, through their enacting and reproduction could lead to an alteration of 
institutionalised principles. This is not equal to the institutionalisation of ROM, as only 
parts of the practices related to the program were in some way assimilated into the 
institutional realm of the social setting. 
 
The current chapter argues that scripted interactions (see chapter 9) consist of two 
dimensions: discourse and habitual (scripted) action; the two components of scripted 
interaction. The argument of this chapter is the following: the process of including 
practices in the institutional realm requires two elements: (1) a ‘carrier’ of practices, 
which is scripted interaction; and (2) a time frame of sufficient length, which allows these 
new principles to become taken-for-granted through sufficient repetition. The chapter 
proposes that both discourse and habitual action constitute institutions and as such 
contribute to the depersonalisation and the permanence of certain practices. This chapter 
will identify depersonalisation and permanence to be two critical features that allow 
scripted interaction to influence the institutional realm. This chapter will discuss instances 
of institutional change at the Rabobank using these views of institutionalisation.  
 
The next section will present a brief review of some characteristics of the institutional 
realm at the local member bank similar to the discussion of Soin et al. (2002). Then it will 
continue to discuss relevant insights from institutional theory. It will argue that discourse 
and habitual action are both a part of scripted interaction. Discourse and repeated action 
are both elements that contribute to the survival of shared principles through time. 
Paragraph 10.3 will explain these terms and explain why they are important in the final 
stages of institutional change. Then, the fourth section will discuss how in some banks, 
discourses and repeated actions contributed to institutional change. Finally, the chapter 
presents a discussion, which addresses the usefulness of viewing institutional change as 
constituted by both discourse and repeated actions. 
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10.2 Institutions in the Rabobank 
At the Rabobank, one could observe massive differences in knowledge and commitment 
between the MT+ groups and the rest of the organisation. MT+ groups successfully 
developed their own ‘shared typifications and interpretations of behaviour’, which were 
unavailable to people outside the MT+ groups. At the level of the local member bank, 
institutions comprise of the shared, collective principles of behaviour underlying day-to-
day routinised action within a social group; such as a segment. These principles cannot be 
directly observed, as they include taken-for-granted and tacit knowledge about the socially 
defined proper ways to behave. However, institutions underpin regularities in behaviour. 
References to such regularities may therefore point to those institutions that underpin 
these regularities. Although institutions can consist of tacit knowledge of behavioural 
requirements, institutional change can be observed more easily than institutions 
themselves (Barley & Tolbert, 1997). 
  
Over the years, the cooperative identity of the Rabobank has led to a stance that has been 
very forgiving when results have not been achieved, projects have not been undertaken, 
and reports not written. Being a cooperative has reflected upon the internal relations in 
that the people orientation always prevented some member banks from sanctioning a lack 
of commitment. There are three categories of principles underlying collective behaviours 
and interactions that were targeted by the ROM program at the various banks. These are 
commitment, accountability and risk/result orientation. These are not institutions, but they 
are behavioural principles targeted by ROM, which at some banks under study led to 
institutional change; that is, an enduring alteration in the taken-for granted assumptions of 
collective behaviour.  
 
ROM was to provide the tools necessary to increase the result/risk orientation of people, 
as well as their commitment to agreed plans and accountability for their results. To many 
member banks, ROM sought those behavioural dimensions that were underemphasised in 
the past. Commitment, accountability and result/risk orientation could not be easily 
reconciled with the cooperative mission of the Rabobank. Thus, for many member banks, 
there was a discrepancy between their people orientation that was a continuing source of 
pride and the issues of commitment and accountability that were too closely associated 
with technocratic instruments, such as sales tallies and individual targets. The 
management of the Groningen bank, in particular, was convinced that structural 
adaptation without behavioural adaptation made little sense. Therefore, this bank and 
other banks that felt the same, attempted to reinterpret the ROM program so as to embed 
the new principles of structure and behaviour in the day-to-day operations.  
 
From this standpoint, ROM was aimed at creating a break at a basic level of local 
interaction. It was aimed at influencing the shared elements which collectives of people 
use as a basis for their decisions and action choices. Put differently, ROM was meant to 
alter the very basis of acceptable behaviour. From this perspective, it follows that ROM 
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can be seen as a set of instrumental rules and practices that were meant to have a profound 
influence on the institutions present at the member banks. From the case material, patterns 
are emerging of member banks that are using ROM to forge changes in the acceptable 
behaviours of interaction. The Groningen and the West-Zeeuws Vlaanderen banks, in 
particular, were seen to use ROM for the embedding of behavioural principles. 
 
10.3 Institutional change through discourse and action 
Burns & Scapens (2000, pp. 5-6) use the following definition of an institution: ‘a way of 
thought or action of some prevalence and permanence, which is embedded in the habits of 
a group or the customs of a people’. From this definition, it follows how difficult it is to 
study institutions. Institutions are often not directly observable by those who are not an 
intimate part of the social setting; and taken for granted by those who are. Jepperson 
(1991) presents the following general definition of institutions that focuses on its 
reproduction: ‘institutions are socially constructed, routine-reproduced (ceteris paribus) 
program or rule systems’ (p. 149). These program or rule systems exist in their own social 
context, outside the perceived sphere of influence of any individual. Meyer and Rowan 
(1991, p. 42) argue that ‘institutionalisation involves the processes by which social 
processes, obligations or actualities come to take on a rule like status in social thought and 
action.’ According to sociologists such as Meyer and Rowan, institutions can be 
production systems (such as the corporation), enabling structures (such as the contract), 
social programs (such as marriage), or performance scripts (such as academic tenure) 
(Jepperson, 1991, pp. 144-145). Barley & Tolbert (1997) define institutions as ‘shared 
rules and typifications that identify categories of social actors and their appropriate 
activities or relationships’ (p. 96). From these various definitions, it follows that 
institutions have two main properties: (1) they are depersonalised, which means that 
institutions are disassociated from the particular circumstances and the people involved in 
their conception. As a consequence, individuals cannot alter institutions directly; and (2) 
institutions appear permanent to those who belong to the social group under the influence 
of the institution. That is, institutions are taken for granted to such extent that newcomers 
come to recognise the institution as ‘just the way things are’. This depersonalisation and 
permanence are qualities of institutions that will be addressed further on in this chapter. 
 
Institutional change involves changes in the institutional realm. More precisely, 
institutional change is here considered to be either additions or modifications to shared 
typifications, generalised expectations, or interpretations of behaviour (cf. Barley & 
Tolbert, 1997). Institutional change can thus involve changes in the principles 
underpinning habitual thought or action or the introduction of new practices that qualify 
as institutions. A principle of behaviour or a practice qualifies as such when they are both 
depersonalised and sufficiently permanent.  
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The process of institutional change is a two-stage process: firstly, action and rules-
routines will influence each other. Chapter 9 discussed how this rules-routines dialectic at 
some member banks could produce ambiguous results, which prevented 
institutionalisation, as rules did not lead to alterations in routine interaction or led to 
unexpected results. Secondly, when the rules-routine dialectic and the realm of action 
affect each other, it does not mean that institutionalisation necessarily occurs. Additional 
conditions such as depersonalisation and permanence are necessary conditions for 
institutionalisation. This section argues that institutions are constituted by scripted 
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Figure 10-1: habitual action and discourse constituting institutions 
 
Figure 10-1 shows that scripted interaction can affect an institution. Scripted interactions 
are represented by a combination of scripted action (which were addressed in chapter 8) 
and discourse, and both are considered to constitute institutions1. Therefore, this chapter 
argues that institutional change at the Rabobank proceeded both through changes in 
scripted action as well as through changes in discourse. To explain this statement, the next 
two sections will clarify how institutions can be constituted by discourse and habitual 
action, respectively.  
 
                                                
1 Chapter 3 clarified the meaning of the term “constitute”. The term is used in the meaning of “sustain” and 
“giving form to”. As such, institutions are sustained and given form by scripts and discourse. 
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10.3.1 Discourse constituting institutions 
Phillips et al. (2004) argue that institutions arise by the reproduction of discourse rather 
than the reproduction of action that Barley & Tolbert (1997) focused on. They argue that 
it is through the production of texts (the discursive effects of action) that 
institutionalisation can take place.  
 
The notion of ‘discourse’ has been defined as sets of statements that bring social objects 
into being (Parker, 1992; see Grant & Hardy, 2003), or more specifically: ‘a system of 
statements which constructs an object’ (Parker, 1992, p. 5). Through this definition, it is 
clear that discourse is considered here to be more than the practices of writing and talking. 
Discourse constitutes and gives form to existing institutions. Sinclair (1995, p. 224) notes 
that ‘discourses can be understood as the “regimes of truth” (Hollway, 1989, p. 39) which 
society and social institutions offer to participants’. She continues to argue that discourse 
‘provides a way of advancing the wider interpretative project of understanding “the 
historical and social contexts within which social decisions and policies are made and 
institutions created, sustained and transformed” (Harmon & Mayer, 1986, p. 322)’ 
(Sinclair, 1995, p. 224). Hall (2001, p. 72) argues that discourse ‘ “rules in” certain ways 
of talking about a topic, defining an acceptable and intelligible way to talk, write and 
conduct oneself.’ Discourse also ‘ “rules out”, limits and restricts other ways of talking, of 
conducting ourselves in relation to the topic or constructing knowledge about it’ (Hall, 
2001, p. 72). Discourses can thus be defined as: ‘structured collections of meaningful texts 
(Parker, 1992)’ (Phillips et al., 2004, p. 636); these collections are functioning as ‘regimes 
of truth’ and as such, they objectify practices (i.e. to provide them with a rule like status).  
 
Additionally, texts are ‘any kind of symbolic expression requiring a physical medium and 
permitting of permanent storage’ (Taylor & Van Every, 1993, p. 109). Texts include talk, 
but they also can take other forms, including written documents, verbal reports, pictures, 
symbols and other artefacts (Phillips et al., 2004, p.636). Speaking, writing or depicting 
experiences in some way can generate a text. A text therefore takes on some material form 
and it is accessible to others (Taylor et al., 1996, p. 7). As such, texts are an important part 
of interaction.  
 
Although this definition of texts stretches the meaning of texts beyond that used in 
common language, it focuses attention on the idea that texts, through the discourse they 
are part of, are capable of forming categorisations in organisations and helping to 
privilege some meanings over others. Jepperson argues in this respect that social order can 
attain such a status that the associated interaction patterns are enforced by routinised, 
socially constructed controls. He notes that institutions are: ‘those social patterns that, 
when chronically reproduced, owe their survival to relatively self-activating social 
processes’ (Jepperson, 1991, p. 145). Of interest here, is that he does not limit himself to 
action, but addresses social processes and social controls, which can include discourse as 
a social process. 
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The value of the notion of discourse (a structured collection of meaningful texts) and the 
notion of text (a symbolic expression requiring a physical medium and permitting 
permanent storage) is that they are able to ‘carry forward in time’ principles of conduct, 
similar to observable repeated action (as proposed by Barley & Tolbert (1997)). 
Moreover, discourse, in the definition used here, excludes incidental texts or exchanges. 
Only those texts that are recognised to be part of a set of understandings, or meanings, are 
a part of a discourse. A discourse can therefore be considered to be more closely 
associated to an institution than individual texts, because discourse structures 
organisational interactions into ‘regimes of truth’ and isolated texts do not. Phillips et al. 
(2004) argue that it is through discourse that actions are able to transcend time and space 
within organisations. Their ideas on the process of institutionalisation are depicted in 
Figure 10-2.  
 

















Figure 10-2: A discursive model of institutionalisation (Phillips et al., 2004) 
 
They note that actions are constrained and enabled by existing institutions, as deviations 
can be costly. Phillips et al. (2000, 2004) argue that these deviations from social patterns 
are costly in various respects: ‘economically (it increases risk), cognitively (it requires 
more thought), and socially (it reduces legitimacy and access to resources that accompany 
legitimacy’ (2000, p. 28). From actions, texts will be generated if the actions are novel 
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enough to invite organisational sense making and if they affect legitimacy. These texts can 
come to be embedded in organisational discourse, which in turn produces institutions. The 
framework of Phillips et al. (2004) does not allow for institutions to follow action without 
the production of discourse. This thesis differs from the views of Phillips et al. in that it 
does allow for the production of institutions through scripted action, in much the same 
way that discourse can produce institutions.    
 
The framework in Figure 10-2 contributes to this thesis the idea that discourse can 
produce institutions, and that discourse thus influences institutional change. From the 
above views, one can infer that action becomes depersonalised and socially embedded (or 
institutionalised) through the discourse which actions produce. Phillips et al. (2004) argue 
that ‘institutions are constituted through discourse and that it is not action per se that 
provides the basis for institutionalisation but, rather, the texts that describe and 
communicate those actions’ (p. 635). Yet, a number of authors have argued that actions in 
themselves can also come to constitute (part of) the institutional realm. Although 
discourse and habitual action seem to be different notions, both relate to the ‘traces’ that 
actions leave behind in time. Therefore, the next section will focus on the role of habitual 
action as constitutive of institutions.  
 
10.3.2 Scripted action constituting institutions 
As explained earlier in this thesis, Barley & Tolbert (1997) and Burns & Scapens (2000) 
argue that institutions underpin habitual actions. They argue that shared actions can 
become taken for granted to such an extent that new entrants adopt these actions as ‘the 
way things are’. 
 
Barley & Tolbert (1997, p. 96) further argue that ‘actors create institutions through a 
history of negotiations that lead to “shared typifications” or generalised expectations and 
interpretations of behaviour. The patterned relations and actions that emerge from this 
process gradually acquire the moral and ontological status of taken-for-granted facts 
which, in turn, shape future interactions and negotiations’. This statement clearly refers to 
the diachronic relation between the rules-routines dialectic and the institutional realm. 
They are not subject to recurrent mobilisation to ensure repetition; rather, they are enabled 
through routines (Farao & Skvoretz, 1986; see Jepperson, 1991, p. 145). Institutions have 
in common that they are relatively stable, self-enforcing patterns of repeated activity.  
 
Institutionalisation is, by definition, a collective process. It is the process that makes 
interactions taken-for-granted and external to the individual. The definition of Barley & 
Tolbert (1997) is suitable for this thesis as it connects institutions to the various social 
categorisations that can be observed. Burns & Scapens (2000) have modelled these 
relations. They argue that the existing institutional realm affects the relations between 
rules and routines and vice-versa. In the context of this chapter, rules can be seen as the 
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ROM program, while routines are scripted regularities underlying behaviour (see chapter 
9). The principles embedded in the institutional realm are encoded in the rules-routines 
dialectic. This dialectic is enacted in action that, in turn, is reproduced in this dialectic 
diachronically. Finally, the changes in the dialectic of rules-routines may be introduced 
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Figure 10-3: The process of institutionalisation (Burns & Scapens, 2000) 
 
Burns & Scapens (2000) argue that institutional principles are encoded into rules and 
routines. Actors enact these rules and routines and by this repeated behaviour, 
reproduction of routines takes place. Institutionalisation of rules and routines involves a 
disassociation of their particular historical circumstances. The institution is then locally 
represented by the related routines, which represent themselves to the individual as the 
behavioural script. Contrary to the claim of Phillips et al. (2004) that action influences the 
institutional realm through texts and discourse, the above authors argue that, through 
repetition, action in itself can affect institutions. Therefore a conceptual difference exists 
between Barley & Tolbert’s (1997) views, who focus on the role of action in 
institutionalisation and those of Phillips et al. (2004) who focus on the role of discourse in 
institutionalisation.  
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10.3.3 Scripted interaction: discourse and action constituting institutions  
This thesis resolves this difference, because it claims that scripted interaction constitutes 
institutions; scripted interaction being a combination of discourse and scripted action. It 
perceives action and discourse to be two sides of the same coin. Chapter 9 referred to this 
coin as scripts of interaction, which are the social practices that govern interactions. 
Phillips et al. (2004) argue that discourse produces institutions, and that these institutions 
constrain and enable action. But then the diachronic relation between action and structure 
is not addressed. Moreover, these authors do not acknowledge that texts can be ill 
equipped to transmit experiences. Not all experiences can take on a written form of some 
kind. It is this trait that Bartunek & Moch (1994) addressed when discussing third order 
change. Other forms of expression (think of paintings and dance as examples of forms of 
creative expressions) can appeal to experience that cannot be transmitted through texts1. It 
is for these reasons that this thesis uses the notion of discourse in institutional change, but 
it does not grant supremacy to texts over action.  
 
Moreover, Barley & Tolbert (1997) argue that scripts are encoded in institutions, in a 
similar fashion as rules and routines in the Burns & Scapens (2000) framework. Barley & 
Tolbert (1997) define these scripts as ‘observable, recurrent activities and patterns of 
interaction characteristic of a particular setting’ (p. 98). This definition emphasises the 
idea of interaction as the carrier of institutional principles and it reinforces the point of 
this thesis that (scripted) interaction can influence the institutional realm. To emphasise 
that not all actions and texts constitute institutions, I use the term ‘scripted interaction’ 
instead of ‘interaction’, to point out that only recurrent, habitual actions are ‘carriers’ of 
institutionalised practices. Figure 10-4 depicts scripted action and discourse (as a 
discourse is, by definition, a structured set of texts, a discourse can never be scripted in 
itself; see paragraph 10.3.1 above for a discussion of discourse).  
 
Discourse and scripted action will form the basis for the further analysis of the changes in 
the institutional realm at the Rabobank as depicted in Figure 10-4: 
 
                                                
1 Phillips et al. (2004) circumvent part of this problem by having texts include symbols and artefacts. However, 
they also stress that texts need to take on some material form (p. 363), and I argue here that some experiences 
cannot be transferred into a meaningful material form.  
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Figure 10-4: Scripted interaction and institutions 
 
Figure 10-4 depicts the interaction between formal rules and routines (or: scripted 
interaction as it was referred to in chapter 9). Scripted interactions consist of both action 
and discourse. The work of Phillips et al. (2004) focuses on the repetition and 
interpretation of action through discourse as an integral part of institutionalisation. Burns 
and Scapens (2000) and Tolbert & Barley (1997) focus on the repetition of action through 
routines. Together, discourse and scripted action are captured in the term ‘scripted 
interaction’, as used in chapter 9. Now, the matter at hand is how discourse and scripted 
action are able to change institutions or how they introduce new behavioural principles in 
the institutional realm, in one form or another. This will be addressed in the following 
sections. 
 
10.4 Action & Discourse at the Rabobank 
Earlier chapters have described how, at the Rabobank, groups of representatives of the 
various departments (segments) were formed. These so-called MT+ groups, often 
supported by consultants, defined priorities for the bank and the changes that needed to be 
made in order to reach a desired state. The outcome of this process was always a set of 
formal plans for the coming periods. However, as the process developed, the majority of 
the MT+ groups gradually came to recognise that a change in attitudes and behaviours 
was also required. Although they used many different terms, the desired changes could be 
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captured under the following three headings: result/risk orientation, commitment and 
accountability. 
 
In the process of coming to shared definitions of the behavioural changes, MT+ members 
spent much time clarifying the meaning of various terms. For example, at many banks, 
discussions revolved around being ‘entrepreneurial’; not so much if the bank needed to 
become entrepreneurial, but what it meant to be entrepreneurial. It was a definitional 
issue, if nothing else. The activities undertaken in MT+ groups were thus resulting in the 
production of (1) discourse and (2) shared actions. The next sections will describe how 
these two categories contributed to changes in the institutional realm of some member 
banks. In particular, they will describe the events surrounding the ROM program at the 
Rabobank Groningen. I will argue that at this bank, changes to the institutional realm took 
place to such extent that the General Director felt himself to be dispensable. The changes 
were sufficiently de-personalised and permanent to speak of alterations of the institutional 
realm. The next sections will focus on discourse and the dimensions that appeared to 
influence its production. Then, the focus will be shifted to action, so that both elements of 
scripted interaction are discussed.  
10.4.1 Institutional change through scripts of interaction: discourse 
Phillips et al. (2004) argue that actions can alter institutions through the discourse they 
produce. They note that actions leave traces in time by virtue of the texts that are 
categorised into discourses. In short, their argument is that actions generate texts. These 
texts can come to be embedded in discourse, which in turn can come to produce 
institutions. Some member banks, and the Groningen bank in particular, were in the 
process of promoting the development of a new discourse reflecting an increased attention 
for accountability. This ‘discourse of accountability’ encompassed various texts that 
enabled people to recognise and to relate to accountability. At most of the banks under 
study, such a discourse did not exist. But at a few banks, the discourse was under 
development by the production of texts and their inclusion in what was to become the 
‘discourse of accountability’. This section analyses the events leading up to the emergence 
of a ‘discourse of accountability’. It will organise the discussion around the notions that 
Phillips et al. (2004) found to be of interest: sense making, legitimacy, genres of discourse 
and competition between discourses.  
 
Sense making: 
Although the notion of sense making was explored extensively in chapter 7, where it was 
used as framework to interpret the events surrounding the selection of action, it also 
appears to be important at other stages in the process of institutional change. Chapter 7 
follows Feldman in stating that sensemaking precedes action; People need to make sense 
of their experiences to be able to formulate action. In the current context, sense making 
follows action. Consider again the figure that was used in chapter 3 and in chapter 8: 
 






Actions Problems or issues
 
 
The figure illustrates the bi-directional nature of sense making. The sense making process 
works prospectively on problems, or issues, as they were termed in chapter 7. At the same 
time sense making occurs retrospectively with respect to elapsed action, in efforts to 
account for and to explain actions and their consequences. As noted earlier, the two 
variants of sense making cannot be separated empirically, as prospective sense making 
and retrospective sense making affect each other constantly; the meaning given to elapsed 
experience affects the sense making of new issues or problems. Chapter 7 explained how 
episodes of sense making can arise from the presence of problems, or issues. Yet, 
following Phillips et al. (2004) this section argues that sense making is also important in 
the process of institutionalisation as episodes of collective sense making produce the texts 
that, over time, can become included in new or existing discourse. Moreover, the 
incorporation of texts into discourse causes ‘depersonalisation’ and detachment from their 
source. This means that discourses become detached from the people and the specific 
circumstances in which they were conceived.  
 
The structure of the ROM program invited selected people to actively search for new 
meanings and definitions. The participants in the various MT+ groups were doing just 
that: creating new meanings and outlooks based on those meanings. The MT+ groups 
were seeking to make sense of the environment they found themselves in. And to most of 
the participants, the fact that employees needed to act more pro-actively, and to be more 
committed to arrangements previously agreed to, found sufficient support through the 
collective exchange of meanings to result in ‘consensus meaning’. But the MT+ groups 
were too small to be able to affect others in their respective banks. The difficulties in 
diffusing the conclusions reached by MT+ groups are an explanation for the limited 
changes in the institutional realm in some member banks. The dissemination of the texts, 
being material expressions of behavioural principles resulting from ROM (result/risk 
orientation, commitment and accountability) beyond the MT+ groups, was problematic. 
Disinterestedness and passiveness typified the others at a number of the banks, when they 
were confronted with newsletters and when the various project leaders attended 
departmental meetings. An employee at one of the banks remarked: ‘This is as usual, I 
knew they (MT+ group) were doing all sorts of things in there (meeting room), and then 
we would get informed on their results. But what is it then that we are supposed to do with 
that?’ The MT+ groups were able to develop their own language, through the activities 
they needed to undertake for the ROM program. For example, the consultant could 
instruct the participants to discuss the position of the Rabobank in their local market. 
From these discussions, a collective understanding arose that was to function as a basis for 
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further discussion and development of the plans. The people outside the MT+ groups 
were, for a large part, excluded from these discussions and they were only exposed to 
their outcomes.  
 
These people missed out on two related features of the MT+ meetings: sense-making 
opportunities and participation in the development of the associated texts. The various 
project leaders and the consultants were assuming that the MT+ members would fulfil an 
ambassador’s role. But they could only communicate the outcomes of the meetings, as the 
collective meaning that had been developed could not be fully captured in narratives. 
Therefore, the texts that accompanied the sense making processes lacked meaning to the 
people who were not involved earlier. One of the reasons of this lack of meaning was that 
there was no discourse available to classify and categorise the texts. As argued by Phillips 
et al. (2004), changes to the institutional realm can occur through the texts produced by 
organisational sense making. But this sense making and the associated texts were limited 
to the MT+ groups.  
 
Therefore, the dissemination of texts and meaning resulting from the sense making was 
especially problematic beyond the MT+ groups, as these texts could not be classified in 
existing discourses. The problem addressed here is that the employees of the member 
banks were lacking two notions that were needed for the isolated texts to influence 
institutions: (1) the sense making opportunities that would have given the isolated texts 
their meaning; and (2) a discourse that could allow employees to classify the texts and 
extract meaning from them. Although the MT+ group could not draw on an existing 
discourse initially, it could extensively make sense of the texts that the management and 
the consultant provided. As a result, one can argue that the MT+ group was in the process 
of discourse creation, as they were classifying and linking various texts related to a 
desirable future state of the bank and its implications for individual behaviour.    
 
Some individuals at some member banks were well aware of the problems associated with 
disseminating texts, without the availability of a discourse. At the Rabobank Groningen, 
this was most obvious. The project leader and the General Director of this bank made the 
ROM program subordinate to the objective of organisation wide cultural change. At this 
bank, the early stages of the program were generally comparable to those of the other 
banks. What stood out in Groningen, in comparison to other member banks, was the way 
in which the Groningen bank disseminated meaning to the entire organisation. By 
‘meaning dissemination’, I refer to attempts to transfer experiences through various 
means, including texts and discourse. The description in chapter 4 noted that the bank 
used the following devices to facilitate this dissemination:  
 
1. Core values and personal contributions to the mission became an explicit part of 
personal evaluations. 
2. The exterior of the head office building was covered with a massive poster with 
the mission: ‘A Partner in Ambition’. 
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3. After this poster was removed, the walls and floors inside of the building were 
covered with stickers with such slogans as:  
a. ‘Knowing what some else wants, and how to contribute’ 
b. ‘Commitment’ 
c. ‘Partner in Ambition: Open, Result oriented, Reliable, Committed, 
entrepreneurial’ 
d. ‘Reliable’ 
e. ‘Dare to ask for feedback and be willing to accept it’ 
4. An entertaining theatrical piece at the banks’ Midsummer Barbecue held at the 
General Directors’ home. 
5. The publication of a colourful plastic booklet that described the conclusions of 
the strategy meetings, and texts and images that clarify these topics. The booklet 
basically explains what the conclusions of the MT+ meetings mean to those who 
were not part of these meetings. 
 
Secondly, the bank had replaced almost the entire management team and numerous 
employees. This in itself had two consequences: -1- it created explicit sense making 
occasions, as people attempted to make inferences from the consequences of these events, 
and -2- it increased the legitimacy of those who where taking over the now vacant 
positions. This last notion will be discussed in the section covering legitimacy, whereas 
sense making is the topic of the current section.  
 
The Groningen bank was effectively providing sense making opportunities to people 
outside the MT+ groups, as well as providing many compatible texts that could form a 
‘discourse of accountability’.  
 
As noted earlier, the dissemination of meaning outside the MT+ groups was problematic 
at many member banks. Initially, this was also the case at the Rabobank Groningen, but 
during the formal ROM project and afterwards, the ROM project leader offered various 
means for employees to attribute meaning to the outcomes of the MT+ meetings. Rather 
than simply communicating these through newsletters and the intranet (isolated texts), the 
project leader opted for a creative approach to encourage employees to interest themselves 
in what was to become the ‘new’ bank. In addition, the bank hired an architect to express 
in different, creative ways what was to become the identity of the new bank. At the same 
time, it was made clear by the lay-offs and by the constant use of the new texts by 
managers and by the other participants in the MT+ groups that employees could not 
continue to work as they had done in the past. The events at Rabobank Groningen are akin 
to second order changes, which are: ‘changes in the cognitive frameworks underlying the 
organisation’s activities, changes to the deep structure or shared schemata that generate 
and give meaning to these activities’ (Bartunek & Moch, 1994, p. 24). The project leader 
wanted to support and influence sense making among employees using the above means. 
The Groningen bank was no different to the other banks in distributing minutes of 
meetings and newsletters (texts). But the bank also provided indications of the meaning of 
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the texts; effectively helping to produce a discourse of accountability. Moreover, it 
provided many sense making opportunities that allowed additional texts to emerge.  
 
Apart from the formal sense making occasions, gossip also played an important role at the 
Groningen bank. Chapter 8 discussed how informal communication, including gossip, was 
observable at the Groningen bank, while it was not overtly present at other banks. The 
chapter suggested that these discussions functioned as sense making devices, which were 
not available to employees at other banks, where these discussions were less frequent. As 
a result of the sense making at the Groningen bank, people outside the MT+ groups have 
developed various texts that relate to accountability. According to the project leader in 
Groningen: ‘when the manager Corporate Clients proposed some drastic measures for his 
segment, the hallways were buzzing with comments. But when the segment showed 
improved results, the talk became more positive’. These texts were all structured around 
the subject of accountability and cultural change. The project leader saw the fact that 
these texts were included in a discourse of accountability as a positive development: 
‘these behavioural changes remain abstract to most people… It is my personal challenge 
to relate to the frames of reference of people for whom interest in this matter does not 
come naturally’. To this project leader, it did not primarily matter, which texts were 
included in the emergence of a discourse of accountability as long as this discourse was 
emerging.  
 
An employee of the Groningen bank describes how people gossiped following messages 
from the MT+ groups or the quarterly personnel meetings. ‘People gossip a lot about 
these meetings and the messages that they conveyed. The first thing that many people do, 
and I notice this for myself as well, when you hear a negative message, it is often rather 
vague, and you do not want to know exactly what it is about. I think to myself: “well, it 
will pass”, and I just get back to work. However, sooner or later, the message re-emerges 
as someone addresses it, while everyone has intended not to discuss it. As a result, in no 
time, everyone discusses it with everyone…. It does not change my feelings associated to 
the events so much, rather, it allows me to express them in terms of other peoples 
concerns.’ At the Groningen bank, gossip allowed people to produce texts that formed 
discourses.   
 
This was somewhat different at other banks. Those banks that focused on the structural 
features of the program, and the objectives envisaged by Rabobank Nederland, were 
rather disappointed by the few discussions and questions that were initiated by employees. 
The management of these banks felt that the ROM program was an excellent device for 
collective planning, but it actually contributed little to lasting behavioural change. The 
banks that used the program primarily to forge changes in the organisational structure 
were engaged in first-order change: i.e. change that is considered appropriate given the 
groups’ accepted beliefs on how the organisation should act. These beliefs themselves are 
untouched by the change. One of the Rabobank Nederland consultants argued that the 
program focused too much on changing the work-structure, while failing to address the 
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underlying beliefs of the employees of the bank (in particular beliefs about identity and 
purpose, see chapter 8). An example of this point can be found in the following extract 
from an evaluation of ROM, prepared by the group of consultants: ‘Many banks notice 
that the basis of employees outside the participating group (MT+) is doubtful or 
insufficient. Communication about the program plays an important role, but the way in 
which the necessary change or improvement is implemented, is also crucially important. 
Structure is sufficiently attended to, but behaviour, which is deemed beneficial to actual 
implementation, deserves much more attention’.   
 
The Rabobank Groningen deliberately created sense making occasions for those who were 
not part of the MT+ group discussions. At the same time, it made clear that the old ways 
(e.g. failure to take responsibility for ones actions) were unacceptable. Basically, it 
became cognitively attractive for employees to address the notion of accountability, 
instead of ignoring it. The accompanying production of texts (including gossip) was 
therefore present, more so than at other member banks. The second order change (change 
in beliefs about the appropriate ways of behaving) that the Groningen bank was engaged 
in, was in part dependent on enabling employees to make sense of the events which were 
surrounding them, while making a reversion to old motivations and behaviours more 
difficult. In essence, the bank was actively promoting sense making by providing both an 
opportunity and a motivation to do so. The resulting texts were important building blocks 
for a discourse of accountability. By withholding sufficient sense making opportunities, 
other banks reduced the likelihood of the production of texts and as such the emergence of 
discourse and institutional change was more unlikely.  
 
Legitimacy: 
Phillips et al. (2004) argue that ‘texts that are produced by actors, who have a legitimate 
right to speak, who have resource power or formal authority, or who are centrally located 
in a field’, are apt to influence discourse that in turn can alter the institutional realm of the 
organisation. The significant role of legitimacy in institutionalisation was visible at the 
Groningen bank in the dissemination of the agreed principles of accountability, 
commitment, and result/risk orientation. This was due to the central role of the new 
manager Corporate Clients. This manager was previously employed by the ING bank; a 
bank that is known for its technocratic structure and its strong shareholder orientation. 
This manager Corporate Clients became very influential in the Groningen bank for a 
number of reasons:  
1. He brought personal characteristics that many people felt the bank particularly 
needed. These characteristics included a very strong result orientation, and a firm 
belief in the measurement of performance and the positive effects of making 
people accountable for their actions. 
2. His openness: he is a person who expresses his opinions quite directly and 
personally. This in itself was a break for the Groningen bank, where people 
traditionally had treated each other with caution. The manager not only 
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confronted the employees of ‘his own’ segment, but also his fellow managers 
with the consequences of their actions.  
3. The direct and firm support he received from the General Director. In a local 
Rabobank, the General Director is the most important person; not only 
hierarchically, but also historically. Although the General Director and the 
manager of the segment Corporate Clients did not always agree on courses of 
action, the Director overtly supported the actions of the manager. To the manager 
Corporate Clients, the General Director’s support meant a considerable increase 
in the legitimacy of his actions. 
4. The successes of his segment. The manager succeeded in achieving a number of 
short-term gains. These included improved financial results, which were due, in 
part, to the number of lay-offs and to improvements in the risk portfolio of his 
segment. Although the lay-offs came at the cost of a short-term decrease in 
morale, the financial gains of the segment set the tone for the department and 
ultimately for the bank.  
Moreover, in the early stages of ROM, there was a consensus of opinions between the 
General Director, the Manager Corporate Clients and the project leader of the change 
program. This group of three was to become the ultimate issue elite (chapter 8) at the 
bank.  
    
Because of the legitimacy that the Corporate Clients manager enjoyed, both as a person 
and as a manager, the meanings he gave to issues mattered to others in the bank. The texts 
he produced became influential1. A similar notion developed at the West-Drenthe bank. 
The manager Financial Advice had legitimacy through the credibility and relative success 
of his segment. Through this legitimacy, his opinions mattered beyond the mere opinion 
of an ‘average’ individual. Both at the Groningen bank and at the West-Drenthe bank, the 
legitimacy of the messenger led to the ‘objectification’, or the increasing ‘rule-like’ status 
of their messages. By this I mean that their messages were more difficult to challenge, 
simply because they were expressed by those influential people. Not only did the 
messages of these ‘opinion leaders’ redefine the purpose of the organisation and 
everyone’s role therein, they also clarified which behavioural alternatives were no longer 
possible. The legitimacy of both the messenger and their messages made it rather difficult 
for people to ignore these messages. By explicating the behavioural alternatives that were 
undesirable (see the previous section on sense making), the ‘opinion leaders’ increased the 
legitimacy of behavioural options that were deemed desirable. 
 
For example, consider the following extract of a document from 2002, in which the 
manager Corporate Clients in Groningen discussed some general ideas on restructuring 
his segment. Oddly, this document was named: ‘A Course in Gardening’; ‘an important 
asset of this segment is the willingness to change and to learn. It is now necessary to 
                                                
1 He introduced the terms ‘technically bankrupt’ to describe the bank’s initial financial position and ‘consulting 
attitude’ to describe the sort of people that his segment needed. These terms were soon to be used throughout the 
bank. 
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establish a cultural change, which implies a drastic change program. I quote Senge: 
“leaders who attempt to establish change through persuasion need to take a gardener as 
example. The gardener does not stand next to a plant to attempt to persuade it to grow. If 
the seedling does not have the potential to grow, the gardener needs to make room to 
allow the high-potentials to grow”’. The gardener came to represent the way of managing 
that he introduced. The document emphasised individual responsibility and accountability 
and as such, the manager unambiguously associated himself with these notions and 
associated texts, including texts involving gardening.  
 
It appeared that the legitimacy of the source of texts influenced the degree to which the 
texts were included in a ‘discourse of accountability’. The manager Corporate Clients of 
the Groningen bank expanded his powerbase, as he could influence the creation of 
discourse more than others. As such, he was able to increase the legitimacy of his own 
texts, which, in turn, led to an increased probability that these texts were actually included 
in a discourse of accountability. Therefore, a vicious circle between legitimacy and 
discourse came to exist. This circle is depicted below. 
 
 








The figure reflects the mutual interaction between discourse and legitimacy. A manager, 
who has legitimacy to produce texts, has a higher probability that these texts are included 
in new or existing discourse. Through the ability to influence discourse, the manager 
affects the ‘regimes of truth’, that were discussed in paragraph 10.3.1 above. In turn, this 
increases the manager’s legitimacy, as legitimacy can be evaluated through ideas of 
‘truth’ embedded in discourse. As a consequence, discourses can maintain their own 
existence, in a similar manner to institutions.   
 
Genres of structured discourse: competition between discourses 
The mere production of texts may lead to the production of discourse, and these 
discourses may lead to institutionalisation. However, competition between discourses may 
arise, in that existing discourses challenge newly emerging discourses. Phillips et al. 
(2004) suggest that unchallenged discourses are more likely to produce institutional 
change or new institutions. 
 
At the West-Drenthe bank, the credibility of the emerging discourse on accountability was 
greatly reduced by a competing discourse focusing on the limited influence that local 
Discourse Legitimacy 
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member banks have in strategy determination. A few participants of the MT+ group did 
not agree with statements, made by the consultant and the management team, which 
reflected the need to ‘take charge of the bank’s future’. These participants argued that a 
local member bank has very few ways left to influence its own future. Rather, they noted 
that most policies are made centrally and a small bank does not have the resources to 
deviate from these policies. One can argue that two competing discourses could be 
observed: an emerging discourse of accountability, and a discourse of autonomy. The 
latter embedded the belief that a small rural bank is not very autonomous, because of the 
many regulatory and economic constraints. This belief was contested by the emerging 
discourse of accountability. As a result, some people doubted the usefulness of the MT+ 
meetings.   
 
At the Groningen bank, there was a similar risk of competition between discourses. 
During the strategy meetings with the MT+ group, there were discussions of how being 
entrepreneurial meant that one needs to see opportunities and capture them (in fact, this 
notion was emphasised by the General Director of the bank). Participants reacted by citing 
recent events in which he could not react adequately to demands for new services by a 
new customer, because the customer did not have proper identification. New policies 
meant that without proper identification, little could be done to serve this commercially 
promising customer. From this episode in the MT+ meeting it followed that policies 
meant to manage the risk profile of the bank were sometimes at odds with the commercial 
assignment of account managers. This potential conflict threatened the texts surrounding 
result orientation and accountability, as people recognised that their attempts to display 
desirable behaviours were limited by a focus on risk reduction, which was also an 
important theme at the time. A potential competition between different discourses was 
present. However, this potential competition between the risk-oriented discourse and the 
emerging discourse of accountability and results-orientation did not cause many problems 
later on in the process, as ROM in the Groningen bank accommodated a broad definition 
of “results”, that included financial gains, but also the associated risks.  
 
With regards to competition between discourses, the events at the Groningen bank 
differed from those at West-Drenthe. At the West-Drenthe bank, there was no clear 
hierarchy in discourses that indicated the significance of the change, as witnessed by 
lengthy and inconclusive discussions about the precise formulation of the mission of the 
bank. Similarly, the potential for competition between existing discourses and the new 
texts developed in the course of the ROM program remained. At the Groningen bank, this 
risk was initially present, but through adaptation of meaning and clear prioritisation 
(commerce or risk), a hierarchy of discourses began to emerge. 
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10.4.2 Institutional change through scripts of interaction: action 
The last sub-section argued that transmission of newly agreed principles through time can 
occur through the development and the dissemination of discourse. The current sub-
section argues that the dissemination of behavioural principles through time (a necessary 
precondition for institutionalisation) also occurs through habitual action; the other side of 
scripted interaction. Scripted interaction may involve the use of specific discourse, but 
they may also involve a series of actions that are expected and (tacitly) anticipated. This 
sub-section will focus on the role of scripted actions through time, and their effects on 
institutionalisation. It does so, by focusing on the timeframe of change; its continuity in 
terms of attention and resources; person-role detachment, which relates to the likelihood 
that new behaviours are no longer associated with any individual, but with the role that the 
person is taking; and the perceived inevitability of adopting new behaviours. These were 
seen to be recurring themes at the participating banks. Moreover, these dimensions are 
ways in which either depersonalisation or permanence can take shape.  
  
Timeframe: 
Some interviewees were concerned about the sheer amount of projects, programs and 
other change efforts that they were confronted with. They felt that they needed to shield 
their staff from many of these programs, so the managers would allow their employees the 
time to go through each change with sufficient opportunities for embedding its results in 
organisational routines. For example, consider this comment by the General Director of 
the West Zeeuws-Vlaanderen bank: ‘If you want to seriously use this project (ROM), you 
have prepare your organisation; people are being confronted with targets, and then you 
are going to burden them with all new projects, asking them to take part in project 
organisations and so forth. Yes, then we do not make it easier for them to pursue the 
changes we have envisaged. Basically, you just have to have the courage to do only this 
one thing for one or two years.’ In terms of the Burns & Scapens (2000) framework, this 
General Director argues that his bank needs to take enough time for sufficient iterations 
between the rules-routine dialectic and the institutional realm. Enacting, reproduction and 
finally institutionalisation takes time. However, events may arise that are deemed more 
important, so there may be limited time for behavioural embedding. The General Director 
continues: ‘we are currently working on the fiscal harmonisation in Europe. For us, being 
a bank situated close to the border, it is of vital importance to deal with this. So I say to 
Ko, the ROM project leader, ‘ROM is a wonderful project for us, I really mean that, but it 
is vital for us that we focus on the fiscal harmonisation now’. So everything we have is 
now directed towards this new aim. Now, then it is clear that, although we continue to 
confront people with the plans and control stemming from our ROM activities, it is clear 
that it does not have our priority. Well, I am well aware that we lose a lot in that.’  
 
From the perspective of a participant in this program at the bank, the confusion is clearly 
noticeable: ‘in the context of ROM, we have agreed on many courses of action. Now we 
are well into the new year, but nothing happens….. We received a mail that there were 
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more important developments with regards to the fiscal harmonisation. I believe that this 
is absolutely true, but it still resulted in a breach in credibility; what we agreed upon did 
not happen yet.’ At the Altena-Biesbosch bank, the manager Business Administration also 
expressed her concern with the timeframe. She noted: ‘We like to do these things in a 
structured manner. So we adhere to the process model. And I try to plan when we need to 
do what. And still, it appears every single time that we are short on time. We use the 
excuse of not having enough time, but I think we mean, we do not take enough time. As 
one of the results, we have created only limited commitment for the things we planned and 
acted out in our MT+’. This was similar at the Groningen bank, as the project leader 
acknowledged, but to this bank the overarching ‘change program’ is not finished after 9 
months (the cycle time of ROM). This led to a situation in which people did not feel they 
had finished the program once the budgets were produced. Continuing references to the 
various parts of the change program, which included ROM, were being made after it was 
formally concluded. Therefore, the timeframe is defined differently at the Groningen 
bank.  
 
As such, the Groningen bank did not have fewer programs and projects than any of the 
other banks. But, it found coherence and structure between these projects. As a result, 
people were sooner aware of the purpose of the various projects that they heard of. The 
overarching “change program” was the central concept that all projects contributed to in 
some form. It structured the projects and appealed (unknowingly) to the following 
criticism on the ROM program (taken from the evaluation of ROM, done by the team of 
consultants): ‘More attention to coherence: local banks indicate that the coherence 
between (ongoing) projects (including ROM) is not always clear. This makes it more 
difficult to make proper choices’. Additionally, in the Groningen bank, employees were 
frequently confronted with new episodes of the “change program”, through the various 
projects and programs. Over time, people were exposed more intensively to the ‘change 
program’ of the Groningen bank and its objectives, albeit in changing forms and shapes. 
However, even the “change program” was to end in some years, and all banks were 
concerned that behavioural changes were not sufficiently ‘permanent’ to last in the long 
term. Many interviewees named continuity as an important dimension. Continuity relates 
to the embedding of behaviours in social groups, so that reliance on single individuals is 
minimised. This will explained further in the next sub-section.  
 
Continuity: 
Most managers included in the study pointed to continuity as an important factor to embed 
changes in their organisations. Most people found some form of continuity essential for 
lasting interest in the agreements stemming from ROM: accountability, commitment and 
result/risk orientation. Two primary sources of continuity could be discerned: exemplary 
behaviour and person-role detachment. The former will be discussed here; the latter will 
be the topic of the next sub-section. Exemplary behaviour is a visible demonstration of 
desirable behaviour. At most member banks, people felt that especially the management 
team members needed to display exemplary behaviour, to build both the credibility of the 
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new requirements and to carry them forward in time. Moreover, managers needed moral 
leverage, as the new behavioural requirements for the staff often resulted in very 
subjective evaluations. Only when managers were demonstrating the desired behaviour 
themselves, did they have sufficient credibility to criticise others. However, this display of 
desirable behaviour was not always present.  
 
During a strategy meeting at the West-Drenthe bank, the MT+ group decided that the 
bank lacked commitment to its plans. The participants felt that once someone was 
committed to a specific action, that person would remain loyal to that decision and follow 
through on actions resulting from the decision. The management team was pleased with 
this recognition, although the consultant warned that they needed to be the first to show 
exemplary behaviour. Afterwards, when agreeing the tasks to be done after the meeting, 
the consultant very naturally transferred his responsibilities to the project leader. The 
consultant stated: ‘remind me that I follow through on the things we agreed upon, if I 
don’t respond in time, tell me’. Although the remark was innocent enough, when 
confronted with the observations of the researcher, the consultant was very surprised that 
he had said this. He argued that it is easier to observe other people’s behaviour than to 
change one’s own. In this light, the remark of an employee at the Groningen bank is also 
relevant. He noted: ‘we are very positive on any cultural change, because we feel that a 
cultural change is necessary in the other departments, but not in ours. The primary feeling 
is that the others do need it.’ Such reasoning prevents people from applying the principles 
they had agreed upon. It is possible that everyone agrees with the need for a change, while 
nothing actually changes, as nobody feels personally addressed. In this respect, chapter 8 
pointed to ‘the generalised other’. The generalised other can serve to capture a 
heterogeneous set of qualities of a social group as if it is an individual. This chapter can 
make an addition to the notion of the generalised other, in that it is a shared cognitive 
entity that carries forward in time a set of properties which can actually be included in the 
institutional realm. Institutions can encompass prototypes of roles, just as scripts are 
prototypes of meaning (Schott, 1991). This will explained further in the next sub-section, 
but for this sub-section it is important to recognise that the ‘generalised other’ can come to 
constitute institutional principles, and as such contribute to the continuity of these 
institutional principles.   
 
Person-role detachment:  
A General Director of one of the member banks was unhappy with the current role of the 
General Directors within the Rabobank. He felt that the role of a General Director, and 
other functions as well, should take precedence over the characteristics of the person. In 
his opinion, this was needed to ensure that the agreed principles of behaviour would not 
come to rest on single individuals. He basically proposed to ‘de-personalise’ behaviour, in 
that specific traits should be part of a role, instead of a person. In suggesting this, this 
director pointed unknowingly to a feature of institutions: they are independent of 
individuals. This emphasis on personal characteristics, a ‘fit’ between the desirable 
qualities of an individual and the roles defined by the ROM process, was for some banks a 
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reason to change their recruitment and selection policies. A similar recognition could be 
seen in the Groningen bank. At this bank, HR policies were changed dramatically in 
response to the call for more entrepreneurialism and results orientation. Candidates for 
new positions were required to demonstrate a clear commitment to the core values of the 
bank. According to the General Director, this was more important than previous selection 
criteria, such as formal qualifications. The idea that selection based on personal 
characteristics is more important than selection based on skills has gained considerable 
support within the Rabobank. Consider the comment of the General Director of the 
Rabobank Zwolle: ‘We have merged with the Hattem bank. This merger is an occasion for 
Rabobank Nederland to reassess my fitness as General Director compared to their ideas 
of the role of a General Director. So the departments Supervision & Compliance and 
Management Recruitment come to visit the bank to hold interviews, 360 degrees feedback 
sessions, etcetera. They formulate an advice for the executive board, which takes a formal 
standpoint’. This advice is formulated through a comparison between the personal 
characteristics of the General Director, and the formally documented desired qualities of a 
General Director.  
 
On many levels, the bank is attempting to decouple the role from the person. ROM gave 
this a strong impetus as it focussed attention on the qualities needed of role incumbents. 
At one of the banks, a Will-Skill matrix1 was to be filled out, that would chart whether 
employees were fitting into the new requirements for their role. The result was that roles 
and personalities were sufficiently objectified that a match could be made. A role was 
therefore more than a job-description. A role included attitudes and ambitions. As such, 
roles were increasingly used to formalise and to carry forward in time desirable 
characteristics of employees, which surpassed discrete descriptions of tasks. For this 
thesis, this increasing use of roles represents efforts to embed desirable personal 
characteristics in the formal roles. As such, it is a source of continuity that allows new 
practices to become depersonalised. 
 
Inevitability: 
At the Groningen Rabobank, the outcomes of ROM were slowly rendered inevitable. 
Inevitability was not a conscious policy choice; some of it could be called ‘chance’. 
However, at this bank and at certain others, inevitability meant that participants revised 
these interactions around commitment and result orientation simply because they had no 
choice. Inevitability could be observed in two ways: (1) a collectively shared sense of the 
inevitability of new practices; and (2) a collectively shared sense of the unsuitability of 
current practices. Although the two categories are alike in many respects, they differ in 
orientation. The first does not exclude the continuance of current behavioural patterns; 
rather, it is about adding new practices. The second is about the uselessness of existing 
practices and thus it involves replacing these practices.  
                                                
1 Employees quickly renamed the Will-Skill matrix as the Will-Kill matrix, due to the suspected consequences it 
could have career-wise.  
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People at most, but not all banks, were well aware that things needed to change. However, 
not everyone at the various banks was equally convinced of the inevitability of the 
introduction of new practices. This variation could often be attributed to their different 
roles in the organisation and their associated orientations. One General Director for 
instance made it clear that he saw his role as overseeing market developments and 
anticipating events he expects to happen within a timeframe of two to three years. Others 
have more internally focused orientations as well as shorter timeframes. From the 
different ways employees perceived their roles, differences arose in the time frame of their 
outlook and how they weighted the events. For example, at the West-Zeeuws Vlaanderen 
bank, the management team saw a clear threat in the harmonisation of European tax laws, 
while the people on the work floor indicated that business was booming, as they had 
beautiful offices and many Belgian customers who came to clip the coupons of their 
bonds. These differences were caused by differences in orientation, and also by 
differences in information, as managers were better informed than other employees. 
Differences in role-induced outlook and in information led to differences in opinion 
concerning the immediate need for the introduction of new practices. But the activities 
surrounding ROM could reduce these differences, and led people to similar conclusions. 
The Groningen project leader remarked: ‘I could have come up with the current mission 
myself, even before the ROM program started. I mean, we had more knowledge on the 
possibilities and impossibilities. That gave us (managers and himself) a head start.’   
 
Differences of opinion also existed initially about the unsuitability of existing practices 
(category 2 above). At the Groningen bank and at the Nieuwerkerk bank, they were 
working with the Compasses (the Rabobank’s propriety Balanced Scorecard system), to 
monitor the banks progress. Rabobank Nederland developed these Compasses, and as 
such they are available for all member banks. However, it was not until the ROM program 
was underway, that it became clear what the Compasses were supposed to do; put 
differently, the ROM program gave a new meaning and use to existing systems and 
practices. The General Director of the Groningen bank put it like this: ‘We already had 
the Compasses, and we were using them to the best of our ability. However, the ROM 
program was a logical next step, as it gave us more uses for the Compasses. ROM 
allowed us to employ the Compasses more integrally in our planning and control cycle.’. 
A financial controller at this bank adds: ‘Although we were trying to use these 
instruments, they were not embedded in anything structural, which gave us a strong 
feeling that we were not in control: terrible things could happen, and we would only learn 
about them when we were too late; I believe that ROM could tie together the systems and 
plans to increase the general feeling of control that we lack now’. At the Rabobank, a 
broad collective of organisational participants agreed that things needed to change, not 
because they saw the new practices as inevitable given market developments, but rather 
because of the observable problems with current practices.  
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10.5 Discussion 
This chapter has presented a number of elements that were seen to influence the 
institutional realm at the Rabobank. These are summarised in Table 10-1. 
 
This chapter argues that for scripted interaction patterns to alter the institutional realm, 
two conditions need to be met: a form of permanence needs to be present and some form 
of depersonalisation must occur. Permanence is important to allow scripted interactions to 
be repeated sufficiently. Repetition causes interactions to produce traces in time of 
elapsed action. Such traces must be sufficiently permanent to become included in the 
institutional realm. A second condition is depersonalisation; the new practices need to be 
sufficiently depersonalised so that they are not associated with any single individual. 
These two elements are key elements in the definition of the institutional realm (Barley & 
Tolbert, 1997; Burns & Scapens, 2000; Phillips et al. 2004), as suggested earlier in this 
thesis.  
 
The chapter discusses scripted interactions, a notion which accommodates both action and 
discourse. Both action and discourse are able to carry experiences forward in time, and 
both can be depersonalised. The following table offers the elements that are influential in 
one or both of these dimensions of institutions and thus contribute to institutional change.  
 
Table 10-1: Summary of dimensions of institutionalisation 
 
The table depicts the various elements that have an influence on the institutional realm. It 
shows the two dimensions of scripted interaction: discourse and scripted action, and both 
have a direct influence on institutional change through depersonalisation and 
permanence. As the chapter noted earlier, for practices to be included in the institutional 
realm, they need to be depersonalised, so they are not dependent on any single individual 
and they need to be sufficiently permanent, so they will linger and leave traces of their 
existence.  
 
The signals at the Groningen bank were pointing to changes to the institutional realm. As 
noted earlier, institutional change needs an element of permanence/continuity, and one of 
Dimension of interaction: Elements affecting institutionalisation: Affecting institutionalisation through:
Discourse: Sense making Depersonalisation
Legitimacy Permanence
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depersonalisation, to be distinguished from a mere change in scripts and routines invoked 
by scripts. At the Groningen bank, these were present. The General Director: ‘I am not 
alone anymore, in what I want for this bank. I do not have to spell out every action I want 
undertaken. And perhaps more importantly, the group of people that really wants to go for 
it increases, without much pressure from me’. This person has observed a process of self-
enforcing change. Institutional change seems to have achieved sufficient critical mass at 
this bank. At least this critical mass is sufficient to warrant some faith on the part of this 
General Director: ‘I am not needed anymore. If I were to leave, I am sure that the path we 
set out to follow would remain in tact. It is a good feeling to know that this does not 
depend on me personally anymore, and it is definitely more comfortable than some years 
ago.’. The former project leader feels the same, but with some reservations. ‘There is 
quite a wide group who are acting according to the principles we have agreed on. 
Certainly the former MT+ members are still in key positions and that helps. And the 
number of people subscribing to these values increases constantly. However, I feel that I 
still need to be vigilant, but that could also have to do with my new position as manager 
Corporate Clients.’   
 
The above comments point to institutional change. The General Director feels 
dispensable, as he is no longer the embodiment of desired changes. In fact, an ever-
increasing group of people are taking ownership of the changes. These changes are 
infused in rules, discourses and in scripted actions, the individual counterpart of routines. 
These are all building blocks that reduce dependency on “change agents”, as no single 
individual has the perceived ability to challenge the new desirable behaviours. Moreover, 
as the Groningen bank entered its third year of ongoing cultural change, although projects 
and people have come and gone, projects and individuals, both managers and other 
employees, are all measured to a similar standard: what does it or he/she contribute to the 
objectives of the social group and the bank? This has become one of the central principles 
of interaction at the Groningen bank. 
 
10.6 Conclusion 
The previous chapter discussed a number of instances in which institutional change failed, 
because of inconsistencies between existing scripts of collective behaviour and the new 
rules embodied in accounting systems, projects such as ROM, and standard operating 
procedures. However, in certain instances, institutional change could be observed. From 
chapter 9, a logical inference is that institutional change may follow the introduction of 
new rules, if they are either in line with existing scripts of behaviour, or if there is some 
occurrence (shock) that warrants people altering their existing scripts of behaviour. 
However, this does not guarantee that institutional change will occur. The alignment of 
rules and collective scripts is required for such change, but this is not sufficient. 
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The discussion in this chapter has revolved around the additional requirements for 
institutional change; the ‘externalisation’ of scripted interaction, through 
depersonalisation and permanence. The process of institutionalisation is the ongoing 
reproduction of action through repetition and through discourse. This chapter is about the 
elements that were seen to be of influence in this process. It started by recognising that not 
all accounting practices driven by the ROM program were institutionalised. However, 
some of the outcomes of the discussions that were an instrumental part of ROM were to 
become the new principles of behaviour. In the two or more years of this study, some of 
these new principles were found to be incompatible with existing practices and as such, 
they did not translate into actual behaviour (see chapter 8). Other principles were 
incorporated into behavioural scripts and carried forward in time. The current chapter 
describes how these behavioural principles were (in part) introduced in the institutional 
realm through repeated action and the emergence of discourse. 
 
A number of member banks wanted to purposely change the criteria by which a social 
group accepted or rejected types of behaviour. Institutional change arises from more than 
the introduction of new behaviours; the permanence of these behaviours is also important 
as well as the notion that institutions are by definition maintained by the collective. The 
chapter also proposed that these behaviours at the Rabobank are best conceptualised by 
scripted interactions. This conceptualisation focuses on both the collectively sanctioned 
nature of interactions and the taken-for-granted nature of scripted interaction. Moreover, it 
recognises both action and discourse as carriers of past events, which leave traces of their 
existence in social groups. The chapter presented a list of elements which potentially 
increase the likelihood of specific scripted interactions to actually affect the institutional 
realm.  
 
The last five chapters have analysed institutional change at the Rabobank. The next 
chapter will propose a theoretical framework that encompasses the conclusions from these 
chapters. It will present the insights that were obtained at the Rabobank as well as discuss 
the contributions of this study, in light of the objectives stated early in the thesis.  
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11 A revised framework of institutional change at the 
Rabobank 
11.1 Introduction 
The argument presented in this thesis revolves around the manner in which social (sub-) 
groups deal with changes in the accounting domain. This work focuses especially on the 
manner in which changes are included in the assumptions underlying the day-to-day work 
at the workplace. In order to study these processes, research was conducted at the 
Rabobank through the use of case studies. The Rabobank is especially appropriate for this 
study, as its domestic operations include more than 300 branches that are all formally 
autonomous. This means that any acceptance of centrally developed programs such as 
ROM cannot be directly enforced. The formal autonomy of member banks has led to the 
expectation that the decision processes at the various banks are located at a more local 
level and therefore are easier to trace. 
 
This thesis essentially proposes a four-stage process that ultimately provides an 
explanation of the inclusion of new principles into the institutional realm through new 
management accounting practices. Each stage can have many pitfalls and many 
unintended effects, which in itself explains why institutionalisation is such a complex 
process: there are many ways in which the process of institutionalisation can produce 
unexpected results. The thesis attempts to contribute to earlier work on management 
accounting change that is founded on institutional theories. It does so by focusing on the 
micro level; that is the way in which institutions present themselves to individuals.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to tie together the conclusions of the previous chapters, to 
provide an assessment of the implications of these conclusions for the notion of 
management accounting change, to propose a revision to the framework presented in 
chapter 3, and to discuss possible consequences of this framework. The chapter will do so 
by first recapitulating the main conclusions of the thesis so far. Then it will propose 
alterations to the theoretical framework and finally it will present a framework that applies 
some of the insights from this work to existing institutional frameworks. 
  
11.2 A cognitive exploration of institutional change 
Chapter 3 proposed a theoretical framework (see page 65) that is repeated in Figure 11-1: 
 





































Figure 11-1: theoretical framework (chapter 3) 
 
The framework was developed as a chronological theoretical representation of changes in 
the institutional realm, which can encompass various management accounting practices. 
The framework distinguishes 4 phases that can eventually lead to changes in the 
institutional realm. The framework was presented in chapter 3 and its empirical 
application was described in chapters 6 to 10. Chapter 6 presented a first order analysis of 
the events surrounding the implementation of ROM; that is a description of how the 
events presented themselves to the people involved. Chapters 7 to 10 presented a second 
order analysis of the events, in which ROM was analysed and interpreted by the 
researcher, as described in the chapter covering research methodology. 
 
Phase 1: Issue recognition 
The framework argues that from the numerous signals that target people every day, some 
stand out to be noticed. This is crucial for institutional change, as institutions tend to reify 
their own existence and as such influence which issues are picked up and which are 
ignored. Issue recognition is a relevant topic because the question ‘where does contextual 
change come from (e.g. from an idiosyncratic and exogenous or endogenous force)’ (Seo 
& Creed, 2002, p. 224) is not addressed extensively by the literature covering 
management accounting change. The framework employs insights from other literature 
and it suggests that cues are those signals that allow people to pick up on changes that, for 
some reason, cannot be ignored. Cues cause contrasts to emerge that can lead in turn to 
surprise or emotional discomfort. However, although theoretically sound, it appears that 
the notion of cues is difficult to capture empirically, as cues can be different phenomena. 
The term cues appears to be used for the signals that make people realise that something 
out of the ordinary is occurring, and also for the events that the signal represents. 
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Although the signal and the event it points to are related, they are not the same. Therefore, 
chapter 7 suggested expanding the terminology into cues and issues. Issues are those 
events that produce cues. The cue is thus an event or an experience that points to an 
underlying issue; e.g. a deviation from budget can be a cue for declining market 
conditions as an issue. The act of interpretation, or sense making, allows agents to relate 
cues to their underlying issue. Whether an event produces cues, and thus becomes an 
issue, depends on its salience for the people involved. Salience is not a characteristic of 
the issue itself; it is a characteristic of the relation between the issue and the people 
involved. This became clear in the empirical work for this thesis. Chapter 7 found that 
there was not one event that was sufficiently salient to induce immediate issue recognition 
in the member banks. Rather, a collection of several seemingly unrelated cues emerged 
that together pointed to an issue that was designated as accountability. The notion of 
accountability, as the issue deserving attention, was defined through social processes in 
the early stages of ROM.  
 
Chapter 7 also discussed the idea that cues can trigger different types of cognitive 
processing. Cues can lead to either scripted processing or conscious processing of 
situational information. The latter can lead in turn to script development or to isolated 
unscripted action, both of which require explicit sense making efforts. As this work is 
mainly about changes in the institutional realm, script development and associated sense 
making efforts are especially of interest. The insights obtained in chapter 7 produced the 
graphical representation in Figure 7-5 of cues and cognitive processing.  
 
Phase 2: Action selection 
Chapter 8 argued that actions defined in the course of ROM, in part resulted from a 
collective application of scripts, or schemas. The resulting behavioural adaptations are 
akin to ‘first order change’ as they leave the shared assumptions embedded in scripts and 
schemas unaffected. However, when these schemas are unable to cause sufficient 
reduction of anxiety or emotional discomfort, people can engage in what I referred to as 
invention. This encompasses the development of action without sole reliance on existing 
scripts. In fact, from an act of invention new scripts may emerge, but not necessarily so. 
This was the topic of chapter 9. Chapter 8 argued that existing scripts continued to play a 
role at the Rabobank; invention is simply impossible without at least a rudimentary 
understanding of basic scripts. Therefore, the processes of meaning provision and the 
associated behavioural changes resulted from both a process of schematic processing of 
signals and a process of invention. These two were the pillars of the analysis of action 
definition at the Rabobank.  
 
The participants in the MT+ groups used scripted knowledge to infer causality, valence 
and inferences related to accountability. However, many employees had limited exposure 
to the strategy meetings. Also, the composition of the groups was differentiated 
hierarchically, which meant that some participants were cautious in addressing various 
topics in an open and honest way. Caution in itself is a form of emotional discomfort and, 
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as such, many people were induced not to rely on scripted knowledge alone. The process 
of invention was rather important to all local member banks as they were attempting to 
make the transition from undirected viewing to enacting and discovery, which involves 
active scanning for information and the creative interpretation of this information in 
attempts to probe the environment. It appeared that organisational identity and image 
played an important part in the sense making processes of the participants in the MT+ 
groups. Identity was clearly not a fixed notion of what people in the bank felt the bank 
represented. Rather, they adapted the meaning of the cooperative identity to accommodate 
the purpose of the ROM activities.    
 
Phase 3: Routinisation 
Chapter 9 made use of various theoretical insights to discuss a distinction between 
routines, scripts and habits. Habits are individually oriented and invoked in an automatic 
fashion. Conversely, routines are oriented towards the collective, but they too are invoked 
in a habitual fashion, although some suggested that routines can be accompanied by 
conscious invoking instead of the habitual invoking of routine behaviours (see Feldman, 
2000, 2003). Scripts are the underlying cognitive regularities that may accompany habits 
and routines. Chapter 9 also argues that for rules to influence routine behaviour (Burns & 
Scapens, 2000), the routines must be consciously invoked; that is sense making needs to 
accompany the invoking of these routines. The chapter presented several instances of 
rules-routines interaction, or as the chapter referred to it, rules-script interaction. These 
instances pointed to the importance of ambiguity. Ambiguity between the new rules and 
the existing routines, as well as between the existing rules and the new rules, increased 
anxiety as organisational participants were unsure on how to balance them. This increased 
anxiety caused organisational participants to hold on to sources of security and continuity; 
here mostly represented by the cognitive scripts that were already present. The interaction 
between rules and routines is a process that was especially problematic when 
organisational participants at the Rabobank were unable to resolve this potential 
ambiguity. Ambiguity that exists between formal rules forces organisational participants 
to make a selection between the various rules. In order to make such a selection, people 
may come to rely on existing scripts in order to make inferences about the respective 
importance of the various rules. As a consequence, new rules that cause ambiguity can 
lead to a reinforcement of the very behavioural scripts they were meant to change.  
 
Phase 4: Institutionalisation 
An institution is different from a set of routines. Institutions are to a certain degree 
permanent, and taken for granted; they are independent of the individuals or the events 
that enabled them to develop, and they are self-enforcing, meaning that people tend to 
perceive experiences in a manner that confirms the institution as ‘the way things are’ in 
their social environment (Burns & Scapens, 2000). Chapter 10 argues that, at the 
Rabobank, particular institutions are constituted by scripted patterns of interaction. These 
patterns of interaction relate both to shared action and to discourse, which is shared by 
definition. Experiences are carried forward in time through discourse and through 
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repeated observable action patterns, or a combination of the two. Both are leading to the 
depersonalisation of past actions; they help these actions to become detached from the 
circumstances in which they were developed. In all, it is scripted interactions that carry 
past experiences forward in time.  
 
Traces of institutionalisation were found at the Groningen bank. Various statements were 
made referring to the depersonalisation of the issue of accountability and its solutions. 
Moreover, the terminology (discourse of accountability) the bank had adopted, comprised 
specific texts that described what the bank wanted to be and what it was not. Finally, a 
‘critical mass’ of people adopting the new practices was achieved, which made 
conforming to the new behavioural principles cognitively more appealing than continuing 
to use existing behavioural patterns. The chapter therefore argues that changes were made 
to the institutional realm. Specifically, statements pointing to the self-enforcing nature of 
the changes and the persistence of these changes were evidence of that effect.  
 
The argument of chapter 10 is that the process of institutionalisation depends on the 
ability of groups of people to carry set behaviours forward in time, beyond those 
characterised as “routines”, “habits” and “scripts”. An institution can qualify as such when 
it is independent of its source, and when it is independent of an individual who acts as the 
‘carrier’ of specific sets of behaviours.     
 
11.3 A revised framework of institutional change 
This section will present two frameworks. First, an adapted framework will be presented 
that shows how new events can lead to behavioural alterations on the part of an individual 
actor. Second, a framework will be proposed that shows how these insights affect 
institutionalisation in social groups. The first framework focuses primarily on the 
individual, while the second framework depicts the effects on a social collective. 
 
11.3.1 Behavioural changes of an individual 
The empirical chapters in this thesis suggest a revised graphical representation of 
institutional change as it relates to individual actors. It shows how changes can emerge in 
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Figure 11-2: Revised framework of individual behavioural change 
 
The left-hand side of the framework depicts the issue. An issue is made up of a collection 
of cues, which contribute, through a process of collective sense making, to the salience of 
the issue. An issue needs resolving, as it causes high degrees of emotional discomfort. 
Whether cues are perceived as such and whether they contribute to the salience of an issue 
is contingent on various factors. The framework distinguishes past behaviour, which may 
lock-in future behaviours; existing scripts that affect the manner in which people interpret 
possible cues; the set of interpretative tasks and predominant frame of reference, both of 
which relate to the fact that people tend to be more sensitive to signals that they can relate 
to, through their job-related tasks, their religion, or their upbringing. Finally, others’ 
actions can serve as a powerful cue, in that other people can act unpredictably leaving the 
implicit theories on their behaviours invalid, or others’ behaviours may pose a direct 
threat to ones own welfare.  
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Two arrows are departing from the box designated ‘issue salience’. One arrow points 
upward to existing scripts. This arrow indicates that, in decision making, people draw on 
existing scripts. Even in the most of conscious decision making, people draw on existing 
scripts to formulate expectations about the alternatives they are considering. Therefore, 
scripts play an important part in any kind of action formulation. More specifically, scripts 
help people assess the causality, valence and inferences of the events they encounter. This 
process is termed in the figure: ‘scripted action selection’. The arrow also points in the 
reverse direction, as scripts influence the salience of issues, and as such they influence 
what is an issue to begin with (see chapter 7). 
 
The second arrow points downward to a box named ‘attribute meaning’. It is this arrow 
that depicts the conscious process of action definition. Through the act of sense making, 
people create a meaning for the issue (that is, they attribute meaning to the issue through 
sense making processes), and this helps them to come to a definition of action. The arrow 
points in both directions, indicating that sense making includes both prospective sense 
making as well as retrospective sense making; as explained in chapter 8. This process of 
sense making, meaning attribution and ultimately action selection is named invention. The 
act of invention is seen to be influenced by identity and image; power differentials; the 
degree of involvement in the events; communication patterns; and organisational culture. 
Invention and scripted action selection are the two tiers that lead to action development, or 
as the framework refers to it: the selection of a behavioural response. When the events 
leading up to this behaviour selection are recurring, script modification may occur to 
include these new behaviours. This means that people can potentially invoke these actions 
somewhat mindlessly in similar circumstances. This is akin to habitualisation, which is 
reflected by the lowest box in the figure. 
 
The figure does not depict routines, nor does it depict institutions. The reason for these 
omissions is that routines and institutions exist by virtue of the collective. An individual is 
unable to create routines or institutions, although he is able to influence routines through 
his actions, scripts and habits. To address how the above views affect the institutional 
realm, a wider perspective is needed. The next sub-section will address the implications 
for the social collective in which routines and institutions present themselves. 
 
11.3.2 Inclusion of scripted individual behaviours in the institutional 
realm  
This sub-section presents a framework that explores the implications of the views 
presented in this thesis for the collective development of institutions. This framework has 
institutions and routines as the focus, not the individual actor, although it includes the 
social collective of which he is a part. Consider Figure 11-3 for a graphical representation: 
 
 






























Figure 11-3: Institutional change through conscious processing of cues 
 
The framework depicts the institutional realm and the realm of action, which were used in 
the Burn & Scapens (2000) framework. However, the current representation divides the 
area between the two realms into three panes, indicated by I, II, and III.  
 
The left hand side of the framework shows multiple cues that make up the issues that can 
trigger a reaction by organizational participants. From the pane that represents the issue(s) 
an arrow points to the domain of the individual, indicated by pane I. This arrow reflects 
the idea that cues and issues can be picked up by individuals in the organisation1. Yet, 
interpretation of these cues and decisions for action does not follow simply and 
“logically” from the recognition of these cues. Individuals do not decide on action in 
isolation, and they do not apply ‘universalistic’ logic without relating cues to the social 
habits that determine in part which actions are considered ‘rational’. Therefore, the arrow 
pointing from issues is directed towards pane II. This pane reflects the process of 
reconciliation of individual decision-making processes, with the collective sets of 
regularities in behaviour. Burns & Scapens refer to these regularities as ‘routines’, but I 
name this ‘scripted interaction’, a combination of scripted shared actions and discourse 
(Chapter 8 and 9). From this pane, an arrow is directed to the realm of action. This 
recognises that action can result from cues, issues and influences exercised by scripted 
                                                
1 Although it must be clear that an issue gains its salience as a consequence of a collective recognition that the 
various cues are indeed pointing to a notion, here defined as an ‘issue’. Put differently, an issue can present itself 
to an individual in the social group, but the emergence of an issue is the result of a collective process of 
interpreting various cues. 
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interactions. Chapter 8 referred to this process by the term ‘sense making’. Individuals 
extract meaning from cues as well as the cognitive and behavioural regularities embedded 
in group processes. Action arises from this process of sense making. In a similar fashion 
to the Burns & Scapens (2000) framework, a diachronic relation exists between the realm 
of action and the regularities embedded in scripted interactions. However, they do not 
specify this relationship further, while I refer to this process as individual sense making.  
  
Pane II is located in the individual domain as well as in the collective domain. The pane 
represents processes that affect both individuals and the collective. In this, the pane 
presents a transition from individual actions and decisions into the collective and vice 
versa. Scripted interactions are located here. Although individuals contribute to 
interactions through action and discourse, scripted interactions only exist by virtue of a 
collective. However, scripted interactions are less difficult for individual actors to discern 
than institutions. They are dealing with scripted interactions on a day-to-day basis. 
Chapter 8 argued that collective action choices, such as those resulting from MT+ 
meetings, do not result from simply enacting patterns of interaction. These are often 
insufficient to come to collective action in response to salient issues. Therefore, I 
introduced the notion of invention, to describe the collective process of creative action 
definition that is not dependent on existing scripts. These episodes of invention are, of 
course, never without scripts, but they do not dominate the processes of action definition. 
At the Rabobank, it was clear that the consultants were particularly keen on invoking 
episodes of invention, to allow new and creative solutions to surface. From these episodes 
of invention, sense making leads to new actions that are influenced by these episodes of 
invention (hence the arrows down to the realm of action). As a result of these episodes of 
invention, new patterns of scripted interaction may arise1 that might translate into changes 
in the future institutional realm. This process is depicted in pane III.  
 
While pane II depicts a shared domain of individual actors and the social collective of 
which he is part, Pane III shows the domain of the collective. The collective here is the 
social setting in which specific institutions are present. Pane III represents the relation 
between the institutional realm and the shared domain indicated as pane II. In a similar 
fashion to the ideas of Burns & Scapens (2000) and Barley & Tolbert (1997), the figure 
shows arrows depicting inter-relations between the set of scripted interactions and the 
institutional realm. Chapter 10 argued that changes to the institutional realm can emerge 
when two main conditions are met: depersonalisation and permanence. Both are essential 
for inclusion in the institutional realm as they represent the idea that institutions have 
some degree of permanence and the idea that institutions are detached from their source or 
an individual actor. Through a number of mechanisms described in chapter 10, the two 
conditions of depersonalisation and permanence materialise. The arrow pointing from 
pane II to pane III represents these two conditions needed for institutionalisation. A 
                                                
1 These episodes of invention and the emergence of newly scripted interactions are akin to episodes of 
unfreezing and refreezing as proposed by Schein (1985). 
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second arrow, pointing in reverse indicates the reproduction of institutional principles in 
behavioural scripts. 
 
In all, the framework uses the basic ideas outlined in the frameworks provided by Barley 
& Tolbert (1997) and Burns & Scapens (2000). However, it added a cognitive level to 
these works. Moreover, the framework can provide new explanations to previously 
unanswered questions. These questions such as: where does the propensity for 
institutional change come from, if actors are institutionally constrained themselves; and 
how do institutions present themselves to individual actors, are the types of questions that 
can be addressed using the framework depicted in Figure 11-3.  
 
11.4 Contributions of the study 
This work set out to add a micro level of understanding to management accounting 
change. More specifically, it envisaged exploring how particular institutions affect 
individuals in organisations and how changes in management accounting practices 
manifest themselves to these institutionally constrained individuals. In order to study these 
processes, a case study was conducted at 14 local member banks of the cooperative 
Rabobank. This work has proposed some views that may qualify as contributions to 
studies employing institutional perspectives to management accounting change. The 
following four contributions are suggested additions to the institutional approaches (OIE) 
to management accounting change. 
 
First, this work has discussed how human agency is possible for institutionally 
constrained individuals. In extremis, individuals are influenced by the institutions in their 
environment to such a degree that they perceive problems and solutions in terms of those 
institutions. As such, institutions tend to maintain their own existence. Institutions can be 
represented by habitually invoked routines at a collective level and by scripts at the level 
of the individual. Moreover, changes in the institutional realm start with cues that are 
difficult to reconcile with institutionalised understandings (often in the form of scripts). 
Many small and seemingly unrelated cues can increase the salience of a single issue, 
causing increased anxiety and emotional discomfort for the individual. As such, changes 
in management accounting practices can stem from the discomfort that results from many 
small unrelated cues that point to an overarching issue. Institutions cannot prevent people 
from noticing many inconsistent signals (cues) that are then cognitively clustered or 
grouped to form issues pointing to the need for alternative management accounting 
practices.  
 
Second, action does not follow unequivocally from the recognition of an issue. Many 
courses of action are possible, but the individual will have preferences that are both based 
on his analysis of the issue (sense making), which is akin to attempts to be as rational as 
possible (bounded rationality) and based on the institutionally determined set of 
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alternatives, that are presented to this individual through scripts. Together these two 
categories cause the people involved to define actions that are expected to resolve the 
issue. Burns & Scapens (2000) do not explicate how decisions for actions embedded in 
management accounting practices are reached. But, through the use of insights from other 
disciplines, this thesis may contribute to the OIE inspired management accounting 
literature.  
 
Third, the thesis points to ambiguity, which can arise from incompatibilities between 
formal rules, or between new rules and existing behaviours. As a result, people may revert 
to existing scripts to reduce emotional discomfort resulting form this ambiguity. However, 
this thesis also explored a situation that resulted in behavioural adaptations. These 
behavioural adaptations resulted from the organisation’s ability to render existing scripts 
useless. Any ambiguity could therefore only be solved by the adoption of new principles 
of behaviour that revolved around accountability. As such, the recognition of the 
importance of potential ambiguities, the resulting emotional discomfort, and the action 
alternatives that people can select, are meaningful additions to institutional perspectives of 
management accounting change.  
 
Fourth, the thesis adds to the management accounting change literature in arguing that 
institutions are constituted by scripted actions, and by discourses. It argued that it is likely 
that institutional change affects both scripted action and the discourse produced by 
actions. As such a focus on these elements can provide more insights into the process of 
institutional change, and how this process unfolds for the individual as a part of a social 
collective. In all, this thesis has provided a way of addressing human agency in 
institutions. By creating an argument that uses terms and ideas from cognitive sciences, 
such as scripts and schemas, it has illuminated the ways in which individuals are parts of 
collective phenomena, such as institutions. And as such, it proposes additions to the 
management accounting change literature that uses institutional theory as its frame of 
reference. 
 
Finally, the next and final chapter will present the conclusion and the evaluation of this 
study. It will reflect on the results achieved, it will try to assess its significance to 
management accounting change, and it will look ahead to new areas for research. 
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12 Evaluation and conclusion 
This final chapter will engage both in retrospective sense making as well as in prospective 
sense making. It will look back in assessing the limitations of this study. The focus will 
then shift to the present and discuss the implications of the findings for management 
accounting change. The chapter will also look ahead with a discussion of the possibilities 
for future research. As the current study has produced questions as well as answers, it 
could lead to an expansion of the research agenda for management accounting research. 
The chapter ends with a few final remarks. 
 
12.1 Limitations of the current study 
The study presented in this thesis investigates how a particular type of change proceeded 
at the Rabobank. From the theoretical views that were used to structure and to interpret 
the study and its outcomes, scripts were found to be important features, as they could be 
seen as individual representations of the regularities underlying much of human 
behaviour. However, this focus on scripts exposes the scientific communities’ inability to 
find an empirically meaningful concept of a script. This thesis studies scripts through the 
use of interviews, observations and written evidence of various sorts to identify 
regularities in human behaviour. It is then assumed that these individually identifiable 
regularities are rooted in a set of expectations of other’s behaviours and future events; i.e. 
scripts. However, although there is an abundance of theoretical evidence that scripts play 
a role in change at a cognitive level, these are difficult to apply in empirical explorations. 
 
Gioia (1992) used an alternative method in a study in which he himself was both the 
researcher and the primary participant. One could argue that he, as a researcher, had 
access to all information present in his consciousness. However, for the majority of 
studies, this is not feasible, simply because being a researcher biases experiences to such 
extent that accounts of these experiences may not be valid representations of the events. 
This was not an issue in Gioia’s case, as he became a researcher long after the 
experiences, he reported on, took place. Another alternative method that can be used to 
study cognitive regularities is the laboratory study. The studies by Michael Cohen (e.g. 
1994; 1996) focused on routines and learning. He used controlled environments to 
eliminate alternative explanations for the emergence of routines. Such a method allows 
the researcher to control for unwanted influences on behaviours, and thus allows him to 
better isolate behaviours that have been influenced by cognitive structures; simply 
because alternative causes have been eliminated. However, the current study did not opt 
for these alternative modes of research, as they do not allow for a process view of 
management accounting change. A process of organisational change is virtually 
impossible to simulate in a laboratory environment, as the complexity of the organisation 
cannot be replicated. This complexity is an essential influence in how people deal with 
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changes and thus it must be included in the research design. Although the method selected 
for this thesis fits the research objectives, it did expose the scientific community’s 
inability to come up with an empirically meaningful concept of the script (and the 
institution, for that matter). Although this thesis has made a modest attempt to develop 
these concepts, it can hardly be considered a finished task. 
 
A second limitation of this study is one of its strengths at the same time. The case studies 
have been conducted at the Rabobank, which is one of the largest cooperative 
organisations in the Netherlands. The advantage of conducting case studies at a 
cooperative bank is that all member banks are formally autonomous. This means that 
member banks decide for themselves how to plan and execute their own change programs. 
So cases at the Rabobank provide a unique opportunity to track a change program in a 
large organisation, where most of its decision-making is located locally. Yet, the 
cooperative has its own set of unique problems that affected many of the decisions made 
in the various member banks. For example, the member banks have different relations that 
affect local decision-making. Relations with private members from the local community, 
relations with the various boards, and relations with Rabobank Nederland and the 
collective of member banks are unique to the cooperative. Organisations with different 
governance structures have different stakeholders and experience different pressures. How 
these affect the results obtained is unclear. 
 
A third limitation of the study is that it insufficiently recognises that experience can also 
enter the institutional realm through organisational relics and symbols. This study has 
implicitly included them in its empirical chapters, through an emphasis on shared 
interaction. One can argue that relics and symbols can only come to exist through 
interactions. However, this has not been explicated and no evidence has been presented 
about the value of symbols and relics, as they were not overtly present at the various 
member banks under study. However, it should be considered a limitation of this study, 
and the inclusion of symbols and relics may provide a valuable contribution in the future.  
 
Lastly, this work has used ideas and concepts from disciplines other than management 
accounting. The thesis is primarily aimed at the introduction of these concepts in the OIE 
inspired accounting change literature, where these ideas and concepts are not well 
represented. The accounting domain has a profound influence on the organisation and its 
participants. So the accounting literature also needs to contribute to other disciplines. But 
this thesis has not sought to extend its envisaged contributions to other disciplines.      
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12.2 Implications for future research on management accounting 
change 
Two questions are highlighted by this study: -1- how and when do organisational 
participants recognise a need for change in the management accounting domain? -2- how 
do institutions present themselves to individuals? 
 
-1- how and when do organisational participants recognise a need for change in the 
management accounting domain? This thesis argues that through the interpretation of 
different cues, which produce a collectively defined issue, a perceived need for change 
emerges. This means that the perception of a need for change can be influenced by the 
presence of cues, the interpretation of cues, and the resulting collective definition of one 
or more issues. Chapter 8 also introduced the notion of the ‘issue elite’; a group of people 
that have the ability to influence a number of cues, interpretations and the presence and 
meaning of an issue. The mere notion of an issue elite leads to the proposition that the 
emergence of issues or problems in organisations is not inevitable, but they can be the 
product of politics of interpretation (March, 1989b). 
 
Issue elites do not necessarily include all senior managers, although it is likely that some 
are included, because of their access to information. But also others in the organisation 
who are located proximately to relevant networks can come to be included in the issue 
elite. The issue elite actually influences the agenda of the organisation, and this view 
resembles of a Foucaultian concept of power, where power is exercised through networks 
rather than through the hierarchy. To the accounting community, the issue elite as an 
agenda-setting entity has some interesting consequences for explanations of the 
persuasiveness of management accounting information in the organisation. One could 
argue that the composition of the issue elite (which roles are represented) affects the types 
of issues that are highlighted, as the role-incumbents have greater knowledge of some 
functional areas of the organisation than others. Moreover, these incumbents can have an 
interest in increasing the salience of issues that appeal to their specific area of expertise. 
Similarly, members of the issue elite need to take an active part in agenda setting, to make 
sure that they remain included in the issue elite, because they are seen to provide 
necessary expertise. The centrality of the management accountant in these relevant 
networks could be of importance to the instigation of changes in the management 
accounting system. However, this is speculation that requires greater insights into the 
composition of the groups that instigate change. Not only to obtain more knowledge about 
the influence of the management accountant on agenda setting in the organisation, but also 
to obtain insights into the processes that lead to a change in management accounting 
systems and practices. Therefore, I call for a further exploration of the processes 
preceding management accounting changes. It is reasonable to assume that these 
processes continue to exercise their influence through the episodes of collective sense 
making, which can be instigated and influenced by the issue elite.   
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-2- how do institutions present themselves to individuals? Institutional theory has had its 
fair share of criticism. In particular, critiques relating to the abstract nature of institutions 
and the difficulties associated with empirical studies as a result of varying definitions of 
these phenomena have resounded over recent decades (Zucker, 1991). To make the notion 
of institutions empirically more meaningful, it is important to find phenomena that can 
serve as proxies for institutions. The current study used cognitive scripts to model how 
institutions can underpin behavioural regularities; these behavioural regularities were 
analysed at the level of the individual. This appears to be a promising avenue for research. 
Although institutions come to exist by virtue of collective processes of sense making and 
invention, they can be represented to the individual by repeated patterns of action and 
discourse. Therefore, theories of cognitive psychology can provide insights into the 
processes enabling and constraining action alternatives, and how these present themselves 
to the individual. In all, to produce more compelling institutional explanations for the 
process of management accounting change, we need to know how institutions present 
themselves to individuals and how they affect their behaviour. This knowledge can then 
be applied to the accounting system to study the processes through which the management 
accounting systems impinge on the behaviour of individual persons and of groups of 
people. I therefore propose that extending the idea of the institutions, beyond the change 
agenda in management accounting research, can offer much insight in the interaction 
between the accounting system and the organisational participants who operate under its 
influence. However, to study this interaction, we first need to gain knowledge about how 
an institution in general, and the accounting system in particular, represents itself to the 
individual at the cognitive level. I therefore call for further studies into the cognitive 
representation of institutions. Once we have obtained more knowledge on these 
representations, we can use them as a proxy for the presence of institutions in social 
settings, and it should then be possible to better chart the influence of these institutions on 
human behaviour; a particularly fruitful area for students of management accounting and 
control.  
 
12.3 And finally…. 
The literature (e.g. Nooteboom, 2000) has hinted at relations between cognitive 
psychology and institutional theories. But so far, the OIE inspired management 
accounting change literature has not discussed these relations extensively, although it 
builds on some of these areas separately. This thesis has discussed some of these relations.  
 
The manner in which issues come to the attention of organisational participants is a 
consequence of organisational sense making. Some cues can come to mean similar things 
to many people, and through sense making they come to constitute an issue that needs 
resolution. The idea of sense making was included in virtually all phases of the study. In 
retrospect, this is not surprising, as sense making is an on-going human quality. Sense 
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making can be seen as attempts to be as rational as possible in light of all the constraints 
that people impose on themselves as the price for their ability to communicate and to 
engage in intelligible social interaction. At the other end of the spectrum, we find the 
individual’s inability to make sense of everything all the time. People resolve this inability 
by unconsciously allowing themselves to simplify their expectations of others and of their 
own alternatives by using a script. This thesis argues that scripts can qualify as individual 
representations of institutions. As such, it does justice to the features found in sociological 
studies, which state that structure is maintained by the ongoing enacting of this structure. 
Scripts can cause people to “mindlessly” reproduce those actions that form the foundation 
of structure. When changes are imminent, people can engage in collective sense making 
that results in both invention of new practices as well as increased reliance on existing 
scripted knowledge.  
 
This thesis has taken as point-of-departure the premise that human action is not wholly 
constrained by institutions, nor is behaviour purely economically rational; where an actor 
selects the appropriate alternative based on some identifiable criteria. Rather, people 
perform many tasks rather automatically, and these tasks can be invoked automatically as 
well. However, under specific conditions, people are prone to be as rational as they 
possibly can be, under the constraints imposed by existing institutions, their past and 
various other elements. They make conscious efforts to make sense of their experiences, 
and to reduce the discomfort they are feeling. Sense making is an integral part of lasting 
change. Sense making is a requirement for internalising changes. As a consequence, 
organisations need to strive for appropriate opportunities for organisational sense making. 
At the Rabobank, the MT+ groups were seen as think tanks, in that they would come up 
with information needed for the ROM processes. They were also assumed to act as 
ambassadors of the ROM program. However, none of people in the member banks were 
aware that group-wise sense making and invention could not be communicated. These are 
experiences that cannot be carried by the mere communication of the outcomes of 
discussions of the MT+ group. This was one of the primary reasons for the increasing gap 
in knowledge between the MT+ groups and the rest of the employees.  
 
The Rabobank case shows that sense making plays a central role in management 
accounting change. Scripts can be altered through sense making, and through changes in 
scripts alterations in the institutional realm can emerge. One of the greatest challenges for 
the future will therefore be to specify the processes through which people make sense of 
their day-to-day world, and how this sense making impinges on scripts, routines, and 
ultimately on institutions. To gain deeper insights into the role of management accounting 
change, we need to study its effect on the use of scripts and the propensity of people to 
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(I) = Interviewee 
 
- Ask (I) to tell something about himself. 
Instruction: do not indicate what areas the interviewee should cover 
- What is (I)’s role in the organisation? 
- Which educational background does (I) have? 
- Which aspirations does (I) have, carreer or other wise? 
- Ask whether (I) thinks if he fits in an organisation such as the Rabobank. 
 
Groups & subcultures 
- Describe what you think is the most important goal of the member bank and the 
department. Also mention what you think is the identity of the department and the bank? 
- What activities do the segment and the bank see as important and meaningful on a day-
to-day basis? 
Instruction: ask for concrete examples. 
 - Address the culture of the bank (think of the cooperative values, and the way people 
dealt with results)?  
- Who is the most influential person in your work. Answer the question from a formal and 
an informal perspective. 
 
Cues 
- Describe how people worked before ROM was introduced? 
- What was the precise reason for the acceptance of ROM? 
- Did this development surprise you, did you have specific emotions associated to it? 
- Was ROM a significant break from the way people worked before? 
- Did ROM emerge from a concrete question from member banks, or was it initiated pro-
actively from Rabobank Nederland? 
- At your bank, who were involved in the decision fro ROM? 
- Did you, at any time, worry, or feel relieved, happy or disappointed by the events that 
occurred at your bank during the ROM program? 
- How were the intentions of the program communicated to the bank and the employees? 
 
Prospective sense making   
Instruction: ask (I) to go back to the situation in which the program was initiated. 
Others’ interpretations: 
- Could you tell me about how the initial plans for ROM were received in the bank and in 
your segment? 
                                                
1 This interview guide is a translation of the original one as all interviews were conducted in Dutch. Although the 
interview guide is set up as a series of questions, these were primarily used as general topics and areas to be 
covered. The questions were not asked literally, but they were used to inform the conversation and to make sure 
that no previously identified topic was left out. However, many more topics were discussed, and depending on 
the particular circumstances, the discussion was allowed to deviate from this interview guide. 
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- Which people were influential in the way you perceived the program, and why? 
- Did you ever discuss the change with people outside of the formal occasions, if so, with 
whom? 
- Could you elaborate on this ‘informal opinion’ about the process and the necessity of 
change? 
- Did your opinion about ROM coincide with other’s opinions? Why was this? 
 
Local interpretation schemes 
- Do you think that your position at the Rabobank influences the way in which you 
perceive the ROM program? Put differently: do you think that your social group affects 
the way you interpret the program in terms of use, form and necessity? 
- Why does the program matter for your bank? 
 
Predispositions & purposes  
- What do you think the objective was of the program? 
- Can you tell me how the program was arranged formally: steering committees, 
champions, change agents? 
- What was the role of the Rabobank Nederland consultants? 
- What meetings and trainings were there at your bank? 
- Could you indicate what you personally expected from the change? 
- Which problems did you envisage for the segment that you are part of? 
- Did you feel that you could oversee the consequences of your actions in relation to 
ROM? 
- Did you have an overall view of the ROM program, or did you correct your ideas on the 
program as you went on with the program? 
- Ideally, how would you like to alter the typical behaviours at this bank? 
- Do you think that ROM contributed to these behavioural adaptations? 
 
Past experience 
- Did you have experiences that were particularly helpful for your role in the program? 
- Could you tell me about a program from the past, that this program resembles with? 
- Do you think that your expectations with regards to the progress of ROM are partially 
influenced by earlier experiences. If so, elaborate? 




- What were your responsibilities in the ROM program? 
- Is there any explicit connection between this program and other Rabobank programs? 
- What do you consider the most remarkable element of ROM and its implementation at 
your bank? 
 
Retrospective sense making 
Instruction: ask (I) to focus on the current time. 
- What do you think about the formal features of the ROM program? 
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- In retrospect, how important were the opinions of your close colleagues for the manner 
in which you interpreted the events that took place? 
- If you could do it all again, what would you change? 
- In relation to this last question: is there anything that you have learned that you could 
use in the next program? 
 
Committed action 
- Was your position in the program widely known in the bank? 
- Did everyone agree on the contents and purposes of the program? 
- Did you involve yourself in the program, or were you asked to do so? 
- Do you think that the results of the program are reversible at reasonable costs? 
 
Script modification & Routinisation 
- Did you change the informal criteria on which you evaluate others and their work? 
- Are you inclined to conform to the agreements made in the ROM program, and why? 
- How did you ensure that newly agreed principles of behaviour, resulting from the ROM 
program, were embedded in your day-to-day ways of working? 
- Do you have a concrete example? 





Please respond to the following statements: 
 
- To achieve my objectives in my work, my informal influence exceeds my formal 
influence in importance. 
- The ROM program was neccessary for this bank. 
- My past experiences are an important guideline in the way I evaluate and 
implement programs such as ROM 
- My colleagues are an important source of information, when it comes to altering 
my expectations of the ROM program. 
- I feel it is important for us to compare our activities with other banks. 
- I already managed result oriented, even before ROM was introduced. 
- Rabobank Nederland has a lot of respect within the member banks. 
- Rabobank Nederland must compensate its lack of formal authority by the use of 
informal influence and elaborate communication. 
- To me, ROM is a successful program. 
-  Personally, I feel that Rabobank Nederland needs to have more direct influence 
over the member banks, when it comes to the acceptance and implementation of 
programs such as ROM.  
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Appendix 3: Summary in Dutch 
 
 
Dit proefschrift rapporteert over een onderzoek naar het proces van management 
accountingverandering bij de Rabobank. Het onderzoek heeft als doel om meer inzicht te 
verkrijgen in de processen die management accountingveranderingen bewerkstelligen. 
Meer specifiek is het onderzoek gericht op individueel gedrag (inclusief weerstand) van 
medewerkers en managers bij veranderingen in management accountingprocessen en -
systemen. Het onderzoek is geworteld in institutionele theorie. 
 
Het proefschrift beschrijft drie invloedrijke stromingen van institutionele theorie. Het 
concludeert dat ‘Old Institutional Economics’ (OIE) en de verschillende toepassingen 
hiervan het meest geschikt zijn om als raamwerk voor interpretatie te dienen in deze 
studie. Een institutie kan zijn: ‘een manier van denken en bepaalde gewoonten die 
voldoende permanent en invloedrijk zijn, en die ingebed zijn in de gewoonten of 
gebruiken van een groep’ (Burns & Scapens, 2000). Management accountingsystemen en 
-processen kunnen worden gezien als een set van regels en routines die op termijn invloed 
hebben op instituties. Echter, OIE laat de invloed van het individu op veranderingen 
grotendeels onbesproken. Het ziet instituties als sociale structuren die door individuen 
worden gezien als gegeven feiten. Hoe deze instituties vorm krijgen voor het individu in 
zijn dagelijks werk blijft onbesproken. Een tweede punt van kritiek op OIE vloeit voort uit 
het eerste. De huidige toepassingen van OIE doen geen uitspraak over de manier waarop 
de noodzaak tot verandering wordt vastgesteld binnen een organisatie. Als instituties de 
sociale structuren vormen waaronder mensen interacteren, interpreteren en actie 
ondernemen, hoe kan institutionele verandering dan ooit plaatsvinden? Immers, mensen 
zien instituties als permanent en onveranderbaar. Het proefschrift presenteert een 
theoretisch raamwerk dat voortbouwt op OIE, maar dat specifiek aandacht besteedt aan 
bovengenoemde punten van kritiek. Het gaat specifiek in op de rol van het individu in de 
vorming en de verandering van instituties, en op de manier waarop een noodzaak tot 
institutionele verandering doordringt tot groepen individuen die onder invloed zijn van 
diezelfde instituties.  
 
Het theoretisch raamwerk dat de basis vormt voor de interpretaties in dit onderzoek, gaat 
ervan uit dat individuen een groot gedeelte van hun activiteiten ondernemen zonder 
bewuste analyse van de omstandigheden. Activiteiten vinden plaats in een vorm die in het 
raamwerk het ‘script’ wordt genoemd. Een ‘script’ is een ‘regelmatig uitgevoerd schema 
van gedrag, ingebed in het geheugen, dat beschrijvingen bevat van gebeurtenissen en 
gedragingen die geoorloofd zijn in bepaalde omstandigheden’. Als script wordt ook het 
gedrag gezien dat het gevolg is van het uitvoeren van een script. Onder de theoretische 
omstandigheid van stabiliteit, zullen individuen voornamelijk acteren volgens deze 
scripts. Echter, wanneer individuen zich realiseren dat scripts niet meer voldoen, dan 
kunnen individuen zich bewust worden dat hun impliciete assumpties over hun omgeving 
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niet meer valide zijn. Bijgevolg gaat het individu zich meer bewust bezighouden met zijn 
omgeving en de meest geschikte acties. De signalen die voor een dergelijke 
bewustwording zorgen, worden ‘cues’ genoemd. Echter, ‘cues’ zijn ook de signalen die 
zorgen voor het aanroepen van scripts. Cues hebben dus twee functies: onder condities 
van stabiliteit zijn zij het signaal dat zorgt voor het aanroepen van scripts; onder condities 
van verandering vormen zij de indicatie dat scripts niet meer voldoen en leiden zij tot 
bewuste verwerking van omgevingsinformatie en de definitie van nieuwe acties. Dit 
laatste (het bewust verwerken van informatie uit de omgeving en het definiëren van 
nieuwe acties) wordt ‘sense making’, of ‘betekenis geven’ genoemd. Dit verwijst naar het 
verminderen van ontologische onzekerheid door het plaatsen van situationele informatie 
in een cognitief kader, waardoor het individu opnieuw oorzaak-gevolg relaties kan leggen 
van gebeurtenissen in zijn omgeving. Betekenis geven leidt tot de definitie van nieuwe 
acties, die in de loop van de tijd kunnen worden opgenomen in scripts, hoewel dit niet 
noodzakelijkerwijs zo hoeft te zijn.  
 
De relevantie van scripts voor een studie over institutionele verandering ligt in het feit dat 
scripts gerelateerd zijn aan routines en instituties. Routines zijn collectieve gewoonten, 
terwijl scripts hiervan de individuele expressies kunnen zijn. Op grond van eerder 
gepubliceerd werk betoogt dit proefschrift dat institutionele verandering plaatsvindt door 
veranderingen in de formele regels van een sociale groep en veranderingen in de 
daadwerkelijke collectieve gewoonten van een groep: de routines. Deze veranderingen in 
de regels en routines manifesteren zich bij het individu als veranderingen in de scripts die 
ten grondslag liggen aan zijn gedrag. Het proefschrift stelt dus dat op individueel niveau 
institutionele verandering vorm krijgt door veranderingen in scripts. 
 
Methodologie 
Het onderzoek gebruikt de etnografische gevalsstudie (case studie) als methode van 
dataverzameling. Deze methode is bijzonder geschikt voor het in kaart brengen van de 
onvoorspelbare processen waarmee management accountingveranderingen gepaard gaan. 
Met deze methode kan het gedrag van mensen in de organisatie worden bestudeerd in hun 
eigen omgeving. De etnografische gevalsstudie verzamelt data uit meerdere bronnen en is 
gericht op het verkrijgen van begrip van de gebeurtenissen in brede zin. Dit type 
gevalsstudie maakt het mogelijk om aandacht te besteden aan de betekenis die betrokken 
individuen zelf geven aan de gebeurtenissen.       
 
De interpretatie van de resultaten van de gevalsstudie heeft plaatsgevonden in twee 
stappen. In de eerste orde analyse worden de gebeurtenissen bekeken vanuit de ervaringen 
van de betrokkenen. De eerste orde analyse is dan ook voornamelijk beschrijvend van 
aard. De tweede orde analyse omvat interpretaties van de onderzoeker. Via deze 
interpretaties is het theoretisch raamwerk verder verfijnd en aangepast. 
 
Het object van onderzoek is het programma Resultaatgericht Sturen (RS) van de 
Rabobank. Het programma is ontworpen om lokale banken te ondersteunen in het 
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professionaliseren van de planning- en controlcyclus en mensen zich meer bewust te 
maken van de gevolgen van hun acties. RS heeft een functionele component en een 
gedragsmatige component. De eerste dient om de lokale bank de technieken aan te leren 
voor een gestructureerde planning- en controlcyclus. De tweede dient om een 
resultaatgerichte attitude bij medewerkers te bevorderen. Een aantal lokale banken vond 
dat mensen zich meer bewust moesten worden van de gevolgen van hun handelen. RS 
dient om mensen in hun gedrag meer rekening te laten houden met deze gevolgen. Een 
voorbeeld van zo’n nieuwe houding zou zijn: ‘afspraak is afspraak’, om aan te geven dat 
men doet wat men belooft.       
 
Resultaten 
De resultaten kunnen worden opgedeeld in 4 gebieden: (1) de aanleiding tot verandering; 
(2) de definitie van actie in reactie op de erkenning dat verandering noodzakelijk is; (3) de 
manier waarop deze acties onderdeel kunnen vormen van routines; (4) hoe deze routines 
uiteindelijk kunnen leiden tot institutionele verandering. 
 
Aanleiding 
De literatuur betoogt dat de bewustwording dat verandering noodzakelijk is, vaak 
voortkomt uit de aanwezigheid van cues. Deze cues fungeren normaal als onbewuste 
signalen dat scripts moeten worden aangeroepen, maar zij ontstaan ook uit de 
bewustwording dat scripts niet de gewenste resultaten opleveren. Het bleek bij de 
Rabobank dat verschillende individuen verschillende redenen hadden om RS te 
introduceren binnen de lokale bank. Deze redenen hadden met elkaar gemeen dat deze 
vaak te maken hadden met ‘verantwoording voor eigen acties’. De aanwezigheid van de 
Kompassen (de Balanced Scorecard van de Rabobank) leidde tot onzekerheid over hoe 
deze ingezet konden worden in de beheersing van de organisatie. RS zou de Kompassen 
kunnen integreren in een uniforme methodiek van beheersing. Verder zagen veel 
individuen professionaliteit als gewenste eigenschap. Professionaliteit werd vaak 
gelijkgesteld aan verantwoording en was dus een reden voor de introductie van RS in 
sommige lokale banken.  
 
Verder was de relatie tussen lokale banken en Rabobank Nederland een belangrijke factor 
die de notie van verantwoordelijkheid naar de voorgrond schoof. Zo hebben lokale banken 
meer macht gekregen ten koste van Rabobank Nederland door een herziening van de 
topcoöperatie. In combinatie met een aantal schandalen die de Rabobank Groep veel 
schade hebben berokkend, heeft dit er toe geleid dat het collectief van lokale banken 
verantwoordelijkheden van banken veel zwaarder wil aanzetten. Specifiek voor financieel 
zwakkere banken vormt RS een middel om aan te tonen dat zij zich committeren aan het 
beleid van het collectief van lokale banken. De analyse toont dat cues niet automatisch 
naar eenzelfde type actie leiden. Bij de Rabobank was het een samengaan van meerdere 
cues die leidde tot ‘verantwoording’ als aandachtspunt. Een aandachtspunt wordt in het 
proefschrift ‘issue’ genoemd. Het betoogt dat de aanleiding tot evolutionaire verandering 
kan liggen in het samengaan van veel verschillende cues, die in eerste instantie niet aan 
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elkaar gerelateerd hoeven te zijn. Echter, deze cues kunnen zorgen voor ontologische 
onzekerheid, die verminderd wordt als er een overkoepelende oorzaak voor het bestaan 
van de cues wordt gedefinieerd. Het aandachtspunt, of ‘issue’, is dan zo’n overkoepelende 
oorzaak. Het proefschrift stelt dan ook dat cues leiden tot de definitie van één of meer 
aandachtspunten, die op hun beurt onderwerp worden van verdere actie.  
 
Definitie van actie 
Dat er aandachtspunten bestaan bij de verschillende banken, die gevat kunnen worden 
onder dezelfde term ‘verantwoording’, leidt niet automatisch tot een eensluidende 
definitie van acties die elke lokale bank dient te ondernemen. RS is een programma dat 
lokale banken voor keuzes stelt met betrekking tot hun gewenste toekomstige positie en 
de manier waarop zij deze denken te gaan bereiken. Deze keuzes dienen evenwel door de 
lokale bank zelf te worden ingevuld. Welnu, de manier waarop de individuen acties 
definieerden bleek bij de betrokken banken zeer te variëren. Acties werden vastgesteld in 
zogenaamd MT+ verband, een groep medewerkers bestaande uit het management van de 
bank, de interne en externe projectleiders en vertegenwoordigers van alle afdelingen van 
de bank. Deze MT+ groepen definieerden de positie die de bank zou willen innemen, 
alsook de acties die dit mogelijk zouden moeten maken. De definitie van deze acties was 
een collectief proces van betekenis geven. Betekenis geven is het proces dat volgt op de 
erkenning dat verandering noodzakelijk is. Het proces van betekenis geven gaat om het 
verwerken van situationele informatie. Betekenis geven leidt tot het definiëren van nieuwe 
acties en kan op termijn leiden tot het ontstaan van nieuwe scripts. Het collectieve proces 
van betekenis geven bij de Rabobank kwam tot stand door het uitvinden1 van ieders 
positie met betrekking tot het aandachtspunt ‘verantwoording’. Dit werd onder andere 
beïnvloed door de relatieve macht van de deelnemers, zowel formeel als informeel, de 
identiteit en imago van de bank en de deelnemers, en de cultuur van de bank. Echter, de 
deelnemers aan de MT+ waren niet volledig onafhankelijk van elkaar. Zij interacteerden 
ook onder een aantal gedeelde sets van scripts. Deze gaven de deelnemers informatie over 
causale verbanden, de significantie van de activiteiten die zij ondernamen en de 
consequenties van de voorstellen die zij deden. Het proefschrift betoogt dan ook dat de 
medewerkers bij de Rabobank tot gedeelde acties kwamen door middel van het uitvinden 
van elkaars voorkeuren, waardoor de groep betekenis kon geven aan de informatie die zij 
verzamelden; alsook door het gebruik van bestaande gedeelde scripts die de individuen 
hielpen causale verbanden te leggen, de significantie van acties in kaart te brengen en 
consequenties te overzien. 
 
‘Routinisatie’ van acties 
In de loop van het project poogden de leden van de MT+ groepen de acties die zij hadden 
gedefinieerd, te communiceren naar de rest van de bank. Dit werd ervaren als een 
moeizaam proces. De medewerkers buiten de MT+ groepen hadden niet veel ervaring met 
RS en zij gaven aan dat zij zich niet goed konden voorstellen wat de bedoeling was van de 
                                                
1 Uitvinden is de directe vertaling van de term invention, een term die wordt gebruikt in het proefschrift.  
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acties die voorgesteld werden in het kader van RS. Het bleek dat ‘routinisatie’ van nieuwe 
acties niet opgelegd kon worden door middel van regels. De routines waar de MT+ 
groepen naar op zoek waren, worden in het proefschrift interactiescripts genoemd. 
Routines zijn collectieve fenomenen, welke hun weerslag vinden in individuele scripts. 
Omdat veel MT+ groepen zich bezig hielden met de manier waarop mensen met elkaar 
omgingen (bijvoorbeeld: ‘doen wat je zegt’), ging het hier dus om scripts die kennis 
bevatten over hoe men met elkaar om diende te gaan: interactiescripts. Als zodanig richt 
het proefschrift zich op de manier waarop deze scripts zich konden ontwikkelen. Het 
bleek dat er dubbelzinnigheid kan ontstaan tussen de nieuw gedefinieerde acties, die de 
status hadden van formele regels, en bestaande scripts.  
 
Deze dubbelzinnigheid leidde ertoe dat individuen de formele regels niet altijd konden 
plaatsen in een cognitief kader, aangezien de regels strijdig konden zijn met de scripts die 
al langer onderdeel waren van dit cognitief kader. Als zodanig bleken mensen de nieuwe 
regels te negeren, en zich vast te houden aan bestaande scripts. Bij een aantal banken was 
er sprake van dat er geen scripts beschikbaar waren ten behoeve van ‘verantwoording’ en 
de manier waarop daarmee omgegaan kon worden. Echter, bij deze banken zat er veel 
dubbelzinnigheid in de formele regels. Zo communiceerden de MT+ groepen dat formele, 
individuele prestatiemeting belangrijker moest worden. Echter, de systemen die dit 
moesten waarmaken, waren hiertoe niet in staat. De verwarring die dit opriep, deed veel 
afbreuk aan de beoogde veranderingen. Dubbelzinnigheid tussen formele procedures, 
regels en structuren leidde tot afwijzing van verandering buiten de MT+ groepen. Het 
proefschrift presenteert echter ook een geval waarin scripts werden aangepast en routines 
werden gevormd. Dit gebeurde door twee processen die gelijktijdig plaatsvonden: 
verspreiding en volharding. Verspreiding gaat over de manier waarop de MT+ groepen in 
staat waren om hun ervaringen te delen buiten het MT+; volharding gaat over de 
inbedding hiervan in de dagelijkse praktijk. Bepaalde Rabobanken bleken in staat om de 
MT+ niet alleen informatie te laten verspreiden via nieuwsbrieven en werk-overleggen, 
maar ook ervaringen, voortgekomen uit de episodes van betekenis geven. Behalve het 
verspreiden van informatie bleek ook het delen van ervaringen noodzakelijk om meerdere 
medewerkers door hun eigen proces van betekenis geven te laten gaan. Uiteindelijk bleek 
dat ‘routinisatie’ het gevolg was van de wijziging van scripts van mensen buiten de MT+ 
groepen. Het wijzigen van scripts ging wederom gepaard met episodes van betekenis 
geven. Het bleek dat betekenis geven een noodzakelijk onderdeel is van het adopteren van 
nieuwe routines.    
 
Institutionele verandering 
De literatuur stelt dat sets van regels en routines de componenten zijn van institutionele 
verandering. Bij de Rabobank zou men dus verwachten dat de nieuwe routines invloed 
gingen uitoefenen op bestaande instituties. Dit was ook zo, maar het proces dat tot deze 
invloed leidde, was hierbij van belang. Het bleek dat herhaalde actie niet de enige invloed 
was op institutionele verandering. Ook discoursen waren een belangrijke bron van 
institutionele verandering. Interactiescripts produceerden niet alleen acties, maar ze 
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produceerden ook teksten. Deze teksten (gesproken, geschreven en zelfs ingebed in 
symbolen en relikwieën) waren georganiseerd in discoursen. Zowel de acties als de 
discoursen voortkomende uit de interactiescripts droegen bij aan de twee dimensies die 
bepalen hoeveel invloed routines en scripts hebben op instituties: depersonalisatie en 
permanentie. Depersonalisatie houdt in dat bepaalde interacties niet afhankelijk zijn van 
de bron waaruit zij zijn ontstaan. Dit betekent dat de interactie blijft bestaan, maar ook dat 
men niet meer weet van wie of uit welke historie de interacties oorspronkelijk afkomstig 
waren. De interacties zijn verworden tot ‘de manier waarop het nu eenmaal gaat’, wat een 
typische eigenschap van instituties is. Permanentie gaat over de manier waarop de 
interacties als blijvend kunnen worden beschouwd, zonder dat mensen er constant bewust 
aandacht aan besteden. Met andere woorden, het gaat dus om de manier waarop de 
interacties zijn ingebed in het dagelijks gedrag en in de discours die in een sociale setting 
wordt gebruikt. Het bleek dat enkele lokale banken waar institutionele verandering kon 
worden waargenomen, ruimte hadden geboden voor de ontwikkeling van herhaalde 
interacties, alsook expliciete aandacht hadden besteed aan het opzetten van bankbrede 
discoursen. 
 
Toegevoegde waarde van de studie   
Op basis van het onderzoek beschrijft het proefschrift een aangepast theoretisch 
raamwerk, dat expliciet aandacht besteedt aan de rol van het individu bij het tot stand 
komen van institutionele (management accounting-) verandering. Het stelt dat de 
aanleiding van verandering de vorm kan aannemen van verschillende ongerelateerde 
signalen uit de omgeving die een vorm van ontologische onzekerheid veroorzaken. Door 
een sociaal proces, beschreven in het proefschrift, kan er een aandachtspunt of ‘issue’ 
worden gedefinieerd, dat mensen in staat stelt het te bespreken en er oplossingen voor te 
formuleren. Hiermee is een mogelijk antwoord verschaft op de vraag hoe instituties, die 
juist verandering belemmeren, toch kunnen veranderen. Het raamwerk maakt ook 
onderscheid tussen bewuste analyse van situationele informatie (betekenis geven) en het 
aanroepen van scripts, die patronen van gedrag omvatten die vrijwel onbewust kunnen 
worden uitgevoerd. Het proefschrift betoogt dat, op individueel niveau, instituties 
gerelateerd zijn aan scripts. Betekenis geven is dan het ter discussie stellen van gedrag dat 
eerder onbewust was.  
 
Voor het verklaren van institutionele verandering stelt het proefschrift dan ook een 
indeling voor op drie niveaus. Het eerste niveau is het niveau van het individu. Het stelt 
dat mensen vanuit de erkenning en de herkenning van cues een aandachtspunt definiëren. 
Vanuit het aandachtspunt kunnen er acties worden ondernomen via het script, of er dient 
een bewuste ontwikkeling van aangepaste acties tot stand te komen. Het proces waarop dit 
plaatsvindt kan individueel zijn, maar het zal vaak in de context van de sociale groep 
plaatsvinden. Vandaar het tweede niveau: het niveau van de sociale groep; dit is het 
niveau waarop het individu betekenis geeft aan de gebeurtenissen, waarbij hij wordt 
beïnvloed door andere individuen in zijn sociale groep. Vanuit deze processen kunnen er 
nieuwe scripts ontstaan; deze scripts zijn de individuele representatie van de routine. 
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Vervolgens kunnen deze routines en scripts invloed uitoefenen op bestaande instituties, 
mits zij voldoende permanent zijn en ontdaan zijn van relaties met de specifieke 
omstandigheden waarin de scripts en routines tot stand zijn gekomen. Dit vindt plaats op 
het derde niveau, het niveau van het collectief en instituties, waarop een individu nog 
maar weinig invloed denkt te hebben.  
 
Het onderzoek geeft aanknopingspunten voor een verdere bestudering van de rol van het 
individu in management accountingverandering. Uitgaande van de veronderstelling dat 
management accountingverandering bij kan dragen aan institutionele verandering, draagt 
het onderzoek bij aan kennis over de manier waarop de noodzaak tot verandering kan 
ontstaan binnen instituties. Het onderzoek draagt ook bij aan de kennis over de manier 
waarop individueel gedrag invloed heeft op instituties en vice versa. En tot slot draagt het 
bij aan kennis over de inbedding van management accountingveranderingen in gedrag, 
gewoonten en instituties.     
 
